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
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


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# THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

BY

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VOLUME XIX

OF

A HISTORY OF ALL NATIONS



LEA BROTHERS & COMPANY  
PHILADELPHIA AND NEW YORK

81047

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
1905

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BOOK I.

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THE SECOND EMPIRE.





# THE SECOND EMPIRE.

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE REACTION OF 1851 IN GERMANY.

THE revolution that shook Germany to its centre in 1848 was no whit more vehement in character than the reaction that followed immediately on its suppression. Everywhere this had free play, and everywhere it manifested the most fervent zeal to efface the last traces of the democratic spirit. The Confederate diet led the way in setting an example to the separate governments. In conformity with the compact between Austria and Prussia, its objects were, on the one hand, the abrogation of all constitutions and state laws not in harmony with the fundamental laws of the Confederation; and, on the other, the repression of the atheistic, antimonarchical, socialist, and communistic press. A so-called political committee was charged with the preparation of the requisite measures; and in conformity with its report the diet, on July 6 and 13, 1851, formulated general rules for the regulation of the press, and societies or clubs, leaving it to the several governments to mould these into a more definite and effective shape in accordance with their individual requirements. It further abrogated many popular rights commonly held inalienable, adding, on August 23, a provision that, in the event of any government declining or neglecting to act spontaneously, it could of itself intervene to enforce the requisite measures.

But few members of the Confederation, and these only the smaller ones, had either the will or the courage to resist being carried away on this high tide of reaction. Most loyal to the principles he had recognized before 1848, and since then carried out in his land, was Duke Ernest II. of Saxe-Coburg; and the governments of Saxe-Weimar, Brunswick, Meiningen, and Oldenburg also made honorable efforts to preserve whatever was of real value in those of 1848 in their new constitutions. All the more fervent, on

the other hand, was the reactionary zeal of the other members of the Confederation, while the desire for rest and the dread of turmoil inspired by the failure of 1848 conspired to paralyze the peoples' power of resistance. Saxony disgraced herself by expelling from their positions in the University of Leipsic the patriot professors M. Haupt, Otto Jahn, and Theodor Mommsen (Fig. 1). In Bavaria and Württemberg, and in Hanover, after the accession of the blind king, George V., on November 18, 1851, the reactionary nobility and bureaucracy held full sway. In Hesse-Cassel the infamous Hassenpflug, whom the people called in execration *Hessenfluch*, 'Hesse's curse,' acted as minister under a 'provisional constitution' of his own device, until, in 1856, the obstinate opposition of the chambers compelled his resignation. The minister von Dalwigk of Hesse-Darmstadt, who annulled communal autonomy, and surrendered the rights of the state to the Catholic church, alone surpassed him in baseness. The Mecklenburg reactionists won a complete victory. The liberal constitution was annulled; and the old hated feudal system, with its tripartite division of power (dating from 1765) between the sovereign, the nobility, and the city corporations, came again to lusty life, and has remained in force to this day. The results have been seen in an alarmingly great emigration and loss of population, due to the impediments put in the way of civic industries and the oppressive feudal burdens imposed on the peasantry and agricultural laborers.

In Prussia, too, the reactionary party opened a vigorous and obdurate campaign against the new constitution. By the end of 1851 it had moved for no fewer than seventeen modifications upon it, and received the assent of the government to the majority. Nor did Vienna fail in encouragements to the king to follow the example of Emperor Francis Joseph, and throw the whole constitution to the winds. The feudalists built their hopes of inciting the king to a breach of the constitution on his antipathy to all constitutionalism, — not diminished by his stormy experiences during the last years — and with this end in view secretly concocted a regular plan of campaign, their party-cry being "the unwritten constitution, older and more validly binding than the written one." First of all, the chambers were to be empowered to make a series of essential changes in the latter such as would make the necessity for its revision imperative. This would afford a pretext for converting it into a royal charter, in virtue of which the king would be empowered to

abrogate all unpalatable institutions and laws, and, in short, fulfil the wishes of the feudalists. Much as this cunningly devised plan was in harmony with the king's conservative predilections for the old estates, yet from regard to the oath he had taken to the constitution he did not feel himself free to enter into it unconditionally. Sorely against the will of its authors he sent a draught of the scheme through M. Niebuhr to Bunsen in London for his advice. His conscience, he assured his old friend, admitted of no juggling with his oath, yet, could his honor be kept untouched, he was of the full conviction that modern constitutionalism would be death to Prussia. Bunsen was shocked beyond measure to see how those around the king were seeking to inveigle him into their net. Still, his conviction that the scheme would go to pieces on his monarch's own conscientiousness and the faithful counsels of the Prince of Prussia did not deceive him. Frederick William rejected this underhand abrogation of the constitution. But all was done that could be done to assimilate the constitutional system to that of the old estates. The little band of liberals, with all their resolution, were unable to bear up against the overwhelming force of the assault on their principles; and their leaders, one after another, gave up the hopeless contest. Against the express terms of the constitution, a law was passed in January, 1852, permitting the institution of entails; the ordinance of 1850 regarding communes based on the principle of self-administration was repealed; the seigniorial police, as well as the circle and provincial diets (in which the nobles enjoyed an absolute ascendancy) were restored. Within the cabinet the landed nobility found their main supporter in their efforts for the restoration of prerogative in the minister of the interior, von Westphalen; the extreme church-party, in the minister of public instruction, von Raumer; while the bureaucracy was as if embodied in the president, Manteuffel. When their aims coincided, the three parties were as one in keeping watch on any opposition movement. And not only the administration, but the judiciary, became the partisan agents of the reaction.

None regarded the omnipotent power of the police with greater complaisance than the feudal party, so long as this was exerted in repressing inconvenient movements; but over itself it conceded it no power. When the president of police, von Hinkeldey — who, despite his habitual arbitrary procedure, had been of real service in organizing the police of the capital — presumed to initiate proceedings



against the reckless gambling in the Jockey Club, he was challenged to face the pistol of its best shot, Lieutenant von Rochow-Plessow, and killed on the spot. The immunity granted the duellist showed to what length aristocratic arrogance could go with impunity.

With the reaction particularism, or insistence on the prerogatives of the individual states as opposed to general interests, as was to be expected, again asserted itself in force. Even to refer to a unified Germany was accepted as a proof of an ill-affected mind. In lieu of this the dogma that all German history pointed to the development of the different races was proclaimed in all the dialects of the fatherland. Even the military convention entered into by some of the minor states with Prussia came to be regarded as a contravention of the constitution of the Confederation. Of all the creations of the revolutionary years, one only was now extant, — namely, the so-called national fleet of nineteen small vessels. The Danish war had shown the necessity for a strong German fleet. But who was to be its owner? After interminable disputes between Prussia, Austria, and the second-rate states, the Confederate diet finally, on April 2, 1852, decreed the dissolution of the German fleet. On the motion of the Oldenburg state-councillor, Hannibal Fischer, the ownerless national navy was brought to the hammer, Prussia becoming the purchaser of its most available vessels. This was the act by which the Confederate diet, amid the derisive laughter of all Germany, celebrated its rehabilitation.

This, the first occasion of trial, showed how little calculated the new-born *entente cordiale* of the two greater powers was to stand the proof. Nor was it long before this was to receive further illustration. When Prussia, moved by the unpropitious aspect of European politics, decided to give up the Union of 1850, and again enter the diet, it did this on the supposition, which it regarded as self-evident, that the conditions existent before 1848 should again be in force, — namely, that neither of the greater powers should introduce any measure without previous concert with the other, so that they might be in a position to control the diet by the subordination of the other members. But Prince Schwarzenberg had more ambitious views. Not content with recapturing the position for the diet which the old federal constitution had conferred on it, he was still more intent on utilizing the Revolution, which had brought Austria so near her fall, for the realization of far-reaching schemes. Prussia was to be brought into subjection to the behests of Vienna not less completely

than the smaller states had been to the common dictates of the two great powers. Should it prove contumacious, it was to be over-ridden by help of the other powers; for the hegemony of Prussia was such a bugbear to the smaller states, that of their own accord they gladly nestled under the wings of the double-eagle. The facts that these were little attracted by Prussia's stringency and tireless energy, and that many of their sons were already in the Austrian service, were of no little avail in furthering his designs. These found exposition in the superciliously free-and-easy manner which the presidial deputy, who was regularly an Austrian, assumed towards his colleagues, even in contravention of the simple rules of business propriety.

So long as von Rochow was Prussia's representative at Frankfort, he submitted without remonstrance to Austrian ascendancy. But a change came with Bismarck's entrance on the scene. Little as he came in the character of Austria's antagonist, and anxious as he was to conceal minor difficulties between the two powers from




FIG. 1.—Theodor Mommsen.

fear of imperilling their common influence, he soon saw himself compelled, by the determination shown to overrule Prussia, to an energetic war of defence. He found in the diet no appreciation of Germany's common interests, and of the consequent necessity for harmonious co-operation and due subordination. The annoyances in regard to points of punctilio and other matters of trifling import, he might have been well content to ignore; but when it came to questions affecting Prussia's honor and vital interests,—to the question, in short, whether she was the vassal of Austria,—he yielded not a hand-breadth. Thus in entering his protest against the raising of money for the maintenance of the fleet, not by the agreed-on contributions of the several states, but by anticipating a loan and borrowing from Rothschild, he converted an undignified haggling over comparatively petty sums into a question of the fun-

damental rights and powers of the Confederation; and brought still more into relief the overbearing arrogance of the Austrian president, when he declared the diet to be competent to deal with all questions which *he* declared within its powers. The attempt to make the committee intrusted with the editing and publishing of the minutes a mere tool of Austria, he resisted so energetically that it had to be forthwith abandoned. What the majority of the diet would have liked best would have been to prevent Prussia from withdrawing her eastern provinces from the Confederation, because such a withdrawal was essential to her maintaining her position as an independent great power.

So long as Count Thun was president of the chamber the relations were at any rate endurable. Under his successor, the 'pompous and unreliable' von Prokesch-Osten, they became sensibly worse. From that moment Bismarck assumed a firmer attitude. Already the conviction began to dawn on him that the quarrel must ultimately be decided by the sword. These experiences irrevocably determined his views of German relations. Now, as ever, he held that a close and honorable union of Austria and Prussia, on terms of strict equality, was the situation most promising of benefit for the whole land; but he held not less firmly that, if the indispensable conditions of equality were not conceded, Prussia had nothing for it but to maintain the fight against Austrian tendencies, and to maintain and fortify her position in the Confederation.

Far more important than the petty skirmishes at Frankfort were the enlargement and extension of the Prussian Customs-Union (*Zollverein*), which, unless renewed, was to have terminated with the close of 1853. Schwarzenberg's ambitious scheme, ably seconded by Baron von Bruck (Fig. 2), the Austrian minister of commerce, was to draw this into the sphere of Austria's power. Prussia, however, steadily refused to consider the reconstruction of the union on the basis of the admission of Austria, and secretly won over the states of the Hanoverian Customs-Union (*Steuerverein*) (September 7, 1851), to agree to unite with the Prussian union from January, 1854. Some of the second-rate states — notably Bavaria and Saxony — threatened to form a new Zollverein with Austria, with or without the participation of Prussia; but the prompt reorganization of the old Zollverein, on November 16, 1852, by the latter power, in conjunction with Brunswick, the Thuringian states, and the states of the former *Steuerverein*, coupled with the threat of exclusion in case



of contumacy, brought the recusants to their senses. Commercial war with Prussia would have meant industrial ruin, especially in Saxony. On April 4, 1853, the Zollverein was renewed for a period of twelve years, excluding Austria, but including all the other Ger-



FIG. 2. — Baron von Bruck. From the steel engraving by A. Weger.

man states, thus embracing an area of 197,000 square miles and a population of nearly 33,000,000.

About the same time Prussia took another step in her upward career, rendered doubly important by this auspicious compact. She planted her foot on the North Sea coast, from which she had been



shut off by the surrender of East Friesland. On July 20, 1853, she acquired from Oldenburg — not without protest from Hanover — a small strip of land on the Bay of Jade as a site for a naval harbor.

Schwarzenberg was not spared to see this denouement. He died of an apoplectic stroke, April 4, 1852.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECOND EMPIRE, AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

THE *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, was the *terminus a quo* for a new departure in the life of the nations. That from this date a new empire was in process of evolution even a purblind man could see. The prince-president took up his abode in the Tuileries, and the imperial eagle took the place of the Gallic cock on the standards of France. The French nation was, as the prince-president assured it on the promulgation of the constitution on January 14, 1852, nothing but the France rejuvenated by the Revolution of 1792, and organized by the Emperor Napoleon. For such a land monarchy was a necessity; it was only logical that the form should adjust itself to fact. The Revolution of February had erred in dreaming that it could create a republic under the centralization that had its root in the first empire.

The four months intervening till the meeting of the legislative body, during which the president wielded the dictatorship, were utilized to abrogate, one after another, the institutions which were the guaranties for freedom. The National Guard was reduced in numbers, and placed under the orders of the civil authorities, and deprived of the right of choosing its officers. The university professors lost their security of tenure; the prefects, under the supervision of the council of state, ruled with absolute authority; the press was made subject to the arbitrary will of the executive. Persigny (Fig. 3), minister of the interior, in a circular regarding the electing of members of the legislative body — while declaring the time for intrigues and political corruption past — instructed the electors that in order to insure harmony among the departments of state, it was essential that they should place the stamp of their approval only on the candidates enjoying the confidence of the government.

This instruction came so opportunely, and was so fully in accord with the popular antipathy to the republic, that the elections resulted



FIG. 3. — Vicomte de Persigny. From a photograph.

in a simple confirmation of the plébiscite of December 20. The official candidates were all but unanimously elected. In his address of welcome to the legislative body, the president assured it that if he had really cherished the purpose ascribed to him of restoring the empire, he had had ample opportunities for realizing it, and by anticipation cast the responsibility on the parties hostile to him for any possible change in the form of government he might see himself compelled by their machinations to make in the future. "Let us maintain the republic," he concluded; "it threatens no one, and can assure peace to all the world."

This so-called legislative body was, indeed, but a puppet that moved only as its strings were pulled. It had neither the power of initiation, nor of interpellation, of complaint, petition, nor inquiry into the finances; and of its proceedings, nothing beyond the bare official report could be published. Its tribune was carried away, and it could communicate with the ministers only through the government commissary. Over the sittings of the senate the constitution cast an impenetrable veil. All knew its special function was to guard against any violation of the constitution, but no one could say whether it ever had an opportunity for exercising this power. On June 28 the prince closed its sittings with the assurance that the trial made of a constitution of pure French origin showed that the nation possessed all the conditions for a strong, free government. Nevertheless, the confiscation of the immense wealth of the late royal family made the worst impression. Morny, Magne, Fould, and Rouher, retired from the ministry.

But the chase after an imperial crown was not given up. The distribution of the eagles to the army, on May 10, had been fixed on for the proclamation of the empire; but Louis was too secure of the popular voice to be willing to receive it from praetorians. He knew that the bourgeois and peasant classes looked to a despotism to shield them from a red republic, and that their desire was not for glory, but for peace and rest. And the prince, in his triumphal progresses through the land, was never weary of promising them these. At Bordeaux, on October 9, he declared, "Mistrustful persons say to themselves that the empire is war. I say that the empire is peace, because France wishes peace, and when France is contented the world is at ease." His return to Paris was celebrated with imperial honors, and the demonstrations generally were so unequivocal that he felt himself secure in yielding to the popular call. On November 4



the senate and legislative chamber decreed to refer to a plébiscite the question whether the people willed the restoration of the imperial dignity in the person of Louis Napoleon with reversion to his descendants. The vote gave 7,824,129 yeas; 253,149 nays.

The empire, for which literature, art, and politics had for thirty years being preparing the way, was established, and the dream of Strasburg and Boulogne realized. Since the king of Rome had, in 1815, been recognized by the chambers as occupant of the throne, the new emperor assumed the title of Napoleon III. (PLATE I.) The civil list—irrespective of the 3,000,000 francs yielded by the state forests—was fixed at 25,000,000 francs, as it had been for the first Napoleon. The generals Saint-Arnaud, Magnan, and Castellane were, in recognition of their services in December, 1851, created marshals. The constitution suffered two serious limitations: first, the legislative body was required in future to vote the budget as a whole, without having the power of rejecting individual items; second, the emperor received absolute authority to conclude commercial treaties without the concurrence of the legislature. A new municipal law reduced the communal administrations to still closer dependence on government. To such as complained that freedom had not been granted freer play, the emperor responded, "that freedom never helped to found an enduring political structure; she only crowned it when time had confirmed it." In order to give Europe tangible evidence of the peaceful disposition of the new empire, the standing army, already reduced by 30,000 men, was further depleted of 20,000.

The crowned heads of Europe regarded the accession of this new sovereign to their number with mingled dismay and perplexity. Visions of new Jénas and Austerlitzes flitted before royal eyes, but were at length put to rest by the pacific assurances of the emperor. The lesser potentates, then the monarchs of Prussia, Austria, and England, received him into fellowship with the customary greetings. Nicholas of Russia, however, refused to address the new emperor by the usual style of "My Cousin and Brother," gratifying his spleen by using the less honorable title, "My Friend." The slight was remembered; and the semi-hostile attitude of Russia, which the other European states refused to imitate, had no slight influence in producing the state of isolation which proved so disadvantageous to that country a little later in the Crimean war. Public sentiment in England, at first unduly alarmed lest Napoleon might imitate the ag-



PLATE I.



Emperor Napoleon III.

From the copper-plate engraving by Metzmacher, 1859.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 30.*

PLATE II.



Empress Eugénie.

From the portrait by F. X. Winterhalter (1806-1873).

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 31.*

gressions of his great uncle, was quieted by the emperor's demeanor and the military preparations of the English government.

But the wall of separation between Louis Napoleon and the old ruling houses was to be brought more prominently into view when he looked around for a wife to perpetuate his dynasty. Thrice rejected on various pretexts, on January 22, 1853, he suddenly announced to the senate his approaching nuptials with a young Spaniard, Eugénie de Montijo (PLATE II.), Countess of Téba, and on her mother's side of the Scottish house of Kirkpatrick. This marriage was accepted, both in and out of France, as a pledge of peace; and this conviction the emperor deepened by opening a great agricultural and industrial World Exposition in Paris, May 1, 1853.

This was the honeymoon, not for the emperor alone, but for the whole nation. But it was soon sped. Neither Napoleon's character nor position permitted him freedom of will. He was “the Man of Destiny,” and as heir to his great uncle regarded revenge for 1814 and 1815 as a sacred legacy bequeathed by him, and therefore held himself called on by a higher power to transform the map of Europe. It was first necessary, however, that he find an opportunity to penetrate by force the veil of distrust which separated him from the general current of European politics; and this Russia supplied him.

The haughty czar, Nicholas I., despising the weakness of the states shaken or overturned by the revolution of 1848, felt that the time was now arrived to extend the sway of ‘Holy Russia’ over the Islam-cursed lands that separated her from the Mediterranean. He wanted only the co-operation or neutrality of England, and a pretext. The latter was supplied by the strife between the Greek and Latin churches in Palestine over the Holy Places. So embittered was the acrimony between Christ's professed disciples here, that but for the presence of Turkish policemen the Saviour's grave would have been stained with their blood. The subjects of contention were certain claims in connection with the Holy Places, of themselves of very minor importance,—as, which church should have the keeping of the key of the great gate of the Holy Sepulchre (Fig. 4), and the like. Such weight, however, was attached to them in the East that it came to be a question of the political influence of France as defender of the Latin church, and Russia as champion of the Greek. The protectorate claimed by the former dates back to the Crusades, and is further supported by the ‘Capitulations’ extorted from the sultan by Louis XIV., and on a firman of 1757 specifying the con-



cessions granted to the Latins, confirmed by the Treaty of Paris in 1802. Russia maintained the claims of the Greek church on the basis of the peace of Kutchuk-Kainardji of 1774. In 1850, when




FIG. 4. — The Holy Sepulchre, under the dome of the Church of the Sepulchre at Jerusalem.

France, backed by Austria and other Catholic powers, made earnest representations to the Porte in favor of the Latins, the Porte's disposition to enter on the question aroused the cabinet of St. Petersburg, which insisted on the maintenance of the *status quo*, and

threatened in case of non-compliance the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Turkey. Cowed by the menaces, now of the one power, now of the other, the Porte let contradictory decisions be extorted from it. This served only to make confusion worse confounded.

Meanwhile the political exigency which we have seen stimulated Louis Napoleon to urge the question of the Holy Places with still greater energy. The effect was soon visible in Constantinople. Reshid Pasha, foreign minister, gave place to Fuad Effendi, a decided



FIG. 5. — Drouyn de l'Huys. From the lithograph by Coëdes.

partisan of France; and the French ambassador, Lavalette, to the intense indignation of the Greeks, carried through the surrender of the key of the great portal to the Latins along with other concessions.

Napoleon's foreign minister, Drouyn de l'Huys (Fig. 5), saw quite clearly that Nicholas, in the whole matter, had something in view very different from a key or a silver star, — the annihilation, in short, of the Turkish Empire in Europe. In order, therefore, to deprive him of his pretext of solicitude for orthodox interests, and expose his true intent to the light, de l'Huys caused it to be intimated to St. Petersburg that France no longer insisted obstinately on the




claims she had shown to be valid. His discernment was justified. The advent to power of the Aberdeen coalition ministry, in December, 1852, which was held to be a symptom of growing coolness between the western powers, emboldened the czar to lift the mask. Could he only win over England to his side the die was cast for Turkey. But he would intrust the game to no hand but his own. In order to give to his communications the character of a private conversation, he induced the Grand Princess Helena to invite the English ambassador, Sir George Hamilton-Seymour, with his lady, to her house, where he also appeared. "Never," said he in an easy unconstrained tone, "was it more essential that England and Russia should be on the best of terms than now. When we are agreed I am quite unconcerned about the west of Europe; it is immaterial to me what the others may do or think. As regards Turkey, that is quite a different question; that country is in a very critical state, and may be the cause of much trouble." He wished to break off here, but the astute diplomat knew how to lead him on still further. "Turkey," he continued, "threatens to collapse; that will be a great misfortune, and it is of the last importance that England and Russia should come to a full understanding beforehand. We have a very sick man on our hands; it were a great misfortune for us if he should slip away from us before all needful provisions were made." He made similar suggestions to the Austrian ambassador. In a second interview with Seymour, on January 14, 1853, he repeated and expanded his suggestions, intimating that he might find it necessary to occupy Constantinople as a temporary holder or depositary. He expected that England would let herself be seduced by the prospect held out to her of part of the spoils, — namely, Egypt and Crete.

Curiously enough the authorities in London were at first in no way clear in regard to the purport of these communications. Lord John Russell, in his reply to the czar, contented himself with congratulating him on his wise and unselfish policy, so beneficent for Europe, and with expressing the wish that the difficulties with the Porte might be adjusted by an understanding among the great powers. Not till a third interview did Seymour (Fig. 6) fully satisfy himself that a ruler, who pertinaciously insisted on the impending break-up of a neighboring empire, had made up his mind no longer to wait for such a catastrophe, but to precipitate it. He set himself, therefore, to draw from the czar what his real designs were. With unsophisticated artlessness the monarch explained that

these contemplated no permanent occupation of Constantinople by Russia, but just as little by any other power; further, that he would never consent to the reconstruction of a Byzantine empire, nor to such an aggrandizement of Greece as would make her a powerful state, nor to the cutting-up of Turkey into small republics which would be merely places of harbor for revolutionaries; rather would he fight as long as a man and a musket was left to him. He then unfolded a cut-and-dried scheme of division. A memorandum of Count Nesselrode, Russian foreign minister, delivered to the British government March 7, while repeating the invitation to England to join with Russia, had the obvious purpose of reducing the czar's confidences (of which he felt he had been too free) to the simple expression of a desire for an interchange of views, and concluded with urging that the whole matter should be a secret confined to the two sovereigns. But Lord Clarendon, who had succeeded to the charge of the foreign office, maintained the reserved attitude of his predecessor. "England," he declared, "desired no augmentation of territory and could enter into no arrangement by which she might derive advantages of this nature, and could be no party to an engagement that must be kept secret from the other powers." Nevertheless, Nicholas, in an interview with Seymour on April 18, brought the conversation back to the subject of the Holy Places, in regard to which, he declared, he had been grievously outraged by the sultan, notwithstanding which he had put neither a single ship nor a solitary battalion in motion. "But," he added, "I am not a man to be trifled with; and if the Turk will not listen to reason, he will have to be taught by force."

Thus ended these remarkable conferences, of which the world heard nothing for a year. Not till provoked by the bold assertions of the "St. Petersburg Journal" did the English cabinet expose the



*S. H. Seymour.*

FIG. 6.— Sir George Hamilton-Seymour.  
From a photograph.

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


FIG. 7. — Prince Menshikov.

documents that enabled the courts of Berlin and Vienna to appreciate the degree of respect with which the czar had allowed himself to speak of them.

But already portentous storm-clouds were gathering over Turkey.



At the same moment that Nicholas was disclaiming to the English government all designs hostile to Turkey, he was arming his vanguard under General Dannenberg for an advance into Moldavia, and equipping his Black Sea fleet for a sally from the harbor of Sebastopol. Prince Menshikoff (Fig. 7), after holding an ostentatious review of the forces prepared to move, took ship with a great following, as envoy extraordinary, for Constantinople. To the representatives of the western powers, Nesselrode represented Menshikoff's mission as one of mediation. In reality it was meant to exhibit the czar to those akin to him by race or religion in the Turk's dominions as their one true defender. The demands which the prince was instructed to make were: the formal announcement of the firman of May 30, 1852; the dismissal of Fuad Effendi from the foreign ministry; the emission of a firman declaring the keys of the church of Bethlehem the rightful property of the Greeks; the revocation of the concessions to the Latins; a guaranty for the maintenance of the rights of the Orthodox church in the future; and, finally, the conclusion of a separate treaty conceding these claims. In case the sultan should require support against the western powers, and especially against France, he was empowered to promise him a secret league of defence. If these demands were rejected or evaded, he was to give the Porte three days for reflection, and then with the whole embassy leave Constantinople.

On March 2 Prince Menshikoff betook himself to the Sublime Porte, in order to pay his respects to the Grand Vizier, Mehemet Ali (Fig. 8). Of Fuad Effendi (Fig. 9), who stood ready to receive him, he took not the slightest notice, but wrote next morning to the Grand Vizier that it was impossible for him to hold intercourse with a guileful minister. Fuad, in view of the deadly peril impending over Turkey, offered himself up as a victim, and Rifaat Pasha undertook the foreign office in his stead. This was a victory — though a small one — for Russia, and encouraged Menshikoff in his conviction that the Porte must surrender at discretion. The moment was well-chosen. Both the western powers were represented by temporary proxies. Napoleon had recalled Lavalette for having gone too far in the question of the Holy Places; and Sir Stratford Canning — appointed by Palmerston as door-ward of the Bosphorus, and from his experience and personal character possessing an extraordinary influence with the Porte — was on long leave of absence in order to evidence the resolve of his government to keep itself from being





FIG. 8. — Mehemet Ali Pasha.

mixed up in the impending complications. In this emergency the English proxy, Colonel Rose, took it upon himself to summon the English squadron lying at Malta into the Archipelago; but the British ministry, in continued dependence on the good faith of Nicholas's pacific assurances, sent a counter-order to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

On March 22 it declared to the French ambassador that, till it had evidence to the contrary, it held itself bound to believe that Menshikoff's mission had no threatening import for the independence or integrity of Turkey. It restricted itself, therefore, to hastening the return of Canning (Fig. 10) (now Lord Redcliffe) to his post. The French government, also, sent an ambassador in the person of



FIG. 9. — Fuad Pasha. From a photograph.

Lacours to Constantinople, and ordered its Mediterranean fleet to sail to Salamis.

For fourteen days Menshikoff kept himself shut up in complete silence. At length, on March 16, he disclosed to Rifaat Pasha the real object of his mission. The Turkish minister, on hearing his demands, was struck dumb with dismay; but the seal of absolute silence sought to be imposed on his lips he flatly refused to respect. The arrival of the two western ministers inspired the Porte with fresh courage. Still, with the view of doing something to conciliate



FIG. 10. — Marble statue of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.  
By J. E. Boehm. In Westminster Abbey.

its formidable foe, two new firmans were issued in conformity with Russia's demands in regard to the Holy Places. But this did not satisfy the main object of Menshikoff's mission. This, as he disclosed for the first time on April 19, was the conclusion of a secret treaty by which the czar should be recognized as guardian of the sultan's Christian subjects, and immediately thereupon he produced a ready-prepared draft of the treaty, with the intimation that if it were not accepted by May 10 he would leave Constantinople. This demand, also, the Porte refused; but invited the prince, with the assurance of its kindest consideration for its Christian subjects, to a personal interview with Rifaat. The prince, instead of accepting this, forced his way into the presence of the sultan, but was coldly referred by him to his







PLATE III.



Emperor Nicholas I. of Russia.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 41.*

minister. This new insult to the Porte had the result of causing the dismissal of the too pliable Rifaat and his colleagues; whereupon Reshid Pasha, the rival of Mehemet Ali, became the soul of the new ministry. Turkey now declined to sign even the note with which Russia ultimately professed herself ready to be contented as a substitute for a treaty. On May 20, therefore, Menshikoff declared his mission at an end, and the day after embarked with all the personnel of the embassy, rancor in his heart over his defeat, and thirsting for revenge.

In London Russia's course produced a revulsion in feeling. The conviction that Turkey's integrity, so essential for keeping open the route to India, was threatened, startled the government from its optimistic dream. On May 28 Lords Clarendon and Russell announced in parliament the resolution of the crown to afford, in case of need, armed aid to Turkey. With correct prescience of what was impending, the troops were collected in a camp at Aldershot, and a great naval review was held at Spithead. Nevertheless, in order to deprive Russia of every pretext, the Porte, on the advice of the western powers, in a firman of June 4, solemnly confirmed all the privileges promised to the Greek and Latin Christians.

Nicholas (PLATE III.) seemed perplexed at the miscarriage of his policy. The most discreet among his advisers, and especially Nesselrode, counselled moderation. Thus urged, he adopted what seemed to him a middle course between peace and war. He caused the designed occupation of the Danubian principalities by way of pledge to be notified to Constantinople, and accompanied this with a demand that Reshid Pasha should forthwith sign Menshikoff's note without modification, and transmit it to Odessa. The only effect of this was that, under orders, the French and English fleets dropped anchor in Besika Bay, at the entrance of the Dardanelles. This concert of the western powers, held by Nicholas to be impossible, was not his only disillusion. The new Austrian minister, Count Buol, refused Russia's offers of alliance, and urged pacific views upon St. Petersburg. In vain. On June 26, the czar, in a manifesto to his people, announced the immediate occupation of the principalities; and on July 3, in conformity with an order emanating directly from himself, and without Nesselrode's knowledge, the Russians crossed the Pruth. The commander-in-chief, Prince Gortchakoff, on the exit of the two hospodars, made himself dictator of the principalities.

Even this act of violence the Porte, counselled by Lord Redcliffe,

in order to set its moderation in the clearest light, did not accept as a declaration of war. This, with the insufficiently defined position of parties, led to a maelstrom of inconsistent negotiations by the separate powers. Although Napoleon's indecision was enhanced by the unconcealed aversion of the English court to his person, he resisted the endeavors of the Russian czar to win him to his side. A sort of informal conference of the four powers was held at Vienna; and in the general earnest desire for peace this resulted in a note of July 31, offering the czar large concessions. Nicholas declared himself satisfied with these, but only on the express condition that the Porte should assent to them without any modification. Already diplomacy was jubilant over its successful work; peace seemed assured, and the prices of stock rose in the bourses. Looking with clearer eyes than his government, Lord Redcliffe saw that such a recognition of the czar's protectorate over twelve million subjects of the sultan was making him the virtual ruler of Turkey. Meanwhile the din of arms and the eager preparations for impending struggle roused the warlike spirit of the Turks, while the astute Reshid Pasha (Fig. 11) calculated that, come what might, Europe could never abandon Turkey. The divan refused the unconditional acceptance of the note. The western powers desisted from their work of mediation, and in England the feeling became daily more bellicose. It was like the infusion of fresh, warm blood into veins dried up during the long years of peace; and the return of the peace deputation from St. Petersburg, enchanted with their reception, was unavailing to cool it. Prince Albert had to suffer severely under charges, widely disseminated, that he was using his position to favor foreign dynasties and to the prejudice of England; most unjustly, for no one looked at affairs with so little bias or saw deeper into their actual condition than he. An autograph letter of the czar to the queen, appealing with singular want of tact from the false policy of her ministers to her wisdom, was formally returned. Nor was he more happy in his answer to a pacific note of Louis Napoleon, in which he tauntingly assured the latter that the French would not find the Russians of 1854 less patriotic than their fathers of Moscow in 1812. Napoleon began more and more to familiarize himself with the thought of war. Under his influence, the representatives of the four powers met at Vienna, and issued thence, on December 5, a protocol declaring that the integrity of Turkey, as defined by treaties, was a condition indispensable for the maintenance of the European



equilibrium, and that the impending war could not be allowed in any way to infringe it.

This declaration had less importance as guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey than as bearing the subscriptions of Prussia and



FIG. 11. — Reshid Pasha.

Austria, and so constituting the germ of a quadruple alliance to the isolation of Russia.

Meantime affairs had taken an entirely new turn in Constantinople. A vehement petition of the Softas (students of the Koran) demanded war in the name of the Prophet. On October 8 the Turk-






FIG. 12. — Omer Pasha.

ish generalissimo, Omer Pasha (Fig. 12), demanded from Prince Gortchakoff the evacuation of Turkish soil within fourteen days : while the Anglo-French fleet, on the call of the sultan, passed through the Dardanelles, and cast anchor in the Bosphorus. The first shot was fired on the 25th, when a Russian flotilla off Galatz suffered some loss from the fire of the Turkish batteries. This was followed, on November 4, by the Porte's declaration of war. Omer Pasha at once manifested the qualities of an able strategist. By rapid movements and skilful choice of positions, he succeeded, with little actual fighting, in inspiring his own troops, and discouraging the hitherto confident Russians. It became manifest that the Russian Colossus — compelled at once to keep his eye on the Poles and the Baltic, and wage war in Asia — had not a force at his disposal adequate to secure the long line of the Danube.

Of the English ministers, Palmerston was the most convinced that war was inevitable, and that the sooner it began the better. Lord Aberdeen, on the other hand, clung to the hope of peace. But now there came an incident that startled him from his illusive dream. On November 30 a Turkish squadron of twelve vessels was assailed in the roadstead of Sinope by Admiral Nakhimoff, and in a few hours annihilated. In acting as he did, the Russian admiral was entirely within his rights ; but the execution of the deed almost under the eyes of the English and French fleets seemed little else than a defiance. In England it called forth a cry at once of shame and indignation ; and the peaceful accents of Cobden and Bright — on which the czar had so much reckoned — were drowned in the charges of cowardice and treachery hurled against the ministers. On January 3, 1854, the combined fleets entered the Black Sea ; and the Russian admiral was notified that every warship that committed an act of hostility upon Turkish vessels or harbors would be sent to the bottom. It was at this juncture that the English government published Seymour's famous interviews with the czar. On March 12, 1854, the western powers concluded a defensive treaty with the Sublime Porte, and on the 27th declared war against Russia. On April 10 a compact was entered into between them in London, "to re-establish peace between Russia and the Sublime Porte on sure and lasting grounds, and to guard against the return of complications that had threatened even to disturb the general peace." The compact was left open to be subscribed by other powers, among whom Sweden was confidently counted on through the alluring bait of Finland.

Prussia observed in general a neutrality as strict as the vacillating character of King Frederick William would permit. Austria, on the contrary, influenced by French diplomacy, and exasperated by the boundless arrogance of Count Orloff, Russia's special envoy to Vienna, inclined to the side of the western powers, though her financial straits made her proceed with caution. This 'ingratitude' was not forgotten by Russia in later years. France, England, and Austria signed a protocol at Vienna, on April 9, to which Prussia soon assented, which contained the following four provisions: the integrity of Turkey, and the evacuation of the principalities; security for the civil and religious rights of Christians by all means consistent with the sultan's independence; the discovery of guaranties for the maintenance of the European equilibrium; a mutual pledge by each of the four powers to be no party to negotiations with Russia without previous consultation with its colleagues. Later, the German Confederation also acceded to this compact.

Thus the situation now stood: the west of Europe at open war with Russia, with the central states wavering between neutrality and mediation. Of any combination of the conservative powers against Napoleon, there was no longer any thought. King Leopold of Belgium led the way in setting himself in better personal relations with the 'upstart potentate.'

War was upon the nations — remarkable for the fact that it found not one of the combatants prepared for it. Russia, with her immense distances, had to contend against the want of means of transport, especially of railroads. The western powers had relied on their navies for this; yet even so late as January, 1854, the available French troops were put down at only 6000, the English at 3000. An adequately effective land army England did not, indeed, possess; but even in France nothing was in readiness when the necessity was seen for raising the expeditionary army to 30,000 French and 18,000 English. The means of transport were insufficient, and the disorder prevailing at the embarkations may be characterized as indescribable. On March 31 the first French landed in the peninsula of Gallipoli, but as late as May 26 Saint-Arnaud wrote thence to the emperor: "We have teams for only twenty-six cannon, and matters are still worse in regard to supplies. It is impossible to carry on war without bread, shoes, cooking-utensils, and canteens. This comes from the hurry in which everything had to be done: the men were embarked on steamships; the provisions, horses, and other supplies on



sailing vessels." The English command-in-chief was intrusted to Lord Raglan (Fig. 13), whose missing arm was a memento that he had stood at Waterloo against the first Napoleon. At Constantinople the French ambassador, Baraguay d'Hilliers, had fallen out with Lord Redcliffe, and insisted on the sultan's dismissal of his ministers, who were too amenable to British influence; and scarcely had Saint-Arnaud's arrival stilled this dispute, when he himself stirred up a fresh one by his claim to the command not only of the Turkish but of the English forces.

A rising in Albania, doubtless instigated by Russia, and openly supported by Greece, aggravated the complications, until the occupation of the Piræus, after repeated warnings, by a French division under General Forey, compelled King Otho to desist.

Hostilities were initiated by the English bombardment of Odessa, which effected nothing beyond the destruction of some merchants' property. A council of war was held by the three chief commanders at Varna. As Paskevitch (again in command of

the army of the Danube) had become master of the northern Dobrudja, and thereby caused Omer Pasha's withdrawal to Shumla, the council determined to check Paskevitch's anticipated advance on Constantinople, form a junction with Omer, and deliver battle. But Saint-Arnaud (Fig. 14) soon convinced himself that his force was in no case to undertake a campaign till the announcement of approaching re-enforcements that would raise his strength to 60,000 decided him to transfer his base to Varna, where, in July, 30,000 French and 20,000 English stood together in array.




FIG. 13. — Lord Raglan.



For their having had time to concentrate their strength at this point, the western powers had to thank the entirely unexpected resistance made by the garrison of Silistria, under the leadership of three English officers, to its Russian assailants. Paskevitch himself was wounded, General Schilder killed, as was the gallant commandant of the fortress, Moosa Pasha. On June 22, before the allies advanced, the Russians recrossed the Danube. The cause was not



FIG. 14. — Marshal Saint-Arnaud.

a military, but a political one — namely, the threatening attitude assumed by Austria. On June 3 her demand, supported by Prussia, for the evacuation of the principalities was despatched to St. Petersburg; on the 14th, Austria — without consultation with Prussia — concluded a treaty with the Porte, by which she bound herself to bring about the evacuation of the principalities, if need were by force of arms, and to enter into no engagement with Russia which had not as its basis the recognition of the sovereign rights

of the sultan and the integrity of his empire. At the same time she contracted a loan of 400,000,000 florins. Russia anew declared herself ready to accept the first three points of the Vienna protocol of April 9, but passed over the fourth in silence — that, namely, requiring guaranties for the closer association of Turkey with the European equilibrium. This defective assent the western powers promptly declared insufficient. Notwithstanding this, Austria took another step nearer to them, by declaring her adoption of the principles agreed on

between France and England, as essential to the restoration of peace. These were : 1, abrogation of the Russian protectorate of the principalities, and the substitution therefor of a common guaranty of the great powers ; 2, the clearing the mouths of the Danube of all impediments to navigation ; 3, revision of the Straits compact of 1841 ; 4, Russia's renunciation of all claims to protectorate of the subjects of the Porte, in lieu of which the other four powers would unite in efforts to secure the rights of Christians without infringing on the dignity or independence of the sultan.

These four points constituted henceforth the standard, as it were, around which European policy with all its kaleidoscopic mutations always eventually rallied. Austria transmitted them to St. Petersburg ; but received for answer Nesselrode's assurance that he could not even consider them, adding that should Russia ever see herself compelled to such a cancellation of all treaties, this, so far from securing a lasting peace, would only deliver over Europe to endless entanglements. On August 20 Austria entered the principalities ; whereupon the Russians, without any show of resistance, recrossed the Pruth.

This act of Austria, though a blow aimed at Russia, had this advantage for the latter state, that it enabled her to direct her undivided strength against the attack in the south. Napoleon's projected attempt to rouse Poland was frustrated by Palmerston's insuperable objections. England's objects in the war, he explained, were restricted to two, — the breaking up of Russian influence in Turkey, and the annihilation of her Black Sea fleet. It was, however, high time for all parties that something should be done. To the czar's vexation over the difficulties he encountered, there were now superadded the first symptoms of bodily ailments of which he was never to recover, while among his advisers there prevailed the same petty jealousies that divided his generals in the camp. The confidence of his people, even of his most loyal adherents, began to waver amid so many miscarriages. Among the many plans discussed by the allied generals at Varna, they at last united on that pressed by England, — namely, a landing in the Crimea, and the capture of Sebastopol. But suddenly a new enemy, more formidable than the Russians, appeared in their camp. Cholera broke out : 6000 French died of sickness during a fruitless expedition into the Dobrudja. The fleet, too, became infected. The most needful appliances were wanting, — even medicines and hospital necessities. A conflagration

burst forth at Varna, on August 14, which destroyed the stores collected there, and from which the powder-magazine was with difficulty saved.

The operations of the Anglo-French fleet in the Baltic, under Admiral Charles Napier (Fig. 15), effected nothing of note.

At length the allied host of 24,250 French, 21,500 English, and 6000 Turks, with abundant supply of war-material, was in a condition to set sail from Varna. On September 14 it touched land in



FIG. 15. — Admiral Charles Napier.

the Crimea, at a dilapidated Genoese fort, not far from Eupatoria, and by the 18th the disembarkation was completed (PLATE IV.). The day after, the advance was begun on Sebastopol, a naval stronghold founded in 1784 by Catharine II. to command the Black Sea, of whose speedy fall no one had a doubt.

Russia's total force amounted to 700,000 men; but on this was imposed the task of defending a frontier-line of enormous length, stretching from the White Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia to the Caspian. In the Crimea there were in all only 51,000 soldiers; and of



Kamchli.  
Left wing of the English.





PLATE IV



From the painting by G. H. Mont.

Disembarkation of the French and English troops in the Crimea, on September 14, 1854.

From the painting by G. H. Mont, on the basis of materials supplied by the French General Staff.

History of the Crimean War, Vol. I, p. 100.

these 38,000, with at most 18,000 to 19,000 sailors and marines, stood at Prince Menshikoff's disposal for the defence of Sebastopol and its outskirts. He awaited his assailants on the heights rising behind the little stream Alma, in which position he thought to maintain himself till the arrival of re-enforcements should enable him to hurl the enemy into the sea. A sharp encounter resulted on the 20th. Menshikoff was flanked, and retired, but in good order. He expected that the victors would follow close upon his heels, and that he would see Sebastopol attempted by storm on its north side. This, however, the exhausted condition of the allies and their deficiency in cavalry combined to forbid. Besides, the assault promised success only through the co-operation of the fleet; and the admirals refused to expose their wooden batteries to certain destruction before the stone bulwarks of the fortress. On the 23d the allies were startled by loud detonations, — an intimation to them that the Russians had sunk five ships of the line and two frigates in the harbor, and so made the place unassailable on the sea-face. With these sank the sanguine calculations of the allies. On the land side Nicholas had, in 1837, ordered the construction of fortifications; but all that had been erected was a solitary fort. In the present spring the work was resumed with the purpose of at least making the place secure against a *coup de main*. Day and night the men labored on the earthworks, under the directions of Lieutenant-Colonel Todleben. Not to be cut off from communications in his rear, Menshikoff resolved to withdraw with a part of his force to Bakhtchisarai, leaving the defence of the north side to General Korniloff, and that of the south to Admiral Nakhimoff. To the serious detriment of the allies, sickness compelled Saint-Arnaud to give over, on the 26th, his command to Canrobert (Fig. 16). Saint-Arnaud died three days later. While Europe was being deceived by the story of the fall of Sebastopol, brought by a Tatar to Bucharest, the allies were marching around the fortress to Balaklava, where they were in close connection with their fleets. By this double flank-march the armies crossed each other, and the English, striking Menshikoff's rear-guard, captured his baggage.

For an immediate assault, which experts like Niel and Todleben later declared to have been not impracticable, the fortifications appeared to the allies too strong; and a regular siege was therefore resolved on. Work on the trenches was begun on the night of October 10, and this proved the opening of one of the most memo-



FIG. 16. — General Canrobert.

nable sieges known to history. When morning revealed these works to the Russians their joy was great. They had now time to complete the counter-works, that under Todleben's skilled directions







### Map of the Crimea

From Fowler's *History of the War*, London, 1855

sprung out of the ground as if by magic, and to arm them with the heavy artillery of their sunken fleet. They were thus able to reply with superior weight of metal to the fierce bombardment which the allies, supported by their fleets, poured on them from more than 1100 guns, from October 17 to 19. The hope of a speedy reduction of the stronghold had now to be abandoned; and there was nothing left the assailants but to return to the work on the parallels, which was rendered doubly toilsome by the rocky nature of the soil. From this time forth Russia continued for a whole year to despatch to this point in her extreme south all her available resources in men and material. Thousands of wasted forms strewed the long roads with dead and sick; and the wearied survivors, on arriving at their destination, found not a place of rest and refreshing, but a town exposed to a fire as of Hades, and better supplied with bullets than with bread.

On a sudden the attention of the besieging host was called to its own defence. Prince Menshikoff, after receiving re-enforcements of the soldiers set free by the evacuation of the principalities, caused General Liprandi, on October 25, to make a desperate assault on the intrenched camp near Balaklava, which, occupied by only 4350 English and Turks, was much too extensive and too far advanced for so meagre a garrison. (See PLATE V.: Map of the Crimea and Sebastopol.) The first onset, delivered immediately on crossing the Tchernaya, captured the Turkish intrenchments near the village of Kadikoi, while an attack of 3000 brave but ill-led Russian horsemen was in a few minutes brilliantly repulsed by Lord Lucan, with but 300 English heavy cavalry. The Light Brigade, under Lord Cardigan, next received orders to charge and recover the guns captured by the Russians. Blindly these devoted men rode against the foe, and of 607 that rode forward only 198 returned. "It was magnificent," said General Bosquet, "but it was not war." The advantage remained with the Russians, who maintained possession of the captured intrenchments and the vale of the Tchernaya, as well as of the Woronzoff road connecting the English camp with the besieging force.

On the completion of the third parallel the storm was fixed for November 7. But this Menshikoff determined to anticipate by a new attempt to raise the siege. The main attack was to strike the English on their left wing, and, with the help of a sally from the fortress, he calculated on hurling the islanders into the sea. The grand princes Nicholas and Michael rode on to the ground to be

witnesses of the sublime drama. A thick fog on November 5 favored the surprise of the Englishmen, encamped on the plateau of Inkerman. But with promptitude Lord Codrington rallied his men, who, for the most part scattered over the plateau in small detachments, defended themselves heroically till Bosquet (Fig. 17) came



FIG. 17. — General Bosquet.

to their aid. The extraordinarily bloody struggle ended with the retreat of the Russians, who of their 36,000 men had 10,730 put *hors de combat*; of their 14,600 combatants, the English lost 2600; the French of 8200, only 800. The Russian generalship was miserable; but this cannot detract from the glory of the English troops, whose reckless valor and unexampled tenacity have given this the name of 'the Soldiers' Battle.'

The situation now assumed a serious aspect for the besiegers. Inkerman had disclosed to them the terrible danger that ever im-



pended over them. Of the purposed storm there was no longer any thought; they were now only concerned to maintain their position till the arrival of re-enforcements. Rain turned the camp into a sea of mud; a new malady known as trench-sickness made its appearance. On November 14 a violent cyclone wrought terrible havoc, shattering many ships on the coast. This was succeeded by torrents of rain, by frost, and icy wind-storms from the north. A thirty hours' fall of snow covered dead and living with the same chilly winding-sheet, while the meagre supply of fuel could be procured only from a distance. All paths disappeared. During the whole winter the French corps was not able to make provision for more than ten days in advance; 9000 of its men lay in the hospitals; the horses died by wholesale; the commissariat was altogether defective. It was much worse with the English, whose administration fell into indescribable disorder. The troops were dying of starvation, while vast stores lay rotting in the harbor-magazines. There were neither means of transport, nor food, nor clothing within the camp. Great consignments of boots, indeed, arrived; but they were all for the left foot. Ships laden with winter clothing went to the bottom. One miserable consolation was, that the Russians had to endure the same hardships as the allies. Thus did the land of the Taurians justify her ancient reputation for devouring all strangers that touched her shores.

The first tidings of the deplorable condition of her soldiers reached England through the agency of an institution now heard of for the first time, — namely, the special correspondent, — of whom each of the great London papers had one in the camp. Hate for the Russians instantly gave place to indignation and contempt for the home authorities. In the parliament summoned for December 12, to grant supplies for the carrying on of the war, the government had a bad time. According to their own showing they had sent to the East, since March, 53,000 men; of these 16,000 were all that now stood in the ranks. What had become of the rest? Yet the opposition, from patriotic motives, postponed their main attack till after the passage of the government measure for the mobilizing of 15,000 volunteers, and the enlistment of 10,000 foreigners. Thereupon, however, the Aberdeen ministry was overthrown, on January 30, on a motion by the radical, Roebuck, for an inquiry into the conduct of the war. After both Derby and Russell had shown themselves unable to form a cabinet, Palmerston, 'England's truly patriotic



minister,' became inevitable. He hastened to anticipate the parliamentary investigation by reforms in the administration of the army. This, hitherto partitioned among numberless hands, was now concentrated in those of the commander-in-chief and the war minister. The commissariat, transport, and medical departments were reformed from the foundation; the construction of barracks and of a railroad from the landing-place to Balaklava were ordered, as well as the laying of a cable from Varna to the Crimea. Concurrently with this, volunteers offered themselves in such numbers that the vanishing army soon saw itself recruited to repletion; while Miss Florence Nightingale set a glorious example to women of high rank in all lands by betaking herself to Scutari to organize a system of care for the sick in the hospitals.

Meanwhile an empty treasury, and the firm opposition of Prussia, which was inspired by Bismarck, restrained Austria from further open measures of hostility against Russia. Secretly, however, she concluded, on December 2, 1854, an offensive and defensive alliance with the western powers, agreeing to take the field if peace were not concluded within a specified time, and invited Prussia to join her. The proposal was indignantly refused. "Not the heroic defence of Sebastopol," Prince Paskevitch (Fig. 18) subsequently declared, "but the noble firmness of the king of Prussia, restrained Austria from joining the western powers." But, in truth, another cause co-operated to this end. England felt keenly the secondary position to which the weakness of her land force compelled her at the seat of war, and, since November, had been dealing with Sardinia, whose army she, with money in her hand, deemed it a light thing to buy over. But Sardinia's army was not for sale. In Turin there sat a statesman, who already, with prescient eye, discerned that this Oriental complication might be made to work out Italy's redemption. This was Count Cavour; and he declined to treat with England on any other footing than that of equality. If Sardinia were to take part in the war it should be as an ally, not as a stipendiary. His main object, then, was to anticipate Austria's adhesion to the western powers. On January 26, 1855, he entered into a treaty by which Sardinia bound herself to send 15,000 men, with all possible despatch, to the seat of war. In return England advanced her auxiliary a million pounds sterling, and by secret articles guaranteed the permanency of her constitutional monarchy and the integrity of her territory.

Meanwhile the French government displayed a feverish energy in

superseding the defective organization which hurry had compelled it to give to its expeditionary corps by a more thoroughly effective one. The emperor despatched his adjutant, General Niel, to inspect the condition of the army and of the field-works. He found the so-called besiegers, despite the successfully repelled assault on Inkerman, very much in the position of the besieged party. Sebastopol had its outside communications open, and was in free correspondence



FIG. 18. — Prince Paskevitch.

with the army standing between the Tchernaya and the Belbek. Todleben (Fig. 19) was incessantly surrounding it with one work of defence after another. In specially protected pits he esconced riflemen as close as possible to the French workers in the trenches, while constant sallies gave the besiegers scarce time to draw their breath. Of driving the enemy from the plateau of the peninsula by open force, neither Menshikoff nor Todleben any longer thought; but

they sought, by gradually wearing away their strength and demoralizing them in spirit, to compel them to raise the siege. The arrival of Omer Pasha with 20,000 men, in February, 1855, exasperated the Russians to the highest degree. But the attack on him, on February 17, led by General Kruleff, ended in a repulse. This renewed fiasco led to the retirement of Menshikoff, whose place was taken by Prince Michael Gortchakoff.



FIG. 19. — General Todleben.

Suddenly there resounded throughout Europe the tidings of the death, on March 2, of the Czar Nicholas, not yet sixty years old, physically of lung disease, morally of a broken heart. He was succeeded on the throne by his son, Alexander II., now thirty-seven years old, whom the world willingly believed to be in sympathy neither with his father's ambitious ideas nor his adventurous policy. Though he might not at once be able to quit the path into which he had been led, the personal impediment to peace was out of the way.

Meanwhile Alexander Gortchakoff had been at all imaginable pains in Vienna at least to postpone an open breach with Austria, and had succeeded in gaining that country's assent to the opening of



renewed negotiations. The interval till the opening of the conferences Russia employed in striving by all possible means to draw Prussia closer to herself. St. Petersburg had come to learn the value of Prussian friendship. "Tell Fritz," the dying czar had said to his wife, "to remain ever the same to Russia, and never to forget the last words of his father." Frederick William vacillated between the wish of entering into the European concert, and reluctance to pledge himself to anything that could drive him beyond the line he had prescribed for himself. The Great Powers were prepared to admit Prussia to the concert, but only on the distinct condition that she pledged herself, in the event of the failure of the renewed negotiations, to take a direct part in the war. This was precisely what the king unconditionally refused to do.

Thus the conference of Vienna, on March 15, 1855, opened its sittings without the presence of Prussia, shortly thereafter, like its predecessor, to dissolve itself with nothing accomplished. The rock on which it was shipwrecked was the third article of the ultimatum to be presented to Russia, — that, namely, which dealt with the neutralization of the Black Sea. The fixing of a maximum for her naval strength there, Gortchakoff declared to be a condition Russia would never assent to. The western representatives were equally decided in rejecting the counter proposition of Austria, who had separated from them on this point, for the opening the Straits to the fleets of all nations. They declared their powers exhausted, and on June 4 the conference broke up.

The alliance of December 2 existed now only on paper, and the western powers had to renounce all hope of seeing Austria draw the sword. Buol, whom they charged with double-dealing, had become as much the object of dislike to them as to Russia; and while Austria was, on account of the cost, discharging the reserves she had called in, the Sardinians were setting foot on the soil of the Crimea. From the day of the breaking up of the conference of Vienna, Napoleon, on his side, regarded the alliance with Austria as dissolved, his one view now being to bring the war to an honorable close. Already the vision of Italian unity was floating before his fancy, and a dim instinct urged him to avoid engagements that might inconvenience him at a later day. The dismissal of Drouyn de l'Huys, and his replacement by Walewski, was a sure token of a profound change in France's foreign policy. Concurrently with this, Lord Russell had to resign office in England.



The community of feeling in regard to Austria tended to draw still tighter the bonds that united the two western powers. The way toward this had already been paved by a personal meeting of Napoleon and Prince Albert at Boulogne in the autumn, when their long-cherished mutual antipathy was, by an interchange of views, converted into friendship. The capture of Sebastopol at any price, so emphatically demanded by public opinion, was agreed on as a settled matter. The Malakoff tower had already been fixed on by the general of engineers, Bizot, as the key of the fortress; and on February 13 operations against it were begun. A concurrent attempt by Bosquet to capture by a nocturnal *coup-de-main* the counter-works instantly thrown up by the Russians on the Green Mamelon proved a failure, while Todleben conducted a veritable subterranean war against the besiegers' mines. On April 9 a renewed frightful bombardment was poured on the defences from 520 pieces, to which the Russians replied with 998. Great injuries were inflicted; but these the defenders, with their wonted perseverance, at once repaired. On the following day General Bizot was fatally wounded. The French opened their fourth parallel on April 15, but the storm was put off from one fixed day till another. The fruitlessness of these gigantic efforts suggested to Napoleon that he should visit the Crimea in person and undertake the command-in-chief. This, however, was far from palatable to the London cabinet, inasmuch as the English army would thereby be relegated to a still more subordinate place. With great difficulty his advisers prevailed on him to give up the notion. Instead of going to the Crimea, the emperor betook himself, with his wife, to London, where both were received with great honor. Queen Victoria returned the visit on the occasion of the Universal Exposition at Paris. If any longing for hazardous adventure still hovered about the emperor's brain, it was dispelled by an attempt on his life, made by an Italian, Pianori, in the Champs Élysées, April 29, in revenge for his annihilation of the Roman republic.

At Sebastopol the assault was again put off to await the arrival of the announced re-enforcements, while, meanwhile, an expedition was undertaken against Kertch. At this juncture a new factor entered into the war, through the connection of the Crimea with London and Paris by telegraph. On May 4 Canrobert received from the emperor the following cablegram: "The moment has arrived at which you must get free from the situation in which you

find yourself. As soon as the reserve corps arrives, the offensive must absolutely be resorted to." The general instantly recalled the expedition already on its way to Kertch, to the intense disgust of Lord Raglan, who, in conjunction with Omer Pasha, interposed a decided protest against the emperor's plan of offensive operations in the open. Thereupon the French general, correctly judging that he was not competent to cope with such difficulties, begged for his release. On the recommendation of Niel, who occupied the place of the dead Bizot, Péliissier was intrusted with the command-in-chief.

The new commander also was unable to reconcile himself to the plan of operations dictated from Paris. His view, like that of his predecessor, was to drive the Russians from their advanced works back into the fortress proper, and then by a determined assault to carry its southern portion, and by this compel the fall of the northern half as well. But because the English attached so much importance to the taking of Kertch, he, for the purpose of restoring harmony, decided on deferring the carrying out of his own plans in favor of theirs. This decision made the worst impression at the Tuileries, the emperor remaining firm in his conviction that the fate of the Crimea was to be decided through a great victory over the Russian field-army. He especially disapproved of the expedition to Kertch, as dividing the allied strength, while it could have no decisive effect on the war. None the less, Péliissier carried out his purpose. The expedition set out, and was successful beyond expectation, the submarine mines, on which the Russians relied for closing the entrance to the Sea of Azof, proving ineffective. General Wrangel, in consideration of the superior force of the assailants, evacuated the city, and blew up its fortifications, without, however, preventing the great store of supplies collected there from falling into the enemy's hands undamaged. Unfortunately the victors sullied their name by their ruthless plundering of the place. The allied fleets thus obtained the mastery of the Sea of Azov, so that the Russians could henceforth receive supplies only over the Isthmus of Perekop. Expeditions against Anapa and Sukhum-Kale found there nothing to do, the Russians having evacuated both points before their arrival. The season had now once more become favorable, the troops gathered fresh confidence, and a cheerful camp-life developed itself on the scene of so frightful sufferings.

At the same time Péliissier (Fig. 20) resumed the attack on the fortress. On the night of May 23 the Russians, after a hot fight,

were driven out of their most advanced works, and an end thereby was put to their counter-approaches. On June 7 the west bastion lying before the Karabelnaya was carried by storm, the English being equally successful in their attack on the stone-quarries. On the other hand, the attempted French storm of the Malakoff (fixed for




FIG. 20. — General Pélissier.

June 18, in revenge for Waterloo) utterly miscarried, as well as the English attack on the Great Redan. This result seemed to justify the emperor's prognostications; but Pélissier, through the threat of resigning, enforced the carrying out of his own views. With the arrival of the summer heats, cholera and scurvy renewed their attacks in more violent form than hitherto. Of 121,000 men, the



French had 21,000 sick. On June 28 Lord Raglan died, and was succeeded by General Simpson. The nearer the allies approached the stronghold the heavier became their task, the more watchful and energetic the Russian defence, and the more severe the allied losses. A new complication arose when Omer Pasha—who felt his position in the Crimea to the last degree painful—determined to proceed to Armenia to carry help to the hard-pressed Kars. But more deplorable still was the situation within the fortress. Nakhimoff had fallen, and Todleben was wounded. From the wretched condition of the roads along which the supplies had to be carried for over 600 miles, want began to make itself felt; while Gortchakoff felt himself too weak to come to the help of the stricken city from without. Yet ever more urgently called on, alike by the suffering garrison and from St. Petersburg, he made at length a desperate effort. His battle near Traktir, August 16, resulted only in another defeat. Here, for the first time, the Sardinians came under fire, and, led by La Marmora, demeaned themselves gallantly. The bombardment went on, by night as by day, without intermission, and made it impossible for the beleaguered soldiery to repair their damages; while the trenches crept ever closer to the walls.

While matters were thus progressing, the *Moniteur* of August 27 published a letter of the emperor to Pélissier, in which he promised his brave soldiers a speedy end to their toils through the impending fall of Sebastopol, inasmuch as, according to reliable secret information, the Russian army was in no condition to continue the struggle a second winter in the Crimea. This communication hastened the purpose of a general storm. On September 8 this was carried into effect. To the division of MacMahon fell the honor of planting the French flag on the Malakoff, despite the desperate tenacity with which the Russians defended this commanding point. In the Little Redan, on the other hand, owing to the murderous fire from the fortress, the French were not able to maintain themselves. Three times the English under Lord Codrington stormed into the Great Redan, to be as often driven forth. But the fall of the Malakoff decided the fate of Sebastopol. In the following night the Russians evacuated the southern city, passing by a floating bridge to the northern, after blowing up all of the supplies they could not carry with them. The ships still in the harbor were in like manner destroyed, so that of the once proud Black Sea fleet not a shred remained.



What occurred afterwards was but a tedious protraction of the terrible struggle. Regardless of the bitter loss, Gortchakoff declared to the Emperor Alexander, who had betaken himself to the neighborhood of the conflict, that the Crimea must be held at any price, and the foe awaited in the strong position of Simferopol. A fruitless reconnaissance against this by the allies proved the justness of his judgment. But he who had failed to rescue Sebastopol could not remain at the head of the army; and, as graciously as was possible, he was relieved of his command and replaced by General Lüders.

But Russia was at the end of her resources. She had lost a quarter of a million of men; her sources of supply were exhausted. She had not one ally; even the attempt to stir up Persia against Turkey was foiled through Western diplomacy. She could do nothing else than make peace; and she was able to offer her hand with the more honor that in the Armenian seat of war she had just achieved a great success, that in the eyes of Orientals far outweighed the loss of Sebastopol. On November 28 Muravieff, after suffering a severe repulse on September 29, compelled the surrender of Kars, so heroically defended by the Englishman, Williams. Omer Pasha arrived too late to relieve it.

The allies, on their side, found themselves at a loss what next to put their hand to. On the earnest representation of England, the noble docks at Sebastopol were destroyed. An expedition against Kinburn, in which three French ironclads — the first of their kind — took part, compelled the place to capitulate on October 17. But a continuance of the campaign in the Crimea, or anywhere in South Russia, Pélissier, though at the head of 147,000 men, declared an impossibility, recommending in its place the transfer of the seat of war to the north, where the fall of Sveaborg had dealt the Russians a heavy, though by no means a fatal, blow. In France the army and nation, now that their honor was satisfied through the fall of Sebastopol, were alike satiated of war. Even Napoleon had attained all, and more than all, he could reasonably have hoped. He saw himself admitted as an equal into the circle of the greater sovereigns, and elevated to the position of an arbiter in the affairs of Europe, — his favor courted, and his hostility dreaded and deprecated. Further aggrandizement of his generals' glory he had rather to fear than wish for. And now, since he had failed to attain that which constantly lay at the bottom of his heart, — the revision of the map of Europe, — through league with Austria against Russia, he felt himself im-





pelled to attempt its achievement, after reconciliation, in conjunction with Russia against Austria. Of the czar's ready co-operation he harbored no doubt. Meanwhile, to try the effect of just one turn more of the screw in accelerating this, the half-dormant negotiations with Sweden were resumed afresh. Canrobert was sent to Stockholm; and on November 9, 1855, a defensive alliance was concluded between Sweden and the western powers. On the other hand, that power which at first showed the greatest reluctance to let herself be drawn into the war was now the one to insist on its continuance and the complete humiliation of Russia. It was galling to England's pride that, now that her army was in a better condition than it had been at any time during the war or for long before it, hostilities should be suddenly put an end to ere she had done anything worthy of her name, either in the Crimea, the Black Sea, or the Baltic. For this reason Austria's proffer of her good offices for the resumption of negotiations with St. Petersburg found little acceptance with the London cabinet, which was, besides, by no means flattered to find that Walewski, without designing to consult it, had been taking counsel with Vienna in regard to the peace conditions to be proposed to Russia. Such was its irritation over the latter subject, that Palmerston threatened, in case of necessity, to continue the war with only Turkey as an ally.

Notwithstanding, on November 16 Count Esterhazy, the Austrian envoy, went to St. Petersburg as the bearer of the ultimatum agreed on, in the first instance, only by France and Austria. This contained the well-known four points, sharpened by a fifth, namely, a demand proceeding from Austria for the cession of Bessarabia. If he did not receive a satisfactory answer by a given date he was to demand his passport. The king of Prussia let himself be prevailed on by Vienna to recommend the acceptance of the ultimatum; and finally an Anglo-French war-council, held in Paris, January 10, 1856, cast its weight into the scale. Hard as it was for Alexander to listen to any word proceeding from Vienna, — as if Austria had taken Sebastopol, — he yet made up his mind to the acceptance of the ultimatum. In order to effect the formal conclusion of peace, it was resolved to hold a congress; and as an evidence that France was once more the pivot for European politics, Paris was fixed on as the meeting-place.

The congress (PLATE VI.) was opened February 25, 1856; and, to Austria's supreme displeasure, England carried her point, that



Sardinia should be admitted on a footing of full equality. England was represented by Lords Clarendon and Cowley; France, by Count Walewski, who was president, and the Baron Bourqueney; Austria, by Count Buol and von Hübner; Turkey, by the grand vizier, Ali Pasha, and Djemil Bey; Sardinia, by Count Cavour and the Marquis Villamarina. Prussia was at first unrepresented; but, inasmuch as she was one of the signatories to the Straits Convention of 1841, she received an invitation later, and on March 18 von Manteuffel and von Hatzfeld took their seats in the congress.

Immediately on its meeting a general armistice, till March 31, was decreed: and on the day before this was to expire, — namely, the 30th, — peace was concluded. The first article declared the neutralization of the Black Sea; Russia being allowed to retain in it only the ships necessary for its coast service, whose number and strength should be settled in a special convention. In like manner, each of the powers was granted the right of stationing two light vessels off the mouths of the Danube to protect the freedom of its navigation. Much more bitterly did Russia contest the second article, which concealed the cession of territory demanded from her under the title of “a rectification of frontiers in favor of Moldavia.” More resolutely than all the others had Austria insisted on the removal of Russia from the mouths of the Danube. When she carried her point, Count Orloff whispered into the ear of Count Cavour, — “Austria’s representatives little think how many tears and how much blood this rectification of boundaries will cost their land.” A special commission was decreed for carrying out the works for the clearing the mouths of the Danube of the sand-bars, with which Russia had purposely allowed them to be choked up to the hindrance of navigation. The Porte pledged itself to grant to the Danubian principalities — whose unification was frustrated through its opposition, and that of Austria — an independent national administration, for devising measures towards which a commission should sit in Bucharest. Both principalities, as well as the immunities and rights of Servia, were declared to be under the common guardianship of the powers. Further, the Porte announced the issue, at England’s desire, of a firman, on February 21, concerning the conservation of its Christian subjects’ rights and liberties, as well as the reforms to be introduced into its own administration; the powers, thereupon, expressly disclaiming all desire to found upon this communication any claim to interference in Turkey’s internal affairs. On the motion

of France the congress further declared Turkey's entrance into the common law of Europe, and guaranteed the integrity of her territory.

Thus was an end put to this memorable war, that had cost France 80,000 men, 10,240 of whom fell in the battle-field; England lost 22,000, of whom 2800 were slain in fight; Sardinia, 2200. Turkey's loss was estimated at 35,000. Of Russians had perished, mostly by disease, about 300,000. Especially it was epoch-making for the history of the art of war. It demonstrated the inability of wooden war-ships to compete with land-fortresses, and thereby gave the impulse to their conversion into iron batteries, while it showed that the transport of immense bodies of troops was only possible through the aid of steam. In it, too, more humane principles were for the first time recognized in regard to the position of neutrals, though, in this instance, only provisionally. The United States had been successful in establishing these principles as a norm for all time in its treaty with Russia of July 22, 1854. Finally, in it France and England renounced the right of issuing letters of marque.

Napoleon's darling project of converting the congress into a general European one, for the revision of treaties and the transformation of the map of Europe, was frustrated through the opposition of England. "That," said Lord Clarendon, "means the Rhine boundary for France, the restoration of Poland, the transmutation of the German Confederation, and the absorption of its small states into Austria and Prussia." For the Poles, Palmerston would very gladly have said a word to gratify the public sentiment of England; but he had to yield to the conviction that Russia would, in no circumstances, even discuss the subject. Cavour had to congratulate himself on better success. Here he saw the first out-sprouting of that crop whose seed had been sown amid Sardinian blood in the Crimea. He submitted to the representatives of France and England a memorial on the situation in Italy, and received from Clarendon the promise that the congress would not separate till he had had an opportunity to speak a word for his country. In Napoleon's programme, too, the transformation of Italy constituted a prominent feature: but his occupation of Rome, as well as regard for the pope, and, still more, for his own clergy, formed obstacles to his speaking plainly out. He ultimately consented, however, to a free discussion of Italian affairs, as well as of those of Greece. On the ground of these preliminary talks, Walewski, on April 8, proposed to the congress an interchange of ideas on several matters that demanded solution, instancing, in the

first place, the condition of Greece, and then the unsatisfactory state of matters in the States of the Church and Naples. Instantly Buol was on his feet, objecting vehemently to the congress dealing with any subject outside its competence, and threatening it, in case it should persevere, with Austria's withdrawal. Cavour saw plainly that here he could attain nothing definite. On the other hand, Austria, by obstinately rejecting all interference in any shape, and addressing a circular to the several Italian governments denying Cavour's right to speak in the name of Italy, lost the opportunity of withdrawing with honor from an untenable position. In regard to Greece the English representatives declared nothing could be done so long as Otho I. sat on the throne ; and, as his deposition was beyond the competence of the congress, it restricted itself to an unmeaning declaration. One equally meaningless was directed against the unbridled licence of the French fugitives' press in Belgium. As a sop to the peace-party in England, Clarendon prevailed on the congress to record its wish, that nations before appealing to arms should call in the good offices of some friendly power as a mediator. The congress closed its proceedings with a declaration (April 16) elevating into a principle of international law the practice which had been followed during the war at sea. This is embodied in four provisions: Privateering is abolished; the neutral flag covers the enemy's goods, except contraband of war; neutral goods under a hostile flag cannot be seized unless they are contraband of war; a blockade to be binding must be effective. Spain, Mexico, and (on formal grounds) the United States declined adhesion to them.

Amid all the variety of matters with which this many-sided congress busied itself, that which was the ostensible cause of the war was passed over in silence. Of the Holy Places not a word was spoken. Just before its close England, France, and Austria entered into a separate provisional secret treaty for the further protection of Turkey, and prescribing the common procedure which every violation of the Treaty of Paris would infer as a consequence. Such an alliance, though entered into without any very definite object, appeared to save Austria from entire isolation, and to lend her a sort of moral support. But when this treaty became public, through its being laid before the English parliament, it served to add fresh fuel to Russia's exasperation against her former ally.



## CHAPTER III.

### RUSSIA, ENGLAND, AND THE EAST.

THE very boundlessness of the claims put forth by the late czar now served to make Russia's sense of her humiliation all the keener, and it was soon seen that she was by no means disposed to carry out the peace conditions in a spirit of honor and loyalty. Counting on the dissolution of the Anglo-French alliance, she not only construed every ambiguous point so as to evade anything implied in it disadvantageous to herself, but she did not hesitate to violate the direct terms of the treaty. Instead of simply evacuating Kars, Muravieff continued to hold it till he had utterly destroyed its fortifications, while, in Bessarabia, Russia levelled the fortresses of Ismail and Reni with the ground, sold all the public buildings, and obstinately delayed the rectification of its boundaries. The main rock of contention in regard to the last matter was constituted by Bolgrad, south of which the new line decreed by the congress was to run. The Russians maintained that the place meant was New Bolgrad, lying several miles to the southward, the possession of which would assure them contact with the navigation of the Danube. The isles lying off the mouths of the Danube formed another apple of discord. After long contention it was agreed, in November, 1856, to resummon the Congress of Paris; and this on its meeting adjudged Bolgrad to Moldavia, compensating Russia by another slice of Bessarabia.

But what was regarded as of highest import in St. Petersburg was that Russia, in order not only to repair her enormous losses, but also to re-enter on the path of progress from which the deceased czar had for a generation diverted her, had, for the first time in her history, to renounce the energetic rôle she had played in regard to her outside policy. "Russia does not nurse her wrath; she rallies herself," were the reassuring words in which Prince Gortchakoff (Fig. 21) announced to foreign courts her change of attitude, and the reduction of her army; and the cessation of recruiting for



four years bore testimony to the good faith of the assurance. The promotion of his people's material interests lay nearer Alexander's heart than any craving for foreign conquest. The disorder of the state finances had its date from before the Crimean war. After a vain attempt to restore the silver currency, the government had recourse, in 1843, to that last resort of desperate states,—bankruptcy,—by setting the bank assignats entirely out of circulation, redeeming these to the amount of 595,000,000 rubles by 170,000,000



FIG. 21. — Prince Alexander Gortchakoff.

rubles of newly created notes of the Imperial Bank, put into forced circulation. But after the minister of finance was empowered, in 1855, to meet all extraordinary war expenses by the temporary issue of letters of credit which the state pledged itself to redeem at latest within three years after the cessation of the war, the business world gave itself no further trouble about the vast amount of paper-money in circulation. Further extraordinary issues became necessary to meet the deficiency caused by

the war. Landed property sank in value, the half being in pledge to the banks of credit; the national debt ran up to 1,520,000,000 rubles. In 1859 the capital of the various banks, and the vested funds of corporations, benevolent institutions, churches, and foundations, even the sums pending between parties at law, were placed at the disposal of the finance minister. The new-fangled plan of publishing the state budget (adopted in 1862) satisfied only those who had faith in its figures.

Ever since 1825 a ban had been laid on the intellectual development of the country. Before this time its young aristocracy had

been wont to receive their education abroad, but then an embargo was laid on any lengthened foreign residence. The nobles now looked for honor and prestige only in so far as they were able to enter into the official bureaucracy. Appointments were conferred, not on the most competent, but on such as were most adept or most ostentatious in subordinating themselves implicitly to the will of the czar. The whole public service was now, indeed, practically limited to little more than a painful observance of petty formalities and a rigorous system of police supervision, the most potential of all the offices of state being the chief of the 'third department' (the secret police). The terror inspired by the revolutions of 1849 suggested to Nicholas the scheme of closing the universities of his empire (except Dorpat and Helsingfors), long regarded with suspicion as the foci of liberal ideas, and of supplying their place with military technical schools, and even these situated at wide distances from each other. The full carrying out of this idea was, indeed, postponed for the time; but the universities were subjected to the strongest restrictions in respect not only of the subjects taught, but of the tone of the teaching, and placed under the supervision of martinet and ignorant generals with the name of curators, while the study of philosophy was given over to the hands of the orthodox clergy. The number of students at each institution was limited to 300, and their doors were virtually closed to the lower classes. All indeed in any way associated with scientific culture seemed, as if of set purpose, stimulated to hate of the government system. Hand in hand with the Russianizing of the alien races within the empire went the systematic proselytizing of Protestants and Catholics to the orthodox church, with which the United Greek church also was compelled, on the simple behest of the czar, to associate itself.

The conviction of the untenability of this system, and his own more humane and enlightened views, constituted the Czar Alexander's motives for attempting reforms in it. The removal of Count Alexis Orloff, the all-potent head of the third department, the iron rigor of whose administration had made revolutionaries innumerable, and his replacement by the more moderate Dolgoruki, lifted, as it were, a mountain from the heart of Russia: the rigid quarantine against the outside world was raised; the stringent provisions impending over the universities were repealed; the press was conceded a degree of freedom it had not known for years; large numbers of

exiles were allowed to return from Siberia; railways — discounted to the utmost of his power by Nicholas — were promoted; municipal institutions organized; even the jury system was introduced into the courts of justice. "Reforms," the czar said to his nobles at Moscow on the occasion of his coronation, "must begin from above; we would not have them originate from beneath." What he had mainly in view in these words was at once the most difficult and the most inevitable of the life-tasks before him, — namely, the abolition of serfdom.

Serfdom was first recognized as a legal institution in the reign of Peter the Great; but it was under Catharine II. that it was extended over the whole empire, even to provinces such as Little Russia, where it had previously scarcely been known. The serious drawbacks involved in it, however, made themselves so soon sensible that, as early as the time of Alexander I., serious, though resultless, consultations were held with a view to its abrogation. Nor was Nicholas better disposed toward it; his main objection being that it made the nobles, in some measure, independent of the crown. Various committees appointed by him busied themselves with the question. Through the decision that serfs could give evidence on oath in criminal cases, they were recognized as enjoying a certain degree of personality. In 1842 they were granted the privilege of entering into contracts, and in 1847 the still higher one of becoming purchasers of their owner's property, in the event of its being put up to auction for debt, and so of constituting themselves independent landowners. This last privilege was, however, withdrawn in the following year; and Nicholas's dread of publicity, in which he saw something revolutionary, but which alone could have overcome the opposition of the nobles, prevented any other effective measure being adopted. On the whole, the situation of the serf continued to be one of heavy oppression. The number converted into freemen through voluntary emancipation increased but slowly; and even this means of deliverance was shut off by the outbreak of the Crimean war. And yet it was this war that gave the impulse for the overthrow of the system. As conscription made the serf a freeman, in order not to injure the nobles too deeply in their agricultural interests by frequently repeated levying, the period of service had been lengthened out to twenty-five years. But this, on the other hand, made a war-reserve impossible; and the want of such had been most severely felt in the Crimean struggle. Wherefore





PLATE VII.



Emperor Alexander II. of Russia.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 73.*

one of the first reforms introduced by the new war minister, Miljutin, was to limit the period of service to seven years,—a condition which made the continuance of serfdom impracticable. In January, 1857, a new secret committee commenced its sittings, under the presidency of the sovereign, to devise measures for its conclusive abrogation; but, thanks to the studied obstacles interposed by the interested parties, the work went forward but slowly. The nobles of the different governments, who insisted on being heard in their interests, became divided into an opposition majority and a consenting minority. At the very least, they demanded indemnification in the form of political privileges for the material sacrifices they expected to be called on to make. But the czar (PLATE VII.) did not let himself be diverted from his purpose. In 1858 eight hundred thousand crown-peasants received their freedom; and the prerogatives of the landowners over their seigniorial bondmen were very materially restricted. The whole work was crowned by the ukase of March 3, 1861, abolishing the system after a transition period, during which the peasants should be temporarily held to labor, and decreeing a complete re-ordering of the whole agrarian relations, along with the institution of local judges known as ‘Arbitrators of the Peace.’ By June 1, 1865, the better half of the whole body of bondsmen, amounting to five millions of men, had become free renters or virtual proprietors of their lands. The administration of the newly organized peasant communities (*Mirs*) was ordered; and to each of these a portion of arable land was allotted in perpetual usufruct, on account of which each peasant had to perform a settled proportion of work, the whole community being held responsible for its performance.

A revolution of so deep-reaching a character could not be accomplished without producing serious social convulsions. The relations of the nobles to their properties became perplexingly confused and unsatisfactory; disorders broke out in various places, due to the impatience or conceited vanity of the peasants themselves, to not a few of whom that bequest of bondage—hatred of work—converted the intended benefit into a loss; others were seized by a wild passion for destruction, of which a series of incendiary fires in May, 1862, gave too palpable evidence. Even among those of them of a higher order, who had been accustomed to solace themselves for the yoke they had to bear by secret draughts of the poison of radical and socialistic ideas, an uneasy spirit of ill-defined craving

began to manifest itself. The even yet suspiciously overwatched student became, as the harbinger of a better future, the first-fruits of the change in the public sentiment. Teaching was promulgated from the chairs unimpeached, at variance with all the received conceptions of authority; young people of the middle and lower ranks poured in streams into the universities, and carried thence, instead of a defective education, a very decided system of "views." The czar became alarmed at the bad spirit getting possession of the youth, and, with the view of bridling it, nominated Admiral Putjatin as minister of instruction. The new minister's autocratic and maladroit attempt to undo all the liberal gains of the last years by a simple stroke of his pen, provoked, in 1861, serious risings of the students in St. Petersburg and Moscow, in which the public took their part with such passion of energy that Putjatin and his tools had to give way. Even the highest classes read with avidity the organ of the revolutionaries, "The Bell" (*Kolokol*), appearing from 1851 in London and later in Geneva, whose editor, A. Herzen, knew how, despite all the vigilance of the government, not only to disseminate his views widespread over all Russia and among all ranks, but also to spice his columns with news concerning the most secret affairs, derived, no one knew how, from the most exclusive circles. For many years this journal continued to be a power in the land, till its influence was sapped, partly by the position which the fanatical fugitive from Siberia, Bakúnin, attained on it, and partly by the greater liberty accorded to the native press. The nobles and cultured classes indulged in the delusive dream that the czar would convert his uncle's ideas into reality, and grant the people a voice in making the laws at the expense of some portion of his autocratic authority. Through this hope the concessions made by him to the Finnish estates, and to the patriotic longings of the Poles, were hailed as the precursors of reforms in Russia.

With Nicholas and Paskevitch the two chief enemies of Poland passed away close upon each other. At the Congress of Paris Count Orloff had put aside Lord Clarendon's plea for this country with the remark that his master purposed to grant, of his own free will, all the favors he asked for it. Alexander II., on his visit to Warsaw in May, 1856, gave expression to his sincere desire for Poland's reconciliation. But his appended warning — "No illusions" — had no meaning for a people who knew not how, by loyal and prudent conduct, to merit the gift of nationality. The measures



adopted by him with a view to conciliation failed of their end; the Poles remained malcontent. On November 29, 1860, — the thirtieth anniversary of the battle of Grochow — there was a bloody conflict between the populace of the city and the police. The day after, a deputation, headed, by the archbishop, delivered to Prince Gortchakoff a petition to the czar praying for the restoration of the institutions assured to them by Alexander I. The Agricultural Society, founded by Count Andrew Zamoiski, an active minister in the last revolution, transformed itself more and more into a political club constituting the centre of anti-Russian agitation. Numerous amnestied fugitives testified their gratitude for the clemency which permitted their return by systematically inciting the masses to revolt. Nevertheless, the czar still believed he could persevere in the path of gradual and well-considered reform, in concert with the small but influential party of the nobles which continued true to a policy of reconciliation. The head of this party, the Marquis Wielopolski, was summoned as a counsellor to St. Petersburg; and on March 26, 1861, a ukase appeared making many important concessions, — the institution of a Polish council of state, consisting one-half of government officials, the other of free members; of a council of education, exclusively Polish, with Wielopolski or its head; and finally of elective government, district and municipal councils. But in the eyes of the fanatical nationalists, the marquis, precisely because he had dealings of any kind with Russia, was a traitor to his country, and doubly a traitor by recognizing the cession of the Polish provinces of Lithuania, White Russia, and the Ukraine as the basis of an accommodation with the Muscovite government. The Poles rejected the hand held out to them; even the Catholic clergy ranged themselves on the popular side, although the czar had made approaches to the Vatican, and was making preparations to give *bona fide* effect to the concordat of 1847, hitherto existing merely on paper. On the occupation by soldiery of the Bernardine Church, which had been prepared for the celebration of the Kosciusko festival, the administrator of the diocese of Warsaw decreed the closing of all the churches of the capital; and whoever neglected or refused to conform to the order for a general national fast found himself exposed to maltreatment by the populace. On October 14 the whole land was declared in a state of siege, the Agricultural Society having been already closed.

The contradictory character of the measures emanating from St



Petersburg, vacillating as they did between severity and conciliation, made the confusion absolute and nullified all Wielopolski's efforts for accommodation, thus delivering the land entirely into the hands of the radicals ("Reds"). Suddenly, on June 8, 1862, Poland was startled by the nomination of the Grand Prince Constantine as its governor, and Wielopolski as vice-president of its council of state, by which he was made head of the whole civil administration of the land. Concurrently with this the five governments received native Poles as their governors. The emancipation of the Jews was announced; the way paved for the elevation of the peasant class by the relief granted them from forced labor and other seigniorial prerogatives; an investigation of their grievances was promised to the Catholic clergy; even the University of Warsaw was reopened, and its chairs filled with native teachers; while on October 1 the governor opened the sitting of the state-council with an address in Polish. But the cravings of the Poles, once aroused, were not to be satiated by any such half-measures. A meeting of the nobles, called by Count Zamoi-ski, utterly disclaimed all interest in any such palliative measures, declaring their want of confidence in any government but a native one, and that they would never rest satisfied till all the provinces of the Polish nation were reunited with it. To this resolution the nobility of Podolia and Lithuania adhered. Murderous assaults on the Grand Prince, General Lüders, and Wielopolski gave the impulse for the institution of a secret tribunal which let loose its assassin-emissaries on the enemies to the cause. This frenzy determined the public sentiment of Russia. The liberals, who up to this time did not conceal their sympathy with Poland, now turned their backs on it. Only revolutionary "Young Russia" any longer saw allies in its Polish confrères. London was rife with preparations for a Russo-Polish rising; but the vessel which was to have conveyed Bakúnin and his confederates to the coast of Lithuania was laid under embargo in Malmö by the authorities of Sweden.

Notwithstanding all these discouraging disillusions, the Grand Prince and Wielopolski did not let themselves be diverted from the path of reform. But they regarded it as indispensable that the real instigators to mischief should be rendered innocuous; and this was the underlying motive for the decree of conscription for the whole kingdom issued on September 20, 1862, and put into execution on January 15, 1863. According to instructions — meant to be secret, but which did not remain so — the decree was to strike especially

the section of the population suspected of revolutionary tendencies, wherefore the wonted exemption of students and other youths of the cultured classes was on this occasion held in abeyance. With true Russian barbarity these arbitrarily determined recruits, in Warsaw and other towns, were dragged from their beds at night by soldiers and policemen. Many, however, who had received timely warning rescued themselves by flight to the forests, and, there gathering themselves into armed bands, often engaged in bloody skirmishes with the regular troops. This conscription was the torch which set fire to the inflammable material accumulated in readiness. The secret committee issued a call to arms, and the sale of Cossack horses ordered by the government from motives of economy facilitated the creation of an insurgent cavalry. Mieroslawski was called to the dictatorship. To allure the lower classes to the standards, every patriot peasant was promised free possession of his little farm, and each portionless combatant for the fatherland the ownership of two acres of land. Nevertheless, the cause found less general acceptance among the country people than with the townsmen, nobles, and clergy. The insurgents' frequent declarations that their quarrel was with the Muscovite government alone, and that Prussia and Austria were no further concerned in it than that their Polish districts were looked to for volunteers, money, arms, and moral support, attained their object only so far that Austria maintained to the rising a sort of neutrality bordering on friendliness. Prussia, on the other hand, by placing four army corps on her frontiers, and by other energetic measures, relieved Russia of half her task, and thereby occasioned the insurgents to direct their main strength upon the south and southeast, and to take the Galician frontier as their base of operations. Here alone did the insurgents make a stand worth naming; the hope of foreign aid cherished by the Poles proved altogether illusory. After a resistance of seven days, Mieroslawski saw himself compelled to flight over the borders; and his rival, Langiewicz, who thereupon assumed the dictatorship, had the same fate. On the whole, this rising exhibited the same miserable spectacle of internal dissensions that all the previous ones had done.

After the flight of Langiewicz the national government itself undertook the command-in-chief, declaring every attempt upon the dictatorship high treason, and making itself formidable, not by open war, but by the secrecy in which it enveloped itself. Its ramifications permeated all classes of society; it forbade the payment of all taxes;

rejected the czar's offers of amnesty; laid hands on twenty-two million florins of state-funds; and executed its penal sentences through its own peculiar police — while the authorities, despite their most anxious efforts, were entirely unable to discover its locality. The Catholic clergy persevered in fomenting the movement; and after the hanging of a convicted Capuchin friar, the vicar-general forbade all music in the churches, and even the tolling of bells. In St. Petersburg the battle between the liberals (still in favor of conciliation) and the Old Russian party continued long undecided, till the nomination of Muravieff to the governor-generalship of Lithuania, and of Count Berg to the presidency of the Polish council of state, proclaimed the victory of the latter. Both went to work with implacable stringency, the former, indeed, with absolute ferocity. Severely penal repression of all demonstrations, extraordinary forced contributions, executions, deportations *en masse*, followed on each other with fearful rapidity. The peasants were instigated to betray their lords by the bribe of having their rented plots changed into freehold possessions; every higher office was filled by a Russian. In August, 1863, the Grand Prince Constantine left Warsaw; in the following year the supreme head of the secret government, with several of its members, fell into the authorities' hands; and with the execution of five of these, on June 18, 1864, and the deportation of the rest to Siberia, the last spark of the rebellion was quenched.

Severely — though not unmeritedly — did the Poles expiate their frenzy, through a more ruthless encroachment on their nationality than they had ever hitherto known. Indeed, almost all that had been left to them was now lost. The subordination of all their institutions and administration to the ministries in St. Petersburg, with the new partition of the land into ten governments and fifty-eight circles, effected its complete administrative absorption into Russia. Russian was made the language of the law-courts and the higher seminaries, while the native nobility, through the emancipation of their peasants, were shorn of half their wealth. To dry up, once for all, the sources of support which the revolt had found in the religious houses, 114 of the 197 in existence were finally closed. Education was taken out of the hands of the clergy; and the ukase of May 22, 1867, subordinated the Catholic church of Poland to the Russo-Catholic college of St. Petersburg, and inhibited the clergy from any direct communication with the Vatican.

From the time of the Polish revolt a distinctly perceptible



change set in among the governmental and social circles of Russia. Up to this period the liberals—the admirers and disciples of European culture—had enjoyed the ascendancy; but the shipwreck of all attempts at reform in Poland now transferred the predominance to the Slavophiles, who, full of faith in the grand historical mission of the Slavs, saw safety only in the rejection of all west European influences, and in a return to the Old Russian type of nationality. This party directed its efforts to two ends,—one domestic, the other external. By the attainment of the former of these it would know itself clear of all un-Russian historical organizations existent within the empire, and the danger would be averted of imperial absolutism finding support, in the decisive hour, among the still alien and European-disposed sections of the population in opposition to the will of the real Russian people. Scarcely, therefore, was Poland subjected when a campaign was opened against the Baltic provinces under the leading of Juri Samarin. The systematic vilification of the complicated political and social relations of these provinces, which enjoyed a degree of administrative independence, moral and intellectual culture, and general prosperity that made them the envy of the rest of Russia, had its origin not alone in hate of their Teutonic aristocracy, but also in the conviction that their hereditary independent institutions formed a bar to the realization of the Slavophiles' ideal democratic future. To be freed from these impediments in the readiest way possible, the party was prepared provisionally to concede unlimited authority to the government, otherwise so much the object of its suspicions. The first open announcement of the government's change of attitude thus induced was through the ukase of December, 1865, decreeing a rigid censorship of the Baltic press, at the same time that it granted freedom from such restriction to the press of the two capitals. The other aim of the party—the external—is known as Panslavism. For well-nigh a quarter of a century a conviction of the community of the interests of all the Slavic races had been gaining ground in Russia. The Hungarian campaign of 1849 had kindled a desire for the extension of Russia's sphere of power so as to comprise all west and south Slavdom; and the enthusiasm for the Ban Jellachich was not for him as a loyal subject of his sovereign, but as the foremost champion of Slavic nationality; and Nicholas had regarded the situation with unconcealed satisfaction. But it was not till the close of the Crimean War that this tendency waxed into a veritable power. The millenary of the empire, cele-



brated in 1862, bore an avowed Slavic impress; and the desire of Alexander II. to propitiate the Poles had, as one of its motives, the hope that conciliated Poland would form a bridge leading to western Slavdom. Even a vision of the disintegration of the Austrian empire, and the annexation of its Slavic provinces, floated before his mind.

The Crimean War had rescued Turkey from being swallowed up by Russia in her character of protector of the Greek Christians. Panslavism now threatened her with a similar fate, by preaching all the more loudly its doctrine of the fellowship of the southern Slavs with their Russian kin. Even independently of this, the war, instead of saving Turkey, had only added to the number of the causes tending to her dissolution, and accelerated their operation. From the Congress of Paris she received the fatal gift of being able to incur debt by borrowing; and Sultan Abdul-Aziz, brother and successor of Abul-Medjid (Fig. 22), who died June 25, 1860, made so reckless a use of this power that he soon delivered the shattered credit of his empire over as a plaything to the bourses of Europe. This led of necessity to an ever-stronger application of the tax-screw to his Christian subjects, and no less consequentially to their growing discontent. The firman of 1856 remained a dead letter; and Europe's tutelage, under which the congress had placed these peoples, only manifested itself through the jealousy with which the powers watched each other, Turkey being left to deal with them as she would.

Precisely at this juncture a profound movement stirred the world of Islam. Turkey felt herself doubly outraged by the new concessions made to these Christians, in that she regarded herself as the victor in the war. Her pride, religious as well as national, was in arms. Fanatics returning from Mecca secretly preached a holy war; and their announcement that the hour for the extermination of the infidels had come occasioned a murderous butchery of the Christians in Jiddah, Arabia, in June, 1858. In Syria religious hatred was aggravated by race-hate in the case of the Christian Maronites and the Mohammedan Druses of the Lebanon. The Turkish authorities were wilfully blind to the preparation being made by the latter for the impending conflict, and, as if of set purpose, denuded the region of troops. After the Druse attack on the Maronite villages near Beirut, in May, 1860, the Turkish commander ordered the Christians to lay down their arms, in return for his promise of protection, and then gave them over to their enemies, who mas-

sacred all without mercy, the Turkish soldiery taking part in the slaughter. The mania for murder spread to Damascus; and for six days its governor looked calmly on at the festival of death, during which the greater part of the Christian quarter, even the consulates, was destroyed. The Arab patriot, Abd-el-Kader, who had retired hither, nobly intervened as guardian of the hunted Giaours; but he



FIG. 22. — Sultan Abdul-Medjid. From the lithograph by F. Jentzen; original painting by J. H. Kretschmer.

stood alone. The report of these atrocities roused the righteous indignation of the west, but the mutual jealousies of the cabinets prevented any common action. Napoleon, indeed, who gladly welcomed any opportunity for a stage-effect that could take up the minds of his subjects, was captivated by the prospect of unfolding the tricolor on the Lebanon. But this purpose of his met with little

countenance from the other powers ; and it was not till a protocol had been signed at Paris, on August 3, pledging the renunciation of all views to acquisition of territory or of exclusive advantages, either political or commercial, that 6000 French troops were shipped to Syria, under command of General d' Hautpoul-Beaufort, and accompanied by an international commission. Within four days the French executed 158 culprits in Beirut. Meanwhile, to anticipate foreign interference, the Porte had despatched thither 16,000 men, under Fuad Pasha, with full powers to repress disorders. In accordance with Turkish precedent, Fuad would willingly have left malefactors of higher rank unmolested ; but, at the instant requisition of the commission, he was compelled to open an investigation into the doings of the Supreme Council of Damascus ; and, to prevent the unbelievers from pressing onwards to the Holy City, condemned the governor and several of the high officials to death or other condign punishment. Besides a compensation of 75,000,000 piastres (\$3,125,000) to the sufferers, the Porte had to organize a new administrative system for the Lebanon, with a Christian governor and a native police. On this being accomplished, English jealousy compelled the withdrawal of the French.

The mutual jealousies of the great powers, and the strained relations consequent thereupon, constituted the conditions that enabled the Christian races of the Balkan, with the countenance of Russia, still further to loosen their new relations with the Porte as ordained by the Congress of Paris. The beginning was made in the two Danubian principalities. After the expiration, in July, 1856, of the septennial term for which their hospodars, in terms of the Treaty of Balta Liman, held office, the future political organization of these lands gave rise to much excited controversy during the administration of the officers provisionally appointed by the Porte. The main question was, whether they should remain separate or be unified into one state. But this question, as well as all the subordinate ones, was, like all others among these politically crude peoples, deeply colored by an admixture of personal and purely selfish interests. After some resistance on the part of Moldavia, the divans of the two principalities, in October, 1857, gave their voice for conjoining them into one neutral state, — Rumania, — with a hereditary dynasty. But as the Porte interposed energetic objections to this, the powers withheld their sanction. The plan preferred by them was that Moldavia and Wallachia should each have its own hospodar and divan ; but



that, without prejudice to their relation of vassalage to the Porte, they should have one common supreme court of justice and one council of state consisting of sixteen members. But this bit of artificial patchwork went to pieces on the spot. The election of the noble, Alexander Cusa, in January, 1859, as lifelong prince of Moldavia, and immediately thereupon to the same position for Wallachia, practically constituted the longed-for state of Rumania; and nothing was left the powerless Porte but to accommodate itself as best it could to circumstances.

The example of Rumania worked powerfully on the other Christian peoples of European Turkey. The Servians dreamed of a great hereditary kingdom of Serbia, which should comprise also Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Because the strongest opposition to this scheme was looked for from Austria, their prince, Alexander, son of Black (Kara) George, made himself, through his adhesion to this power, so obnoxious to his people that he was compelled to abdicate. Immediately Milosh, who had been expelled in 1842, now an old man and a devoted adherent of Russia, but held in the highest esteem by the Serbs as their liberator from the yoke of Turkey, was called back to the vacant throne. On his death, in September, 1860, he was succeeded by his son Michael, during whose rule the powers, in order to put an end to the perpetual bickerings and collisions between the people and the Turkish soldiery, in September, 1862, came to an agreement highly to the advantage of Serbia, by which Turkey's right of military occupation was restricted to four citadels, including that of Belgrade. In Herzegovina the rising of the Christian peasants, under Luka Vukalovitch, supported by Prince Nikita of Montenegro, who had succeeded his murdered uncle, Danilo, in 1860, took such proportions that the Austrians moved out of Ragusa with the view of interposing. But when Omer Pasha advanced against Cettinje, the prince submitted to the Porte's ultimatum without gaining the strip of coast he so ardently desired. Among the long-suffering Bulgarians the movement at first assumed an ecclesiastical aspect. Stimulated by their lower clergy, who were bitterly opposed to a foreign hierarchy, whether Grecized Slav, or Turcized Greek, the people demanded a native exarchate and a service in their own tongue. They attained both objects through the help of Russia, which attached more importance to a close association with Turkish Slavdom than to the sympathies of the Greek element and its domineering church potentates. We can



thus see how the awakening of the Slavic races of the Balkan to political consciousness was effected at the cost, not only of Ottoman supremacy, but of Greece as well, whose high-flown, fondly cherished dream of expanding its little peninsular state into a new Byzantine empire became thus dissipated into thin air. This little classic kingdom still suffered severely from the crudity of its organization and the desolating effects, moral as well as material, of the war of liberation. The childless, incapable King Otho became, through the three years' occupation of their capital by the French, an object of odium to his subjects, who held him responsible for this humiliation. In 1862 the popular discontent found expression in an unsuccessful military insurrection, which, notwithstanding the clemency shown to the culprits by the sovereign, renewed itself within the year while the royal pair were making a progress through the disaffected Morea. Hurriedly taking ship for Athens, Otho reached the Piræus, to find the proclamation of his own deposition and the nomination of a provisional government, consisting of Bulgaris, Kanaris, and Rufos; and instantly departed for his native country without setting foot on Hellenic soil. Ignoring the treaty of 1832, which excluded princes of ruling houses from the throne, the Greeks almost unanimously made choice of Queen Victoria's son, Alfred, duke of Edinburgh, as Otho's successor, in the hope that he would effect the reunion of the Ionian Islands, sorely wearied of British protection, with the kingdom, as well as of the brethren of their race still under Turkish sway. On this prince declining the proffered honor, their ultimate choice (March 30, 1863) fell on a minor, namely, Prince William of Denmark, who had the advantage of being brother-in-law to the heirs-apparent of both England and Russia. He ascended the throne with the title of George I., bringing with him the Ionian Isles as a dowry.

Russia found indemnification for the reserve she imposed on herself in respect of European affairs in the uninterrupted expansion of her territories and influence in Asia. Even the Crimean War brought no check here. In the Caucasus, where the chief Schamyl had established a sort of theocratic commonwealth, and inspired the bold mountaineers with the resolution to fight for their liberty, the resistance waxed gradually less obdurate, especially after new military roads made the mountains less inaccessible. Even the outbreak of the Crimean War failed to call Schamyl into action, and the allies did nothing to win him as an ally. After the war the Russians threw themselves with redoubled vigor upon the Caucasus. Schamyl

was able to maintain himself in his last fastness, Ghunib in Daghestan, only till September, 1859, when he was carried off a prisoner to St. Petersburg. The subjugation of the Caucasus was soon complete; 400,000 expatriated Circassians were settled by the Porte in Bulgaria, others in Asia Minor. After Japan had opened its ports to the United States and England, Admiral Putjatin, who in 1853 had been sent out to explore the Japanese waters and the coast of Manchuria, concluded in 1855 a treaty gaining the same privileges to Russia, and further ceding to her the island of Saghalien, rich in beds of coal, as well as the northern Kuriles. The conflict of England with China gave occasion to another extension of Russian territory and influence in Eastern Asia. In 1856 the Lower Amur land was incorporated under the name of "The Coast District of Eastern Siberia," and Putjatin, Russia's ambassador at the court of Peking, was adroit enough to avail himself of China's straits, due to her struggle with England, to secure by the treaty of Aigun (May 28, 1858) the cession of the whole left bank of the Amur, together with the coast region on the right, a territory covering some 300,000 square miles. Notwithstanding China's efforts at prevention, a lively trade at once developed itself between the empires, with Kiakhta as its emporium. Shortly thereafter the Khalka Tatars — between the province of Irkutsk and the great Mongolian desert — acknowledged the sway of Russia, while she gradually made her way, across steppes and wastes, to the heart of Mid-Asia. After, by little and little, incorporating three millions of Kirghiz, erecting the fort of Aralsk at the mouth of the Sir-Daria, and constructing a flotilla on the Sea of Aral, Perovski, in the middle of the Crimean War, subdued the robber khan of Khiva, and annexed the upper region of the Sir-Daria to the empire. With this conquest, the immemorial trade-routes of Inner Asia fell into Russia's hands, the Caspian became covered with Russian vessels, and an effectual check was imposed upon the plundering Turkoman tribes. With growing anxiety England saw these advances that made Russia more and more her rival for ascendancy in Asia. Much to her relief, Gortchakoff, in November, 1864, indicated the line leading from the Lake Issi-Kul by way of Tchemkend to the Sir-Daria as Russia's natural boundary in these regions, which she would not, out of regard to her own interests, overpass. Scarcely was the line reached, when General Tchernayeff (1865) crossed it without scruple, captured Tashkend, the emporium of the Middle Asiatic and Chinese trade,

and took possession of the whole of Turkestan as a Russian province. On May 14, 1868, General Kaufmann entered Samarkand. The khan of Bokhara also became a vassal of Russia.

England, during these years, enjoyed greater internal repose than almost any one of the states of the Continent. Since the Chartist fiasco of 1848, she had experienced no movement whose promoters spoke of an appeal to arms. It was different in Ireland. There the aspirations with which the great agitator, O'Connell, had inspired the people still glowed in many hearts. It is true that the "Young Ireland" party was composed mainly of journalists, students, littérateurs, and embryo poets; but the Continental revolutions of 1848 operated to convert this semi-sentimental literary organization into a political confederacy. Smith O'Brien, a man of family and large possessions, but whose head was turned by the adulation of the people, was, with Meagher, at its head. But a more extreme faction broke away from this under the leadership of John Mitchel, and declared for an immediate appeal to arms; its organ, "The United Irishman," proclaimed weekly the virtues of vitriol. As the existent laws were not adequate to deal with such reckless patriotism, the government armed itself with stronger and sharper measures, and Mitchel was sentenced to transportation for fourteen years. On "Young Ireland" becoming thereupon more noisily demonstrative the habeas corpus act was suspended, and warrants issued for the arrest of the ringleaders; and after a brief collision with the police the 'rebellion' was at an end. O'Brien and Meagher were sentenced to death, but the penalty was commuted into transportation for life. Later Meagher and Mitchel succeeded in making their escape, and with that the "Young Ireland" movement vanished from sight. But the evils in which it had its origin were in no measure remedied. It seemed as if custom had made the people of England blind to them.

But they were moved to real excitement when Pope Pius IX., encouraged by the Catholic tendencies of the Anglican church, in a bull "given at St. Peter's in Rome under the seal of the fisherman," September 20, 1850, re-established a hierarchy in England, which should derive its titles from its respective sees, "which we, by this present decretal, erect into distinct apostolic provinces." In accordance with this all England was partitioned into dioceses, and placed under the care of an archbishop and twelve bishops. Cardinal Wiseman, a learned priest, and eminent preacher and controversialist,



but a man of overweening episcopal arrogance, was named archbishop of Westminster. Since the Reformation no cardinal had been seen within the borders of England. The cry of "No Popery" resounded anew from one end of the land to the other; and the archbishop's pastoral letter, with its defiant announcement that England again took her place in the glorious constellation of the whole body Catholic, was not calculated to allay the excitement. Lord John Russell, than whom there was no more zealous advocate of toleration, in an open letter to the bishop of Durham, denounced the pope's arrogance in the strongest terms as inconsistent with the queen's supremacy, the rights of the church of England, and the independence of the nation. Mass meetings, day after day, gave even more vigorous expression to their condemnation of the pope's procedure, and petitions without number were sent up to the queen and parliament. Cardinal Wiseman was personally insulted in Liverpool, and his effigy was burned everywhere in place of that of Guy Fawkes. Never had the generation witnessed such an outburst of indignation. The government introduced a bill to prohibit Roman Catholic priests assuming titles derived from any place or district within the United Kingdom. But on the inapplicability of this to Ireland making itself obvious, the substance was so far dropped out of the bill as to leave little more than a general declaration against the assumption of illegal titles.

England suffered a severe loss in the death, on July 2, 1850, of Sir Robert Peel, who, if not her greatest, was her most patriotic and most upright statesman. The whole nation mourned him, only Palmerston expressing himself coolly on the subject. In point of fact, the accident left Palmerston the most influential statesman in England. The stand he took on the side of the peoples and against the governments during the convulsions of 1848-1849, although dictated by anything rather than by a love for the democracy, had gained him from the Continental governments the title of 'Lord Firebrand,' and the character of a patron of the Revolution and a time-server. Endowed with a peculiar faculty for foreign politics, and, once engaged in a conflict, ready to sacrifice everything for victory, he often bore himself towards other states with an easy recklessness, that, when exhibited to the weaker, almost assumed the character of brutal insolence. This Greece experienced in a marked manner on the occasion of two British subjects invoking the help of their government against that of Hellas. The appel-



lants were men of very different type, — the one, Dom Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew, whose house the mob of Athens had plundered out of revenge for having been prohibited from celebrating Easter in their customary way by burning Judas Iscariot; the other, Finlay, the historian of Greece, a part of whose property in Athens had been seized, in spite of his protest, to be converted into the royal garden. Convinced that France stood in the background, and was weaving an intrigue against England, Palmerston insisted most peremptorily on satisfaction; and since the Greek government hesitated to comply, a British squadron appeared off the Piræus, in January, 1850, and laid an embargo on all the Greek shipping in the harbor. Greece, thus brow-beaten, appealed for support to the two other protecting powers; but these received in London the scantily civil intimation that this was a matter between England and Greece alone, and one with which other powers had nothing to do. The wily Jew took advantage of the situation to swell his claim to an immoderate amount. Even the House of Lords passed a resolution disapproving of the high-handed procedure of the minister, but Palmerston was adroit enough to give it the color of being motived solely by the desire that every Englishman abroad should feel himself secure of the protective arm of his government. After his brilliant speech in defence of this policy, the House of Commons voted approval of his conduct. Out of regard to Russia and France, however, he deemed it prudent to settle the matter by a compromise.

Even the queen not seldom complained of Palmerston's arbitrary modes of procedure, and with the prince consort — in whom he saw her irresponsible private minister — his relations were not a little strained; but this affected his conduct but little, his rule of action being based on the conviction that so long as he enjoyed the confidence of the country he had nothing to fear from any one. When his premature approval of Napoleon's *coup d'état* led to his exclusion from power, all the world held his career as definitely closed; but within a few weeks he avenged himself on his late colleagues by defeating them through his amendment on their militia bill. Lord Derby formed a new cabinet; but as, besides himself and Disraeli, its members were men of slight political capacity, while his position was surrounded by difficulties in connection with the corn-laws and the navigation-act, and, above all, through the growing popularity of the free trade policy of the Manchester School, he

felt himself compelled to resign, December 16, 1852. A new administration (Coalition) was formed under Aberdeen, the leader of the Peel party, with Gladstone, now forty-three years of age, as its leading spirit. Even as early as 1838 this statesman had made his name heard by his book, "The State in its Relations to the Church," and he rendered it more illustrious through his brilliancy as a debater, and by being the most perfect master of parliamentary eloquence among the Peelites. To the surprise of every one, Palmerston also entered the ministry; and the wonder was heightened when he undertook not the foreign office, with which he was regarded as indissolubly associated, but the home department, with which he had had hitherto nothing to do. The desire of binding the new ruler of France more closely to England was probably the main reason for his recall. But neither had this cabinet a long life. Russell's withdrawal and Roebuck's motion, of which we have spoken, brought about its fall; and Palmerston's elevation to the premiership was now inevitable.

The Crimean War was the last occasion on which England interfered independently in Continental relations. Parliament and people were alike wearied out with the strain put upon her by this struggle; and she developed more and more a disposition to interfere in foreign affairs only in a diplomatic way, and to let her internal prosperity be disturbed as little as possible by outside complications. The inability of the fleet to cope with coast fortifications, made manifest in the war, and the Continental tendency towards colossal land forces raised by conscription, with which England could not vie, tended to conform this disposition. All the more earnestly, therefore, did she address herself to opportune reforms at home. The attempts to open the doors of Parliament to Jews had more than once been approved by the Lower House, and as often frustrated by the Lords. But after the carrying of Russell's motion for the omission of the formula "on the true faith of a Christian" from the oath administered to a Jew, Disraeli, himself a Jew by birth, had, as leader of the House of Commons, the satisfaction of seeing Baron Rothschild take his seat (July, 1858) as one of the representatives of the city of London, and Jewish emancipation thereby converted into a reality. The long antiquated rule requiring each member to prove that he was a landed proprietor was superseded by one requiring a county member to show that he was worth £600 a year; a borough member, £300. The year 1857

saw the abolition of the penalty of transportation, first enacted in 1717, Botany Bay having been selected as the penal settlement in 1787, and, later, Van Diemen's Land and Norfolk Island. The colonists had long protested against the system, but in vain, till the discovery of the Australian gold-fields put an end to it conclusively. In 1856 Cyrus M. Field, an American merchant, came to Liverpool to advocate the laying of a submarine telegraph cable across the Atlantic. The idea seemed to the English mind chimerical; yet it met a better reception than did the scheme of the French engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps, for cutting a canal through the Isthmus of Suez, a few months later. Politicians, capitalists, engineers, with one voice scouted this, its especial opponent being Palmerston, because by it Egypt would be still more completely cut off from the Turkish empire and a way opened to the East Indies.

The events occurring beyond seas, within the wide sphere of Britain's influence and interests, stirred her peaceful home-life only on the surface. Wranglings went on persistently with China, who, notwithstanding the terrible civil war which lacerated her southern provinces, tried to escape from the obligations of the peace of 1842. All attempts hitherto made by the native Chinese to eject the Tsing dynasty from its conquest-won throne had failed through their dread of the Manchu troops. After the war with England revealed the weakness of these warriors, these attempts gained in boldness and persistence. In 1851 an adventurer of the name of Hung-siu-tsuen had himself proclaimed emperor in the province of Kwangsi; and on his capture of Nanking, in March, 1853, this city was designed as the central point or capital of the new empire of Tai-ping, or Universal Peace. Although Emperor Hung, whose head had been turned by the teaching of the missionaries, gave himself out as the younger brother of Christ, the revolt was in reality nothing more than a Chinese uprising against Manchu domination. Hung afflicted this richly cultivated district with atrocious cruelty, but was never able to press farther towards the north than the Yang-tse-Kiang; and the recapture of Nanking, on July 16, 1864, by troops — the 'Ever Victorious Army' — which had been organized on the European model by the American, Ward, and the Englishman, Gordon, made an end of the rebellion, after it had cost not far from two million lives. Before the fall of the city the Tai-ping emperor (Tien-wang) put an end by cremation to his own life and those of his wives.

The more impotent the Peking government had shown itself to be



in dealing with this rebellion, the less were the English disposed to rest quiescent under such rude demonstrations of vigor as that given by Yeh, governor of Canton, in his seizure of the *lorcha*, or cutter, "Arrow," navigating the Si-Kiang under the British flag. The crew were imprisoned on the charge of piracy, and the British consul's demand for their release refused on the plea that the vessel was not English but Chinese, without any right to carry British colors. The Chinese exasperation over the coolie-trade, through which, under the pretext of hiring free labor, the British tried to make up for the loss of slaves in their colonies, had doubtless a part in prompting this energetic action of the mandarin. But Sir John Bowring, the British governor of Hong Kong, at once took the matter in hand, and demanded, not only compensation, but a pledge that no such occurrence should be repeated in the future, threatening reprisals unless full satisfaction were given within forty-eight hours. The dread of consequences induced Yeh to compliance; but Bowring, nevertheless, caused Admiral Seymour to cannonade Canton, and destroy a large number of junks. To this violent procedure Yeh replied by setting a price on the head of every Englishman. The matter attracted great attention in England; and, although the House of Lords rejected a vote of censure on the British authorities in China, — proposed by Lord Derby, — the Lower House, on the motion of Cobden, supported by Gladstone, Disraeli, Roebuck, Lytton, and Russell, adopted such a vote by a majority of sixteen. Yet, though the modern world had scarcely seen such a flagrant abuse of the power of the stronger, Palmerston, trusting to the popular feeling in regard to the sacredness of the British flag, instead of resigning, appealed to the country and carried a triumphant victory. Cobden and the other leaders of the Manchester party lost their seats, and 'the great war-minister' returned to office stronger than ever.

Suddenly, however, England received a shock, such as had scarcely been known to history. On July 23, 1857, London celebrated the centenary of the battle of Plassey, which established British rule in India; and almost simultaneously with this a mutiny broke forth in that land that shook her sway to its very foundations. Undoubtedly India had been indebted to British rule for many blessings. The administration of Lord Dalhousie (governor-general from 1847), especially, had been distinguished by a series of the most beneficent reforms, — among which may be reckoned the construction of highways, railroads, and canals, the institution of the tele-



graph, and of a postal and native educational system, the promotion of irrigation, and the suppression of infanticide and widow-burning. He added the Panjab to the empire; and, after Lord Gough had subdued the Sikhs and driven their confederates, the Afghans, back through the mountain-passes, he overran Burma, and compelled its king to cede the province of Pegu. Moreover, the death of every Indian prince was made a pretext for declaring that his domains had fallen into the empire. In this way Nagpur, Satterah, Jhansi, and Berar were annexed in succession, and finally the kingdom of Oudh, which alone contributed a population of from four to five millions. The costliest and most tangible trophy of his successes was the famous Koh-i-nur diamond, surrendered by the maharajah of Lahore to Dalhousie, and by him sent to Queen Victoria.

These innovations, deeply affecting the conditions of Hindu life, and the overthrow in rapid succession of so many thrones regarded as sacred, roused a wave of excitement that passed through the whole native population, and stirred it up to redoubled antipathy to foreign rule. Fanatics promulgated an old prophecy that this rule was to endure only for a hundred years; the Afghan war had shown that British soldiers were not invincible; the mischances of the Crimean War, which Oriental fantasy had exaggerated extravagantly, and, above all, the successes of Russia in Asia, had impressed the Hindus with the conviction that England's power was on the wane. Moreover, they knew that she was on the eve of hostilities with China, and that General Outram, at the head of a considerable force, was in motion upon Persia, against which the governor-general had declared war, because it had, at the instigation of Russia and in violation of its engagements with England, compelled the surrender of Herat. The fulness of time for a rising seemed to have come, and a spark only was needed to start the inflammable material into flame. This spark was supplied by the introduction among the native (Sepoy) troops of the Enfield rifle, whose cartridges, opened with the teeth, were said to be greased with a mixture of tallow and lard. To the Hindu the cow is a sacred animal; to the Mohammedan the swine is unclean. Although the governor-general had caused this rumor to be denied on authority, the Sepoys remained fast in their conviction that this was part of a plot against their religion as well as against their cherished system of caste. A spirit of disaffection diffused itself everywhere; whole bodies of troops refused to handle the new weapons, and the severe punishments inflicted served

only to enhance the embitterment. Military grievances, national hate, and religious fanaticism all conspired to the same end. Native princes, too, participated in the movement; and — what the English never dreamed of — Mohammedans and Hindus forgot their religious antipathies to unite in accomplishing the overthrow of British supremacy in India. In the north there were 120,000 Sepoys in the British service; of Europeans but 22,000. The native troops in all the three presidencies amounted to 300,000; the European, to only 43,000, and of these 5000 were in the field against Persia, the rest being dispersed over an immense extent of territory. The prospects for a revolt could scarcely be more favorable.

On May 10, 1857, within a year after Lord Canning became Dalhousie's successor, the mutiny broke openly forth at Meerut. The Sepoys massacred their officers and other Europeans, and liberated eighty of their comrades who had been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for insubordination. The European troops, indeed, rallied and repelled the mutineers; but the latter now threw themselves into Delhi, and, proclaiming the octogenarian king — a descendant of Timur and a pensioner of the East Indian Company — emperor of India, planted the flag of rebellion on his palace. Immense quantities of warlike supplies fell into their hands; the Sepoys of the neighboring districts joined them; the mutiny had become a national and religious war.

Although warning voices had not been wanting to admonish England of her peril, yet the tidings of the outbreak struck her like a thunderbolt. The news of the wholesale massacres, especially of the atrocious cruelties perpetrated on defenceless women and children, sent a thrill of horror through the heart of the nation that sank all thought for the preservation of India in its thirst for vengeance. Fortunately Lord Canning did not let himself be carried away by this furor of passion, but acted with thoughtful discretion. On his own responsibility he retained the troops destined for China, and used them for the suppression of the rising. Luckily for him the war with Persia was of short duration. Through the mediation of France it was brought to a close by a peace signed in Paris, March 4, 1857, according to which the shah, in consideration of England's retrocession of her conquests, evacuated Herat, and pledged himself, in the event of future complications with Afghanistan, to call on the good offices of England. The efforts to preserve the presidencies of Madras and Bombay from the contagion of

rebellion proved successful; while the Sepoys stationed in Lahore were disarmed, and the Northwest Provinces thus made safe. The Panjab was held in obedience by Chief Commissioner General John Lawrence, and by this the most indispensable condition secured: viz., a basis for operations against Delhi. Moreover, certain of the native princes and rulers continued steadfast in their loyalty to England, particularly the Maharajah Sindhia of Gwalior, and Rani, princess of Jhansi, who, in the uniform of a cavalry officer, led her troops to battle in person.

But all this did not prevent the mutiny from breaking out at other points, while the siege of Delhi was dragging along its slow length under many difficulties. In Lucknow, Sir Henry Lawrence, governor of Oudh, had to retire with men, women, and children into the fortified residence, and there sustain a harassing siege till he was killed by a shot. The commandant of Cawnpore, General Sir Hugh Wheeler, had called on him for help; but as not a man was to be spared from Lucknow, Sir Hugh addressed himself to his neighbor, Nana Sahib, esteemed as loyal, who hurried to him with well-feigned readiness. In reality Nana was athirst for revenge, because the English government had denied him a competent pension. No sooner had he arrived than he placed himself at the head of the mutineers. The English — 465 men, 280 women, and as many children — hemmed in at the magazine, heroically repulsed all assaults. Nana, in despair of mastering them by force, pledged himself that they should have free departure on condition of delivering up their arms. There was no alternative left them. But when they were in the act of embarking on the Ganges the men were treacherously attacked and shot down, while the women and children were seized as prisoners. But General Havelock, with 1000 English soldiers and six cannon, was already on the march, and, after forcing his way in the face of numerous bands far superior in numbers, appeared before Cawnpore. Infuriated with rage, Nana massacred his defenceless prisoners, throwing several while yet alive into a well, and then ventured a battle before the city-gates. Defeated, he sought refuge amidst the jungles and swamps of Nepal and was never more heard of. His lieutenant and accomplice, Tantia Topi, was captured at a later period, and hanged. Delhi, after a long and obstinate siege, was taken by storm by General Archdale Wilson, the king with his family captured, his palace looted, three of his princes shot down without formality, and he himself sentenced to



transportation. General Outram—now back from Persia—was sent to Oudh with unlimited authority, but generously resigned to Havelock the noble task of relieving Lucknow, and delivering those shut up in it from the fate of the Cawnpore victims. Havelock forced his way thither in the face of heavy opposition, but was himself shut in, and had to wait till Sir Colin Campbell—now named commander-in-chief of all the forces in India—relieved him in turn, and conveyed his sick and wounded, women and children in safety to Calcutta. Worn out with his heroic labors, Havelock died on November 24. Campbell thereupon took Cawnpore; and on March 19, 1858, the resolutely defended Lucknow—the two main foci of rebellion. The mutiny, conducted without plan or system, now gradually died out, and the warrior gave place to the executioner, who carried out his task with merciless severity and unwearied assiduity. On May 1, 1859, England was able to celebrate the suppression of the mutiny by a day of general thanksgiving.

The rising resulted in putting an end to the rule of the East India Company. In point of fact the administration of India had for a long time been out of its unlimited control. The Board of Directors was only partially nominated by the company, the government also naming a part, while through the Board of Control it had the power of reviewing and modifying the decrees of the company. The governor-general was named by the crown. The company had the power of recalling him. On the whole, the system of double government had long been found to be cumbrous and unworkable. The revolt simply demonstrated the impossibility of continuing it. Already, in 1853, the privileges of the company had not been renewed, as usual, for a definite period, but only till parliament should otherwise determine; and now by enactment of the latter the entire government of India was vested in the crown, September 1, 1858. Queen Victoria was proclaimed sovereign throughout all India, and Lord Canning became her first viceroy.

The Indian mutiny had operated to defer the war with China. In this England now found a coadjutor in France, who had long felt herself aggrieved by the Middle Empire, through the refusal of satisfaction for the murder of her missionaries. Moreover, it seemed to the Emperor Napoleon very seasonably expedient to unite his arms once more with those of England, and that in an enterprise presenting few difficulties. As the Chinese remained obdurate, Canton was taken possession of by the united fleets, and the Mandarin



Yeh made prisoner. But not till the allies proceeded to the mouth of the Pei-ho River, and, capturing the forts there, sailed up the stream, did the pride of the Chinese government abase itself. The Treaty of Tientsin, concluded by it with Lord Elgin and Baron Gros (June 26-27, 1858), granted to England and France the right of maintaining embassies at the court of Peking, and reciprocal rights to the Emperor of China at London and Paris. Toleration was secured for Christians, and freer ingress for the ships of the allies into Chinese waters, and for their subjects into the interior of the country. China paid the costs of the war, and Europeans were no longer to be branded as barbarians. Russia and the United States became parties to the treaty. The French Admiral Rigault de Genouilly took advantage of his presence in Eastern waters to demand, in concert with Spain, satisfaction from the king of Annam for the murder of missionaries and Christian converts in his territory. On February 17, 1859, he captured Saigun, defeating an army advancing to its relief. The king of Annam thereupon sued for peace, but the negotiations fell through. Not till 1866 did hostilities come to a close, and France enter upon the by no means tranquil possession of a new colony.

The Peace of Tientsin was but short-lived. When the representatives of England and France were on their way to Peking for the exchange of ratifications they found their way barred by the (restored) forts at the mouth of the Pei-ho river, whose commanders declared themselves without authority to permit their passage. They offered, indeed, to apply to Peking for such authority; but Admiral Hope, regarding this as only one of the customary Chinese evasions, attempted to effect the passage by force, but was repulsed. Although the British government manifested little desire to proceed to extremities, it allowed itself to be overruled by the French emperor, who was anxious at once to give the world assurance of the firmness of the English alliance, and to satisfy his clergy of his care for their interests, as well as to gratify his people's craving for a new sensation. On August 30, 1860, the allies made themselves masters of the Kaku forts at the mouth without firing a shot, then captured, after an obdurate struggle, those lying on the left bank, whereupon the rest surrendered, and the way was open to Tientsin. A mandarin of the first class was found here, and preliminaries of peace were agreed on. On a sudden the Chinese diplomat vanished. The whole thing was a ruse to give the Chinese commander, San-ko

li-tsin, time to organize renewed resistance. The approach of winter counselled prompt action, and the allied generals decided to march on Peking. On the way they were met by Prince Tsai and War-Minister Khung, but again the object was only to gain time. Of six Englishmen and twelve Frenchmen who, through treachery, fell into the hands of the Chinese, some were murdered, and the others barbarously maltreated. Advance was barred by 50,000 Tatars, who, in the battle that ensued, were completely routed. Even this did not altogether discourage the Chinese. At the bridge of Palikao, crossing the canal, the allies were again assailed by immense masses of Tatar horsemen, armed, however, only with matchlocks or bows, and wholly ignorant of the art of war. These, too, were cleared out of the way and the road stood open to Peking. Prince Kong, the emperor's younger brother, now made his appearance with a petition for cessation of hostilities; but as the Chinese refused the immediate release of the prisoners, the advance was continued unchecked. For the first time European feet trod the streets of the capital of the Heavenly Empire, which, up to this time, fancy had exaggerated beyond measure. They found it, as well as the imperial palace, deserted. The permission granted to his troops by the French commander-in-chief, Montauban (Fig. 23) to carry away 'mementoes' from the latter resulted in the most shameful looting of the elegant buildings filled with costly objects of all kinds. The summer palace — Yuen-Ming-Yuen — with all its irreplaceable treasures, Lord Elgin gave to the flames in retribution for the inhuman treatment of the captives. Yet the situation of the allies — to whom the court, which had taken refuge in Manchuria, was inaccessible — began to become critical, when, thanks to the exertions of Prince Kong, and the mediation of the Russian minister, peace was concluded, October 25, 1860. This conceded to the European powers the right of having representatives in Peking, and opened Tientsin and other cities to commerce, guaranteed a war indemnity of 8,000,000 taels, made emigration from China free, and ceded to England the district of Cowloon. Shortly thereafter (August, 1861) the emperor Hienfong died; and Prince Kong, who acted as regent for his youthful nephew, Tungchi, taught by experience, renouncing the traditional Chinese system of isolation, concluded commercial treaties with other countries, including Prussia, Spain, Portugal, and Denmark. The western powers lent the regent armed assistance in suppressing the Tai-ping rebellion.



FIG. 23. — Montauban, Count of Palikao. From a photograph.



Unacceptable as this great change might be, and was, to the people and officials of China, yet the epoch-making fact was accomplished of the opening of Eastern Asia and its introduction into the community of nations. China's neighbor nationality, Japan, on recognizing the inevitable, submitted yet more readily to the same conditions.

The heaven-born head of this empire, the Mikado, or Tenno, descended from a dynasty that reached back to the seventh century before Christ, — the oldest on earth, — exercised his function mainly through the royal commander-in-chief, the Shogun, or Tycoon, side by side with whom the feudal aristocracy of the Daimios gradually developed itself. But after several of these princes had made a vain attempt in the twelfth century to usurp the secular government to themselves, the power of the Mikado was gradually reduced to a shadow by that of the Shogun — now become hereditary, — and his person was detained in inaccessible seclusion. Intercourse with neighboring lands and immigration from them was free till the end of the sixteenth century, even the introduction of Christianity — at first through designing Portuguese, then through the superabundant zeal of the Jesuits — met no impediment, several even of the Daimios consenting to baptism. However, in 1582, after the peasant-born Hideyosi (who later assumed the title of Taikosama or Universal Ruler) attained through adoption the dynasty of the Shogun, and had to contend with a rising of the Daimios mainly dependent on Christian support, he not only inaugurated a system of ruthless persecution of the Christians, but closed the empire “forever” to all foreigners with the exception of the Chinese, to whom (as later to the Dutch) entry was conceded at a few points under the most stringent restrictions. Natives were forbidden to leave the country on pain of death. Nor was a breach effected in the iron wall of exclusion till the United States gained an interest in the matter by the acquisition of California and the rapid development of San Francisco, and desired, accordingly, commercial relations with the western shores of the Pacific, and especially harbors of refuge for her whaling fleets. Then Commodore Perry compelled the Shogun to subscribe the treaty of March 31, 1854, by which the United States acquired the right of taking in wood, water, and provisions in the harbors of Hakodadi and Simoda, and of prosecuting trade and establishing consulates there. These privileges were shortly after expanded and extended to the other sea-faring nations. A Japanese



embassy visited Paris and London. But the very suddenness of the revolution gave rise to a violent reaction. The Daimios' hate for foreigners found expression not only in acts of violence — for which reprisals were exacted — but was directed also against the Shogun, respect for whom died away before the exactions of the naval powers and the popular discontent. In 1866 open civil war broke out, which ended in 1868, with the entire abolition of the Shogunate, and the restoration of the governing power to the Mikado, who transferred his residence to Yedo, henceforth named Tokio. At the same time the feudal power of the Daimios was utterly broken, and Japan entered on, and with the single exception of Satsuma's revolt in 1877 persevered in, the path of European progress, hitherto so strange, at a rate that has astonished the world.

## CHAPTER IV.

### NAPOLEON III. AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ITALIAN UNITY.

THE Crimean War was the grandest triumph of the Second Empire. Napoleon had restored to France that halo of martial glory of which she had been so long deprived, and had dictated a peace to Europe. The birth of a son seemed to give the assurance of permanence to the dynasty. The oracle which had hitherto given its responses from St. Petersburg was now consulted in Paris, where the threads of European policy centred. The visit of Prince Frederick William of Prussia, bridegroom of the English princess Victoria, to the imperial court, in December, 1856, was the signal for a formal pilgrimage of princes and crowned heads to the Tuileries; and the oldest dynasties vied with each other in their courtesies toward the new potentate. During the Universal Exposition the empire showed itself in its most brilliant aspect. Day after day there were reviews in the Champ-de-Mars or festivities in the Tuileries. The baptism of the prince imperial was celebrated with unexampled pomp; the legate who represented Pope Pius IX. as godfather brought the empress the consecrated golden rose.

At home the new sovereignty seemed fixed immovably, the clergy constituting one of its strongest stays. As this body had promoted the election of Louis Napoleon, so now it placed all its resources at his disposal and glorified the chosen of the people as a new Constantine and Charlemagne. The Falloux instruction law of 1850 had, as it were, set the seal of consecration on the alliance and, although it later experienced modifications by which the power of the clergy was limited in favor of that of the prefects, the former were still left abundant scope for extending their spiritual sway over the minds of men. At Salette in Dauphiné the Virgin appeared to shepherd-children, and the place became a pilgrim-shrine. The capture of the Malakoff on Mary's birthday the Ultramontane bishops ascribed to this special homage to the Mother of God; and the emperor dedicated a portion of the cannon captured in Sebastopol for a colossal statue in her honor that should testify to all time to the

bond of union between the empire and the church. When on January 3, 1857, Archbishop Sibour of Paris was murdered in the Church of St.-Étienne by an unfrocked priest (Vergès), the Ultramontanes gave it to be understood that this was his punishment for his opposition to the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Nevertheless, the law of 1850 was accepted by the clerics as an instalment only; and Fortoul, minister of instruction, actually conceded the correctness of their view by laying the axe to the root of the University, so hated by them. Of this once so proud and so powerful institution, there remained now little more than the name. The most renowned professors were compelled to desist from teaching or voluntarily tendered their resignations. The University was then partitioned into twenty-seven academies, the High Council of Instruction was subverted, the Collège de France, the Museum of Natural History, and the other high schools of science 'reformed,' robbed of their independence and of the power of naming their own members, which henceforth were often intruded on them for state reasons. The philosophical and literary courses in the middle schools were so far restricted that in 1854 Fortoul was able to boast he had restored the Trivium and Quadrivium.<sup>1</sup>

All this tended to minimize the danger threatened the government from the side of the Legitimists. Though the partisans of "divine right" could not do otherwise than theoretically condemn the principle of the sovereignty of the people on which the empire professedly rested, yet they, with the exception of the bigoted royalists, generally made their peace with it; and many of them went so far as to accept office from the new government. Nor did the Orleanists furnish more matter of dread. The middle classes, from which this party was mainly recruited, lived in such awe of socialism and of the system of espionage by which they were environed, that they did not dare to give even a sign of life, while the princes of Orleans, who hurried hither on the news of December 2, found there was nothing for them to do. The judicial class, among whom were found Dupin, Portalis, and so many other eminent Orleanists, gave in their adhesion without scruple, so that it may be said the whole party of order accommodated itself to the new rule in order to be saved from a republic. Guizot, Salvandy,

<sup>1</sup> The number of "Arts" embraced in the full mediæval course of learning was seven: Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric (constituting the *Trivium*); Music, Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy (the *Quadrivium*). — TR.

Duchâtel and others labored for a fusion of the Orleanists and Legitimists, and contemplated the adoption of the count of Paris by the childless count of Chambord (Fig. 24). Nemours went to Frohsdorf to meet the latter; and the head of the elder line returned the visit, in 1854, at the house of the widowed queen, Marie Amélie, in England. But the plan was wrecked on the insuperable opposition of the duchess of Orleans, who perfectly recognized its essential



FIG. 24. — Comte de Chambord. From a photograph.

impracticability. The workingmen's party and Socialism vanished from sight with December 2. It is true the vanquished of that day rallied at points beyond the French border, in order to organize new centres of conspiracy; but almost every one of the governments expelled the refugees out of regard for the emperor, England alone offering them an asylum. The press was bridled by the new system of 'warnings' invented by Rouher (Fig. 25), and press-offences were withdrawn from juries, and left to be dealt with by the criminal



police courts. A second conviction within a year (in certain circumstances a single one) sufficed to infer suppression of the paper; a simple ministerial order suspended it for two months. Foreign journals could be circulated only with the consent of the government.



FIG. 25. — Eugène Rouher. From a photograph.

If, after such triumphs, the empire required further justification for its existence, it seemed to find this in the unparalleled material progress of the nation. Within a year the indirect taxes increased by 61,000,000 francs, the five per cent rentes rose from fifty-six to eighty-two. The brilliantly successful conversion of the latter into

four and a half per cents not only relieved the state treasury, but threw cheaper capital on the market to the animation of the spirit of enterprise. Nor did Napoleon let this lack for encouragement from above. The last measures of the time of his dictatorship had been the authorization for the establishment of land-banks of credit, and of agricultural chambers in the departments. In the *Crédit Mobilier*, — an invention of the brothers Pereyre — there now arose a new kind



FIG. 26. — Baron Haussmann, Prefect of the Department of the Seine. From a photograph.

of banks calculated to attract the mass of small capitalists, and so to call new industrial enterprises into life. The construction of canals and railroads was stimulated. With the nomination of Haussmann (Fig. 26) as prefect of the Seine a new era dawned for Paris, which changed the old capital, with its narrow, crooked, many-cornered streets, into a new city, strategically laid out, with wide, elegant boulevards and broad, straight thoroughfares. To the appropriation for these works of 180,000,000 francs, the city itself added a third.

The Bois de Boulogne was converted into a charming park ; and with the removal of the unsightly structures which separated the Tuileries from the Louvre, began the construction of that complexity of palaces, the completion of which the emperor celebrated, August 13, 1857, by the institution of the St. Helena medal.

One main object in undertaking these great operations was the providing of remunerative employment for the working-classes. The problem of how to ameliorate the condition of the lower classes had long before this exercised the mind of the political exile and prisoner of Ham. With this end the suspension of all public works on Sundays and holidays was ordained, as well as a reform in the administration of the badly-ordered hospitals, 'homes,' and pawnshops, while the bureaus for information regarding work were organized under rules. But the true motive in all that was done for the fourth estate was not a humane, but a political, one. Elevated by the masses to the supreme power, the emperor had nothing so much to fear as their discontent. The satisfying of their needs or cravings was, therefore, the prime object in the system of the Second Empire. Not loyalty, but material interests, bound the masses to it ; and this impressed it with the stamp of materialism. The readiness with which the higher orders, despite their aversion to the empire, imitated it in this baser feature, gave alarming evidence that concurrently with this brilliant rehabilitation of France in respect of external power, in the country itself there was going on a process of deterioration and degeneracy in political and ethical morality, for which the system of government was largely responsible. The world of rank and culture, now that it could no longer occupy itself with great political questions, fell into a state, not of lethargy merely, but of corruption. Giving itself up to idle and frivolous small talk, it found its chief entertainment in the vices of the court and city, and called into being a peculiar variety of the periodical press, that pursued scandal as a specialty, and shamelessly paraded before the public eye the most carefully hidden secrets of private life. The Academy, retaining only the shadow of its former greatness, would have fallen altogether out of remembrance, had it not been that in the universal silence imposed on France by the *coup d'état*, it alone preserved the privilege of speech. To make the characterlessness of the daily press complete, the communication of official information was transformed in the hands of the prefects into a formal subvention of certain papers, while others were in the pay of financial magnates, and







Empress Eugenie and the ladies of her court

From the painting by F. X. Winterhalter

promoted the game of the bourse, i.e., the spoliation of the little capitalists for the benefit of the great.

Then, again, the spirit of enterprise set on fire from above — that ‘democratization of capital’ through the *Crédit Mobilier* and similar institutions, by which the government proposed to itself to play the part of Providence in regard to the people’s means — unchained a mania for speculation, a sort of crazy dance around the golden calf, which became all the madder the less the people found a countervailing influence in their appreciation of higher interests. Paris became not only the centre of universal stock-jobbing, but the headquarters of a luxury that scattered gold with full hands, and revelled in the indulgence of sensuous gratification. If the stream of gold seemed for a moment to slacken, a new issue of shares set it again aflow. In this strange social maelstrom an entirely new class of parvenus developed itself, consisting of speculators, wire-pullers, and the like, suddenly arrived at wealth, who shared among themselves the spoils of the *coup d’état*. In vain did the emperor strive to free himself from such associates. Once in their toils he could do no other than follow them. The new society gave tone to the court of the Tuileries. All its outside pomp and splendor were unavailing to hide the pool of filth, libertinage, scandal, favoritism, and vulgar baseness seething below. The development of an immoderate luxury naturally provoked questions regarding the sources of the wealth that fed it; and unsavory rumors began to float about regarding equivocal speculations even by persons in the highest positions. The prince consort detected even in those about the person of the emperor somewhat of the odor of the canteen and the barracks. It was the part of no one so much as of the first lady of the land to inspire her court circle with a nobler spirit, but for this the Empress Eugénie (PLATE VIII.) was qualified by the culture neither of her head nor heart. Notwithstanding her beauty, she did not understand how to win the love of a people whose pride was little gratified by having a *parvenue* for their sovereign. Just as little was her husband qualified to drag his court up out of the mire; not so much, probably, because he himself set it a miserably dissolute example, as because he sacredly cherished the principle of his uncle, that men are most easily ruled through their vices.

Thus the empire became immeshed more and more in its own essential contradictions. It boasted that it was based on the true democracy, and was bondage; it promised its people a golden age,

and slaughtered freedom of thought; it announced itself as peace, and was born, lived, and died in war; it swaggered like a bully, and was in terror for its life. Intrinsically unable to maintain itself in a land which had lost the power of enduring a permanent form of government, it required the glory of a commanding position abroad to secure for any time its sway at home. But even this glory resembled the *ignis fatuus* which deludes men into the morass. It bore in its bosom germs that were to develop later so fatally for France,—viz., Italian unity and an aggravation of the rivalry between Austria and Prussia.

The personal character of the emperor operated to enhance the difficulties of the situation. Napoleon III. held himself specially called to determine the lot of the nations. He justly recognized the power that national sentiment has acquired in modern times, but the principle of nationality that he deduced therefrom was to be made serviceable to him in destroying the relics of the treaties of 1815. Among the projects engendered in his brain, that of the reconstruction of Italy in a national sense had, since the failure of the Vienna conference, taken a more defined form. His own personal traditions, as well as those of his family, pointed in the same direction; and the reconfirmation of Austria's hegemony over the petty princes of the peninsula was as repugnant to the new principle as to French self-love. The more that he was thus brought into opposition to this power, the more did he cultivate closer relations with Russia. Even as early as the Congress of Paris this was apparent. Count Morny, France's representative at the coronation at Moscow, was received with marked distinction. In July, 1857, a commercial treaty was concluded between the empires, while a personal meeting of their sovereigns, accompanied by their ministers Gortchakoff and Walewski, at Stuttgart, led, if not to a closer bond of alliance, at least to a better understanding.

The state of matters in the various Italian states had become so intolerable as to make its longer endurance impossible. On the Lombardo-Venetian provinces the hand of the conqueror pressed heavily; and, far from trying to conciliate the people through mildness, he had made martial law the sole law in the land. The supreme court was removed from Verona to Vienna, and oppressive taxation seemed to vie with the silk-worm disease in reducing the people to abject poverty. Austria's short-sighted brutality had thoroughly alienated the subject Italians. In Modena the childless

condition of Duke Francis V. made it probable that his land would soon be an inheritance of the Austrian crown. Duke Charles III. of Parma thought only of pleasure and the means to indulge it, for which end the arbitrary proscriptions of private property proved specially effective. On March 26, 1853, this lascivious tyrant was slain by a stiletto in an unknown hand, and five days thereafter the judge intrusted with the investigation of the murder met the same fate. The widowed duchess (daughter of the duchess of Berry), anxious only for the preservation of the throne for her six-year-old son Robert, called men of liberal sentiments to her council, and to meet the land's complete financial ruin pledged her private property for a loan, restricted the expenses of her court, reduced the civil list by a half, and granted the exiles the right of return. It was all too late. The embitterment over the ignominies suffered by the people found vent in a revolt. At once the Austrians pressed in from all sides for its suppression; but the judges who had condemned the ringleaders to death fell one after the other under the stiletto. Soon the courageous duchess had to appear against the brutal General Crenneville in defence of the dignity of her crown and the rights of her land. She demanded, and at the Congress of Paris achieved the withdrawal of the Austrians (who held now only Piacenza), and refused to renew the customs' union with their country.

Tuscany, too, remained till 1855 in the occupation of the Austrians. Although the grand duke had been restored by his own people, yet the emperor of Austria, the head of his house, did not save him this humiliation. A veto was put upon his contemplated re-establishment of the constitution; it had, on the contrary, to be completely abrogated. The press was gagged. The concordat with the papal chair of April 25, 1851, rescinded the clause in the constitution guaranteeing religious equality. Jewish doctors were permitted to treat none but Jewish patients; and the family of Madai, to the scandal of the whole civilized world, were thrown into prison for reading the Bible with their maid-servant. In Naples the bigoted and imperfectly educated King Ferdinand II. had but one thought,—the abasement and subjugation of the middle classes. For this end, and to make the re-enactment of a constitution impossible, he availed himself of the purposely instigated excesses of the populace, and by shutting up his land against the rest of the world sought to prevent the entrance of the Revolution, and thus to



obviate any pretext for foreign interference. The local authorities were chosen from the most incapable and most servile of the people; fathers were denied permission to send their sons into the greater cities for the completion of their education; ultimately even the reading of the official journals in the coffee-houses was forbidden. The scandalously corrupt police were practically omnipotent, and political persecution brought misery and despair upon thousands of families. The number of persons imprisoned was estimated at 30,000, and as many kept themselves in concealment or voluntarily exiled themselves. Gladstone, who investigated the harrowing atrocities of Neapolitan 'justice,' and exposed them in a letter to Lord Aberdeen (which Palmerston sent to the other governments), condenses his judgment into these pregnant words: "This government is a negation of God."

But nowhere were matters in a worse condition than in the States of the Church, where Cardinal Secretary Antonelli, with a hand merciless as it was supple, had enforced the re-establishment of priestly domination. Executions were the order of the day. The discovery of traces of wide-spreading plots in the Holy City itself, whose threads led up to Mazzini and the revolutionary committee, drove Pope Pius IX. yet more unreservedly into the arms of the reaction. Of his so much vaunted reforms the last relics disappeared. The whole official body was unreliable; and the spy-system and brigandage flourished side by side, the latter to such an extent that many bishops were unable to visit parts of their dioceses. Of the soil, six-tenths were held in mortmain; three-tenths were held by princes, mostly relatives of former popes; only one-tenth was in the hands of private proprietors. And while the great church estates, notwithstanding the yearly deficits, were almost tax-free, the small properties were unmercifully taxed. The papal army sank back into its old contemptible condition. In the city French soldiers were required to maintain not only the peace, but the pope's secular authority; in the country, Austrians. From 1849 to 1856 the latter executed 500 persons by sentence of court-martial. Nothing tended so much to alienate the hearts of his subjects from the Holy Father as this foreign occupation. Religion itself suffered from it.

Thus the Reaction and the doings of its patron, Austria, had the effect of directing the eyes of the friends of freedom and country on Sardinia, which, even after the defeat of Novara, was not to be moved to propitiate the clemency of the victor by entering on the



PLATE IX.



Cavour.

From a photograph.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 111.*

path of retrogression. The right to independence achieved, despite this misadventure, on fields of blood, it had first vindicated at home by withstanding the arrogance of the priesthood, which, up to 1848, had ruled uncontrolled in palace, school, and family, had filled every office with its tools, and through them had played the spy on the king himself. On the conclusion of the war, the ministers d'Azeglio and Siccardi made an effort for the mitigation of the priestly yoke, by treating with Rome for some restriction on the prerogatives of the clergy. Baffled in this, the administration set to work independently, and the Siccardi bill of February 27, 1850, subjected the clergy in every relation to the civil law. In order to paralyze the grasping hand of mortmain, it required the consent of the state to the acquisition of landed property or to the acceptance of bequests or gifts by ecclesiastical corporations. Horror took possession of the clerical party at this act of sacrilege! The Holy Father raised his hands to heaven, and prayed merciful God to avert from the people of Piedmont the punishment due to such impiety, and protested against the law. The nuncio left Turin; and its archbishop forbade his priests to obey citations to the secular tribunals, and decreed the ban for all who took part in the execution of the law. The last rites were denied the dying minister, Santa Rosa, because he refused to revoke it. On the archbishop himself refusing to appear before the civil court, he was condemned to imprisonment, and on his release left Turin for Lyons. The archbishop of Cagliari shared his fate.

Cavour (PLATE IX.) succeeded Santa Rosa as minister of agriculture and commerce, October 11, 1850. The king, on giving his assent, jocularly remarked to the other ministers: "For myself, I believe he will heave you all out of the saddle." With him the man destined to be the author of Italian unity entered the ministry.

Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour, was born in 1810, of a rich and noble family. At first he chose the military profession; but, his hopes of taking the field on the side of France against Austria being frustrated, he retired from the army, and devoted himself to agriculture. A two years' residence in London and Paris ripened his views in regard to general politics and political economy. An avowed enemy of Mazzini and "Young Italy," he was none the less an ardent patriot. He was a partner with Balbo and d'Azeglio (Fig. 27) in establishing the journal *Il Risorgimento*. In parliament, where he represented his native city, Turin, from 1849, he was the leader of the Right Centre, without, however, distinguishing himself as an orator,



But a thorough mastery of details, combined with clearness of vision, practical ability, and decision, made him a statesman, while what was wanting to him in many-sidedness was compensated by his warm



FIG. 27. — Massimo d' Azeglio. From a photograph.

love for country, his mental vigor, indomitable capacity for work, and firm belief in the nobility of human nature.

Cavour's entry into the ministry implied reform — energetic, indeed, but well-considered. From the extremes, Right or Left, he held himself equally aloof. First of all, in conformity with his

political and free trade principles, he sought by entering into commercial treaties with France, England, and Belgium to bring the imperfectly developed Sardinia into immediate communication with these civilized and politically advanced nationalities. He labored to cover the land with a network of railroads, which, by the tunnelling of Mont Cenis (begun August, 1857) were to connect with the French system. But he found, to his sorrow, how little he could reckon on most of his colleagues; even the nation was slow to arouse itself from its lethargy. The *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, he hailed, therefore, with pleasure, because he at once comprehended that it involved consequences which might inure to the advancement of the Italian cause. D'Azeglio himself indicated Cavour as his successor; and on November 4, 1852, the latter took his place at the head of the ministry.

The first object of the new premier was to show the world that the Sardinian people knew how to reconcile order and freedom. Austria, incensed, and blinded by thirst for revenge, believed that it had found in a foolish Milanese revolt, which Mazzini promoted from Ticino as a republican prelude to a general rising against foreign rule, the best opportunity for wreaking its vengeance on its hated neighbor. Clear as Cavour had kept himself from being in any way implicated in Mazzini's schemes, yet as representative of Sardinia, which rejected all admonitions to renounce its constitutional aspirations, he was pilloried before all Europe as a member of the European revolutionary committee, and so calumniated as to appear in its eyes the basest of mortals. Although the most searching investigation failed to discover any trace of connection between Mazzini and the Lombardo-Venetian *émigrés* in Sardinia, a decree was issued by Austria, on February 13, 1853, confiscating the goods of the latter. "The Austrians wished," said Cavour, "to do us hurt, and yet have proved of the greatest service to us; we will extract advantage therefrom, and all the sooner cross the Ticino." He recalled the Sardinian envoy from Vienna in token that his country knew how to defend the honor of Italy.

The court of Vienna thought it could best revenge itself by engaging more eagerly than ever before in machinations with the Vatican and the Sardinian clergy, to both of which the minister was doubly obnoxious on account of his moderation in church matters. All the more decidedly was the necessity impressed on Cavour's mind for a reform of church abuses, — as, the excessive number (forty-one)

of archbishoprics and bishoprics, the bondage of the lower clergy, the superabundance of religious houses, and the church's agency in stirring up the country people against the constitution. As the Vatican refused all co-operation, the government went to work independently. A threatening papal allocution was answered by the sequestration of the archiepiscopal properties. On January 22, 1855, the pope pronounced sentence of excommunication on the authors and executors of the law laid before the chambers, without, however, naming them personally. And when immediately thereafter three deaths occurred in rapid succession in the royal family — the king's mother, his wife, and his brother — the finger of God was clearly seen directed against the despoiler of the church. For a moment Victor Emmanuel himself wavered, but quickly recovered himself. Through the Rattazzi law, May 29, 1852, those religious houses which devoted themselves neither to preaching nor to care of the sick were closed to the number of 334, with 4280 monks, and 1198 nuns, and their properties converted into a special ecclesiastical fund — not, as the Radicals demanded, turned into the state treasury.

The first fruits of his daring policy in the Crimean War, Cavour gathered in the opportunity to take an equal part in the Congress of Paris. He availed himself of his presence there to win influence with Napoleon, to ingratiate himself with Lord Clarendon, and to come to a good understanding with Russia. In words of fire he depicted to the representatives of the three great powers the wretched state of Italy, specifying more particularly the condition of Naples and the States of the Church as being a scandal to all humanity, and the iron rule of Austria. But Napoleon did not yet see his way clearly; he desired that Cavour should first of all go to London, and come to an understanding with Palmerston. The trip was made, but found English statesmen too fully occupied by the Indian mutiny to think of doing anything for Italy.

But the great minister did not come back from a fool's errand. "We can boast," he said, "of one grand success. The Italian question is once more elevated into a European one. Italy's cause can no longer be championed by demagogues and revolutionaries; it has been brought before the congress by the plenipotentiaries of the great powers. From the congress it has passed into public opinion, the power to which, according to the expression of the French emperor, belongs the decisive word, and which will ultimately carry the victory." This impression gradually deepened into a conviction throughout



Italy. "The Congress of Paris," said the Sicilian Lafarina, the leader of the National Union, "has given the deathblow to the Italian governments." "If the new-born Italy," declared the former republican, Manin, "must have a king, there must be only one, and that one can be no other than the king of Piedmont." Thus had Cavour given to the cause its two fundamental pillars, — the monarchical principle that trusted itself to the Revolution, and the Revolution which from patriotism stretched forth its hand to monarchy. In this way arose the new national party that with wondrous self-denial renounced all minor and particular objects in order, with united strength, to press towards the grand goal — the shaking off of foreign domination.

To this clearly defined effort Austria had nothing to oppose but impotent rage or precipitate preparations. Fruitless as the policy of Prince Schwarzenberg had been in its ultimate results, it still had shown traits of boldness and decision, in which respects his death left a void that could not be filled. He was succeeded, as we have seen, by Count Buol (though without the title of prime minister), a man of narrow horizon, who understood the conservative sentiment only thus far, that he believed a soldiery and bureaucracy of the least possible culture and dubious morality to be sufficient for the support of the state. The real soul of the government was Alexander Bach, the democrat of 1848, now metamorphosed into Baron Bach, and an absolutist and centralizer of the most inflexible type, who believed that with the successful establishment of a clerical bureaucracy, he would have the surest means in his hand for the subjugation of the refractory Hungarians and Italians. On the former of these nationalities a new wound was inflicted when the crown insignia — sacred to each Magyar, and interred by Kossuth in his flight — were rediscovered and conveyed, not to Pesth, but to Vienna. The abolition of the war-ministry in 1853, and the transference of the entire administration of military affairs to the adjutant-general of the emperor, Count Grünne, deprived the finance minister of all control of the army, and contributed in no small degree to the ever growing disorder in the state economy. A murderous attempt on the life of the emperor, February 18, 1853, by a Hungarian journeyman blacksmith, named Libenyi Janos, was seized on as a new admonition to restore cohesion to the dislocated state by the rule of the church. The negotiations with the papal chair conducted by the Cardinal Archbishop Rauscher (formerly tutor to the emperor) and Count Thun, minister of worship, resulted in the concordat of



August 18, 1855, meant to give a secure and enduring anchor-ground for military-bureaucratic absolutism through the introduction of the theocratic element. In regard to home matters the concordat was specially aimed at Hungary, where Protestantism was regarded as "root-grown opposition;" in foreign affairs it was to be the cornerstone of that policy through which Austria, at the head of the Reaction and defender of the church, should re-establish her hegemony over Germany and Italy.

The church, as represented by Jesuitism, was the only ally on which she could reckon. Through the immense sacrifices of the Crimean War, she had purchased for herself only the hate of Russia, the anger of France, the displeasure of England, and the partial dissolution of her relations with Prussia. The Congress of Paris had exposed her isolation to the whole world; and her consciousness of her friendless condition in face of Cavour's daring début on the political stage, and the ever-rising wave of national spirit in Italy, began to occasion deep anxiety in Vienna. For the first time conciliatory measures were tried with the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. The best results were hoped for from the visit of the emperor and his beautiful young bride, Elizabeth of Bavaria. The nomination of the Grand Duke Maximilian as governor-general was expected to confirm the favorable feeling. The latter, with his wife, Charlotte of Belgium, devoted themselves enthusiastically to their mission; but even if their hands had been free, and the demands of the re-established provincial and central congregations had not been summarily rejected in Vienna, reconciliation between Italy and Austria was now beyond the bounds of possibility.

The more conciliatory Austria showed herself toward Italy, the more bitter became the tone of the Turin press, and the higher and the more defiantly did Cavour bear the national flag. His labors were unwearied. Ruling like a dictator, he subordinated everything to his one great end. As finance minister his care was to provide the sinews of war; as minister of the interior, he moulded the public sentiment; as foreign minister he courted allies. He made loud complaints of Austria's strengthening the works of Piacenza, while he himself, by fortifying Casale and Valenza in connection with Alexandria, created a triangle in which the Sardinian army could maintain itself till the arrival of its allies, and further began the construction of a strong defensive harbor at Spezia. Manin instituted a subscription for the purchase of 100 cannons. Mazzini,

meanwhile, continued ceaseless in his ridiculous and fruitless republican machinations.

Whom Cavour looked for as an ally did not admit of doubt. But Napoleon still hesitated. What now floated before his eyes was a confederation of Italian states on the type of the German Confederation, always open to French influence, with Naples, under a Murat, as a counterpoise to the aggrandized Subalpine kingdom. But precisely here lay the difference between his programme and that of the Turin statesman. The latter, too, had a confederation of states as a second object in his eye; but this confederation was not to be predominated over by any foreign power, but by Sardinia; least of all should it comprise a Napoleonic state as a member. Much rather would he have come to an understanding with Naples and Tuscany; but King Ferdinand rejected with horror any association with a government stained by heresies, ecclesiastical and political; while in Florence the grand duke and his minister, amid this conflict of powers and parties, knew of nothing better to do than peacefully to continue the old policy of playing fast and loose.

It is probable that the decision would have had to be longer waited for had not the current of events been quickened by an untoward incident. As Napoleon was on his way, with his wife, to the opera, on the evening of January 14, 1858, an attempt was made on his life by hand-grenades thrown at his carriage in the rue Lepelletier. Ten persons were killed and 156 wounded; but, as if by a miracle, the imperial pair remained unhurt. The perpetrators were seized, Felice Orsini, the principal in the deed, a life-long revolutionist, being discovered in his hiding-place through the treachery of an accomplice. His restless brain, it seems, had become filled with the fixed idea that the reason for all his failures lay in the secret influence of the emperor, and that the removal of this man — who alone could, but would not, help Italy — was the indispensable preliminary for the liberation of his country. From his prison Orsini addressed a letter to the emperor, in which he implored him to restore that freedom to Italy which it lost through the crime of France in 1849, adding that the peace of Europe and his (Napoleon's) own would remain a chimera so long as Italy was denied independence. The reading of this letter in the court by his advocate, Jules Favre, produced a great effect, and its publication in the *Moniteur* a yet greater.

Orsini's attempt had the weightiest consequences, both in France

and abroad. In the former it gave the signal for a violent reaction, whose first blows were directed against the press. Next the whole country was subdivided into five military districts, each under a marshal. By an open letter of February 1, 1858, the emperor devolved the regency in case of his death upon the empress, and, if she were not then alive, on the prince next of kin. He opened the legislative chamber with a speech, in which, after a glowing exordium regarding the flourishing condition of the country, he went on to say, "It has often been asserted that in order to rule France, its people must be fed incessantly with grand theatrical effect; I believe, on the contrary, that in order to win the confidence of the nation one has only to do good. The aim of the empire is to disseminate over the world the principles of 1789, purged of all abstract theories, without, in so doing, infringing in the least on the principle of authority. Absolute freedom is impossible, so long as there exists in a land a fraction which obstinately perseveres in misunderstanding the first principles of every government. I frankly declare to you, let men say what they may, that the danger lies, not in the immoderate prerogatives of the government, but much more in the want of repressive laws." This laid the groundwork for the proposal of a Draconic safety-law, which the assembly passed almost unanimously. To insure its thorough execution, General Espinasse, a man of brutal energy, was made minister of the interior. There followed an outburst of rage against England. "In this land the plot was hatched; the bombs were fabricated in Birmingham." The *Moniteur* published addresses to the emperor from the army which were replete with insulting allusions to the "murder-den." On January 20 Walewski (Fig. 28), addressed the menacing inquiry to London, whether England meant to make herself an asylum for assassins? Recognizing the justice of this complaint, Palmerston laid a bill before parliament dealing with murderous conspiracies, and expelled Victor Hugo (Fig. 29) from Jersey.

But Walewski's threatening tone had aroused the deep indignation of the British public, which was intensified by the suspicion that France thought she could insult England with impunity so long as she was occupied with the Indian mutiny. Simon Bernard, accused as an accomplice of Orsini, was acquitted; meetings were held throughout the country protesting against any concession or any limitation of the right of asylum. On the second reading of the bill the House of Commons accepted an amendment of Milner Gibson





FIG. 28. — Count Walewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs.



expressing regret that the government, before bringing in the measure, had not replied in suitable terms to the note: and for a second time Palmerston's friendship for Napoleon cost him his place. The




FIG. 29. — Victor Hugo. From the engraving by P. Rajon; original painting by L. Bonnat.

Anglo-French alliance seemed imperilled, but this was too intimately associated with material interests for the emperor not to do his utmost to maintain it. Pélissier replaced Persigny as ambassador at London, and Queen Victoria's acceptance of an invitation to be

present at the inauguration of the works in the harbor of Cherbourg set the seal on the restoration of the former relations.

The emperor, now for a long time accustomed to conduct his foreign policy without consultation with his ministers, despatched a messenger in secret to Cavour, with the announcement that he was ready to second him in his efforts. At his invitation the Sardinian minister met him at the baths of Plombières, in Lorraine, under an assumed name and in deepest secrecy; and on August 20 and 21, 1858, the points were agreed on which should constitute the rule and aim of their common action. These were the creation of a North Italian Kingdom reaching to the Adriatic; the cession of Savoy to France, and of Nice in case of the annexation to Sardinia of Parma and Modena, with the part of the States of the Church beyond the Apennines; the help of France in case Sardinia were attacked by Austria.

To King Victor Emmanuel the thought of giving up Savoy, the cradle of his race, was a bitter one; but the sacrifice was unavoidable, for without a strong ally it was hopeless to think of driving Austria out of Italy. This painful feeling in some measure overcome, the brave soldier was on fire to avenge his father's defeat. Cavour, on his return to Turin, devoted himself heart and soul to making preparations for war; all tasks were secondary to this. Most repugnant of all was it to Cavour to have to stoop to the use of duplicity in concealing from the Italian patriots the engagement into which he had entered. "Let my good name perish," he wrote, "if only an Italy is called into being." On October 19 he indorsed the plan for a general rising laid before him by the leaders of the National Union, as if he depended on them and no one else; and, though well aware of Napoleon's antipathy to Garibaldi, he summoned this veteran champion of freedom—whose popularity and self-sacrificing spirit made him invaluable in his eyes—in deepest secrecy to himself, and succeeded in making him sensible that isolated risings were useless or worse, and that the popular strength could only be made of real avail by being thoroughly organized and concentrated under the leading of one head. He finished by offering him the leadership of the volunteers. The old hero—not then hopelessly spoiled, as he was later, by the flattery of the radicals—was all on fire for the military dictatorship of the king, and instructed his partisans to undertake nothing without the assent of Cavour or Lafarina.

On the occasion of the New Year's reception of the diplomatic corps, the Emperor Napoleon said to the Austrian ambassador, Baron Hübner, "I regret that our relations to your government are not so friendly as formerly, but I beg you to assure the emperor that my personal regard for him is in no respect altered." These words, like a lightning flash, illumined the murky atmosphere. Austrian notes experienced a sudden fall. Other indications of the coming storm followed forthwith. On January 13, 1859, Prince Napoleon (Fig. 30) journeyed to Turin; and, on the 30th, his marriage was celebrated with the king's eldest daughter, Clotilde. The agreement reached at Plombières was now formulated into a treaty, which Cavour insisted that the emperor should sign with his own hand. On February 3, at the opening of the session of the French legislative body, the emperor used these words: "For some time past the abnormal state of Italy, where order can be maintained only through the assistance of foreign troops, has disquieted the diplomatic world. This is not, nevertheless, a sufficient reason for believing in war. Some may cry out for it without fair reason, and others, in their unreasoning fears, point out to France the perils of a new coalition. I shall remain inflexible in the path of right, of justice, and of national honor; and my government will neither be driven nor intimidated, because my policy will never be either provocative or pusillanimous." The pamphlet *Napoléon et l'Italie* had for its object the preparation of the mind of the still reluctant people for war. Legitimists and clerics, timid conservatives and bankers, were as one in deprecating it. Victor Emmanuel, too, on January 10, opened the Sardinian parliament with a significant announcement: "Piedmont, the representative of a grand idea, finds herself in a situation not free from peril; she is not insensible to Italy's cry of anguish."

Austria's answer was the despatch of 30,000 additional troops to Italy. The time for reconciliation was past. Maximilian's administration had now to give place to a military one. Cavour availed himself of the situation to urge on his parliament a plea for the means of defence. The chambers sanctioned a loan of 50,000,000 lire, and unanimously agreed to refrain from embarrassing the government with questions. "We have been led on by degrees," wrote Cavour, on March 20, to his friend de la Rive, "into undertaking a task, just and glorious indeed, but fraught with extraordinary danger. We had not sufficiently taken into account the selfishness developed in modern society through material interests. In spite of






FIG. 30. — Prince Napoleon. From a photograph.



this obstacle, I hope we shall be successful." On March 17 the organization of a corps of Alpine rangers was ordered, and the command given to Garibaldi. Through the influence of the National Union, six to seven thousand volunteers came in from the rest of Italy, and a Hungarian legion was soon under arms. But to this revolutionary fellowship Napoleon took strong objections. While Sardinia was prompted by the scantiness of her means and the impatience of the Italian patriots to a speedy opening of the war, Napoleon was wavering from day to day. Suddenly he declared that he could not take the field before June. Great was the consternation in Turin. Victor Emmanuel wrote him that his desertion of the cause of Italy would be more sensitively felt by Piedmont than the defeat of Novara. In such an event he must communicate to the world the circumstances that had brought him to such an extremity. Cavour hurried personally to Paris, and in union with the Prince Napoleon succeeded in bringing the emperor around.

Again matters took the form of negotiation. Count Buol availed himself of the love of the English Tory ministry for peace, with the view of moving it to mediation. On February 23 Lord Cowley (Fig. 31) came to Vienna with the following peace-proposals: Austria's renunciation of the commercial treaties with the Po duchies; evacuation of the States of the Church by both Austrians and French; seasonable reforms in all the Italian states. But to Austria's inquiry whether these concessions would insure her possession of her Italian provinces, Cavour gave the unequivocal reply that the danger of a war or a revolution could be averted only by the establishment of a separate national government for Lombardo-Venetia; the withdrawal of the Austrians from the Romagna; the recognition of the principle of non-intervention; the inauguration of constitutions in Parma and Modena; and the re-establishment of the Tuscan constitution. This effort of England was backed up quite unexpectedly by Russia, that up to this time had kept herself entirely in the background. Recalling the agreement arrived at at the Congress of Paris, that before an appeal was made to arms friendly powers should be called on to meditate, Gortchakoff proposed a congress. The cabinets of Paris, London, and Berlin accepted the proposal; and Austria did so on March 22, with the proviso that Sardinia should previously disarm. With this condition Cavour, despite France's earnest persuasion, would have absolutely nothing to do, and just as little with the congress. Yet England made one

more effort. She proposed that all the Italian states — not Sardinia alone — should be invited to the congress, and that the disarmament should be mutual, and under the supervision of the great powers. In order not to stand before Europe as a peace-breaker, Napoleon accepted these conditions; and on April 20 he communicated this to Turin, and advised it to follow his example. Cavour was thunder-



FIG. 31. — Lord Cowley.

struck. All seemed lost. In his despair he did not believe he could survive the blow. It was Austria's blundering aptitude for putting herself in the wrong that was his salvation. From the beginning Vienna had regarded Sardinia as the vanguard of France. Count Buol demanded a general disarming; and on Walewski answering that France had not armed — had not a man in excess of her peace

establishment—he cut loose from his sheet-anchor, the English proposal, and addressed an ultimatum to Turin, which Baron Kellersberg delivered there on April 23. It demanded an explicit declaration, whether the king's government was willing without delay to put its army on a peace footing, and disband the volunteers, adding that if the bearer did not receive a satisfactory assurance within three days the responsibility for the consequences would rest on Sardinia.

It was not, however, mere rash obstinacy that impelled Austria to this course. She acted rather under the compulsion of necessity. After committing the welfare of her state and people unreservedly to absolutism, and to all that is associated with absolutism, it was impossible for her to endure a neighbor in Italy holding aloft the banner of political and religious freedom. It was a war of principles on which she was entering. This was the unmistakable meaning of the manifesto to his people with which the Emperor Francis Joseph accompanied his declaration of war: "Austria defends the most sacred possessions of humanity against the subversive doctrines now launched on the world even from thrones."

What could have fallen out more opportune for Cavour? Austria, by ignoring France's acceptance of the London proposal, supplied France with a justification for the alliance, while Sardinia was now the attacked party. Its laconic answer said: "Sardinia, like the other great powers, had given its assent to England's proposals in a spirit of conciliation. It had nothing more to say." Cavour now labored with redoubled energy. In addition to the premiership, the foreign, home, and naval departments, he now undertook that of war. The chambers granted the king the desired dictatorship during the continuance of the war. As soon as this became clearly imminent, the movement passed into the other Italian states. Duke Francis of Modena fled with his treasures to Venice. The returned duchess of Parma had to desert her land a second time. For the future configuration of Italy much depended on Tuscany. If the grand duke was able to maintain himself by the help of an understanding with Turin, then Italy would take the form of a confederation of states; if he did not it would drift into unity. On April 24 Cavour repeated his invitation to Florence to join the Franco-Sardinian alliance. But the grand duke would, at most, only bind himself to neutrality. This quickened the impatience of the national party in his land, who in large numbers



enrolled themselves in Sardinia as volunteers, many of them being sons of the foremost Tuscan families. The Tuscan officers declared they could no longer answer for their soldiers. Vehemently appealed to by his people, the grand duke at length pledged himself to alliance with Piedmont and to a constitution. The party of the so-called Aristonationalists, led by Ricasoli, would willingly have maintained him and his dynasty on the throne; but when abdication in favor of his son was suggested he preferred to leave the land under cover of a protest. The provisional government, on May 8, resigned its authority into the hands of the Sardinian envoy, Boncompagni. Things took a similar course in the Romagna. After the withdrawal of the Austrians, the people raised the national flag, the papal troops deserted, the authorities fled, and a provisional government seized the helm.

Even yet Napoleon would gladly have delayed. Immersed in negotiations, he had let events outrun him. When the Austrian ultimatum was issued, his army was wanting in the most essential necessities; his people had no desire for war; the clerics were only partially silenced by the assurance that the war would be localized to North Italy. But fate, and the stronger man in whose hands he found himself, impelled him onwards. On April 26 he caused it to be announced in Vienna that the passage of the Ticino would be regarded a declaration of war against France. The Austrian army was no longer under the leading of the veteran Hess, but, against his will, under that of the master of the ordnance, Count Giulay, known only for his poor success as a corps-leader in Hungary, without confidence either in himself or his army, a part of which existed only on paper. Other difficulties pressed on the Austrian government,—want of money; the incompleteness of its railroad system; the gaps still intervening between this system and the Venetian, which made the carrying on of war on so remote a scene, a matter of extraordinary difficulty. Not till April 29 did the Austrians, to the number of 100,000, cross the frontier, and, occupying Novara, Vercelli, and Tortona, and resting on Piacenza, threaten the Sardinian line of retreat by way of Novi to Genoa, as well as the advance of the French from Genoa. But now Giulay fell into a state of complete inaction. The cause for this lay not so much in the condition of the rivers, swollen by heavy rains, as in the fear that the French might cross the Po near Parma, and take him in the rear. After some aimless manoeuvres, he retired on May 9 behind the Sesia, a



movement that not only made the worst impression on his own men, but gave the French time to make their appearance.

On May 10 Napoleon left Paris to place himself at the head of his army. "Italy free to the Adriatic" was the war-cry. Two French corps descended from Mont Cenis and Mont Genève to Turin. Two others, with the Imperial Guard and war material, were landed at Genoa, scaled the Apennines, and occupied the valley of the Scrivia. The imperial head-quarters were fixed at Alessandria. As the reports that reached the Austrian commander led him to believe that the object of the French was to advance upon Piacenza, he despatched, on May 20, General Stadion with a strong force to Casteggio, of which he took possession, and advanced upon Montebello. Forthwith General Forey hastened thither by rail, and, supported by the Sardinian cavalry, after an obdurate house-to-house fight, wrested the place from the Austrians; but, as the position was too exposed, he returned whence he had come. But while Giulay directed his attention exclusively to the southwest, and let himself be confirmed in this by sham preparations for throwing bridges over the Po, he really facilitated his enemy's plan for attacking him on his right. This manoeuvre was initiated by Garibaldi and his Alpine rangers, who crossed the Ticino below Lago Maggiore. Meanwhile the main army had broken up for a grand strategic movement. It was a bold and perilous operation, this flank march along the enemies' front, but if successful, a decisive one. On May 26 the French army began to move behind the Sardinians, by help of the railroad, from the district of Alessandria northwards by way of Casale toward Vercelli. There the Sardinians under Cialdini (Fig. 32) crossed the Sesia, and drove the Austrians from the strong position they had taken up near Palestro. Now at length Giulay had a glimmering perception of the danger that threatened his right; but his attempt on the 31st to recover the positions at Palestro was repulsed with severe loss. All Italy exulted, Tuscany and the Romagna being especially inspired. While the struggle was in progress around Palestro, the French crossed the Sesia in force at Vercelli; on June 1 they occupied Novara; on the second the left bank of the Ticino. Fortune had smiled on the daring hardihood of the emperor; the Austrian right wing was effectively turned.

Now at last Giulay became fully aware of the situation. In order to cover Milan, he withdrew his army behind the Ticino, and concentrated it around Rosale. He was now re-enforced by two new

corps under Clam-Gallas, and by General Hess, sent by the anxious emperor as a counsellor. While the latter would have preferred to lead the army back to Verona, to the former matters did not present so desperate an aspect. In his view the main object was to hold the Naviglio Grande, a canal connecting Milan with the Ticino, crossed by three bridges at the villages of Buffalora, Magenta, and Robecchio. Giulay's purpose was to give his troops — exhausted with their retrograde forced march and change of front — a day's rest; but on the 3d the French passed the bridge at Buffalora. Confiding in the co-operation of MacMahon, who had crossed somewhat farther north, near Turbigo, the emperor on the following day delivered the attack. He found Clam-Gallas on the bow-shaped height commanding the roads to Milan, the village of Magenta constituting the key of his position. The ground in his front — covered as far as the canal with hedges, mulberry groves, vineyards, and rice-fields, and traversed by water-courses and deep ditches — presented serious obstacles to the advance of an enemy, but, at the same time, made the Austrian superiority in cavalry and artillery of little avail. When Clam-Gallas saw himself attacked, he sent to the commander-in-chief for re-enforcements. But the French, too, were in straits, and that to such a degree, that it was only by the exertion of their utmost strength that they were able to maintain themselves. It was a time of deepest anxiety. In painful solicitude the emperor awaited in San Martino the appearance of MacMahon, until, at last, the advancing sound of cannon thundering against the Austrian right announced his attack. Then MacMahon led his men on to the storm of Magenta; the combatants on either side rivalled



FIG. 32. — General Cialdini.  
From a photograph.

each other in deeds of valor. General Espinasse found here his death. At length, at half past seven in the evening, the little town fell into the hands of the French.

Both armies had suffered severely; both lay through the night on the battle-field; neither could claim a complete victory. Giulay, of whose troops scarce two-thirds had been engaged, contemplated renewing the struggle on the following day; but Clam-Gallas's declaration that his corps was no longer in a condition to fight, and the demoralization of the army, compelled him to relinquish the idea. Such was the result — astonishing even to the allies — of the battle. MacMahon (PLATE X.) and Regnault de Saint-Angely were created marshals, and the former, duke of Magenta as well. The way to Milan was now open. On June 8 Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel made their triumphal entry into the capital of Lombardy. In order that the festivities in the city might not be disturbed by the Austrian rearguard, standing under Benedek at Melegnano, some eleven miles off, Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers attacked it on the same day, and drove it, after a hot contest, to the bridge across the Lambro. On the 10th the Austrians evacuated Piacenza, and on the 21st not a man of them stood on the west of the Mincio. Middle Italy rose to a man against its governments. The little Austrian fleet retired to Pola in face of the French squadron. A summons to his countrymen by Klapka aroused fears of a new revolution in Hungary. The tardiness of the allies' pursuit, however, gave the Austrians time to rally both at home and abroad. The Emperor Francis Joseph came to Verona, and took on himself the command-in-chief of the army, in place of Giulay, who was dismissed on June 16. In point of fact, the veteran Hess was the real leader, excepting that, through this duplicate authority, the necessary unity was in a large measure sacrificed. Hess's force exceeded that of his enemies by 10,000 men; his artillery was double theirs; and he decided to avail himself of this superiority, and of the supposed spell of the emperor's name, for the vigorous resumption of the offensive. Only a decided victory could restore Austria's supremacy in Italy, and conjure away the dangers threatening on the flanks and in the rear. On the morning of the 23d the advance to the Chiese was begun.

On Napoleon the battle of Magenta had made a deep impression. Haunted by the remembrance of the perils by which he was there encompassed, he resolved henceforth to move with more cautious deliberation, and to keep his army so well in hand as to have it at any



PLATE X.



General MacMahon.

From the painting by René Princeteau.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 130.*





moment ready for battle. Garibaldi alone was detached to watch the Tyrolese sharpshooters. Moreover, the uncertainty at headquarters in regard to the enemy's designs operated as an impediment to the allies' advance. Even Godard in his balloon failed to discover the Austrians' whereabouts. Thus it happened that after the




FIG. 33. — Map of the District between the Oglio and the Mincio.

Franco-Sardinians had passed the Chiese, the two armies came unexpectedly into collision (June 24). A hasty concentration was effected on both sides. The French directed their chief efforts upon the village of Solferino (Fig. 33), the centre and key of the enemy's position, which extended from the southern end of the Lake of Garda in a southwest direction to Medole. Attack and defence were

conducted with the utmost determination. To relieve his hard-pressed centre, Francis Joseph commanded the calvary corps of Wimpffen to make a charge upon the French right wing that stood at Guidizzolo under Niel. But the manoeuvre miscarried, and only weakened the centre by withdrawing a most necessary support. After a struggle of several hours, Solferino fell into the hands of the French, and the bleeding fragments of the Austrians retired to Cavriana; but neither this place nor Cassiano could they hold against the assaults of Niel and the Guard. A furious rainstorm, closing the sultry and oppressive day, concealed the Austrian retreat to the Mincio. The Sardinians, under La Marmora, who constituted the left wing of the allies, when on their march to Peschiera, on the 24th, came also unexpectedly on the eighth Austrian corps, under Benedek, posted on the plateau of San Martino. Five times they came on to the assault, only to be as often hurled back, till, at seven o'clock in the evening, Benedek was compelled, with tears of rage, to obey the command to retreat, and yield his position to the assailants.

Both armies, victors and vanquished, alike found themselves in a state of complete exhaustion. The Austrian loss amounted to 22,000; that of the French to 14,000; the Sardinian, to 5,500. The aspect of the battle-field was sickening, and suggested to the Genevan, Henri Dunant, to call on sympathetic humanity to constitute itself into a society for binding up, on the battle-field, the terrible wounds inflicted by war. His paper, "Mercy on the Battle-field," gave the impulse for the formation of the Red Cross Society, which now embraces all lands.

The dear-bought victory remained to the French, but it was incomplete. The Austrians effected their retreat over the Adige unmolested, and found effectual shelter behind the strong works of the Quadrilateral. This most important movement, combined with other considerations, disinclined Napoleon for the further prosecution of the war. He was sick of the bickerings of his generals; and brilliantly decisive exploits beyond the Mincio were not to be thought of,—only long-protracted sieges in the hot season that threatened his army with deadly fevers. The Italian national movement had far overpassed the limits he had set for it, while he was no little concerned in regard to the secret views of his ally, which might very well bring him into collision with his clergy at home, and certainly were inconsistent with his earnest wish not to quarrel with the pope.

Even the relations between the two armies had become strained. Over and above all this, every day increased the danger that the war might expand into a European one. The three neutral powers, — and especially England and Russia, — who had limited their views to the enlargement of Sardinia by the incorporation of Lombardy and the Po duchies, the erection of Venice into an independent state, and an Italian confederation, were disquieted by the French victories, and were treating with each other in regard to mediation. Prussia even threatened to avail herself of the national feeling aroused in Germany for armed intervention on the Rhine. And against all these possible foes, Napoleon had but one ally — the Revolution! Was it not advisable for him—even with his ultimate aim not reached—to call a halt, and content himself with the triumphs he had won?

On July 6 his adjutant-general, Fleury, carried to Verona proposals for an armistice. On the 8th this was concluded at Villafranca; on the 11th the two emperors met at that place. It was not difficult for Napoleon to show Francis Joseph that his proposals were much more moderate than any that could be expected from the neutral powers. On the 12th the peace preliminaries were signed, embracing: An Italian federal union under the honorary presidency of the pope; the surrender by the emperor of Austria to the emperor of the French of Lombardy (with the exception of Mantua and Peschiera), and the transference by the latter of this territory to the king of Sardinia; Venice to have a voice in the Italian Confederation, but to remain Austrian; the return of the expelled archdukes to their states, and the issue by them of a general amnesty; a requisition by both emperors to the pope for the introduction of the indispensable reforms; and a mutual guaranty of a full amnesty for all compromised persons.

All Europe was amazed at the sudden ending of the war: the indignation of the Italian patriots was boundless. Cavour, on hearing the news, flew, wild with excitement, to headquarters, and had a violent scene with the king. But the deed was done. Victor Emmanuel had not the power to enforce the terms of his treaty with France. To continue the war single-handed — as he contemplated in his first effervescence — was out of the question; there remained nothing for him but to submit to the inevitable. It was otherwise with Cavour, who could not bring himself to put his hand to such a settlement. The federal union that Napoleon sought to impose was



not that of an independent Italy ; for it failed in the first condition — the exclusion of Austria. With Austria holding the keys of Lombardy, — Mantua and Peschiera, — with her vassal archdukes under the presidency of the pope, the federal union was a mockery ; the junction of constitutional Sardinia with absolute states subject to the conjoint influence of two great powers would be, not a bond of national unity, but a lasting source of discord. Without a moment's consideration, Cavour, on July 19, gave in his resignation. Despair reigned in



FIG. 34. — General La Marmora. From a photograph.

Venice ; despondency and wrath in Lombardy. Sullen silence was the emperor's companion on his homeward journey. In such circumstances the position of the new Sardinian La Marmora (Fig. 34) -Rattazzi-Dabormida ministry was one of extreme difficulty. It could not frankly accept the situation if it would not aggravate the prevailing despondency and resentment, and as little dared it to offend the Emperor Napoleon, who was still the mainstay of Italy. In a

circular to the Sardinian envoys, Dabormida declared that the king would never offer his hand to a confederation in which Austria had a part. The Confederation was dead ere it began to breathe. The signature of the definitive peace at Zurich, on November 10, passed almost without notice, for circumstances had already made it obsolete. Of all its requirements Austria had not been able to enforce even the smallest. The article that reserved the rights of the dethroned archdukes, and yet excluded their restoration through force, sounded like a farce, and yet it became the point that determined the destiny of Italy.

For without troubling themselves in the least about this provision, the peoples of Middle Italy set about preparations for their union with Sardinia, and that with wonderful quietness and order, the only victim to the popular fury being Colonel Anviti, in Parma, the debaucher of the murdered duke, and the vile instrument of his crazy despotism. Farini, chosen dictator of Modena and then of Parma and the Romagna, united these territories provisionally, and till they could be formally incorporated with Sardinia, into one government under the name of the 'Royal Provinces of Emilia.' In Tuscany matters took the same course under the leadership of Baron Ricasoli, after the people's representatives had unanimously declared, on August 1, that they would neither recall nor receive back the Lorraine dynasty. Although the Turin government dared not to give open encouragement to these annexations, yet it did so underhand through the king, and even through Cavour, notwithstanding his ostensible retirement. At the request of these provisional governments, General Fanti was sent to organize the military force of their districts on a uniform system. Pope Pius IX. alone offered resistance. On June 16, the thirteenth anniversary of his election, he issued an encyclical against the sacrilegious mutineers, in which he urged the people not to submit themselves to a government that had shown itself so hostile to the legitimate rights and to the servants of the church. On the 20th he threatened with the greater excommunication all who in any way ventured to assail the secular power of the pope. On the same day the papal Swiss stormed the insurgent city of Perugia, and perpetrated outrages that called forth a universal shout of execration. The secret police redoubled their diligence; and whoever was denounced on account of his political opinions — though only out of personal hate — had to undergo a long confinement among ordinary criminals in horrible dungeons.

As for the Emperor Napoleon, the words with which Cavour solaced his retirement proved themselves ever more true. "I have made him spring into the water, now he must swim." The capability of free self-determination passed away from him. Threatened on the one hand with the wrath of the clergy, pursued on the other by the shade of Orsini, overwhelmed by the irreconcilable contradictions in which he had inmeshed himself, he sank into a policy that worked counter to all that occurred, and yet hindered nothing, that wounded his friends without conciliating his enemies, and dealt out counsels that he knew would not be followed. The pope and Middle Italy — that was the problem he had to solve. The former had to be reconciled to the Italian movement for nationality; out of the latter an independent state was to be formed that should act as a counterpoise to the over-ambitious Sardinia. But the discreet and friendly counsel he gave the pope, to grant of his own motion a separate administration to the Legations with a lay government, received as its only answer an allocution to the college of cardinals which declared all complaints to be insolent lies. This rude rebuff brought the emperor back to his old favorite idea of a congress meeting in Paris, which should help him out of his embarrassments. But where to find a common basis for it amid so diametrically opposed interests and views? The pope required, as a condition for his sending a representative, the support of the emperor for the restoration of his secular rule in its fullest extent. The Ultramontane press of all lands sounded a note of alarm in the interest of the imperilled head of the church. The dissolute Queen Isabella of Spain was on fire with ardor to send troops for the defence of the Holy See and of her Bourbon relatives of Parma and Naples. The nomination of the prelate de Merode, a Belgian, as papal minister of war, showed that the Vatican was resolved to wield other than spiritual weapons in its defence. The scanty relics of the old Swiss troops were supplemented by adventurers from all lands. From Austria came whole shiploads of recruits, most of whom had served in the army; Ireland sent 800 men; and there was a Franco-Belgian corps, the Legitimists in which, few as they were, amused themselves with the thought that they were the vanguard of an army that might be soon called on to restore the old order of things in France also. In Rome the white cockade was worn openly; General Lamoricière (Fig. 35), a personal enemy of Napoleon, accepted the command-in-chief. A new source of financial help developed itself in 'Peter's Pence,' a society



for collecting contributions under this name to the Holy Father's treasury having been formed in Belgium in 1859, whose example was quickly followed throughout Catholic Christendom. In an encyclical of January 19, 1860, the pope addressed himself to the



FIG. 35. — General Lamoricière.

bishops of the whole world, declaring that in defence of the States of the Church he was ready to submit to a martyr's death. Cavour, in secret, blessed the pope who by his obstinacy had made a congress impossible. Napoleon had to resign himself to the conviction that



the annexation of Middle Italy to Sardinia could not be prevented. But if this were the case, he was resolved that Sardinia should at least pay the stipulated price for the acquisition of Venice. This change in the imperial policy found expression in the dismissal of Walewski and the appointment (January 5, 1860) of Thouvenel as his successor, a man more friendly to Italy. The first thing that the new foreign minister did was to declare frankly to Vienna that it was impossible to carry out the conditions of the Peace of Zurich, specially adverting to the danger that the Italian movement, hitherto monarchical, might assume a republican character.

A short time thereafter an important change was effected in the Sardinian ministry. The half-hearted way in which Rattazzi had taken up the Middle Italian question, and the readiness with which he lent himself to the scheme of a congress, had cost him the confidence of the king as well as of the public. Garibaldi, in his indignation, resigned the honorary presidency of the National Union, and founded a new one, the 'Armed Nation,' which should openly carry revolt into the Marches. On January 16, Rattazzi gave in his resignation, whereupon the king intrusted Cavour with the formation of a new ministry. The new premier entered on his office by sending out a declaration to the king's ministers at foreign courts, that the re-erection of the little thrones was not to be thought of, incorporation being the only possible solution of the Middle Italian question. He summoned Fanti to the war-office, but left him, notwithstanding, the supervision of the organization of the Middle Italian troops, and he was soon able to add to the royal army 40,000 fairly disciplined men, who were forthwith placed under Sardinian officers. Garibaldi was allowed to give in his resignation from the Middle Italian service. This he accompanied with a farewell proclamation to his soldiers, in which he declared that he was in the meantime removed by craft, but on the day that Victor Emmanuel called on his warriors to fight for the liberation of the country, he would be found at his post by the side of his comrades. "A heart of gold, but the head of a buffalo," said d'Azeglio.

This bold course Cavour would not have ventured to enter on without the support he was sure of finding in England. Even this, however, could not obviate the necessity for ceding to France the price of her assistance against Austria,—Savoy, the ancient patrimony of the house of Sardinia, and Nice, the birthplace of Garibaldi, with an area of 7400 square miles, and 800,000 inhabitants.

Ever since Cavour had exposed to the Congress of Paris the misrule in Naples as a menace to Europe, the western powers had been earnest in their intercessions for an amnesty there, or at least for the milder treatment of the political prisoners. But their labors were thrown away on King Ferdinand ('King Bomba'), so that in October, 1856, both England and France broke off diplomatic relations with Naples. In the souls of this monarch's people there glowed but one political emotion, that, namely, of deadly hate of the whole Bourbon race, that had for generations defiled this garden of Europe with its tyranny; and the consciousness of this feeling impelled the government to continually harsher measures. These were aggravated in an especial way after an unsuccessful rising in Sicily under Bentivegna, and an assault made by a soldier, Milano, on the king, at a review on December 8, in which he received a bayonet wound; 180,000 suspects stood on the police-registers or under supervision, or were in confinement. Yet the ground seemed to shake ominously under the feet of the government. On June 25, 1857, some thirty Mazzinists from Genoa, among them Pisacane, duke of Giovanni, Nicotera, and others, seized the isle of Ponza, liberating 327 prisoners, and landed at Sapri. There, however, they found among the people only terror and lukewarmness. The insurgents were dispersed, and Pisacane was severely wounded; the ship was seized, and its crew — though it was shown they had been pressed into the service — thrown into prison. On England's energetic complaint, however, the engineers, as British subjects, had to be released with heavy compensation; and Cavour compelled the ship to be given up free. As if nature herself had conspired with tyranny, in December the land was visited by a succession of terrible earthquakes, through which 10,000 people were killed. Seventy of the countless prisoners — among them Poerio — were shipped for North America; but they compelled the captain to set them ashore at Cork, and were received with open arms in England, whence they passed to Piedmont.

Such was the situation in Naples when King Ferdinand, shortly after the outbreak of war, died, on May 22, 1859, his wound having mortified. His son and successor, Francis II., — a man of no strength of intellect, of Jesuit training, withheld hitherto from all business and from the contagion of modern ideas, — mitigated somewhat the sternness of his father's rule, but remained steadfast to his neutrality. Shortly after his entry on the government the

sole reliable stay of the old system was taken from it when the Swiss federal council, moved by the occurrences at Perugia, declared the treaties with Naples at an end. Thereupon the Swiss regiments mutinied, and, with the exception of a few faithful individuals, had to be disbanded. Then the government in its infatuation entered zealously into the plan of crusade against the northern revolutionaries concocted at Rome; and, by concentrating its troops with this object upon the northern frontier, exposed the south, and especially Sicily, practically without defence to the revolution. This island, ever eager for separation, would have preferred to anything else a king of its own; but as this was unattainable, it took up the war-cry of Lafarina and the national party, "Italy and Victor Emmanuel!" Cavour renewed to Francis II. the proposal which he had made some time before, for an alliance for the common ordering of Italian affairs; but the king lent a deaf ear to all good counsel. Through this Cavour was constrained to take steps to obviate a catastrophe in Naples, that, without Sardinia's interference, could have but one of three issues, namely, either the triumph of radicalism, or of Muratism, or the confirmation of the present despotism,—each of which implied equal danger for the cause of Italy.

The example of Middle Italy had inspired the Sicilian patriots with a glowing desire to follow it. The time for waiting was past. Cavour had reason to fear that through longer inactivity the leadership of Italy would pass out of his hands. "I hold it to be necessary," wrote Victor Emmanuel to Francis II. on April 15, 1860, "that you should instantly renounce your former policy. If you reject my counsel, offered from honest sympathy for your dynasty, the time may come when I shall find myself in the painful dilemma of either imperilling the gravest interests of my crown, or of myself becoming the main instrument in your ruin." On the 26th the "Milan Gazette" contained this announcement: "Such volunteers as wish to go to Sicily will address themselves for instructions to the office of this paper." On the night of May 6 Bixio took possession — ostensibly by force — of two steam transports in the harbor of Genoa, on which Garibaldi (Fig. 36), with some thousand volunteers, mostly old Alpine rangers, embarked. They landed first on the Tuscan coast, near San Stefano, and took in munitions and water, which had been forgotten. Pursued by two Neapolitan men-of-war, they reached the harbor of Marsala, and lay to there behind two English corvettes, which were purposely so deliberate in obeying the order to move out



that the volunteers were able to effect their landing unmolested. Next day, the 12th, Garibaldi began his march into the interior. As commander-in-chief of the national army in Sicily, he took on himself, in the name of Victor Emmanuel, the dictatorship of the island, and called upon all Sicilians, from seventeen years old to fifty, to arm.




FIG. 36. — Garibaldi. From a photograph.

But so degenerate had the country people become under the debasing rule of the Bourbons that only a very small number — and these mainly allured by the prospect of murder and plunder — responded to his summons. Only the wretchedness of the Neapolitan defence enabled him to advance. After a check, in which he lost his cannon,



he succeeded, on the 27th, in getting possession, by a *coup-de-main*, of the lower town of Palermo. General Lanza opened a bombardment from the upper town, but, observing the demoralization gaining ground everywhere among the royal troops, his courage failed him. On the 30th he concluded a truce; and the ministry, from dread of the volunteers left behind in Tuscany, ordered him to evacuate the city immediately and return home. No sooner had he left than Castellamare, the old penal fort of Palermo, was torn down. By decree the dictator expelled the Jesuits from the island, yet did not omit to pay his devotions at the shrine of St. Rosalie.

The fall of Palermo made a deep impression in Naples. Confiding in Napoleon's jealousy of England, as well as in his antipathy to the volunteers and Italian unity, Francis II. made up his mind to send the moderate-minded de Martino to Paris to invoke the emperor's intervention. Had Napoleon been master of his doings he would only too readily have listened to the prayer, but he could not sacrifice the relations with England. After England had declined his proposal to prevent, by their combined fleets, a landing by Garibaldi on the mainland, he had no other counsel to give the king than to come to terms with Sardinia. Abandoned and in extremity, the Neapolitan court at length had recourse to concessions. On June 25 announcements were made of an amnesty, a new ministry, and a constitution; an alliance with Sardinia, and the assumption of the Italian colors. But the people, already twice deceived by pledges of a constitution, were no longer to be taken in by fair promises; and on the 28th disorders broke out, whereupon the city was declared in a state of siege. The government had sunk so thoroughly into contempt that nothing could save it.

But the court had not yet given up the hope of retaining Sicily. The promise of a separate parliament, and of a royal prince as viceroy, would, it was expected, give to things the same turn they took in 1849. General Nunziante sketched a plan for the resubjugation of the island. But the change in the system of government had introduced discord among the generals, the measures fell into abeyance, and the defection of Count Anguissola, who went over to Garibaldi with the steam-frigate *Veloce*, caused the royalists to doubt the whole fleet. In the army, the system of the late king of making the men directly dependent on himself, through distrust of the officers, and to the weakening of their authority, now avenged itself. The officials in the Sicilian towns recognized the dictator, and paid him

the taxes; and he replied to the announcement of the Neapolitan constitution by the issue of a writ for the Sicilian elections. General Bosco, who stood in the northeast of the island, and on July 17 had made a vain attack on Garibaldi's general, Medici, at Milazzo, now withdrew into the castle of Messina, whence he bombarded that city. On the 23d he recrossed to the mainland, as the new constitutional ministry would not, by a reckless defence, imperil the still hoped-for alliance with Sardinia. On August 3 the Sardinio-Italic constitution — that is, the annexation of the island to Sardinia — was proclaimed.

The nearer the danger approached the mainland, the more animated became the excitement abroad. The reactionaries, and the liberals everywhere, saw in the issue of the struggle in the extreme south the presage of their own victory or defeat. At the entreaty of the German princes, the czar addressed to Napoleon an energetic call to intervention. The emperor of Austria had an interview with the prince of Prussia at Teplitz. England earnestly counselled the court of Turin to negotiate an armistice between Garibaldi and Naples. Even Victor Emmanuel addressed Garibaldi by letter, desiring him to desist from further enterprises. But it was too late. Garibaldi begged to be allowed to be disobedient for once; while Cavour did not let himself again be led astray, but directly incited the great guerilla-captain to make an end of the Bourbon kingdom before the outbreak of the expected war with Austria. He backed up his advice by the secret despatch of arms to him, and sent Admiral Persano into the Straits to cover his passage to the mainland. In Naples anarchy ran riot in expectation of Garibaldi's landing. Treachery lurked everywhere around the tottering throne, and defection was rife. Its own essential rottenness assured the fall of the Bourbon system at the first stroke.

On August 20 Garibaldi landed not far from Reggio. The garrison of Reggio capitulated after a short struggle, as did several bodies of troops encountered on the farther advance. "Our march is a triumph," Garibaldi telegraphed; "the people are jubilant; the troops are disbanding." The courageous young queen, Maria of Bavaria, tried in vain to inspire her inert spouse to mount his war-horse, and, sword in hand, defend his crown. The camarilla, in whose hands he was, would have preferred anarchy to the triumph of a constitutional king. The precious hours were allowed to pass away unimproved. On the evening of September 6 the royal family

took ship for Gaeta. The day after, Garibaldi took the train in advance of his troops, and, accompanied only by a few officers, entered the capital. Naples was beside itself with joy. Garibaldi named a liberal ministry, and put in force the Sardinian constitutional law of March 4, 1848.

Cavour had instructed his admiral to be in Naples if possible before Garibaldi, but the charm of the liberator's name had rendered this impracticable. All the more necessary did he deem it to be to anticipate his arrival in the States of the Church, so that the guidance of the movement, now becoming too powerful to be stopped, might not pass entirely out of his hands. According to secret arrangements with Sardinia, the patriots in Umbria and the Marches rose on September 6, and called on the king for help against the barbarity of the papal mercenaries, which was promised them accordingly. To the dissuasions of the diplomats, Cavour answered thus: "If we do not reach the Volturno before Garibaldi reaches the Catolica, monarchy is lost, and Italy falls a prey to the Revolution. We are forced to act." After Antonelli had bluntly refused to listen to the call made on him in the name of humanity to disarm and disband the rabble that called itself the papal army, the Sardinians under Cialdini crossed the frontiers of the States of the Church. They were everywhere hailed by the people as their deliverers. Lamoricière was utterly routed at Castelfidardo on September 18. Ancona capitulated on the 29th. Umbria and the Marches voted almost unanimously for annexation. The pope was left master of only 693,000 souls.

Naples's turn came next. Here Cavour was in haste to bring matters to a conclusion before foreign powers could interfere to bind his hands. The meeting of the czar with the emperor of Austria in Warsaw, in October, was everywhere regarded as a symptom of warlike resolves; and Napoleon, at the vehement importunity of the Ultramontanes, had ordered the corps of occupation at Rome to be re-enforced to 22,000 men. Whether Garibaldi, in his wrath at this barrier between him and his goal, would submit to the desires and ordinances of the royal government, was matter of serious doubt, and became more doubtful in proportion as foreign masters of phrases, like Ledru-Rollin and Alexandre Dumas, forced themselves in upon him, and as the fight between autonomists and annexationists became fiercer. Fortunately the marquis of Pallavicino-Trivulzio, named by Garibaldi as vice-dictator, was able to bring him back to reason,



and to gain his assent to the verdict of the plébiscite in Naples, which coincided with that of the other provinces. Without waiting for this, Victor Emmanuel passed the Neapolitan frontier. At Isernia a Bourbon division was dispersed; 10,000 royalists withdrew within Gaeta, the rest being driven over the border into the States of the Church. Capua capitulated on November 3. On October 25 Garibaldi met the king at Trano; on November 7 the latter entered Naples; but the hero, deeply hurt that not he, but Farini, was named as governor-general, laid down the command-in-chief of the southern army. In vain did the king offer him wealth and honor; poor as he came, he went back to his goat-island of Caprera. His army was disbanded, and on December 1 the king visited Palermo. The appeals for help which the besieged Francis emitted from Gaeta met with no response; his protests fell dead. Cialdini now plied the bombardment of the completely invested fortress by sea and land. On February 13 Gaeta capitulated, after a siege of 101 days; and on March 12 the citadel of Messina opened its gates, and the last trace of Bourbon sway in Italy vanished forever.

February 18, 1861, was made memorable by the opening of the first Italian parliament at Turin, its first business being the extension of the Sardinian constitution of 1848 to all the Italian provinces. On March 17 Victor Emmanuel assumed the title of 'King of Italy;' the first foreign states to recognize the new kingdom being England, Switzerland, and Greece; thereafter came France, and somewhat later Prussia. But with the establishment of external unity the work was but half accomplished. "My task," wrote Cavour with truth to his friend de la Rive, "is heavier and more arduous now than ever. To reconstitute Italy, to amalgamate the different elements of which she is composed, to bring into harmony the north and south, present as many difficulties as a war with Austria or the struggle with Rome." Many burning questions imperatively demanded prompt settlement; and everywhere there were wanting the conditions — economical and moral — on which to base a great new state. Sardinia was too small a nucleus for the new members easily to merge themselves in it; the comparative facility with which so great results had been attained tended to make many oblivious of the virtues of moderation and discreet considerateness: the old municipal spirit revolted against unity: the higher taxes and the sudden change from prohibition to free trade produced a material depression that the impetuous southerners submitted to the more



impatiently that hitherto they had been inclined to jealousy of the north, and to suspect self-seeking motives in every public character; the Garibaldians were indignant that their general was set aside. Cavour, more a politician than an organizer, was scarcely the man to cope with such difficulties; but greater than any or all of them was that of the relation of the young kingdom to the Vatican.

Of reconciliation the Vatican would not hear. Rome was the centre of a great, and, through the help of the French Legitimists, a formidable, conspiracy for the overthrow of the new order. A part of the disbanded Bourbon army was, with the secret connivance or approval of the papal authorities, enlisted for a war of brigandage against Italy. The most ruthless bandits, who murdered their prisoners with all circumstances of cruelty, appeared in the rôle of champions of the papal throne and the altar; priests incited the people against the heretical king; convents served as lurking-places for the bandits; and such of these as suffered execution died, through papal absolution, secure of heaven. Within twenty months these brigand-warriors lost 2,293 slain in battle, 2,677 prisoners, and 959 shot by sentence of court-martial. What specially aggravated the difficulty of reconciling church and state was that the latter was now stretching forth its hand towards Rome. An Italy without Rome for its capital was what no Italian could think of. In this city alone did Cavour see united the great moral and historical conditions which entitled it to be the head of a great nation; and he believed in the possibility of getting possession of it by amicable arrangement. The peaceful separation of the civil and ecclesiastical powers in such a way as to concentrate and strengthen each — a free church in a free state — that was the thought which he shared with the most enlightened spirits of Italy, the ideal for which his bosom glowed, and towards which he strained with all his strength. The papacy, spiritually new-born, and relieved from all the cares of secular government, would be able to devote itself more entirely and more effectively to the duties of its lofty calling. A merciful fate spared him the pain of discovering how entirely his hopes deceived him. Excessive labors exhausted his bodily powers; and on June 6, 1861, he expired. "*Frate, Frate, libera chiesa in libero stato!*" were his latest words to the priest from whom he received absolution. He fell in the moment of victory, as much a martyr to patriotism as any warrior that ever died on the battle-field. The parliament, deeply moved, suspended its sittings for three days; there was no friend of the

country but mourned him. The majority that had steadily stood by him met, and pledged themselves to remain true to the policy of their great leader.

Cavour's place remained void. He left behind him no successor capable of carrying through his half-accomplished work. The presidency of the ministry was undertaken by Ricasoli (Fig. 37), who




FIG. 37. — Ricasoli. From the copper-plate engraving by Metzmacher, 1861.

found the Roman question further from solution than ever. The failure of his attempts induced him to lay down office, March 3, 1862, when Rattazzi once more accepted the presidency. Neither did he make any progress in accommodating matters with Rome. His old friends, the Radicals, whose views now extended far beyond Italy, set their hopes confidently on him. From Brescia, Kossuth sent forth a call to the Magyars, Slavs, and Greeks for a common effort to shake off the Austrian and Turkish yokes. Garibaldi was at hand, and eager to restore to Italy all that was wanting to her on the farther side of the Adriatic; for if Hungary and the Balkan peninsula were in flames, Austria must let Venetia go. But to all these plans England put a sudden end by her declaration that she would suffer no encroachment on Turkey. This directed Garibaldi's attention to Rome. He preached throughout the Italian cities the

crusade of "Rome and Victor Emmanuel." But this did not at all harmonize with Rattazzi's views, who would in no way interfere with Rome without the Emperor Napoleon's consent. Indeed, under pressure from the latter, he threatened to suppress by force any attempt at filibustering; while the king himself declared that the hour for seizing Rome had not yet come, and that to him alone belonged the right of announcing it. But Garibaldi did not believe in the good faith of this declaration. He embarked, on the

night of August 24, at Catania, with 3000 men. But Napoleon's threat to occupy Naples itself in case of necessity prompted Turin to act with decision. The volunteers, who had landed on the Calabrian coast, came, on August 27, into collision at Aspromonte with a division of the royal troops under Colonel Pallavicini, and were completely routed. Garibaldi, after receiving a ball in his ankle, gave himself up. As Rattazzi had done a little to realize Italy's longings for Rome as his predecessor, so, like him, he fell from power,



FIG. 38. — Minghetti. From a photograph.

December 1, 1862. The Farini-Minghetti (Fig. 38) ministry, which succeeded his, had the courage to oppose itself resolutely to this mania for Rome that fettered Italy to France; and although it shared in the conviction that Rome was the natural and necessary capital of Italy, it determined to let the question lie fallow for a time. Without this complication it had enough to do with financial difficulties. Its year's deficit amounted to more than 260,000,000 lire. The government had to have recourse to in-







First entry of King Victor Emmanuel into Florence

From the painting by Enrico Taffari

creasing the old taxes, and the imposition of new ones, among these the hated meal-tax.

Much more annoying to Napoleon than the attitude of the Turin government was the intractable obstinacy with which the Italian people insisted on Rome. This embarrassed him in his whole policy, and burdened him, in the eyes of the whole Catholic world, with a responsibility which he was increasingly unwilling to bear. On this question he changed his foreign minister, replacing Thouvenel by Drouyn de l'Huys. He felt the necessity of restraining Italy; and as the Turin statesmen desired nothing so much as to be restrained, there grew out of the situation the treaty of September 15, 1864, which disposed of the Roman question for the immediate future. By it Italy pledged herself not to encroach upon the present papal territory, to prevent any attack on it from the exterior, and declared herself ready to assume a just proportion of the debt of the former States of the Church. France, in return, bound herself to withdraw her troops gradually from Rome in conformity with the reorganization of the papal force, the evacuation to be accomplished, however, within two years. But the treaty was to remain in abeyance till the king of Italy should have decreed the transference of his capital from Turin to some place yet to be determined on.

The indignation of the people of Turin at this arrangement was boundless, and was the cause of bloody riots, and the fall of the Minghetti administration. La Marmora constituted a new ministry; Farini became insane. Garibaldi, on his crutches, thundered from Caprera against the defilement of the country by such a convention. "With Bonaparte," he wrote, "there is but one convention possible — the purging of our land of his presence, not in two years, but in two hours." On December 12, 1864, the king, with heavy heart, confirmed the transference of the capital to Florence (PLATE XI.). The Holy Father might well repeat the sigh from the allocution of December 17, 1860: "It is hard for us to decide whether we are protected by friends, or cast into the dungeon by enemies. *Petrus est in vinculis.*"

## CHAPTER V.

### THE INCREASING DIFFICULTIES OF THE SECOND EMPIRE.

IT was the peculiar fate of the Second Empire, that its military triumphs brought it only political mischances. Its Villafranca creature — the Italian Confederation — was doomed ere it began to draw breath; and the imperial government painfully concealed its impotence to avert the misadventure under the guise of non-intervention. It knew that abroad there was confidence neither in its reliability nor its stability. Its alliance with the clergy was shattered by the September treaty; the democracy was excited at seeing freedom and independence conferred on Italy by the same hand that denied them at home. The younger generation made no concealment of their hate of the empire; even the legislative body became an object of anxiety to it, especially after 1859, when a number of republicans abandoned their former reserve, and “the Group of Five” — among them Émile Ollivier — constituted themselves the nucleus of a constitutional opposition. By Morny’s advice, a decree of November 24, 1860, granted the senate and chamber of deputies the right of replying to the speech from the throne by an address, which might be discussed in presence of the government commissioners, they taking part. In the legislative body a free debate was allowed on every bill introduced, and this was taken in shorthand, and published in the official journal. A minister without a portfolio — the so-called speech-minister — defended the bills in the chambers.

Much more important than this homoeopathic dose of freedom, which was to inaugurate the reconciliation between the empire and the spirit of the age, was the change wrought by the emperor’s personal intervention in the economical relations of the country. During the Bourbon and Orleans dynasties the great chiefs of industry had the legislation affecting customs-duties and commerce entirely in their own hands, and had brought the system of prohibition and protection up to the highest point of elaboration. Napoleon decided to break with all this, and, in the form of an open letter to his minister

of state, unfolded the essential features of his economical programme, which was to usher in a new era of peace and prosperity. These were: the abrogation of the duties on wool and cotton, the gradual reduction of those on sugar and coffee, the energetic improvement of the avenues of traffic, advances for the promotion of agriculture and manufactures, the institution of great works of public utility, abolition of prohibitive duties, and the conclusion of commercial treaties with foreign nations.

In regard to the last item a beginning had already been made in October, 1859, when the eminent economist Michel Chevalier visited England, ostensibly with reference to a congress regarding weights and measures. The preliminary discussions, which were taken part in on the English side by Richard Cobden (Fig. 39) and Gladstone, were then transferred to Paris. The council of ministers heard nothing of the business till it was in shape. In virtue of his constitutional prerogative the emperor, on January 23, 1860, signed the commercial treaty with England. By it France bound herself to the abolition of all prohibitory duties on British manufactures, and to the lowering of those on coal, coke, iron, machinery, yarn, hemp, etc.; England, in return, making great reductions on the duties on wine, silk, articles of vertu, etc. Especially significant, and powerfully influential in transforming the customs-systems of the other countries of Europe, was the 'most favored nation' clause, by which the two nations mutually bound themselves to give each other the benefit of any remission or reduction they might grant a third power. By this treaty England sacrificed millions of her revenue; her tariff retaining only forty-eight dutiable articles, of which but fifteen were of financial importance. In France the treaty met with no popular acceptance. The great majority of the people were believers in protection; and the manufacturers and many influential politicians—notably M. Thiers—gave expression to their dislike of the treaty in no minced terms. Time, however, justified it. A great development of French trade began to set in almost immediately on its adoption. Agriculture and cognate industries received an impulse from the Second Empire such as they had not from any previous government. Improved breeds of cattle were introduced, denuded mountain-tracts were reforested, the soil of the Landes was fixed and planted, the marshes of the Sologne drained, model farms instituted, and many other useful works executed. By 1862 nearly a half million hectares (1,225,000 acres) of land had been reclaimed, the





FIG. 39. — Richard Cobden. From the copper-plate engraving by Jacob Stephenson; original painting by C. A. Duval.

arable land increased by 645,000 hectares, the cereal crop augmented by thirty-three million hektolitres, and the yield of wine raised from twenty-eight to sixty-three million hektolitres.

A more unfavorable symptom was the constantly increasing deficit in the national budget, which, produced by an extravagant and corrupt administration, amounted in 1863 to 75,000,000 francs. The attempts of Fould (Fig. 40), minister of finance, to restore the budget to an equilibrium, were frustrated by the Mexican expedition. If a sound administration of finance was unattainable, there blossomed forth, in lieu of it, in unchecked luxuriance, a spirit of wildest speculation. Mirès, king of the Bourse, the buyer-up of newspapers, floater of loans, and builder of railroads, on whose boards the names of the highest aristocracy figured, knew so well how to catch the public ear, and especially the ear of those having small independent incomes, that men rushed with feverish haste for shares in his most desperate schemes, till, in 1861, the bubble burst, and thousands were ruined. Even the government's colossal centralizing apparatus, which on the occasion of the elections stretched its thousand arms over all the land, as well as its system of official candidates, began to lose their efficiency. In the election of 1862 it still maintained its majority in the country districts; for Jacques Bonhomme, though emancipated personally, was still, in respect of up-bringing and culture, the same man he was before 1789, and new ideas found little acceptance with him. In the greater cities, on the contrary, including Paris, and even in a number of the smaller towns, the government was defeated. The new chamber counted fifty-five non-official members. The public regarded the result as a defeat for government, the consequence being a change of ministry. On June 23, 1863, Persigny received his dismissal, and Billaut (and after his sudden death, Rouher) took the place of Walewski as minister of state.

Abroad, the war of 1859 had supplied new fuel to the mistrust of the Second Empire, especially in its weaker neighbors, Switzerland and Belgium. A far more serious matter was the alienation of Russia, produced by the Platonic scheme hatched by Napoleon, in conjunction with England, in 1863, for a new congress to be held at Paris, for the revision of the treaties of 1815, with an especial view to the reconstruction of Poland. Austria appeared favorable. Prussia, on the other hand, concluded a military convention with Russia, on February 8, 1864; and Gortchakoff had an easy part to play in giving the most distinct refusal to the proposal, and in denying the

right of the subscribers to the treaties of 1815 to interfere in any way in Russia's domestic affairs.

Serious as this liaseo was for a monarchy that lived only on suc-



FIG. 40. — Fould, Minister of Finance. From a photograph.

cesses, it would not have been enough to affect the conditions essential to its existence. The germ whose development proved fatal to the Second Empire was not of European origin, but was engendered







Napoleon III., Emperor of the French.

From the lithograph by A. Collette.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 155.*

in North America, finding its indirect occasion in the American Civil War.

Napoleon's main reason for anxiously looking for the dissolution of the North American Union was based on the conviction that this catastrophe would afford him the most favorable opportunity for making France's prestige paramount among the Latin races of Central America without exposing himself to interference from the jealous republic on the north. He despatched his cousin Jerome across the Atlantic to inform himself on the spot regarding the prospects of the American Rebellion; and although this prince came to the conclusion that the attempt at separation would end in failure, the emperor himself held fast to the opposite convictions. An excuse for intervention in Mexico, where the liberal President Benito Juarez (Fig. 41) was now temporarily triumphant over the reactionary clerical and monarchical forces, was easily found. France, Spain, and England all had more or less valid money claims upon the Mexican government; and in 1861 they came to a diplomatic agreement to press these jointly by force of arms.



FIG. 41. — President Benito Juarez.

To Napoleon (PLATE XII.) these financial claims were only a secondary consideration and a pretext. His prime object was the setting-up of a monarchy in Mexico. The reactionary leaders Gutierrez and Almonte, in their hunt after a candidate for the throne, had cast their eyes on the Archduke Maximilian, brother of the emperor of Austria; and as there was no possibility of appointing a French prince, Napoleon indorsed this choice. The prince was now thirty-two years old, and a man of brilliant qualities. In his youth he had shown a taste for the sea, and in 1851 had made a

voyage round the world in command of the "Novara," and thereafter given proof of ability and liberal sentiments by his administration of Lombardo-Venetia. Since then, suspected by the Vienna court-party as a revolutionary and by his own family as ambitious, he had lived in half-disgrace in his castle of Miramar, on the Adriatic. Here Napoleon's tempting offers reached him, and at once set his fancy and ambition on fire. To his misfortune, his wife, Charlotte of Belgium, entered eagerly into the plot, and was the zealous confederate of the conspirators.

From these schemes, which were but half a secret, the two other powers held themselves quite aloof. In order not to be drawn into them against his will, Lord Russell, in the treaty signed at London, October 21, 1861, limited the common action of the powers strictly to the protection of the persons and property of their respective subjects in Mexico. The contracting parties further bound themselves in advance to make no use of their military forces for ends other than those detailed in the treaty, to interfere in no way in the domestic affairs of the republic, and to seek no special individual advantages. Immediately on the common occupation of Vera Cruz the commanders of the allied forces were to invite the Mexican authorities to enter upon negotiations. As Spain had already a squadron lying at Cuba with 5600 men on board, these were the first troops to be landed at Vera Cruz, December 8, 1861. The French government availed itself of this procedure to declare that it was thereby necessitated also to raise the number of its troops, originally fixed at 3000. England sent 1000 men. The command-in-chief was committed to the Spanish general Prim, count of Reus. But great was the astonishment of the English and Spanish commissioners when Saligny, the French diplomatic agent, submitted to them an ultimatum to be sent to the Mexican government, embodying several new demands going far beyond the original ones, among these being the full and immediate payment to the Swiss bankers, Joecker & Co., of a claim of \$15,000,000, — about half of which, as is now known, was to go as a commission to the emperor's favorite, Morny. It was then decided that the powers should separate their demands, each presenting its own; only those common to all being comprised in a collective note, which should at the same time intimate that it was requisite that the troops, in order to escape from the deadly coast-climate, should take up a position farther inland. This last demand Juarez declined to accede to till a basis for a peace should have been defini-



tively agreed on; but, in a spirit of accommodation, proposed that negotiations with this end should be entered upon forthwith. This led to the preliminaries of Soledad, subscribed by Prim and Doblado, February 19, 1862, arranging that peace negotiations should be opened in Orizaba, and that the allied troops should occupy the three points, Cordoba, Orizaba, and Tehuacan, but evacuate them in the event of the negotiations falling through.

On March 3 the French re-enforcements under General Lorencez landed, accompanied by Juarez's deadly foe, Almonte, who at once issued a proclamation to his countrymen calling on them to rally round him, and establish a government in accord with their needs, their character, and their faith. The demand made by the Mexican government for the deportation of this main agent of the monarchical intriguers gave Saligny the longed-for pretext for declining to negotiate further with it. With amazement his fellow-commissioners learned from him that Mexico pined under a reign of terror hitherto unparalleled, and that without delay they must march on the capital. Astounded, they read in the French press that the aim of the expedition was the overthrow of Juarez, and the elevation of the Archduke Maximilian to the Mexican throne. Saligny's two colleagues, having no mind to be made mere tools of this policy, declared this procedure a breach of the London treaty and of the Soledad preliminaries, and with their troops returned on shipboard.

The French remained sole masters of the field. In contravention of the clear terms of the Soledad compact, and filled with the conceit that here, as in China, a handful of troops would suffice, Lorencez, on April 27, commenced his march inland, and, defeating a small Mexican corps under Porfirio Diaz, occupied Orizaba, where he found some hundred people, who proclaimed Almonte president. But his triumph was short-lived. He was repelled from Puebla by a superior force under General Zaragoza, and had to turn back with his object unattained. Want and disease began to decimate his corps. Only the clergy were enthusiastic for Almonte's rule. The clerics of Puebla refused even absolution to the wounded Mexicans "because they had fought against the allies of the church." Juarez, by way of reprisal for the war thus wantonly forced on him, issued a proclamation on his side, declaring all the cities occupied by the French to be under martial law, that every Mexican remaining therein should be treated as a traitor and his property confiscated, holding all Mexicans from thirty years of age to sixty bound to mili-



tary service, and empowering the governors of the separate states to levy guerillas.

Napoleon officially declared the object of the expedition for the first time, on July 3, 1862, in an open letter addressed to Marshal Forey, who arrived with considerable re-enforcements in September: "That America should flourish," he wrote, "is no doubt of high import to Europe. Yet it is no way desirable for France that the United States should gain control of the whole Gulf of Mexico, and thence lord it over South America as well. It is much more our interest to limit her wider expansion, to restore to the Latin races across the Atlantic their due power and influence; and this will be more successfully accomplished by the establishment of a monarchy, or, at least, of a strong government, in Mexico." But Napoleon's theory made as little impression on the Mexicans as Forey's fine-sounding proclamations. At Puebla, the siege of which began, after long delay, on March 18, 1863, he found General Ortega, the garrison, and the population determined to resist to the utmost. The city surrendered, however, on May 17, with 12,000 prisoners. The fall of Puebla involved that of Mexico. Juarez yielded it without a struggle, and retired to San Luis Potosi. Accompanied by Saligny, Almonte, and General Marquez, Forey made his ceremonial entry into the city of the Montezumas, ostensibly amid the boundless rejoicings of the people. The government was made over to a triumvirate, consisting of Almonte, Archbishop Labastida, and General Salas, who without delay summoned an assembly of notables of equivocal reputation. This declared for an empire with the Archduke Maximilian as sovereign; and in the case of his non-acceptance, in the name of the nation, left the nomination of another prince to the good offices of the emperor of the French. The next matters taken in hand by the triumvirate were a treaty with France in regard to the cession of Sonora, and the restoration of titles of nobility. Forey, who initiated a rule of extreme severity, was soon replaced by Bazaine, and the universally hated Saligny by Montholon. A plébiscite, engineered by the French, confirmed the call of Maximilian by an overwhelming vote; and that prince, after a period of indecision, finally resolved to accept the transatlantic throne. On April 11 he signed a compact with Napoleon, by which the latter bound himself to evacuate Mexico in proportion as the native army advanced towards full organization. The foreign legion, 5000 men strong, should remain for six years; the cost of the French expedi-

tion was fixed at \$52,000,000, and the compensation for every French soldier remaining behind in Mexico at \$193 yearly. Maximilian bound himself to pay \$4,800,000 of this debt annually, and, further, to indemnify the French subjects for whatever losses they had sustained in Mexico. In secret articles he further bound himself to confirm all the measures of Forey and the regency. The archduke had found a banker in London to advance him 201,500,000 francs, of which a large part stuck to the fingers of those who had conducted the whole intrigue. He himself got practically nothing.

Thus entirely denuded of means, in a strait between the crying need for liberal reforms and his clerical patrons, with their claims for the abrogation of all laws hostile to the church and the restoration of the confiscated church property, Maximilian (Fig. 42) found himself from the first in an untenable situation. In the hope of extricating himself from it, he turned to Rome, and received thence the promise that a papal nuncio should follow him immediately to his new empire with full powers of reconciliation. On May 28, 1864, Maximilian landed at San Juan d'Ulloa, but met with no friendly greeting. This was the first in a long series of disillusionings. On his part there was no lack of zeal and good-will for Mexico's regeneration, but all to no purpose. His best-meant ordinances remained a dead letter. Liberals and clerics alike recoiled from the avaricious and arrogant French on whom he had to lean. The adhesions to the empire were extremely scanty; it existed only in the capital and certain points in its neighborhood held by the foreign troops; and even in this district a considerable number of towns were in the hands of the liberals. And of what avail could 26,000 men, dispersed in numerous subdivisions throughout a hostile population, be for the effective occupation of a country of such extent? The French dared not venture to move from the spots where they were, while the republican troops were in constant motion. The very methods of terror behind which which the former concealed their weakness served only to fill up the measure of hatred on which they were held. Scarce any step it took was more fatal to the imperial throne than the decree of October 3, technically, perhaps, in accord with the rules of civilized warfare, by which all captured guerillas, as well as all who abetted them, were to be tried by court-martial, and, if found guilty, executed within twenty-four hours. The relation of Maximilian to Bazaine, a man of boundless avarice, was the worst possible. He suspected him, and not without



FIG. 42. — Emperor Maximilian of Mexico. From the lithograph by Durand ; original drawing by Saintin.



grounds, of ambitious views, and, holding him responsible for the neglected condition of the Mexican army, personally demanded his recall.

One principal means on which Maximilian relied for the confirmation of his rule, was the sequestration of the church lands. After weary waiting, the nuncio Meglia at length arrived; but the brief which he brought gave expression only to the discontent of the Holy Father with the concessions made to the liberals, and demanded the suppression of non-Catholic worship, full liberty to the bishops for the exercise of their office, restoration of the orders, clerical guidance of education, and the liberation of the clergy from all subordination to the government. This breach of promise on the part of the Vatican deprived the tottering throne of one of its two pillars of support. The other was soon to follow. Although Juarez had been pressed back to the northern frontier, the desultory guerilla war continued unabated, so that even a partial withdrawal of French troops was not to be thought of; on the contrary, Bazaine required re-enforcements. Ever heavier became the responsibility weighing on Napoleon for his creature. As long as the rebellion in the United States continued he received the protests of the American government and of Congress against the establishment of monarchy in Mexico with the most placid equanimity. But a change came when the fortune of war declared for the Union. When Seward, in December, 1865, announced in Paris the fixed determination to admit of no European intervention on the American continent, the terrified imperial government undertook to hasten the return of its troops with all possible speed. But Seward was not satisfied with this; he insisted on complete evacuation within a year. His protest frustrated not only the nomination of a French general as Mexican minister of war, but also the embarkation of the foreign legion recruited in Austria.

Napoleon cut himself loose from his protégé with scant ceremony. The French troops were withdrawn from Mexico during 1866. The Empress Charlotte (Fig. 43), coldly rebuffed by Napoleon and the pope, to seek whose aid she had recrossed the Atlantic, went insane through grief. Pride and the entreaties of his followers prevented Maximilian from accompanying the retreat of his French protectors. But on their departure he found himself helpless. He was besieged and captured in Queretaro, May 15, 1867. In accordance with a law which he himself had promulgated, he was shot on the nine-





FIG. 43. — Empress Charlotte of Mexico. From the lithograph by Durand ; original drawing by Saintin.

teenth of the following month on the Cerro de las Campanas ('Hill of the Bells') near Queretaro. Generals Mejia and Miramon shared his fate. The delivery of the body Juarez made dependent on a special solicitation of the Austrian government. On this being made and acceded to the "Novara" brought the corpse home.

Between the throne overthrown in Queretaro and that in the Tuileries lay the whole breadth of the Atlantic, but the latter quivered at the transoceanic shock.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE PRELUDE TO GERMAN UNITY.

THE period in German history which extends from about 1855 to the close of 1864 may roughly be described as one of preparation. Germany, whose disunion, beneficial only to a denationalized caste of princelings, their brutal understrappers, and the house of Austria, had made her for centuries the despised football of European politics, first reawoke to sense of national unity and strength under the stress of Napoleonic domination in 1813. After this awakening, the miserable travesty of union which the diplomats of Vienna granted the German nation could only have maintained itself in popular toleration during a stagnation of European international politics such as that which extended from 1815 to 1848. With the revived pressure of international relations brought about by the magnificent schemes of the third Napoleon, the insufficiency and the irrationality of the Confederation became every day more apparent. The Crimean War, the Italian War of Liberation, the affair of Schleswig-Holstein, a dozen other matters, betrayed its shameful inefficiency, and convinced the mass of thinking Germans with continually increasing clearness of the real nature of the hideous paradox which, in a Confederation professing to represent the fatherland, assigned to Prussia, a state entitled by her patriotic history and spirit and real power to stand at the head of Germany, a subordinate and humiliating position beside an Oriental empire and a host of petty princes who dwelt in an atmosphere unventilated since the Middle Ages. During this period, then, the minds of men were being prepared by the logic of events to look elsewhere than to the Confederation for the realization of their hopes of German unity, freedom, and power. This realization, the events of 1848 had shown, no mere paper constitutions, no visionary ideas of revolutionary or republican, could effect, but only a power intelligent, orderly, and progressive, and at the same time ready and able to meet fossil kings and parvenu emperors with the argument of force, to which alone they are amenable. To act this part Prussia was being quietly made

ready by her great statesman Bismarck, and by the able prince who was later to become the first sovereign of a unified Germany.

Important as it has since become for Prussia that she refused during the Crimean War to play the part of a vassal to Austria, yet, notwithstanding her somewhat ostentatious display of independence, the weak point in her policy still remained. She won respect neither at home nor abroad. Friend and foe alike regarded her as fickle and weak, and for this estimate she was mainly indebted to the personal character of her monarch, which received a new illustration in the Neuchâtel embroglio. After the attempt to bring this question before the Congress of Paris proved a miserable fiasco, a number of royalists, under the leading of Count Frederic de Pourtalès, sought to cut the knot by making themselves masters of the castle by a *coup de main*, September 2, 1856, and proclaiming the king as suzerain of the land; but they were quickly overpowered, and some sixty of them were tried for high treason. The case of Neuchâtel had long lain near the king's heart, and it did so now more than ever. He felt himself aggrieved in his divine right as sovereign, which had been expressly recognized by the other powers in the London protocol of May 24, 1852. Yet he declared himself prepared to arrange the affair in a friendly way, with the proviso, however, that the prisoners should first be set at liberty. This condition the Swiss Federal Council, though also ready for a peaceable solution of the question, declined to accede to, requiring that the king should first pledge himself to recognize the independence of Neuchâtel, and renounce all claim of right over it. In these circumstances nothing seemed left the king but to enforce his demands by military measures. But this motion of Prussia unchained the warlike spirit of the Swiss in a way to alarm the great powers. The friendly offices of France and Austria averted the threatened hostilities. On January 15, 1857, the Federal Council decreed the liberation of the prisoners: next day the king, though sulkily, declared himself ready for negotiations with the great powers. The conference (in which Prussia was represented by Bismarck) met in Paris, on May 5, and brought matters to a conclusion satisfactory to both parties. The king, once for all, renounced all rights of suzerainty over Neuchâtel, while, in return, the prisoners were guaranteed full immunity. The king waived his claim for 6,000,000 marks (modified by the conference to a half), but conditioned for the continuance of his title of Prince of Neuchâtel and Valengin.



This unsavory controversy was the last in which Frederick William was engaged. His nervous system had long been overstimulated, the strain showing itself sometimes in eccentricities, sometimes in a sort of stupor. In the June of 1857, on his way home from Marienbad, he visited the Saxon court at Pillnitz, and was there prostrated by a paralytic stroke, which repeated itself in October. Although his condition precluded all prospect of his ever being able to resume the duties of his office, the feudal party, knowing that a regency meant their loss of influence, exerted themselves to the utmost to prevent the appointment of one. The prince of Prussia (afterward William I.) was, on October 23, nominated merely his brother's representative. On October 7, 1858, advantage was taken of a glimpse of sanity to secure the king's subscription to a regency. He then, in company with his wife (and most devoted nurse), made a journey to Italy, but without finding any relief. On January 2, 1861, death released him from his sufferings.

It was as if a mountain were lifted off many hearts. Men's judgments regarding the prince of Prussia had undergone a great change since 1848. His manful fight against the tendencies of the feudal (*Kreuz-zeitung*) party during the Crimean War had quite won him the sympathies of the liberal circles. The marriage of his son, Frederick William, with the eldest daughter of Queen Victoria (January 25, 1858), and of his daughter Louisa with the prince-regent (later grand duke) of Baden seemed to indicate that the Hohenzollerns were turning their backs towards the east in favor of the west. The personal character of the prince-regent was in direct contrast to that of his fickle-minded brother. He was a man of soldierly simplicity and fidelity to duty, inaccessible to favorites, mentally and bodily indefatigable, regardless of personal comforts, and ever at work. The change of ministry — everywhere recognized as indispensable — was not long in coming. Only two of the Manteuffel cabinet — von der Heydt (commerce) and Simons (justice) — were retained, the rest giving place to new men, whose names had a good repute in the land. The presidency was conferred on that true German and excellently disposed man, Prince Charles Anthony of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. The principle on which the new sovereign meant to conduct the state was laid down in a charge to von Auerswald, his minister of state. "There is no longer need," he wrote, "to dread talk of breaking with the past; the hand of reform will be applied wherever it is needed, but extravagant ideas will be energetically

combated by well-considered treatment of affairs in accordance with law. The army, which has worked out Prussia's greatness, must be strong and honored, for the world must know that Prussia is ready to defend the right everywhere."

This clear and seasonable announcement of the 'New Era,' as people hopefully called this time, so different from the clouds of bombastic platitudes in which Frederick William had been accustomed to enshroud his hazy ideas, made the best impression. Public opinion, long suppressed, now made itself felt. After the disappearance of the Manteuffel electioneering influence, the preponderating majority of the new house of representatives was made up of liberals of various shades. The Right was reduced from 224 members to 38. And the fresher breeze breathed from Prussia over all the other German states. A wider interest in public affairs was awakened among the peoples, and the governments deemed it prudent to recognize it. In Bavaria, King Maximilian II. closed a hard struggle with his second chamber with these words: "I will have peace with my people." In Baden and Würtemberg the concordats concluded with Rome were set aside, as the reaction had not had the courage to get the assent of the chambers to them, and in the former of these states the grand duke summoned a liberal ministry. In Hanover the government had to maintain a hard fight with the ever-growing opposition.

The foreign policy of Prussia, also, advanced with a firmer and more even step. Since the Crimean War, Napoleon's endeavors for a closer relation with the North German power had been repeated more than once. In point of fact, however, the "Franco-Russian love-making" appeared to justify the jealousy of the intervening lands. Bismarck, however, who, as the years rolled on, acquired a constantly increasing influence in Prussia, saw the situation in a different light. For him the manner in which any other relation affected that of Prussia to Austria determined his view of it. He rather hoped for than dreaded a Franco-Russian alliance. At the Neuchâtel congress he remained deaf to the allurements of the emperor, who, while alluding to the impending war in Italy, recommended Prussia to round herself off with Hanover and Holstein, desiring for France, in return, only a trifling rectification of boundaries on the Rhine. Unweariedly he remained at his far from pleasant post at Frankfort on the watch against Austrian encroachments. "It is astonishing," he wrote in 1857, "what success Austria attains

by unceasingly persecuting every foreign diplomat who ventures to stand up for the interests of his own land against the wishes of the Vienna cabinet, till either from intimidation or sheer weariness he complaisantly submits. There are but few diplomats who have not preferred to sacrifice conscience and patriotism. Prussia is interdicted from all right to a foreign policy of her own. Prussia cannot permit herself to be treated in the Confederation, not as the third part of Germany, but as one of sixteen votes dominated over by Austria."

The Emperor Francis Joseph, in his manifesto at the beginning of the Italian War, expressed the conviction that her German brothers would not let Austria fight alone. As head of the Confederation he warned Germany of the danger with which it was threatened if its bulwark, Italy—won with streams of German blood—was not defended by its united force. Of one thing alone Austria took no thought—of regard for the interests of Prussia, and concessions to them, and of recognition of her legitimate position in the Confederation. Untaught by the evil results of the same policy in the Crimean War, Austria now repeated it against a prince whose personal character gave it much less chance of success. Once more, without previous understanding with Prussia, Austria, on February 5, 1859, addressed herself to the diet. This body, however, without coming to an immediate conclusion, indicated it as desirable that the German governments should first come to a clear understanding with each other, and particularly to full certainty in regard to common action with Austria. In the beginning of March it ordered the adoption of measures for averting the common danger, viz., the arming of the Confederate fortresses, prohibition of the sale of horses, etc.

Undoubtedly it would have been most congenial to the chivalric spirit of the prince-regent to have arrayed himself boldly on the side of his old comrade of the Confederation. To take advantage of Austria's temporary needs in order to sell the help asked from him at the best price was quite alien to his nature. But it was a very different thing if Prussia was to be required to fight for purely Austrian interests. Again Bismarck was one of those who added his earnest dissuasion. "As soon," he wrote, "as a shot is fired on the Rhine, it is all over with the Austro-Italian war; and, in place of it, a Franco-Prussian one comes on the stage, in which Austria, after we have lifted the load from her shoulders, will stand by us or not, exactly as suits her own interests. That we should play a brilliantly



victorious rôle, she will certainly not consent to." Certainly all the zeal that the second-rate states manifested for the support of Austria could not shut Prussia's eyes to the fact that in case of any eventuality occurring to herself she could look for very little military help from them; for, to them, the repression of Sardinia meant the repression of Prussia also, and the maintenance of the old see-saw system between the two great powers, on which alone their influence rested. At the first mootings of the war question in the diet, Prussia instantly declared that she must assert her complete independence as a European power, and would not, therefore, take upon herself duties other than those prescribed by the federal constitution without special reasons. Austria's proposals going beyond this were set aside through Prussia's formal protest. This document indicated, as the aim of Prussian policy, respect for European treaties, the maintenance of the present situation, and, through that, the preservation of the peace of Europe.

The endeavor to project Prussia, through help of the diet, *nolens volens*, into the war miscarried. Nevertheless, the cabinet at Vienna persevered in the delusion that she would be forced into it through the force of public opinion in Germany. To bring this about, the venal press of Austria was used as a lever, especially *Germania*, the main organ of the Ultramontane anti-Prussian agitation. The 'Great-Germans' saw in Austria's cause a life-and-death question for all Germany; the Ultramontanes preached the crusade against the heretical Sardinians; the numerous holders of Austrian paper foresaw pecuniary loss in a defeat of the imperial state. Thus it came about that almost the whole South violently urged the intervention of all Germany in favor of Austria. In Prussia itself the extreme Right took up the same ground. All these efforts, however, were vain. Prussia was unwilling to move, unless allowed free control over a large part of the Confederate forces; while Austria desired full power, military and diplomatic, to rest in the hands of the diet, where she was all-powerful. Count Buol-Schauenstein (Fig. 44) was removed from the Austrian ministry of foreign affairs because considered too friendly to Prussia. While pretending to desire frank and free co-operation with Prussia, Austria underhandedly attempted to secure the mobilization of the Confederate army without Prussia's consent. When Prussia checkmated this move, Austria preferred to come to terms with Napoleon and sacrifice Lombardy rather than accept aid from Prussia as from an equal.



The fault lay solely on the side of Austria. She had, from the beginning, treated Prussia, not as a comrade in the Confederation, but as a vassal; she had failed, before the commencement of the war, to come to an understanding with her in regard to its scope and



FIG. 44. — Count Buol-Schauenstein.

object, but, instead, had bluntly required vassal service of her; nay, she had declared the war in spite of Prussia's earnest remonstrance, haughtily rejecting her offered mediation, and, instead, had demanded her subordination to the Confederation. The premature

peace she concluded mainly to avert the passing into Prussia's hands of the leadership of Germany in this war; she preferred the sacrifice of Lombardy to imperilling her own hegemony in the Confederation. The cabinet of Vienna overlooked the fact that the inability manifested in this war to lead Germany in a way accordant with her national interests was precisely the reason that deprived Austria of every intrinsic right to the place of leader.

The impression made on the German people by these events was deep and wide. The halo of Austrian strength that, since 1850, had dazzled so many eyes, paled before these exhibitions of diplomacy and generalship; and, in the same proportion, the eyes of the friends of the fatherland were again directed towards Prussia as the state to which alone dismembered Germany could look for the defence of its borders and its honor. In the Würtemberg second chamber the declaration proposed, May 5, by deputy Hölder, "that in this time of danger, the welfare of Germany can be assured only through the re-establishment of internal unity," received twenty-four votes; in the second Bavarian chamber a motion by Völk (August 14) for the creation of a central authority and parliament received forty-five votes. Besides, the conviction of the necessity for Prussian leadership took gradually deeper root in the south. Nevertheless, despite all this, Bismarck's complaint was justified, that, as a rule, individual interests were stronger than a sense of the common weal; that the latter suffered from the fact that, in general, a life on the type of the Phaeacians was pleasanter than one on that of the Spartans. "Men are quite willing to be protected, but pay for it most unwillingly; and least of all are they willing to yield up the least of their sovereign prerogatives for the general good."

Helping hands were stretched forth, from two quarters simultaneously, to keep the national movement on foot, and to guide it into the right path. A meeting at Eisenach, mainly of Thuringian and Prussian democrats, and another in Hanover, with von Bennigsen, the leader of the opposition in the second chamber, at its head, coincided in recognizing the necessity for a radical reform in the federal constitution. The aim of both was the union of the military and diplomatic leadership of Germany in one hand, and that the hand of Prussia; and both expressed the hope that the Prussian government itself would undertake such a reform. After the holding of a third meeting — this time also in Eisenach, and made up partly of South Germans — the 'National Union' (on the type of the Italian) was

founded (September 15, 16, 1859) in Frankfort, consisting largely of the relics of the old Gotha party of 1849. As the senate of the free city interposed obstacles to its holding its meetings there, Coburg, whose duke had shown himself favorable to the reform cause from the beginning, was selected as its head-quarters, with Bennigsen as permanent head of its principal committee. In the same year an attempt was made to oppose to the 'Union' a 'Great-German Reform Union,' composed of Bavarian Particularists and Ultramontanes, and of Württemberg democrats. This identified itself with the schemes of the second-rate states befriended by Austria, but it never attained the standing of its rival. The conviction, everywhere prevalent, of the untenability of the present state of things, impelled men to give expression to their longings in strongly emphatic terms. The centenary festival of Schiller's birth, in 1859, one such as Germany had never before seen, culminated in a vow: "We will be one single people of brothers." The same spirit pervaded the peripatetic associations of men of science, especially the German Association of Jurists, founded in 1860, which inscribed "The Development of a Uniform German Law-system" as a motto on its banners. The idea that no German prince would sacrifice any item of his prerogatives on the altar of country was dispelled by the speech from the Baden throne in December, 1861, in which the grand duke freely declared that he would joyfully surrender any portion of his authority whose sacrifice could contribute to the enhancement of the dignity of the whole fatherland. The prince-regent of Prussia laid it down as a condition to his granting the meeting solicited by the Emperor Napoleon, that the other German princes should have part in it. The meeting took place in Baden-Baden, June 18, 1860.

But whatever value all these ambitious efforts for the reconstruction of Germany might have, in reality everything depended on the manner in which Prussia's domestic relations developed themselves, in which connection the repeal of the exemption of the great feudal estates from imposts should be mentioned. The total collapse of the 'New Era' was brought about by the question of the reorganization of the army, submitted to the people's representatives, on February 10, 1860. The prince-regent — who was heart and soul a soldier — had long seen with sorrow the gradual but constant decadence of the army that, in his young days, had achieved the victories of 1813–1815. More than once had he perceived that Prussia had to put up with



humiliations because her sword was rusted in the scabbard. He knew that Austria would never have ventured to subject her to the indignity of Olmütz had she not been conscious that Prussia was in no condition to resent it. The three last mobilizations had exposed numerous defects, one of the principal being that the ranks could not have been filled but for the calling out of a disproportionately great number of the militia (*landwehr*), whose families, during their enforced absence, became a burden on their communities. The ablest of his generals — von Moltke, Prince Frederick Charles, Manteuffel, von Roon (Fig. 45) —

shared fully in the king's views in regard to reorganization of the army. The scheme projected contemplated the re-enforcement of the standing army by 117 battalions and 72 squadrons, and the increase of the artillery by a fourth. Besides, the reserve term was to be extended from one year to four; and the time of actual service in the ranks, which long had been only two and one-half years, was restored to



FIG. 45. — General von Roon. From the lithograph by G. Engelbach.

three years. The objects aimed at in this reorganization were three: the presence of a greater number in the ranks of the army; the possibility of more rapid mobilization; and the substitution of the shorter service of a greater number for the longer service of a smaller, thus interfering less with the prosecution of civil industry, and with a father's duties to his family. But the people took no account of these mitigating circumstances, and in the house of representatives the measure, when submitted to it, met with violent resistance. People saw in it the abrogation of the popular institution of the *landwehr* and a purpose to revert to a



reactionary policy generally. They said that a main object was to provide the greatest possible number of the young nobility with officers' places. The lower house rejected the measure as 'reaction-



FIG. 46. — King William I. of Prussia. From the lithograph by Engelbach; original painting by Winterhalter.

ary,' voting, instead, 9,000,000 thalers to maintain the army in "a state of readiness for war" for fourteen months.

This constituted the opening of the great 'Period of Conflict,' which was not to close till after the victories of 1866. The opposi-

tion might have been sensible that its sanctioning of even this sum involved the reorganization of which it had disapproved; while the government, for the same reason, was able to accept the situation with equanimity. It went to work just as if the house had voted, not a provisional, but a definitive grant, and the reorganization was at once set afoot. It seemed, indeed, at the next meeting of the legislature (*Landtag*) — that of 1860 — that an understanding might be arrived at. The lower house granted the new sum demanded for the same object, only, however, as a part of the extraordinary budget, and declared the government bound to submit, at latest to the next *Landtag*, a measure modifying the law of 1814. By this decision it virtually recognized what had been done in the way of reorganization as an accomplished fact, and reserved to itself only the right of seeing that what was further done was in accordance with law.

Such was the situation when the death of the childless Frederick William IV. (January 2, 1861) called his brother to the throne. King William I., in his address "To My People," impressively reminded them: "It is not Prussia's mission to live upon the past. In the earnest exertion of her intellectual and moral powers, in the sincerity and warmth of her religious convictions, in the union of obedience and freedom, in strengthening her means of self-defence, lie the conditions of her might. Only so can she maintain her rank among the nations of Europe." But the discontent due to the non-fulfilment of their too sanguine hopes rendered the Liberals deaf to the counsel conveyed in the royal words; and the cleft widened when the democracy formally constituted itself into a party, under the name of the *Deutsche Fortschrittspartei* (the 'German Party of Progress'). An attempt on the king's life by a student, Oskar Becker, at the baths at Baden-Baden, June 14, 1861, was happily unsuccessful.

Discouraging as these experiences were, they effected no change in the principles of King William. The dreaded reaction did not come. To the address of the upper house, earnestly urging him to emulate the example of his deceased brother, he gave an answer not to be misunderstood, that though without any desire for a breach with the past, he would yet apply the hand of reform to the institutions of the country as his father and brother had done before him. The royal coronation took place with impressive ceremonies at Königsberg, on October 18, 1861. The overthrow of the ministry (March, 1862) on a demand by the Liberals for a more specialized

budget, led to the appointment of a more strictly conservative cabinet under the Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, hitherto president of the House of Peers.

Thus the attempted Liberal system had collapsed after an existence of little more than three years. The new ministry, untroubled by the cloud of protests against its practices, left no means untried to have the election result in its favor. Its efforts were vain; the issue was a decided defeat for it. More vehemently than ever the Party of Progress entered the fight against army organization. The extremists took their position doggedly on the standpoint of their right, and demanded that the whole expenditure for the reconstruction of the army up to 1862 should also be classed in the 'extraordinary' appropriation. On September 23 the house rejected the ministry's propositions relative to the matter. Undoubtedly this was shortsighted in relation to Prussia's position as a great power, but intelligible after the experience of the last years in regard to the use made of the army. The remembrance of the mobilization of 1850, and of the by no means creditable rôle Prussia had played during the Crimean and Italian wars, was not calculated to inspire men's hearts with the joy of sacrifice.

On September 29 the Landtag was adjourned; and, among other ministerial changes, Bismarck was called to the presidency, and shortly thereafter to the foreign ministry.

In January, 1859, on the eve of the Italian War, he had been called from his Frankfort watch-post of eight years, and sent to St. Petersburg, "like champagne," as he himself phrased it, "set on ice for future use." After three years' residence in the northern capital, he was transferred to the Tuileries. There had already been talk of calling him into the ministry, the step being deferred only not to render the conflict still more acrimonious; for "Bismarck," everybody said, "is the *coup d'état*."

As the upper house supported his financial proposals, while the lower house continued obstinate in its opposition — as it proved also in 1863 — Bismarck declared that the government would conduct affairs without a concerted budget, — nay, in case of war would lay hands on funds where it could find them. He fell back on the so-called 'stop-gap theory,' that when the three legislative factors could not unite upon a budget the government must simply rule without one. The Landtag of 1863 was hereupon summarily dissolved: but though the king and government tried experiments of all kinds to



influence the electors, the result on October 28, 1863, was little different from that of the last election. The budgetless government continued; the strong measures to which it had recourse only served to widen the breach between the king and his people to a degree such that even the deep-rooted reverence for the royal person became affected. The monarch was himself deeply distressed to see his own peculiar task — the carrying through of which was a work of conscience with him — impeded by so many obstacles, and himself so wrongfully misunderstood. "Sleep comes to me no night," he sighed to Beckerrath, who vainly tried to move him to concessions. His only consolation was that the time would come when his land would thank him.

On the day after the withdrawal of the estimates, Bismarck, in the budget commission, took once more an opportunity for explaining the true object of the military propositions: "Germany makes no account of Prussia's liberalism, but of her power. Though Bavaria, Württemberg, or Baden should do homage to liberalism, no one would therefore assign them Prussia's rôle. She must concentrate her strength for the favorable moment. Not by speeches and votes of majorities are the great questions of the age to be solved, but by blood and iron." This was the pole towards which the needle of his policy pointed. Long had the conviction of the necessity for strengthening Prussia's military power, and plans for the reconstruction of Germany, with Prussia as the leader, been ripening in his mind. In March, 1858, he had addressed a memorial to the then minister-president, Manteuffel, on the necessity for initiating an independent Prusso-German policy. These ideas he expanded in a memorial to Minister von Schleinitz from St. Petersburg of May, 1859. "I see," he concluded, "in our Confederate relations, an evil for Prussia which we shall have to cure sooner or later *ferro et igni*."

Striking as these utterances were, yet what of them found their way to the public made little impression on the parties in conflict with each other. The Party of Progress were willing, like him, to see Prussia at the head of Germany; but they denied the only means available therefor, the re-enforcement of the army; the feudal party was enthusiastic for army reform, but would know nothing of a German policy. It regarded Bismarck as a renegade who had sold his soul to the devil, and that the devil of Bonaparte. "If I am sold to a devil," Bismarck replied sportively, "it is to a German, not to a Gallic one."



Prussia won her first victory over Austria, in the now inevitable struggle, by the definite exclusion of that country from all hope of entering the Zollverein. The last decades had wrought great changes in the economic life of the German peoples. The advance in technical requirements, due to new varieties and forms of industry, tended to obliterate the lines of demarcation between different crafts, and to break the fetters of guild restrictions. The lesser industries saw themselves compelled by their struggle with the greater — daily growing more severe — to devise new ways of working and new means for marketing their wares. The feeling of self-reliance so long repressed by tutelage and red tape became invigorated, and individuals began to co-operate with each other in common works. Mechanic societies began to be formed to make the workingmen acquainted with the results of science, and to disseminate more accurate views among them. The congress of German employers, founded in 1858, was the common centre for efforts after freedom of production, which appeared the only means to enable them to maintain themselves against the constantly waxing tide of foreign competition. Agricultural societies and experimental farms came into existence to enable the cultivator to avail himself of Liebig's researches. The system of co-operative associations — so successful in England — was, through Schulze-Delitzsch, naturalized in Germany, and from the little beginning, made at his home, of a loan-society, grew into large proportions, without governmental intervention. A new science, under the name of sociology, investigated the organic principles of the life of the people. Germany during the last decades had attained an industrial position rivalling that of the most advanced commercial nations. In 1859 the gross customs-duties of the Zollverein amounted to 350,000,000 thalers. Naturally her closer and multiplied economic relations with other lands made her a fellow-sufferer in the shocks that affected them. Not only was the great North American and English crisis of 1857 keenly felt by her, but she let herself be led into the bank mania engendered by the example of the *Crédit Mobilier*, and when the great reaction came had to make expiation accordingly.

The rise of the Zollverein into an industrial and commercial power made it the subject of livelier interest than heretofore to other countries. In 1853 there came a proffer from France to treat concerning customs-duties. This, indeed, came to nothing; but the commercial treaty between England and France soon gave the im-

pulse for the renewal of negotiations. In the beginning of 1861 negotiations with France began in Berlin, even at the moment when, according to the treaty of February 19, 1853, preparations should have been made for conclusive customs-unification with Austria. Hitherto Prussia had parried Austria's importunity by adroit evasions; it now came to be a question whether unity with Austria was not to be debarred once for all by an insuperable obstacle. Passing over the obvious incompatibility of protection and free-trade, the most-favored-nation clause constituted the main rock of offence; for if the Zollverein accepted this with France, the projected union with Austria was conclusively shut out, and the compact of February was a piece of worthless paper. To Vienna the effect of the Franco-Prussian treaty was perfectly clear. In a memorandum addressed to Berlin, Munich, and Dresden, of September 21, 1861, the Austrian government declared that it could not, indeed, prevent the conclusion of such a treaty, but that it would not be unmindful of the great disadvantage at which it must place Austria. But Count Bernstorff, Prussian minister of commerce, did not let himself be led astray; he recognized in the French treaty a means of becoming master of the difficulties, political and economic, threatening with Austria. To the surprise of every one, he concluded the treaty, March 29, 1862. Saxony and the South German states were brought into line after long hesitation, by Prussia's threat of dissolving the Zollverein in case of recusance. On October 12, 1864, the Zollverein was renewed; on April 11, 1865, a commercial treaty was signed with Austria, which country, in respect of the Zollverein, fell into line with the other foreign states.

In this crisis also the indissolubility of the Zollverein had asserted itself; and it had been clearly evidenced that, where true national interests were concerned, Prussia was the natural leader of Germany. The maxim of Bismarck had been indisputably verified, that nothing was to be gained by crouching before Austrian arrogance, but only by showing a bold front to Vienna. Ever since the Crimean War, he felt persuaded that the tenor of events in Germany would in no long time leave Prussia no alternative but to fight Austria for her very existence. That the Confederation could not continue in its present form was as evident to Vienna as it was to Berlin and Germany generally. With the recognition of Confederate reform as an indispensable necessity, the government had taken on itself an obligation, the discharge of which was no longer within

its free discretion. But as soon as a hand was put to the work, the impossibility of transforming anarchy, garnished with the name of "Constitution of the Confederation," into a really national constitution, became painfully evident. Prussia insisted on reform of the military constitution of the Confederation, as the most urgent necessity. "The foreign envoys here," wrote Bismarck from Frankfort, "listen with sarcastic courtesy when, occasionally, there is talk of a Confederate war on a grand scale; and we deputies of the diet require the earnestness of Roman augurs to revise the Confederate military constitution with requisite thoroughness." The necessity for this revision promoted by Prussia, the diet, indeed, recognized in November, 1859; but the solitary distinct proposition — namely, in case of war, to put the northern contingents under command of Prussia, the South German under Austria, and to leave to these two powers the concocting of a common plan of campaign, — the second-rate states, under the influence of Austria, resisted with all their power; and in May, 1860, the military committee rejected it by every vote save that of Prussia. The personal meeting of the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia at Teplitz, on July 26, 1860, brought about by King Maximilian II. (Fig. 47) of Bavaria, with the object of, if possible, removing the estrangement that had existed since Villafranca, led to a fruitless resumption of the attempt. Just as the Prussian propositions for army reform proved fruitless, so did those of Baden, in 1858, for the institution of a Confederate tribunal. The Utopian plan of von Beust for a reorganization of the Confederation, with a Directory of three members, and consultative delegates from the local diets, was now agitated by Austria and the second-rate states.

Relations remained strained in the extreme. Bismarck, in a conference with the Austrian ambassador, Count Karolyi, in December, 1862, took renewed occasion to protest very energetically against Austria's practice of overruling Prussia through majorities in the diet, adding that "Prussia would regard perseverance in such a course as a violation of the Confederate compact, recall its deputies from the diet, and no longer recognize its proceedings. Austria had her choice, either of continuing, with the support of the coalition of the second-rate states, its present anti-Prussian policy, or of seeking an honorable alliance with Prussia. It was his own earnest desire that the latter alternative should be her choice, but this could be evidenced only by the renunciation of her hostile policy at the other German courts." According to Karolyi's report, Bismarck gave



Austria the alternative, either of withdrawing out of Germany and transferring her centre of action to the East, or of finding Prussia, in the next European conflict, on the side of her foes.

But Vienna remained deaf to all remonstrances. Austria and




FIG. 47. — King Maximilian II. of Bavaria. From the lithograph by C. Wildt ; original portrait by Franz Krüger.

the second-rate states continued, as it seemed, resolute in their design of driving matters to extremities. But at the last moment Hesse-Cassel suddenly deserted the coalition ; and thus it came about that on January 22, 1863, the reform project of von Beust was rejected by nine votes to seven. More emphatically than before



Prussia insisted that a satisfactory reform of the Confederation as a whole was impossible; and that she, without regard to all negotiations with this end, now looked to free compacts with the states separately as her object. "Not in an arbitrarily constituted and impotent assembly of delegates could the German nation find an organ entitled to give effect to its will on matters of common interest, but in a representative body based on popular election." "One confederated State and one German Parliament" — the objects for which patriots had struggled for years — was the motto that Prussia now inscribed on her banner, in characters legible far and wide; but such was the prejudice against her great minister — the assumed knight of the reaction — that the words passed away as unheard. And the relations between the two leading powers were rendered yet more strained, on the one hand by the politico-commercial conflict, on the other by the outbreak of the Polish revolt. When Austria joined the western powers in showing favor to Poland, Bismarck checkmated her by cultivating, in view of future eventualities, the friendship of Russia. He "preferred to have the czar as a neighbor rather than the propagandist Poles, who could with difficulty forget that Dantzic and Thorn were once Polish cities."

But in what condition were the domestic affairs of Austria, who was contending thus determinedly for the hegemony of Germany? How much was rotten there had been demonstrated with terrible clearness by the war of 1859, when the Austrian defeats were hailed in the lands of the Hungarian crown with scarcely concealed gratification, and even on the Vienna bourse were greeted with a huzza. It was not difficult to see whither the system that had guided its policy for the last ten years had brought the ship of state. In August, 1859, Bach, the soul of this system, received his dismissal, and Count Goluchowski was named his successor. But a change of personality by no means implied a change of policy; and the discovery of a series of frauds to an immense amount by the late ministry did nothing to improve the public feeling. Finance-Minister Bruck got rid of all responsibility by committing suicide, April 23, 1860; General von Eynatten, head of the war-department, imprisoned on a charge of embezzlement, hanged himself in prison. And these were but symptoms of the wide-spread corruption. To all this were super-added a money crisis, becoming more and more severe, stoppage of payment by the bank, and the total failure of a loan put on the market in March, 1860.

The Goluchowski ministry proposed to quiet the universal discontent by homoeopathic doses of reform. The minister of instruction, Count Thun, sought to win over the Hungarians by the Protestant letter-patent of September 1, 1859, which professed to be the herald of alleviations for the Protestants of the other crown lands also; but the Magyars rejected the specious concession, and



FIG. 48.—Emperor Francis Joseph I. of Austria. From the copper-plate engraving by Metzmacher, 1860.

demanding the restoration of their old synodal constitution. An imperial letter-patent of March 5, 1860, created a ‘strengthened’ *Reichsrat* (council of the empire) for the whole monarchy, consisting of the councils of the estates, the archdukes, and other high dignitaries named by the emperor (Fig. 48), but invested with advisory power only. This concession, vaunted by the government as the

crown of the promised reforms, did not contribute in the least towards allaying the general discontent. In Hungary the agitation against the Protestant patent assumed a threatening — nay, a half-revolutionary — aspect. The government decided on conciliation. Benedek, then the public's idol, was named governor-general of Hungary, the partition of the land into five administrative districts was recalled, the old county system restored, the Protestant patent withdrawn, and an amnesty issued. But this capitulation only availed to show the Hungarians the advantage of their position. It was a bad symptom for the 'strengthened' Reichsrat, opened on May 31, that of the Hungarian magnates summoned, part declined to attend, and that those who did appear seized the leadership to themselves, and, through their complaints, brought the deliberations in regard to the scheme of constitution submitted to the body to a standstill. Once more the government had to give way. "You are the victors," said the emperor to the primate of Hungary. In hot haste the diploma of October 20 was prepared, which, in deference to the wish of the 'strengthened' Reichsrat, declared it to be the irrevocable law of the land that the right of legislation should in future be exercised only under co-operation of the provincial diets and the council of the empire, to consist of one hundred members, sitting in the capacity of delegates from the provincial diets. All affairs properly affecting only the hereditary lands were to be dealt with by the so-called 'restricted' Reichsrat; that is, by one from which the Hungarian members were excluded. The resuscitation of a court-chancellor for Hungary and Transylvania, as well as of a *Judex Curiae* in Pesth, indicated the renunciation of the former so strongly centralized administration. Confidential commissions were appointed to make preparations for summoning the diets of Croatia and Transylvania. Nobody was satisfied except the petty nobles who saw their feudal privileges continued. In Hungary the Magyars took advantage of their successes to treat the Germans and Slavs in the most arrogant manner. Non-native officials and teachers were expelled in great numbers. Freedom of trade and the German laws of exchange were abrogated.

Things could go no longer on in this way. A new ministry under the presidency of Schmerling (Fig. 49) undertook, December 13, 1860, the management of affairs. His programme endowing the provincial diets with free election of members of the Reichsrat, and the latter body with publicity of proceedings, enlarged membership,



and legislative initiative — converting it, in short, into a virtual parliament — was received by the German-Austrians, at least, with great satisfaction. The new constitution was promulgated by letters-patent of February 26, 1861 (the ‘patent of February’), which proclaimed the October diploma, the statute of the Reichsrat following



FIG. 49 — Minister von Schmerling. From the steel engraving by Weger. Original, a photograph.

on that, and the contemporaneously issued provincial constitutions as the constitution of the empire. The Reichsrat was to consist of two houses, that of peers and that of representatives; to the latter house all the local diets of the empire were to send delegates to the number of 343. Only new imposts, outlays, and loans required its ratification. A council of state prepared the draughts



of all laws for the general, or for the more restricted, Reichsrat, or for the provincial diets. According to the regulations issued for the seventeen crown lands, the provincial diets (*Landtage*) comprised representatives of all interests, — agriculture, cities, chambers of commerce, great land-owners, the church and universities. Shortly thereafter the Protestant patent of April 8, 1861, abolished for the hereditary lands (with the exception of Dalmatia) all restrictions on the erection of churches (with or without towers and bells), on worship, care of souls, celebration of festivals, etc., and conferred on the evangelical churches a presbyterial and synodal constitution.

But the rejoicing over this experiment was of short duration. Men reflected that a council of state not directly elected by the people, but composed of delegates from the provincial diets, was nothing better than a caricature of a representative body. Venetia remained plainly recalcitrant, though the government had again revoked the forced circulation of paper money. The last attempt to incorporate it with the empire proved a signal failure. Hungary was no less difficult to conciliate. The extreme party in Pesth, under Tisza and the returned emigré, Count Teleki, maintained resolutely that, owing to the unconstitutional way in which the Emperor Ferdinand's abdication was brought about, his successor, so long as he was not crowned, could be regarded only as the *de facto*, not as the legitimate (*de jure*) king of Hungary. Even the party of conciliation under Déak demanded the restoration of the constitution of 1848, in open contrariety to the Vienna government, which even yet regarded the constitution as forfeited through the revolution. The new order thus found its worst opponent in the arrogance of the Magyars, who were unwilling to be satisfied with anything less than a merely personal union with Austria. The emperor was no less obstinate in insisting on incorporation, and on August 21 the Hungarian diet was dissolved. Hungary now began to be dealt with in earnest. The Pesth magistracy, the Buda council, and all the county congregations were broken up; the primate, who had openly allied himself with the national opposition, was summoned to Vienna, where the emperor made him experience his supreme displeasure; and martial law was proclaimed for all Hungary. Instead of the hoped-for reconciliation matters had now come to an open breach. The diet of Croatia declined to choose delegates to the Reichsrat; the Galician sent them under reservation. The Transylvanian Saxons and a Rumanian congress at Hermannstadt were the only bodies that

spoke out for the unification of the empire and the extension of the imperial constitution to their lands. Against the votes of the Magyars, the Transylvanian diet, on August 21, declared the union of the grand principality with Hungary in 1848 illegal and invalid, and carried through the election for the Reichsrat.

But this body, on its formal opening on May 1, 1862, was found to be far from what it ought to have been. Instead of 343 members, it numbered only 200, and constituted, at most, only the restricted ('inner') Reichsrat. Yet, in any circumstances, the enlarged ('outer') must be had; for it alone, according to the patent, could exercise a constitutional control over the finances. This difficulty was tided over by an imperial message of December 17, endowing this Reichsrat in an exceptional way with the competency of the 'outer', and especially empowering it to deal with the budget of 1862.

But even within this body opposition showed itself, partly to the centralizing, partly to the liberal, tendencies of the government. The Hungarians now sullenly resolved to hold aloof from the Reichsrat; and thus matters dragged on year after year, amid autonomist strifes and jealousies, Venetian discontent, and increasing financial disorder, until the situation became unbearable. A reorganization of Germany under Austrian auspices seemed the only means of restoring strength and prestige to the government. On August 3, 1863, the Emperor Francis Joseph paid a visit to the king of Prussia at Gastein, and communicated to him a plan of reform of the Confederate constitution. A memorandum he brought with him explained that "the ground was everywhere giving way under the feet of such as stood on the Confederate compact; that the structure of the Confederation everywhere showed rents and fissures, and that the mere wish that its rotten walls should sustain the next storm could do nothing to give it the needful stability." If the sudden change of the party in now declaring worthless that Confederate constitution which it had ever hitherto vaunted as a palladium struck the hearer with astonishment, the announcement of a diet of princes to be convened at Frankfort, August 16, which the emperor invited the king to attend, amazed him still more. Without absolutely declining, King William desired a postponement till October 1, so that conferences of ministers might precede the congress. He was, therefore, disagreeably surprised to receive almost immediately an official invitation (prepared on July 31) to attend a congress

on August 16. It was the old cavalier way of treating Prussia that Bismarck had so often protested against in Frankfort. Without hesitation the king declined the invitation, but those for the other princes had already been issued.

On the appointed day the German princes and the burgomasters of the four free cities met at Frankfort, the king of Prussia and the prince of Lippe-Detmold being the only absentees. Nothing was omitted that could give splendor to the occasion. The reform plan that was to capture the illustrious assemblage by surprise was based on the principle of federation, and embraced a Confederate directorate consisting of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and two other greater princes appointed by election, a Confederate council under the presidency of Austria, an assembly of delegates from the diets meeting every three years, and a Confederate tribunal. In case a Confederate state having possessions without the Confederation became involved in war, the directorate might, by a simple majority vote, grant it the armed support of the Confederation. Before proceeding to discuss the proposal, the assemblage decreed, on the motion of the grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, to request the king of Prussia to take part in the deliberations. King William again declined, assigning as his reason that he could come to no conclusion in regard to the Austrian propositions till they had been passed upon by his own ministry. The secondary states, too, gradually found courage to give voice to their opposition. To pacify them the directorate was raised from five to six. But the motion of the grand duke of Baden that the presidency should alternate between Austria and Prussia created yet greater embarrassment, and finally gave the *coup de grace* to the whole project.

More and more intense became the strain between Austria and Prussia. The secondary states, peoples and governments alike, were agitated with fear over the result of the conflict; and no one could see a way out of the chaotic situation till the Schleswig-Holstein question came to solve the difficulty.

The peace of 1850 had left the vexed question of the relation of the duchies to Denmark unsettled. To meet this, a letter-patent of January 28, 1851, issued by King Frederick VII. of Denmark, after long negotiations with the two great German powers, promised a general new ordering of these relations, and that to the effect that the king of Denmark should reign with absolute power in both duchies; that in each the provincial estates should be continued



with a consultative voice ; that every political tie between Schleswig and Holstein should be dissolved, but that in no case should Schleswig be incorporated into the kingdom. To this shameful agreement the Confederate governments could not bring themselves to give the assent required of them by Austria and Prussia without fuller deliberation ; and so these two powers delivered over the land in the beginning of 1853, independently of any Confederate decree. Not till July 29 of that year had the miasmatic reactionary atmosphere become dense enough in the palace of the Confederation to bring it to give its assent. Independently of this, the Danish succession-question had been arranged through the London Protocol of May 8, 1852, by which, in consideration of the importance of maintaining the European equilibrium, the five great powers, with Sweden, bound themselves to recognize Prince Christian of Sonderburg-Glücksburg, the husband of Louisa of Hesse, niece of Christian VIII., as successor in all parts of the monarchy. The duke of Augustenburg was prevailed upon to surrender his claim to Schleswig-Holstein in consideration of a compensation of three million thalers.

Scarcely did the Danes see themselves uncontrolled masters of the duchies, when they were guilty of the most outrageous violations of law and justice. No rank, however high or obscurely lowly, availed to protect those who had championed or professed the cause of German nationality. In place of the arbitrarily dismissed German officials, the land was deluged with Danish satraps of equivocal character ; the German language and German customs were repressed in the most obnoxious manner. At the instigation of the Danish parliament, and without giving the provincial estates a hearing, the Copenhagen government, on January 2, 1855, promulgated a new constitution for the whole monarchy, which made the parliament, with its preponderating Danish majority, the representative of the entire kingdom. The Holstein estates in January, 1856, declared this constitution a violation of the king's pledge of January, 1852, as well as of the rights of the duchy ; but, despite this, it was imposed with new circumstances of aggravation. The declaration of the great powers that the maintenance of their monarchy was a matter of general European interest had completely turned the heads of the Danes, and they went to work in the duchies with utter disregard of plighted faith and justice, believing they could rely on the other great powers for protection against Germany. Moved by a complaint of the Lauenburg estates, Austria and Prussia at length



brought the subject before the Confederation, October 29, 1857. On February 11, 1858, the diet declared the constitution in so far as regarded Holstein and Lauenburg inconsistent with justice, and on August 12 required its withdrawal within three weeks on pain of execution. Denmark deemed it prudent to avert further steps by timely anticipation. On November 6 it declared the constitution no longer in force as regarded Holstein and Lauenburg, and called on the Holstein estates to enter upon friendly negotiations with it. But this compliant aspect was purely specious; in point of fact, it imported the carrying out of the "Denmark to the Eider" programme, that is, the complete disjunction of Schleswig from Holstein, and the incorporation of the former duchy with Denmark. All the more emphatically did the Holstein estates, that met January 3, 1859, make the union of the two duchies the pivotal point of their demands, rejecting the constitution project, and requiring the restoration of the uniform administration of Schleswig and Holstein. But no understanding was arrived at, — nay, the Schleswig estates, on account of their resistance to the Danish constitution, were dissolved, March 19, 1860. Denmark, from her belief that she could avail herself of the Italian War for her ends, assumed a still more imperious attitude towards the duchies. In this belief she deceived herself. English representations brought Napoleon to the conviction that he must not trespass too far on Germany's national susceptibilities if he would not arouse the whole land against himself; and there was nothing he more dreaded than a hostile feeling there so long as he had the war with Austria on his hands.

The Confederate diet replied to the Danish patent of September 23, 1859, in regard to the interests of Holstein, by insisting on the fulfilment of the promises of 1852, and declared the assent of their estates indispensable to every financial measure for Holstein and Lauenburg. In defiance of this the Danish government promulgated its budgets for this and the following year independently of any such assent; nay, the long suffering of the Confederation emboldened it to make preparations for suppressing any resistance on the part of the duchies by force of arms. A levy of 6000 marines was ordered, permission was given for raising a volunteer corps in Copenhagen, and money was collected for the building of gunboats. Frankfort's patience at length gave way. On February 7, 1861, the diet demanded, on pain of execution, the revocation within six weeks of the patent of September 23, 1859, with all the supplementary

ordinances based thereon. As the foreign cabinets earnestly counselled compliance, the Copenhagen ministry saw itself obliged to submit new constitutional propositions to the Holstein estates.

But all this pliability was nothing but illusion. The legal separation of Schleswig from Holstein, and its complete unification with Denmark, was carried into full effect. The 'Eider-Dane' party had got quite the upper-hand in Copenhagen, and the government was completely under the sway of the streets. A royal proclamation of March 30, 1863, declared that, owing to the fault of the German Confederation, the promises of 1852 were incapable of fulfilment. Now that Germany had waited with patience for ten long years for Denmark to carry out the compact, the latter by an audacious *coup d'état* set herself entirely free from it! That, alone, she was unable to cope with her adversaries she was perfectly aware; but she relied on the support of Europe, as well as on the conflicting interests of the German great powers and the domestic struggle in Prussia.

Certainly the ambiguous attitude of the British cabinet gave Denmark a sort of right to depend on this friend at least. Lord Russell had expressly promised that if she followed his counsels he would make it his care that she should suffer no injury, and the Danes explained this as meaning that they could reckon unconditionally on England's support if they only maintained that they had complied with the condition. On March 10, 1863, the Prince of Wales married Alexandra, daughter of Denmark's future king, Christian, while the public sentiment of England was loud and decided on their side. But England's dread of any new warlike complication was a more powerful factor than sentiment. Russell would indeed have intervened upon one condition, — that, namely, of the support of Napoleon. But here the effect of the Polish revolt made itself sensible. Offended by England's declination to take part in behalf of his project for a congress, of which we have already spoken, the emperor declined to back her here. Nor was the czar, incensed that the western powers undertook to deal with Polish affairs at all, any whit better disposed towards a common intervention in those of Schleswig-Holstein. Austria went hand-in-hand with Prussia in this question. True, she followed her ally's lead only in a half-hearted way, and not from any interest in the duchies, but mainly to prevent Prussia from lording it in the north, while, if she would not lose all influence in Germany, she could not afford to manifest indifference in an affair bound up with German nationality.

On July 9, 1863, the diet issued a summons to Copenhagen, calling on it to revoke its ordinance of March 30, and to declare itself ready to introduce a constitution for the whole monarchy in harmony with the agreements of 1852. The Danish government refused compliance. "I have reason for believing," said minister Hall, "that we shall have more than our own resources to fall back upon in this conflict." A new constitution was submitted to the Rigsdag opened on September 28, by which Schleswig was conclusively incorporated into Denmark. Hereupon the diet, on October 1, adopted a resolution, against the votes of Denmark, Luxemburg, and Baden, to proceed with the execution, Austria, Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover being intrusted with it. In order to make it clear that the matter was essentially one of the Confederation, the two great powers agreed to leave the execution to the secondary states, their troops only to serve as a reserve in the event of need.

There now occurred an event in Copenhagen that gave a new color to the question. On November 15, two days after the Rigsdag had adopted the constitution, King Frederick VII. died, and Christian IX. ascended the throne. Two alternatives, neither of them easy, were presented to the new king. He might ratify the new constitution and thus violate all Denmark's obligations to Germany, or he might reject it, and thus rouse the wrath of the populace, who would make short work of his hereditary claim. On November 18 he decided for the former. He ratified the measure, and the die was cast.

So a second question, that of the succession, became mixed up with that of the constitution. In the duchies many officials refused to swear fealty to the new monarch. The crown-prince, Frederick of Augustenburg, who did not regard himself as bound by his father's renunciation, urged his hereditary claim to Holstein; the grand duke of Oldenburg protested against Christian's succession in the duchies; the Ernestine houses, ruling in the Saxon duchies, and that of Mecklenburg, had entered their protest against the London Protocol at the time of its issuance; the German Confederation had never recognized it. The Confederation, therefore, found itself, in respect of the Schleswig-Holstein question, in a position quite different from that of the great powers who had signed the protocol. When, therefore, on November 21, both Christian IX. and Duke Frederick announced in Frankfort their entrance into the government, several of the secondary and lesser states lodged their protest against the



former, while Duke Ernest of Saxe-Coburg had already recognized the prince of Augustenburg as duke. Austria and Prussia, on the other hand, limited themselves to the breach of compacts involved in the new constitution, without entering upon the question of the succession. The distinction between their standpoint and that of the other states of the Confederation came thus prominently into view. The two great powers declared themselves bound by the London Protocol, and ready to carry it out as soon as Denmark fulfilled its obligations. The execution, in which there was a tacit recognition of the king's right to the duchies, was plainly irreconcilable with the present standpoint of the majority. It desired, therefore, in place of this, an occupation and the decision of the succession-question through the Confederation. This would have been to leave the question in regard to Holstein open, and to deliver over Schleswig to Denmark, and lose it to Germany for all time. In any case, the thing most needful to be done was to hasten the necessary military measures with all possible speed. Under the pressure which Austria and Prussia brought to bear upon the smaller states, the Confederation, on December 7, declared by eight to seven votes for simple execution.

In Copenhagen the fanatical Eider-Dane party was once more in the ascendant. The Hall ministry had to give place to the yet more arrogant administration under Bishop Monrad. Infatuated as this policy was, it was at least more intelligible than that of the majority of the Prussian lower house, who, in the suspicion that Bismarck was plotting treason to Germany, refused their assent to a loan of 12,000,000 thalers to meet the necessary military measures.

In order to give foreigners no pretext for intervening, the number of the troops to be contributed by the states for the execution was reduced to the lowest possible. Of these the command-in-chief was given to the Saxon general, von Hake. Five thousand Austrians were assembled, under von Gablenz, on the Elbe, and as many Prussians, under Prince Frederick Charles, Field-Marshal Wrangel (Fig. 50) being named commander-in-chief of the whole. As the Danes of their own will evacuated Holstein on December 22, 1863, the Saxons alone entered it. But the question of assuring the rights of Schleswig still remained. The Austro-Prussian proposition to call on Denmark definitively to recall the constitution of November 18, on pain of the seizure of Schleswig, met with strenuous opposition. The secondary states insisted on forcing the question



of the succession to the foreground, and through the acceptance of this proposition Christian's claim would be acknowledged. Their attitude was in a great measure determined by the public sentiment of Germany, which was decidedly on the side of Duke Frederick, less out of sympathy for him personally than from the desire for national aggrandizement. Chambers in the north as well as south, party and popular meetings, 'Great-Germans' and 'Little-Germans,'



FIG. 50. — General von Wrangel. From the lithograph by Hermann Eichens; original drawing by F. Dietz, made from nature, at Apenrade, in August, 1848.

were as one in speaking out for the duke's claims. The universities investigated and approved them, and an assembly composed of members of the German diets meeting in Frankfort reached a unanimous declaration in his favor. In Holstein the people everywhere proclaimed Duke Frederick VIII. lord of the land. At the invitation of a mass-meeting at Elmshorn, he entered the duchies, and fixed his residence at Kiel. The sentiment in favor of the erection of a new secondary state attained a wonderful degree of popularity. The Vienna and Berlin cabinets observed the national excitement with unconcealed mistrust. But so strong was the movement that the

secondary states, under the leading of Bavaria and Saxony, believed they might venture to determine the policy of Germany independently, and set themselves free from the leading of the two great powers.

The dream was beautiful, but brief. When the Confederation, despite of all remonstrances, rejected the Austro-Prussian propositions, by eleven votes to five, the two governments issued a declara-

ration that they reserved to themselves, as European powers and signatories of the London Protocol, the determination of Germany's further policy. Bismarck had in this attained a great object. He had evaded a Confederate war, with Austria, supported by the majority of the Confederation, as the presiding power, and finally the determiner of the ultimate configuration of the duchies. He had effected even more; he had separated Austria from the secondary states, and riveted her to Prussia, while he had removed the diet out of his way. From this point the action of the two great powers became distinct from that of the Confederation. On January 16, 1864, they announced in Copenhagen that if the constitution of November were not revoked within forty-eight hours they would occupy Schleswig with their troops, and recall their ambassadors. The 'Eider-Dane' party, relying on foreign support, compelled the king to refuse acquiescence. On February 1 the allied forces entered Schleswig, and the Danish troops fell back, fighting, into the strongly intrenched position of the Danewerk. The Saxons withdrew into western Holstein.

The Austro-Prussian army numbered 56,323 men, against which Denmark could place no equal force in the field, and what she had were rather a militia than a trained soldiery. While in time of peace her standing army numbered only 7500, on February 1, 1864, it amounted to 54,000 men, with General de Meza as commander-in-chief. But Denmark's deficiency by land was richly made up by her superiority at sea. Though she devoted one part of her fleet to blockading Prussian harbors and meeting hostile fleets, she had still ships enough to support her land-operations and secure the islands.

The main difficulty in the war against Denmark lay in the fact that the conquest of even the whole peninsula inferred no conclusive issue; for the islands, and, above all, the capital remained unassailable to an enemy who had no available sea-force. Again, should the Copenhagen cabinet be compelled to compliance by a long-continued occupation of the mainland, there was reason to fear that foreign powers might be induced to intervene. Therefore the proper object of operations was, as Moltke explained in a memorandum, the Danish army, and its annihilation before it could reach a place of embarkation. For this reason the task incumbent on the allies was to bar the retreat of the army holding the Danewerk to Schleswig, Düppel, and Flensburg. This was to be effected by crossing the Schlei, and turning the left wing, while simultaneously an assault was made on

the centre. The latter operation was carried out successfully by the Austrians; but, on the other hand, the attack of the Prussians, on February 2, on Missunde, at the narrowest part of the Schlei, was a miscarriage. Prince Frederick Charles was making preparations to force a passage farther down the river, when the enemy rendered this unnecessary. General de Meza had arrived at the conviction that the number and quality of his troops were inadequate for the defence of a line of sixty miles in length, especially as frost had facilitated the crossing of the flooded district. On the night of February 6, therefore, he evacuated the works. The one part of the Danes made their retreat to Jutland, the other to the admirable position in the Sundewitt peninsula, behind the Düppel intrenchments. The allies, as soon as they were aware of their departure, broke up in pursuit. Gablenz overtook the rearguard in the pass of Översee, and, after a hot conflict, compelled it to flight. The Prussians crossed the Schlei in hastily constructed boats. The whole army advanced on Flensburg; but the Danes had too great a start, and could not again be overtaken. The news of the evacuation of the Danewerk produced the greatest excitement in Copenhagen; by way of calming which de Meza was recalled, and replaced by General von Lüttichau, who soon gave way to General Gerlach.

The situation was extremely favorable for the Danes. The fortifications of Düppel constituted a strongly intrenched girdle, serving as a *tête-de-pont* for the Sonderburg ship-bridge, while the sea prevented a direct attack on the flanks. The fertile island of Alsen could feed the troops for a long time, and, from the Danes' command of the sea, the force here could be re-enforced or diminished almost unmarked. The Sonderburg bridge enabled masses of troops to cross from the island, and assemble behind the Düppel heights unseen, and to make sorties on a great scale with a secure line of retreat. The capture of this position demanded a regular siege, and for this siege-guns were wanting. Additional troops, too, required to be despatched to the scene, especially as the advent of spring enabled the Danes to avail themselves of their great superiority at sea. A blockade as well as descents on the coast was to be provided against; and as there were no means for meeting Denmark on her own element, a compensation for the contemplated injuries must be sought for elsewhere. To all this a more extensive occupation of Holstein seemed desirable, in order to impose a check on party intrigues there. Austria and Prussia required from the diet the



evacuation of Altona, Kiel, and Neumünster, as well as the supervision of the Holstein telegraph-system. The latter request was granted at once. and before any decision could be come to in regard to the former, General Wrangel anticipated any possible difficulty by taking possession of the places on February 12. The only point now left unsettled, the two powers explained in Frankfort, was the system of quartering.

The course of events now led up to the question of occupying Jutland by way of pledge. But this had to be preceded by diplomatic conferences; for the agreement between Austria and Prussia contemplated only the occupation of Schleswig, whose frontiers Wrangel had been specially enjoined not to overstep. What alarmed the Austrian government was that a trespass here might give the signal for a European war. In England, particularly, there prevailed an incredible bitterness toward Germany; and the appearance of an Austrian squadron in the North Sea was there regarded as an invasion of the domain on which Britain was supreme. But Bismarck succeeded in impressing on Vienna that the promptest treatment was the surest means for preventing foreign interference, and so attained a point that ruled the common action. The main attack was to be directed against Düppel, while Wrangel was left at liberty to push his troops as far into Jutland as he considered necessary for the prevention of undertakings from that quarter. On March 8 the advance into Jutland was begun. The Austrians drove the enemy toward the north, till they escaped farther pursuit by crossing the Limfjord. Mainly to anticipate the despatch of re-enforcements to Düppel, the bombardment of this latter fortress was decided on; meanwhile Wrangel was recalled, owing to his advanced age, and Prince Frederick Charles (Fig. 51) appointed in his stead.

The construction of the batteries before Düppel began immediately on the arrival of the heavy siege-guns. On March 15 the cannonade was opened; and by the 17th the Prussians were in possession of Düppel itself and the Spitzberg, and commanded the greatest part of the approaches to the fortifications proper. Denmark had declared the Prussian harbors on the Baltic blockaded; but, as she had only four ships at her disposal, she contented herself with stationing them off Rügen. On the 17th a Prussian squadron of three frigates and several gunboats, under Captain Jachmann, attacked the blockading-fleet, but, finding itself overmatched, hastily retreated to the shelter of the forts.



Meanwhile the English cabinet had been laboring to bring about a conference for the accommodation of the quarrel. Lord Russell's proposition, that the conference should be held without interruption of hostilities and without prearrangement of a basis, found consent



FIG. 51. — Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia. From the lithograph by E. Milster.

from all sides. For the diplomatic success of the conference, it was of the highest importance that it should be supported by a military one. The bombardment of the Düppel lines, now invested for five weeks, was hence plied with the greatest energy and with telling effect, while the parallels crept closer to the works. At 10 o'clock

of April 18 the Prussian columns advanced to the storm, and six minutes later the first Prussian banner waved on the breastwork. One trench after another was captured; and by noon the last was in the hands of the victors, whereupon the bridge-head was carried on the first assault. The ship *Rolf Krake*, which took part in the fight, was unable to impose any obstacle. With this the last fragment of the mainland of Schleswig was wrested from Denmark. At sea, also, the conflict was sharply maintained. On May 9 the Danish captain Suenson, with his squadron, attacked two Austrian frigates, the *Schwarzenberg* and *Radetzky*, under Admiral Tegetthoff, with three Prussian vessels, off Heligoland. The *Schwarzenberg* was burned; but the remainder of the allied fleet succeeded in escaping, though sorely damaged, to Cuxhaven.

Immediately thereupon the London conference, which had been opened April 25, arranged an armistice from May 12 to June 12, which was later prolonged to June 26. The first demand made by the two German powers was the complete autonomy of the duchies, with common institutions and the keeping open of the succession-question till it was pronounced on by the Confederation. To Bismarck's secret satisfaction, Beust, the Confederate representative, declared that the majority of the Confederation refused its assent to a settlement that would, under any conditions, constitute a union between the duchies and Denmark; and Denmark, equally unconditionally, rejected the combination in this form. The German powers' next demand was for the complete disjunction of the duchies from Denmark and their union into one state under the prince of Augustenburg, but this Denmark refused even to listen to. Lord Russell, with the consent of the other neutral powers, now submitted a third proposition — namely, the separation of Holstein and the southern part of Schleswig from the Danish monarchy, and this basis obtained in principle the assent of the parties interested; but when it came to the determination of the boundary line, they were wide as the poles asunder. Russell then lost patience, and proposed to Paris that England and France should come to an understanding about a boundary line, and submit this as an ultimatum, supported by a naval demonstration. "Right willingly," answered Drouyn de l'Huys; but taught by experience in the case of Poland, he desired first to know exactly how far England meant to go in case of need. Receiving no satisfaction on this point, he courteously declined to act. Thus, on June 25, the conference broke up without result.

But Bismarck had gained an important success; the great powers had abandoned the London Protocol, and affirmed, in principle, the disjunction of the duchies from Denmark.

Meanwhile the two allied German sovereigns with their ministers had had a meeting in Karlsbad and entered into new agreements. Austria accepted Prussia's basis—the disjunction of the duchies from Denmark. The allies now undertook a descent on Alsen. On June 29, the division of Manstein was transported across the sound, and effected a landing with comparatively small loss. The Danes were surprised, but made a skilful defence, saving the relics of their army by availing themselves of their ships. In Jutland the allies crossed the Limfjord on July 10, near Aalborg, forcing the enemy to embark at Frederikshavn for Zealand. The Austrian and Prussian banners were planted on the lighthouse of Skagen in token of the complete occupation of Jutland. As the Danes, after the capture of Alsen, assembled their North Sea squadron for the defence of Fünen, the Austrian fleet proceeded to free the North Friesian islands from the oppression of the Danish Captain Hammer and his little flotilla. After all means of escape were barred to him, the bold partisan had to surrender, July 19.

Heavy had been the blows necessary to bring about a change of views in Copenhagen. Ever since the Prussians had crossed into Alsen the people of Zealand felt themselves no longer secure; and the same parties who had clamored against a 'humiliating peace,' now pleaded in terror for the concentration of the fleet for the defence of the capital, and a speedy cessation of hostilities. Experience had convinced them that all hope of foreign intervention was vain, and that the continuance of the war was not to be thought of. A new administration was formed under Bluhme, whose peaceful views were, through the mediation of the king of the Belgians, communicated to Berlin. The proffered entry of the whole Danish monarchy into the German confederation was not even considered there, the one indispensable condition of peace being the complete evacuation of the duchies. Just as Prince Frederick Charles had completed his preparations for a landing on Fünen, a suspension of hostilities was accorded the Danes on July 31. The peace-preliminaries were signed on August 1, and the peace itself was concluded in Vienna, October 30, the conditions being the cession of the duchies to the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia, the retrocession to Denmark of the Isle of Aerö and of an adequate part



of North Schleswig around Ribe and Kolding, in compensation for the districts of Jutland enclosed by Schleswig territory, the assumption by the duchies of 29,000,000 Danish thalers of debt, the renunciation by the allies of any war-indemnity, and the maintenance of the allied troops in Jutland at the cost of Denmark. Such were the essential terms of a peace that put an end to one of the most unnatural conditions to which Germany had been subjected since 1815.

The allies had thus acquired the full right of disposing of the duchies. It was reserved for the Confederation to produce an after-piece which made its pitiful position and temper clear to the dullest eye. Although the Confederate execution had now, through the peace, become objectless, Austria would probably have been content to bear with the further occupation of Holstein; but Prussia, on the contrary, addressed a demand to Saxony and Hanover for the prompt recall of their troops. The latter complied without scruple, but Saxony declared that, inasmuch as the commission conferred by the Confederation had not yet expired, the case must be submitted to that body; and even after the fulfilment of all necessary formalities in Frankfort, Beust gave expression to his chagrin by causing the Saxon troops to return home by a *détour* so as to avoid passing through Prussian territory.



## CHAPTER VII.

### THE FOUNDING OF GERMAN UNITY.

THE attempt repeatedly made through the agency of the re-established Confederate diet to constitute the German Confederation of some thirty sovereign states into a European power and through it to inaugurate a German polity, had never shown itself in a more futile aspect than in the Schleswig-Holstein embroglio, the result of which had been the complete disruption of the Confederation. Nor had it fared better with the campaign of the secondary states under the guidance of Pfordten (Fig. 52) and Beust, which through the common action of the two great powers had ended in a humiliating defeat. Not by ways such as these could the aspirations of the entire nationality after unity be satisfied; and just as little was this to be effected by moral conquests, for experience had shown that neither would princes offer up their prerogatives nor peoples their time-ingrained idiosyncrasies on the altar of the cause. The indispensable precondition lay rather in the renunciation of the Austro-Prussian dualism; for this it was, with its rivalries and intrigues, and reciprocal paralysis of action, that prolonged the political life of the minor states, impeded national unity, and condemned Germany to comparative impotence. The high importance of the Schleswig-Holstein war lay in the fact that it not only restored and secured to Germany an important borderland that was in danger of being disjoined from and lost to it, but that it led to the complete sundering of Austria and Prussia and to the decisive struggle between them that inevitably, sooner or later, had to be fought to an issue.

As to what should be done with the liberated duchies, and as to who should have the decisive word in this question, the views of those interested differed widely. "Schleswig-Holstein," said both the great powers, "is, in virtue of the Treaty of Vienna, an Austro-Prussian possession, and only Austria and Prussia have a right to the disposal of it." In opposition to this, the secondary states challenged the validity of the treaty of Vienna, on the ground that Christian IX. had no power to cede what never belonged to him.

The duchies, they said, belonged of right to the legitimate heir, the German prince, Frederick of Augustenburg, and the German Confederation was the defender of his right. Austria also, though desiring because of her international isolation to keep on good terms



FIG. 52. — Minister von der Pfordten.

with Prussia, inclined to favor the pretension of Prince Frederick. The grand duke of Oldenburg also advanced claims. The attitude of Prussia was based on wholly practical considerations. The duchies, Bismarck declared, must, under whatever nominal government, be so administered as to furnish a firm defence and naval base for

Germany in the north. The prince of Augustenburg, relying on his hereditary right, was unwilling to give any satisfactory securities for the safeguarding of Prussia's just interests. Reminded urgently from Vienna that it was time for proceeding to the installation of a proper government, Prussia at last formulated its conditions in a note of February 22, 1865. These were: The new state of Schleswig-Holstein to enter into an indissoluble alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia, with its sea and land forces brought into organic cohesion with hers; Rendsburg to become a Confederate fortress; the cession to Prussia of the land necessary for fortifying the sound of Alsen, of Kiel harbor, and of a canal to be constructed to the North Sea; the duchies to join the Zollverein, and make over their postal and telegraph systems to Prussia. These demands Austria rejected, and so put an end to one phase of the negotiations. She had already replaced her commissioner, von Lederer, by the less pliable Baron Halbhuter, who secretly abetted the Augustenburg government, giving it the most anti-Prussian character, and thereby inaugurated a new era of wrangling with the Prussian commissioner, von Zedlitz, and of friction between the powers. Assured of such support, the hereditary prince restricted to the utmost his concessions to Prussia.

The liberal sentiment of Germany, with more of passion than political insight, took sides against Prussia on this question. The 'National Union,' at a meeting at Eisenach in October, stigmatized the surrender of the duchies to a rule so hostile to freedom as a serious menace for the federal unification of the fatherland. Emboldened by this and similar demonstrations, the Schleswig-Holsteiners insisted more strenuously than ever on the immediate installation of their duke, and with no less earnestness deprecated their subjection to Prussia.

This sentiment operated to prevent any understanding being arrived at between the government and the people's representatives in Prussia. The speech from the throne expressed the hope that "the important events in the immediate past might have contributed to enlighten men's views in regard to army organization; for to this it was due that it had been possible to carry on the war without encroaching on industrial and family relations by calling out the landwehr; nor could the point of expense be made against it, for the regular income of the state had been sufficient to enable government to do without the war-loan that had been denied it." In vain. The



deputy Gneist affirmed that "this reorganized army, with the Cain-brand of breach of the constitution on its brow, could neither now nor at any future time become a permanent institution, so long as divine justice had sway in the land;" and funds for the organization were again refused. The house, after another fruitless session, was prorogued on June 17, 1865, without being able to unite in any view on the Schleswig-Holstein case.

With all the more confidence did the secondary states, in concert with Austria, prosecute the campaign against Prussia. Immediately on the rejection of the Prussian demands of February, 1865, a motion for the installation of the hereditary prince was submitted to the Frankfort diet by Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse-Darmstadt, in defiance of Bismarck's protest that to Austria and Prussia alone belonged the competency of dealing with this subject. Complications and intrigues followed on each other without cessation. The conjunct possession of the duchies had become a source of permanent conflict. Bismarck came to the conclusion that the knot which could not be loosed must be cut, and with matchless adroitness drove Austria into one false position after another. It cost him, however, great pains to accustom the king even to the thought of a breach with his old ally, and to overcome the Austrian influences about his person; but in face of this question so closely touching the honor and prestige of Prussia, William could no longer shut out the conviction that an honorable friendship with Austria was impossible. But just at the juncture, when the tension had become extreme, it dawned upon Vienna that Austria, unarmed as she was, was in no condition to cope with admirably equipped Prussia. The three royal sisters — the Archduchess Sophia, the Queen-dowager Elizabeth of Prussia, and Queen Amelia of Saxony — appeared as mediators. A meeting at Gastein was arranged, and thither King William betook himself, accompanied by Bismarck.

In Frankfort the originators of the motion for the instalment of the prince of Augustenburg, ineffectually active, made another attempt to stem the current of events, or rather to turn it in accordance with their views. They made, on July 27, a new proposition, viz., to represent to Austria and Prussia the necessity for summoning a representation of the duchies elected by free vote, to demand the admittance of Schleswig into the German Confederation, and finally — in order to clear away financial impediments to the erection of a new secondary state — to renounce any claim for the



expenses of the execution, and to charge the cost of the war in Schleswig against the Confederation. But the case assumed an altogether different complexion. The negotiations of Bismarck and Count Blome in Gastein resulted (August 14) in a treaty to the effect that, "since the conjunct rule imperilled the good understanding of the two powers, be it agreed that, without prejudice to their rights to the whole of both duchies, these be no longer exercised in common, but that a geographical division be made, Prussia administering Schleswig; Austria, Holstein; both powers to bring the establishment of a German fleet before the Confederation, with Kiel as the federal harbor; Prussia to be in the meantime in command there, with disposal of the police; Rendsburg to become a federal fortress, Prussia to get two military roads through Holstein, a telegraph-line, and the right of carrying a North Sea and Baltic canal through Holstein; Lauenburg to be ceded by Austria to Prussia in consideration of an indemnity of 2,500,000 Danish thalers." On September 15 the conjunct rule over the two duchies was dissolved. General von Manteuffel became governor of Schleswig, and Field-Marshal von Gablenz of Holstein.

Thus Austria had abandoned her friends, and, without even recognizing the secondary states or the diet, come to an understanding with Prussia. The diet could see no way out of the dilemma, into which it had helped to bring itself, except by proroguing till October. When it became obvious, on its reconvening, that the old majority had crumbled away, Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse-Darmstadt, deeply offended, declared their federal duties as far as Schleswig-Holstein was concerned at an end.

"We have made a compact with Austria far from fire-proof," said Bismarck. In point of fact, the Convention of Gastein was nothing but a make-shift. A final solution of the question seemed as far off as ever. The situation, instead of becoming better, grew worse daily. In Holstein, where the agitation in favor of the prince of Augustenburg went on without impediment from the Austrian commissioner, the antagonism between the powers became pronounced. In proportion as Gablenz showed himself mild and liberal there, Manteuffel (Fig. 53) became the more rigidly stern in Schleswig. He even threatened the prince with arrest if demonstrations such as those on his visit to Eckernförde were repeated. After the 'Schleswig-Holstein Union' had held a public meeting in Altona, on January 23, 1866, to urge the summoning of the estates, Bismarck ad-

dressed an energetic and even menacing protest to Vienna against Austria's rule in Holstein, and especially against her having permitted a demonstration so provocative of disorder, adding that "a hostile or evasive reply would lead to the conviction that the imperial government was no longer disposed to continue in a common path with Prussia." Austria curtly refused to listen to



FIG. 53. — General von Manteuffel.

these complaints. The breach was complete. On February 28 a ministerial council in Berlin, under the presidency of the king, came to the conclusion that any backward step in the succession-question was impossible, and that Prussia must persevere in her path, even at the risk of a war. Still, owing to the state of efficiency to which reorganization had brought the Prussian army, no obvious preparations were made for the struggle. And, while the external conflict was

drawing nearer, the internal one was renewed with greater bitterness than ever, so that on the meeting of the Landtag, on January 1, the government and the representatives faced each with intensified antagonism. When the minister of justice, Lippe, through the nomination of two assessors, secured in the supreme tribunal the conviction of two members for abuse of the liberty of speech, who had been acquitted in the courts of first and second instance, the lower house boldly declared the procedure invalid. In like manner, when the government acquired, by sale of the shares in the Cologne and Minden Railroad in its possession, the disposition of a sum of 30,000,000 thalers, it with equal resolution pronounced the transaction unconstitutional and legally void. Ultimately, when Virchow moved to declare the union of Lauenburg with Prussia null and of no effect, the Landtag was dissolved on the 23d. Both parties were further from reconciliation than ever. So embittered was the feeling against Bismarck, that, impelled by it, a young fanatic named Cohen, on May 5, made a murderous assault on him in the Unter den Linden.

But if Prussia's strength seemed weakened by this domestic conflict, Austria's internal affairs were in a much worse, and all but irretrievable, condition. Austria seemed, indeed, on the high road to disintegration. Schmerling had reached his wits' end with his Germano-centralizing system, while not one step had been made towards reconciliation with Hungary; and the majority of the Reichsrat, from which the Czechs kept themselves aloof, turned its back on a government that, from its ever-increasing financial embarrassments, saw itself driven to very equivocal manipulation of the state funds. Before sanctioning a proposed loan of 117 millions, the finance committee required guaranties that a stop should be put definitively to the arbitrary overstepping of the budget as well as to the contracting of loans under the title of 'depot debts.' The result was, that, instead of the 117 millions, a loan of only 13 millions was conceded. To guard against abuse of section 13 of the constitution, the Reichsrat decreed that, in virtue of this section, only ordinances called for by unforeseen emergencies, and not controverting the constitution, could be promulgated, and that even such should become of no effect unless confirmed by the Reichsrat on its reassembling. On July 30 Schmerling received his dismissal; and Count Belcredi, a Czech, became chief of a reactionary cabinet, composed of old conservative-Hungarian and federal-feudal



elements, which was little more than a tool in the hands of Count Esterházy, the special confidant of the emperor. The Hungarians, under Déak's leading, adroitly took advantage of the conjuncture to draw nearer to the emperor. Count Mailath was named Hungarian court-chancellor, and Transylvania became the first victim of the impending *coup d'état*; its union with Hungary was effected, and its own provincial diet was suppressed. On September 20 an imperial manifesto announced the suspension of the restricted ('inner') Reichsrat till the conclusion of the negotiations with the Hungarians and Croats; the government being provisionally empowered, of its own plenary authority, to deal with all matters of urgency, especially such as affected the economic and financial interests of the empire.

What centralization had failed to effect, it was now purposed to accomplish through federation. To the provincial diets were assigned the functions of the Reichsrat. A disorderly clerico-national agitation sprang up against the Germans. The diets of Prague and Lemberg followed the Magyars in a demand for autonomy. In Bohemia, even the German high aristocracy went over to the national camp. The emperor flattered the Czechs with the prospect of his coronation with the crown of Wenceslaus, while the language-law of 1864 was confirmed which made instruction in Czech obligatory even in German middle schools. And as the Germans in Bohemia were delivered over to the hands of the Czechs, so, in Galicia, the Ruthenians were made over to the Poles.

The Hungarians, who out of hate to Schmerling had given over the empire to Belcredi, now recovered their senses, especially as the Croats were in no wise disposed to be subordinated to them as the Transylvanians were. Déak's platform had two main planks,—the restoration of the constitution of 1848, and the erection of Hungary and its associate lands into an independent monarchy, with Magyar supremacy in the domains of Stephen's crown. The spectacle of Czechs and Poles, in alliance with the feudalists, in the ascendancy in Vienna seemed to the Magyars a menace to their nationality and liberty. Although the speech from the throne with which the emperor opened the Hungarian Reichstag,<sup>1</sup> December 14, 1865, disclaimed the theory of forfeiture of rights, and promised, on an understanding being arrived at,

<sup>1</sup> The Hungarian Diet, or Reichstag, comprises a House of Magnates and a House of Representatives, and corresponds in general to the Austrian Reichsrat.



coronation with the Hungarian royal crown of St. Stephen, the members persisted in their former demands; and, on these being ungraciously rejected, the Reichstag retorted with an address in which, while declaring itself ready to proceed to the revision of the constitution of 1848, it repeated its demand, in an almost threatening tone, that this must be preceded by an acknowledgment of the continuity of its rights. The bond of friendly connection with Hungary was again all but ruptured; and, while this conflict of nationalities was at its height, the financial situation became desperate. The acknowledged deficit of eight millions in 1865 was, in reality, ten times greater. After a loan of ninety millions contracted in Paris was wholly used up, Count Larisch saw himself compelled, in April, 1866, to have recourse to a second, secured by pawning the state domains; and in May the state, in violation of the bank-acts, seized 112,000,000 florins in one- and five-florin bank-notes, and put these into forced circulation as national currency. A forced loan of twelve millions was imposed on Venetia. Such were the circumstances under which the empire allowed itself to drift into war.

In the meantime Bismarck, whom the king had created a count, had been making all needful diplomatic preparations for the struggle. In September, 1865, he betook himself to the Emperor Napoleon at Biarritz in order to secure his neutrality in the duel. He carried thence no formal convention indeed, but, in lieu of that, the assured conviction that Napoleon would not hinder the war, and that there was one means of insuring French neutrality, namely, an alliance with Italy.

Napoleon, since the early brilliant years of his reign, had experienced so many misadventures that his self-confidence had in a good measure deserted him, while the constant advance of the painful malady from which he suffered had sensibly affected his character. Instead of guiding events, he now rather let events prescribe to him. The German embroglio he hoped to make subservient to various of his purposes. Properly improved, it would give him absolution for Mexico, which was the keenest missile in the opposition's quiver; in Belgium and on the Rhine he would find another Nice and Savoy; and finally it would crown his work of 1859 by uniting Venetia to Italy, and thus enable him at once to save Rome and propitiate the party of the Revolution. In the Prussian minister, who exposed his own plans with such unexampled naïveté, he saw

nothing but an adventurer and desperate gambler. He relied on the judgment of his most intelligent generals, whose experience in the Italian war led them to rate the Austrian army far above that of Prussia. At the very least he calculated on a long and murder-



FIG. 54. — Count von Bismarck, Chancellor of the North German Confederation.  
From the engraving by S. Roemer, 1868.

ous struggle, that would make him, without needing to raise a hand, master of the situation; defeated Prussia would have recourse to him, and pay for his protection by the left bank of the Rhine. To facilitate the outbreak of hostilities, he let it be known, both in Vienna and Berlin, that he would be nothing more than an inactive onlooker.

All the more earnestly did Napoleon counsel Italy to ally herself with Prussia. Thus urged, La Marmora despatched General Govone to Berlin. Now began a season of anxious care and arduous labors for Bismarck. On the one hand, it cost him the utmost pains to overcome King William's reluctance to enter on a war against an old friend, and to surmount the strong Austrian influences by which the monarch was surrounded. On the other, he saw himself an object of mistrust to the Italians. It was long ere they could find a common basis for negotiations. The Florentine cabinet insisted, for its own security, that both armies should be made ready for the field simultaneously. Bismarck urged that Italy should make its preparations dependent on those of Prussia. Moreover, Prussia's seeming supineness in the face of Austria's concentration of a powerful force in Bohemia, professedly for the repression of Jewish disorders, and of Saxony's mobilization of her army, with Bismarck's answering Austria's inquiry whether he had it in view to tear up the Convention of Gastein and break the Confederate peace, with a simple "No," and the added explanation that his main object was not the acquisition of the duchies, but the reform of the Confederation, combined to strengthen Govone's suspicions, and make him yet more coy to Prussia's wooing. But the tide turned just as negotiations were on the eve of being broken off. On March 16 the Prussian government learned of a secret note addressed by Vienna to several of the German courts, explaining, among other things, that the Confederation could be granted the power of eventually arranging the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty only on condition of its putting the four non-Prussian Confederate army corps on a war-footing, and ranging them with the Austrian army "in case Prussia should force an open war upon Austria." With this document in his hand Bismarck succeeded in convincing the king of the impossibility of a peaceful settlement of the controversy. On the 24th Bismarck issued a despatch to the German governments, reminding them that, considering the unreliability of the Austrian alliance and the inadequacy of the Confederate military system, the guaranty against the dangers threatening in the future was to be sought in a closer union of the German states, and better established and more secure Confederate relations. In imitation of the Vienna note, it culminated in the question, to what extent Prussia could rely on them in the case of her being attacked by Austria or forced into war through her threatening attitude. The answers were mostly evasive. No time, however,



was lost in concluding the treaty with Italy, though only for three months. By this the Italian sovereign bound himself to declare war on Austria immediately on Prussia's doing so, both kings pledging themselves neither to assent to an armistice nor to make peace without the consent of the other.

On April 9, 1866, the day after the signing of the treaty, Prussia, in the diet at Frankfort, proposed the calling of an assembly, chosen by general and direct election, to consult regarding reform of the Confederation. The real object of this motion — namely, the annulment of Austria's influence in Germany — was kept carefully in the background; but that this, and nothing else, was its true aim, was beyond doubt. It was not for the simple conquest of a province that Bismarck had resolved on appealing to arms, but for the conclusive settlement of the German question in a spirit of true nationality, with the special aim of relieving the country from that influence which had so long weighed like a nightmare on its development. The proposition found little acceptance with the peoples, and only intensified the governments' antipathies to Prussia. Austria did not fail to avail herself of this general disposition. On April 26 she made the proposal (under reservation of certain advantages for Prussia) to cede the duchies to the 'best-entitled claimant,' leaving it to the Confederation to determine whose claim was the best. Meanwhile there went on a continual interchange of notes, in which each saddled the charge of priority in arming on the other, and demanded recall of the steps taken. On April 18 Austria declared herself prepared to proceed with the proposed disarmament providing Prussia also would revert to a peace-footing. But scarce was this basis agreed on when Austria declared she could disarm only in Bohemia, since Italy's preparations for an attack on Venetia made it incumbent on her to place her army there on a war-footing. Bismarck, on the other hand, knowing that Italy was not yet in a state of readiness for war, insisted on disarmament as well in the south as in the north; and as Austria declined to accede to this, the prospect of peace vanished as speedily as it had appeared. Once more (from May 3 to May 5) Prussia summoned her whole active force into the field. Party strife was silenced in view of the seriousness of the situation, and the people rallied around the so much disliked government against the external foe. On May 9 followed the dissolution of the lower house. From the 4th Austria had been making her preparations openly; on the 13th Master of Ordnance



Benedek took the command-in-chief of the army of the north; on the 20th the troops began to move from the rear *en masse* towards Moravia. Nor was there less activity on the part of her Confederate allies.

Meanwhile Count Mensdorff, Austrian minister of foreign affairs, had been exerting himself to win over Napoleon, and through him Italy. Napoleon, however, wished to take no measures to prevent the breaking out of a war from which he expected such advantages. Mensdorff volunteered, if France and Italy would remain neutral, to cede Venetia to the French emperor that he might recede it to Italy, Austria receiving Silesia in compensation. The offer had allurements for the cabinet of Florence, especially as difficulties had come in the way of its carrying out the April convention; but the breach of faith was too glaring for La Marmora to venture upon it openly. Only one way, and that an indirect one, suggested itself. If he should be able to occupy the time with negotiations till the expiration of the April convention (July 8), then Italy would be free from her obligations, and could take what offered with good conscience. He proposed a congress to Napoleon, a suggestion made also by England. The emperor entered into the scheme with delight. The congress not only gave promise of Venetia to Italy, but allured him with the prospect of the Rhine lands. On May 27 France, England, and Russia issued an invitation to a congress at Paris. Prussia accepted unhesitatingly. Austria, on the other hand, committed the irretrievable error of making her participation dependent on conditions which rendered the congress impossible; namely, that the idea of any aggrandizement of any one of the invited parties should be excluded from its deliberations, or any proposal which could infer a change in her own relations to Italy, while the papal government should have a voice in Italian affairs. Of what avail could a congress sitting under such restrictions be to Napoleon? A stone fell from Bismarck's heart. This indirect declination enabled him to cast the responsibility for the war on Austria.

All the more earnestly did Napoleon press his schemes of acquisition in Berlin. His first efforts to carry out such with Prussian help dated back to 1862. Since then he had made repeated proposals through relatives or confidential agents in regard to mutual aggrandizement. Sometimes the question was of Luxemburg, or the boundaries of 1814; sometimes of greater objects, from which French Switzerland and the language boundary in Piedmont were not ex-

cluded. Now his aspirations became materialized, as it were, into a project for an alliance,—offensive and defensive,—whose provisions his ambassador, Benedetti, submitted. But when Bismarck persistently declined to consider this proposal, notwithstanding the implied threats, Napoleon next addressed himself to Austria, which he found more accommodating. On June 9 his ambassador, the duke of Gramont, concluded a treaty at Vienna, by which France bound herself to unconditional neutrality, and pledged her best efforts to insure that of Italy. Austria, on her part, pledged herself to respect the existing situation in Italy and to cede Venetia, while she renounced all claim to an exclusive hegemony over Germany, and bound herself to have nothing to do with any territorial changes that might affect the European equilibrium without the consent of France. It was evident that, let the war go as it might, in whatever territorial changes it involved, France, notwithstanding her unselfishness, would claim a share. None knew better than Benedetti that King William would utterly reject the very possibility of a cession of territory; nay, he learned from Bismarck's own lips that should France reclaim Cologne, Bonn, or Mayence, he would rather retire from the political stage than consent to any such demand. But France, in her frivolity, was convinced that Prussia, after an inevitable defeat, would call on the emperor for succor, and would then be glad to yield him whatever he pleased to demand. Such was the dream on the Seine; how it was realized the world now knows.

In conformity with the change indicated in the despatch of April 26, Austria, on June 1, made the announcement in Frankfort that she regarded her efforts to effect a settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question in harmony with Prussia as frustrated; and, the question being a German one, she referred all ulterior proceedings to the Confederation; and, further, that she had given full power for summoning the Holstein estates. Bismarck promptly declared, on June 3, that he regarded this transference of the question to the Confederation as an express renunciation of the Convention of Gastein, on which this one-sided summoning of the estates was a direct encroachment, against which Prussia reserved to herself the right of taking further steps. Austria, in retort, plainly threw down her glove, by causing Gablenz on the 5th to summon the estates to meet on the 11th. Prussia promptly accepted the challenge; and, on June 7, Manteuffel crossed the Eider, the Austrians retired to Altona, and, their position there being untenable, on the night of

the 12th to the left bank of the Elbe, with the hereditary prince, who with them had left Kiel. The administration of the duchies Manteuffel committed to Baron Scheel-Plessen. In an extraordinary sitting of the diet, on the 11th, the president declared these proceedings of Prussia a breach of the conventions of Vienna and Gastein, and moved the mobilization of the whole Confederate army with the exception of the Prussian corps. Prussia, in a circular of the 12th, protested against the motion as subversive of every principle of the Confederation, adding the warning that the diet's acceptance would mean the dissolution of the Confederation, while those that voted for it would be guilty of an act of hostility to Prussia, who in the war now opened would regard only her own interests and those of the states that adhered to her. In vain. The majority judged the moment had come for drawing the net tightly round Prussia's head. In Hanover men were already dreaming of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Henry the Lion. On the 14th the president's motion was carried over Prussia's protest by the nine votes of Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, Würtemberg, Hanover, the two Hesses, Nassau, and that of the sixteenth curia, which last, however, was justly challenged as being rendered by the deputy for Schaumburg-Lippe without instructions from his government, and indeed disavowed by it. Immediately thereupon the Prussian deputy, von Savigny, arose, and declared that Prussia regarded the Confederate compact as broken, and no longer binding on her, by the declaration of war against one of its members, and that she looked on the Confederation as extinct, and would act accordingly. Notwithstanding, she did not regard the fundamental principle on which the Confederation was based — that, namely, of the national unity of Germany — as annulled, but considered it the imperative duty of the German estates to find means for giving effect to the same. "His majesty's government, therefore, submits the draught of a unification in harmony with the requirements of the time, and declares itself ready to enter into a new confederation with such governments as will hold out the hand to it."

For Austria, torn with dissensions, with an empty treasury, and without an army of reserve, it was an act of infatuation to precipitate herself into a conflict. What she lacked in real strength her press endeavored to make up by arrogant bravado; and even the government cherished the hope that, as in 1850, she would be able to compel Prussia to submission through the development of her



own power and the support of the secondary states. The democrats as well as the particularists of the secondary and lesser states took her side; and in Vienna, Prussia was regarded as paralyzed by her domestic embroglios. But men deceived themselves in regard to the strength of Prussia as well as in regard to the disposition of her people, and not less in regard to the constancy of her king and his council. At the call of their monarch the reserves and landwehr, with quiet resolve, took their places in the ranks. For Austria the moment for challenging a foe was ill-chosen; for neither had her allies completed their armaments nor had any common plan of operations been agreed upon, while Prussia was able to contemplate the coming struggle with the equanimity of preparedness. Austria now pledged herself to Bavaria to make no separate peace, and, in case of territorial changes resulting from the war, to secure Bavaria against loss, and to see that she should be indemnified for any concessions she might have to make. On June 30 it was determined to unite the Bavarians with the eighth Confederate army-corps, and to assume the offensive in a northwest direction. To the Saxons there remained only the prospect of leaving their own land to the foe, and fighting as auxiliaries in Bohemia.

Berlin clung as long as possible to the hope that Hanover, at least, would remain neutral. But as Prussia's aspirations after hegemony became more pronounced, the aversion of King George V. — blind to all that was practical — became ever deeper. Intercourse between the two halves of the Prussian territories was impeded by him as much as possible, and permission for the construction of a railroad to the Jade Bay withheld. The new cabinet constituted under von Borreis in September, after the dismissal of the four liberal ministers, subordinated itself unconditionally to the royal will. "If you fear Prussian ambition," said Bismarck to the Hanoverian minister, "you cannot better disarm it than by becoming our loyal ally. To such an ally a Hohenzollern, after the most successful war, is incapable of doing injury in any shape. But if you associate yourselves with our enemies, and constitute yourselves into a state which we shall have reason to dread will avail itself of every external difficulty of ours to run a weapon into our back, then I warn you that the existence of such a state is incompatible with that of Prussia, and cannot continue with our good will." The Hanoverian court made preparations to concentrate its army at Stade, whence, in concert with Gablenz and 10,000 Holstein volun-



teers, it purposed making a rear-attack on Prussia. On the earnest remonstrance of the Prussian envoy, a great ministerial council, in opposition to the views of the king, spoke clearly out, on May 13 and 14, for neutrality; and on the 20th Bismarck invited Hanover to enter into a treaty which should guarantee its independence in new federal relations. Negotiations were just opened when Prince Solms-Braunfels, the king's half-brother, appeared from Vienna, and through his glowing representations of Austria's power and generous purposes effected a complete change in King George's views, and succeeded in having the Prussian proposals rejected. In vain did the second chamber record its protest against a policy so suicidal; its protest remained as ineffective as that of the Hesse-Cassel estates against the last Confederate resolution.

On June 15, the day after that eventful vote of the diet, Bismarck addressed an ultimatum to Hanover, Cassel, and Saxony, demanding alliance, disarmament, and a German parliament, and, in return, guaranteeing the integrity of their territories and their sovereign rights. Prussia's proposals were rejected, and immediately thereon followed her declaration of war. A manifesto of King William, dated on June 18, the anniversary of Waterloo, conjoined reminiscences of 1813 with promise that, should God grant her the victory, Prussia would be strong enough to substitute for the loose bond which held the German lands together rather in name than reality, a stronger and more wholesome one in another form.

For Prussia the grand objective point of the war was, of course, the Austrian army; but as Hanover and Electoral Hesse, through their situation between the two halves of the monarchy, were in the highest degree dangerous, these had first to be made innocuous. The other North German lesser states—Saxe-Coburg-Gotha under its Duke Ernest II. in the van—accepted Prussia's invitation to alliance; and several of their contingents relieved the Austrian and Prussian garrisons in the Confederate fortresses, which the diet had withdrawn to avert bloody conflicts. Hanover and Electoral Hesse constituted the first task allotted to the western army under the command-in-chief of General Vogel von Falkenstein. Hesse-Cassel was occupied without opposition. The elector was taken prisoner. Almost all Hanover was seized with equal facility. King George hurriedly assembled his troops at Göttingen, whence, on the 21st, he began a southeastward march, intending to join the Bavarians. On the 23d the Hanoverian army, 19,000 strong, reached

Langensalza. Here peace negotiations were entered into with the Prussians, which, however, came to nothing through a series of misunderstandings on both sides. The Hanoverian army withdrew to a defensive position behind the Unstrut, between Thambrück and Nägelstedt.

But now Prussia's patience had reached its limits. On a false report that the Hanoverians in their retrograde march had made an attack on Tennstedt, an order was issued from Berlin to compel their surrender, cost what it might. Forthwith the duke of Gotha exerted himself to procure from Falkenstein re-enforcements for General Flies, who was advancing from Gotha on the Hanoverians; but in vain. Thus it was that Flies, with 9000 men and 22 cannon, was left to face the Hanoverian foe, more than double his strength. All his efforts to storm the bridge of Merxleben, on June 27, resulted in failure. General Arentschildt, who commanded King George's troops, on becoming aware of his enemy's weakness, himself assumed the offensive. Flies, prostrated by the heat, was unable to give orders. The Hanoverian cavalry flanked the Prussian left wing; the centre was hurled back. The capture of Judenhügel and the Elbsberg decided the affair against the Prussians. But the real object of the fight — namely, the detention of the enemy — was none the less attained; and on the 28th Prussian troops streamed in from all sides to crush their adversary thoroughly. The Hanoverians, who did not know what to do with their victory, applied next night for an armistice and a free passage southwards. On these being refused, there was no alternative left them, now utterly exhausted, but to die or surrender. On the 29th the capitulation took place, the conditions being made all the milder owing to the bravery with which the Hanoverians had borne themselves. King George, the crown prince and suite, were allowed to take up their residence where they chose outside of Hanover, and to retain their private property. The officers had merely to give their word not to serve against Prussia, and even the private soldiers were sent home on the same pledge. All the war-material passed to the Prussians. Ultimately the king took up his abode provisionally in the Altenburg castle of 'Joyous Return,' amusing himself with hopes of the triumph of Austria and of French help.

Hard work awaited the Prussians in the struggle with Austria. In this the decisive blow was to be struck. As the concentration of the whole Prussian eastern army on any one point (as somewhere

near Görlitz) covering at once Breslau and Berlin was impracticable, there remained only the organization of two separate armies, with the risk of the enemy throwing itself with its accumulated strength on one of the halves. In the dilemma Prussia had but one resource, namely, herself to advance into Bohemia; for there she could most promptly effect a concentration of her strength. Immediately, therefore, on the vote of June 14, the king decided that he would himself be the assailant. On the 16th the Prussians crossed the Saxon frontier on the whole line from Leipsic to Görlitz. The army of the Elbe, 73,000 strong, under General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, took the route towards Dresden. The first army, 97,000 strong, under Prince Frederick Charles, marched by way of Löbau and Zittau; the second army, under the crown prince, 125,000 strong, constituting the left wing, was in the north of the county of Glatz. The Saxons withdrew into Bohemia, without offering any resistance. On the 18th Dresden was occupied, and precautions at once taken to make it tenable against any assault from the west. A reserve corps was concentrated at Leipsic. On the 22d the army of the Elbe entered Bohemia by way of Schluckenau, the first army by that of Zittau. Moltke's (Fig. 55) plan was for the three armies to pass through the frontier defiles apart, then to press forward convergingly towards a common point, probably on the Upper Elbe, on the plateau between Gitschin and Königgrätz, where they should concentrate for the decisive struggle.

The command-in-chief of the 240,000 men constituting the Austrian Army of the North was intrusted to Master of Ordnance Benedek, since Solferino the most popular Austrian general. In the fixed conviction that the main attack of the Prussians would be directed from Silesia upon Moravia, he had assembled his main force at Olmütz. Their irruption into Saxony compelled him to give up this position, and march towards Bohemia, whence alone he could avail himself of the advantage of operating on the inner line. His purpose was to move north on Josephstadt, and there form a junction with the corps of Clam-Gallas and the Saxons, and, thus re-enforced, to deliver a decisive battle to the first and Elbe armies, and then, bending eastwards, to strike the crown prince.

On the 20th Benedek set out towards the line of the Iser, which he could not possibly reach before the 27th or 28th, so that Clam-Gallas's corps, with a cavalry division, had the heavy task of obstructing for a week the advance of 120,000 standing on the frontier.



Even after this corps was re-enforced by the arrival of the Saxons, under their crown prince, Albert, Clam-Gallas was not more than half as strong as his antagonists. On the 26th the advance of the army of the Elbe, moving forward by way of Schluckenau and Rumburg, struck an Italian brigade, under Count Gondrecourt, at Hühner-



FIG. 55. — General Field-Marshal Count Moltke. From a copper-plate engraving by Johann Lindner.

wasser, and threw it back. The advance of the first army, on the evening of the same day, defeated the Austrians at Podol and Liebenau. The securing of the passages of the Iser was an important advantage to the Prussians. Already the superiority of the needle-gun had been demonstrated, as well as the comparative ineffectiveness of the 'flail method' of storming with the bayonet, which the



Austrians had learned from the French in Italy. Before venturing to attack the army of the Iser standing around Münchengrätz, Prince Frederick Charles decided to await the arrival of re-enforcements.



FIG. 56.—Master of Ordnance von Benedek. From the lithograph by Eduard Kaiser.

But as Clam-Gallas received orders on the evening of the 27th to retire to Gitschin, whither Benedek (Fig. 56) would direct his march from the south, he evaded a serious battle, the Prussians coming into

collision with only three of his brigades in forcing the Iser, which they effected after three separate engagements, at Kloster, Muskyberge, and Podkost.

Early on the 29th the first army received a telegraphic order from Berlin to afford, by its speedy advance, relief to the second army, which, notwithstanding its victorious encounters, of which we shall soon speak, was in a difficult situation enough. The Prussians advanced upon Gitschin in the afternoon, in two columns. On neither side could they break their way through. But at half-past seven there came an order from Benedek, that, as he had given up the idea of moving on the Iser, and the maintenance of Gitschin had therefore become purposeless, the army of the Iser should unite itself with the main army. The Saxons and Austrians evacuated their positions accordingly. The Prussians fiercely pursued the retreating Austrians through the streets of Gitschin; but the Saxon life-guards, with equal skill and bravery, covered their retreat, and then themselves withdrew after holding the town a stricken hour. The capture of Gitschin was of the first strategic importance for the Prussians, inasmuch as it tended to facilitate the junction of the first and Elbe armies (already united) with the second army. The main responsibility for the Austrians' misadventures lay with the commander-in-chief. The loss of the Austrians in prisoners was exceptionally great, and had a demoralizing effect on their troops; and even their cavalry had failed to maintain its ancient fame.

Benedek's reason for countermanding the movement on Gitschin was that he now became disagreeably conscious of the pressure exercised by the second army on his right flank. On the 25th the crown prince's army stood on the line from Liebau to Reinerz before the three portals into Bohemia, at Trautenau, Braunau-Eypel, and Nachod. Benedek still had sufficient time to bar these mountain portals; but, intent only on the offensive against Prince Frederick Charles, he contented himself with despatching a force utterly inadequate for this end, — namely, the corps of von Gablenz to Trautenau, and that of von Ramming to Nachod. The middle pass — Eypel — he left entirely unguarded. On the 26th, therefore, the Prussian guards, constituting the centre of the second army, were able to enter Bohemia through it without impediment. The first corps, on their right, under Bonin, passed through the defile of Trautenau, where several ravine-like paths converge into one. The Prussians found Trautenau unoccupied, while Gablenz's advance

guard was driven back from Kapellenberge and Hohenbruck. But on Gablenz returning to the attack with his main force, first the heights were recaptured from the Prussians, and then the town itself; and they were ultimately forced back into the narrow pass, all mainly through Bonin's injudicious disposition of his force. Only the exhaustion of their enemy saved them from greater losses.

Von Steinmetz, with the fifth corps, had better fortune at Nachod. Here again the Prussians were first at the spot, and by the evening of the 26th occupied the town and entrance to the pass. But the



FIG. 57. — General von Steinmetz.

actual passage of the defile, whose narrowness precluded any attempt at deploying, was difficult exceedingly, and was fiercely, though unskilfully, opposed by von Ramming. On the evening of the 27th the Prussians stood on a line stretching from Eypel, by Kosteletz and Nachod, to Habelschwert. On the 28th the fifth corps, while seeking to unite with the other sections of the second army, struck at Skalitz upon the eighth Austrian corps, by which Benedek had replaced von Ramming's sorely shattered troops. Notwithstanding the enemy's superior force, Steinmetz (Fig. 57) unhesitatingly delivered his



attack, and seized the forest of Dubno. A most embittered struggle developed itself around the wood, in which the enemy's superiority in numbers was more than counterbalanced by the rapid and destructive fire of the needle-gun; at last a brilliant concentrated charge gave the railroad station and the town into the hands of the Prussians. On the same day the advance of the guards drove Gablenz (Fig. 58), with great loss, from Trautenau, rescuing Bonin from his critical position. The mountain passes were now cleared for the second army, with the great roads to the upper Elbe lying open before it, on which river the retreating foe was first able to take up



FIG. 58. — General von Gablenz.

a position under the cover of his fortresses. No impediment worth naming now lay in the way of the unification of the crown prince's whole army on the plateau between Gradlitz and Königinhof. Hiller's division of the guards, on the 29th, took Königinhof by storm, the first and sixth corps following close upon it. As the passage of the Elbe required to be opened for the crown prince by the march in advance of the first army, he granted his sorely wearied troops a day's rest on the 30th, and in an order of the day congratulated them on having reached their first goal.

On the same day King William, accompanied by Moltke, Roon, and Bismarck, entered Sichrow to take the command in person. On



the previous evening, speaking from the balcony of his palace in Berlin, he had said: "Great things have been achieved, greater yet remain to be accomplished." His progress through Prussian territory was like a triumph. Nothing now hindered the immediate junction of the two Prussian armies, but for strategical reasons it was resolved still to keep them asunder. Cavalry parties kept up a sort of connection between them. Up to July 2 the army, sorely in need of rest, remained in its position, which described a semicircle twenty miles across, the advanced guard of the army of the Elbe being pushed forward to Simidar. But, although the vans of the hostile armies were less than five miles apart, strangely enough neither suspected the proximity of the other. The Prussians thought their foe was posted behind the Elbe, with the fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz on his wings; in reality he stood on the right (west) bank, on their own side.

By the 30th the concentration of the main Austrian army had been consummated. At Miletin and on the plateau of Dubenetz, there stood in a position of considerable natural strength, five army-corps and four cavalry divisions in a line of not more than five miles in extent. But Benedek knew that only two of his corps — the second and third — were intact; all the others had suffered enormous losses, in all 35,000 men, including 1000 officers. He was no longer in a position to attack one of the two hostile armies, without the other assailing him in the rear. A junction with Clam-Gallas and the Saxons could only be effected by a retrograde movement towards Königgrätz, and this he made on the night of July 1. The new position was well chosen for defence, and his situation was by no means hopeless. But seized with a sort of desponding melancholy, he had lost all confidence in a favorable issue, and secretly telegraphed to the emperor: "I beseech your majesty earnestly to make peace at any price; a catastrophe is inevitable." The emperor replied: "Peace is an impossibility. If a retreat is unavoidable, let it be made in the best order." Hereupon Benedek announced that he would begin the retreat to Pardubitz on the 3d. Meanwhile, however, the victory over the Italian army at Custozza had inspired the military party in Vienna with new courage. On the night of the 2d General von Baumgarten brought Benedek the peremptory order to attack, taking upon himself the position of chief of the general staff.

Already on July 1 news had reached King William in his head-

quarters at Gitschin of the approaching arrival of the French envoy, Benedetti — another reason for pressing matters to an issue, only that a longer rest seemed necessary for the troops. His suite received orders to accompany him on the morning of the 3d to a conference with the crown prince at Königinhof. But, ere setting out, tidings came from the advance-guard at Cerekwitz that an Austrian encampment was visible on the heights of Lipa. A daring reconnaissance confirmed the report, and determined Prince Frederick Charles for battle. On his own responsibility he made the necessary arrangements. To the crown prince he sent the request to cover his left wing, or, preferably, that he should cross to the right bank of the Elbe by way of Königinhof. General Herwarth received orders to advance to Nechanitz. At eleven in the evening the prince's chief of staff arrived in Gitschin to announce the change in the situation. The king hesitated. The troops seemed not yet sufficiently recuperated, and the distance of the second army too considerable. But a council of war summoned by him decided for battle, and the chief of staff carried back to Prince Frederick the royal assent to the attack. Up till five o'clock in the morning of July 3 the troops were kept moving in torrents of rain to the stations assigned them.

The ground on which the battle of Königgrätz was fought constituted a square of ten miles on each side, lying on the right bank of the Upper Elbe, and divided into two nearly equal parts by the trough of the stream of Bistritz. On the west half, towards Horitz and Gitschin, stood the Prussians; on the eastern, towards Josephstadt and Königgrätz, the Austrians. The Prussian position had the advantage of a good line of retreat, while the Elbe ran almost immediately in the rear of the Austrians. Of their wings, only the right had any natural strength; here a series of steep ridges completely filled the space between the Elbe and the Bistritz, and constituted a natural fortress that was not to be turned, nor to be stormed without great sacrifices. While the Prussians, of their own choice, presented a front of nearly twenty-five miles, the Austrians, 206,000 in number, were concentrated on a line of little more than five miles in length.

It was eight o'clock in the morning when King William gave the order for attack. In union with the army of the Elbe, Prince Frederick Charles held himself strong enough — even should the enemy direct all its force against him — to sustain himself, at least

till the nearest corps of the second army could come to his support. He was not aware that he had the whole Austrian army before him, but reckoned only on three corps and the Saxons. It was essential, that, till the arrival of the second army, he should occupy the enemy at all points; and to do this he had to cross the Bistritz. His plan was that the first army, advancing from Sadowa, should break the enemy's centre by storming the heights of Lipa, while the army of the Elbe should support this main attack by a simultaneous advance against the left wing. If it succeeded in turning this wing, then the Austrian centre was untenable. But the army of the Elbe did not progress so rapidly as was expected. General Herwarth, indeed, after a five hours' march, appeared at half-past seven before Nechanitz; but it required an hour for him to gain possession of the village, and, instead of fording the Bistritz, he consumed another hour in restoring the bridge destroyed by the enemy there. Not until three P.M., after the arrival of heavy re-enforcements, did he succeed in driving the Austrian left from its main position at Nieder-Prim and Probus.

Meanwhile the Prussian centre had had to bear up against long hours of heavy work. Fording the Bistritz, it opened the fight with an attack upon the villages of Mokrovous, Dohalitz, and Benatek. Fog and rain hid everything from view; only the flashes of the cannon revealed a strong artillery opposed to it. In point of fact, the assailants had struck upon an over-strong power of resistance — four divisions and four army-corps as well as the excellently chosen main position of the Austrian artillery on the heights of Lipa. A hundred and sixty pieces showered death into the Prussians in the valley, who even at last were able to respond with only 120. For four mortal hours did the infantry stand the proof of inactive endurance under the ever-increasing storm of grape-shot. The plan of the battle demanded from the centre only the resolute maintenance of the ground they had won, till both wings of the grand army could come into action. Desultory onsets, due to the war-spirit of the men and their weariness of inaction, while they could not be prevented, were productive of no results beyond needlessly exaggerating the loss of life. This condition of the battle inspired Benedek with the hope of breaking his enemy's centre before the wings came up to its support. From Cischkows he despatched the corps of Thun, from Maslowed, that of Festetics against the wood of Benatek, held only by a single division, the 7th, under Lieutenant-General



von Fransecky (Fig. 59). Here a struggle — the most murderous in the battle — developed itself. With heroism all but unparalleled, fourteen Prussian battalions under Fransecky maintained the fight for more than two hours against forty-three Austrian. With the combat fluctuating this way and that in the dense forest, the troops lost all formation, so that any uniform leading was impossible; and not the commands, but only the example, of their officers incited the men, when driven back, to rally. To the victory-announcing blare of trumpets the Austrians precipitated themselves on the last rally-



FIG. 59. — General von Fransecky.

ing-point of their exhausted antagonists. General Fransecky collected the last relics of his men, determined to die rather than yield. Already the king was considering the necessity for a retreat, and the cavalry was assembled for the purpose of covering it. Then in a moment — between twelve and one o'clock — the cry was heard, "The crown prince is coming!" and the thinned ranks were inspired with new life. It was not long till the Austrian attack slackened. Benedek had received from Josephstadt a telegram announcing the approach of the second army.

To Prince Frederick Charles's call on the crown prince to come



to the help of the first army in the impending fight — which arrived at Königinhof at two o'clock in the morning — the latter had replied that his first corps should be ready to support him, but that more he felt himself prevented from doing by the earlier command of the king. At five there arrived the changed order for the advance of the whole second army. The sound of cannon thundering in the distance admonished to speed. The Guards and the sixth corps moved in the van. After crossing the Trotina brook, the foremost batteries, towards noon, were able to open their fire upon the height of Horenwes. Fearfully now did Benedek expiate his error of having in the fight around the wood of Benatek sacrificed the two corps destined to cover his right flank against an attack from the north. When the Austrians realized their danger, they directed their artillery against the new assailant; but what they had to oppose to the crown prince was only remnants of broken commands. By two o'clock the Guard had gained a fast footing on the height of Horenwes, while the division of Hiller scaled the plateau of Maslowed, scattering all before it and capturing fifty-five guns. Pressing farther in the same direction, the wedge forced itself into the enemy's side, while, to the left of the Guards, the sixth corps was already assailing him in the rear. The second Austrian corps hurried to replace itself in safety, and by so doing opened a wide gap in the defensive line into which the battalion of von Kleist, of the first regiment of the Guards, forced itself. On a sudden the two battalions standing on the high ground of Chlum saw themselves surprised, dispersed, captured. The key of the Austrian position was in Prussian hands. Benedek, who — without suspicion of what was going on in his close neighborhood — had, from the high ground between Chlum and Lipa, been keeping his attention exclusively directed to the fight in the front, immediately on receiving the alarming intelligence hastened with all speed thither, only to be received with a fierce fire, and to have his suite dispersed. The height, he decided, must be retaken cost what it might; but the storming columns were ridden down by their own Uhlans giving away before the frightfully rapid fire of the Prussians. Towards three o'clock Rosberitz, to the south of Chlum, was also taken, while in Nedelist, to the left, nearly an entire Austrian brigade was surrounded and annihilated; on the right the wood and village of Lipa were captured by two Prussian divisions. Still Benedek resolved to make one attempt more to recover the lost position, and



PLATE XIII.



Crown Prince Frederick William of Prussia.

From the steel engraving by F. Weber : original portrait by F. Winterhalter.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 231.*

the 12,000 Prussians holding it were compelled to evacuate Rosberitz, before the storming columns, 40,000 or 50,000 strong, which he had rallied for this end. But Chlum, despite all his efforts, was not reached, while the concurrent advance of the army of the Elbe from the south threatened his line of retreat on two sides. In hot haste the command was given for the retreat.

While the struggle was still raging around Rosberitz, the king, who since eight o'clock had watched the battle from the Roskosberge, ordered an advance along the whole line. The troops hitherto held in reserve on the Bistritz received the command with shouts of joy, and to the music of their bands pressed, without a check, forward to the front. King William, in a letter to his wife, thus describes his meeting with these troops: "First I came on the two divisions of the Guard, and a part of the Fusileer regiment of the Guards carrying with them twelve captured cannon, in full advance. The exultation of the men on seeing me is past description. The officers sprang forward to kiss my hand, which at such a time it was impossible to deny them; and so it went on from one troop to another towards the front, all the time to the accompaniment of cannon-fire and of hurrahs that seemed as if they would never cease. There are moments that to be understood must be experienced." On the height of Chlum the two princes met, and congratulated each other. Shortly thereafter the crown prince (PLATE XIII.) found his father. Unable to utter a word, the king held him in his arms, and decorated him with the Order of Merit, while the hautboys blared out: "*Nun danket alle Gott*," — the hymn with which the army of Frederick the Great had celebrated the victory of Leuthen. Driven back upon the Elbe, the defeated army seemed on the eve of a catastrophe. But now its artillery and cavalry offered themselves as sacrifices for the infantry; the former constituting itself into a fire-vomiting semicircle around the retreating bands, the latter throwing itself between the pursuers and pursued. A start was thus gained for the retreat, the men dashing into the passages of the river mostly without formation of any kind. But when they found the gates of the fortress of Königgrätz shut against them, and the ground around it laid under water, with darkness shrouding all in gloom, a complete panic seized the demoralized, though almost unpursued, army. Many hundreds were drowned. Only individual regiments gave creditable examples of discipline and obedience. The Saxons, in particular, maintained an unbroken array. Their



crown prince, Albert, attached himself to the first Jäger battalion, as being the last of his troops to leave the field, and with it reached the passage at Pardubitz.

The loss of the Austrians was terrible, amounting to 44,000 men, of whom 26,000 were missing with nearly 500 officers. The Prussians paid for their victory with 1900 officers and men killed, and 7000 wounded.

Next day Field-Marshal von Gablenz announced himself to the king at Horitz with a proposition for the cessation of hostilities, but received for answer that Prussia was ready to treat for peace on political grounds, but that an armistice was not to be thought of. Appearing again on the 8th, he was not received by the king. While the corps of von Mutius remained behind to observe Josephstadt and Königgrätz, the rest of the Prussian army broke up, on the 5th, for the south, Major-General von Rosenberg with the *Gardelandwehr* occupying Prague. Benedek's purpose of checking the advance of the Prussians by taking up a flank position near Olmütz, where he had collected the remains of his army in an intrenched camp, was frustrated by the Emperor Francis Joseph, who ordered him to hasten with all speed to the defence of the threatened capital. Already King William had come to the resolution of sending the crown prince only after Benedek, and himself leading the first and Elbe armies directly to Vienna, so as to reach it in advance of the troops Austria was drawing from Italy. The Prussians interposed themselves between the capital and the northern army advancing towards it from Olmütz. Benedek saw that a direct march was impracticable, and resolved therefore to make a détour over the Little Carpathians and through the valley of the Waag. Here also the foe was at his heels. On the 22d he was attacked at Blumenau by the seventh and eighth divisions under General von Fransecky, whose object was, by the capture of Presburg, to compel him still farther to the left, so that the main Prussian army might have time to strike a decisive blow against Vienna. But during the fight news arrived of the armistice to take effect at midday of the 22d. Fransecky, eager to make the most of the hours still at his disposal, had his flanking columns in the Austrian rear when the moment came to desist from hostilities.

Of that prodigious energy which, within a month, had carried the Prussians from Dresden, Görlitz, and Frankenstein up to the walls of Vienna, and given into their hands 200 cannon, eleven flags

and standards, and 40,000 prisoners, there was little trace to be discovered among their Italian allies. Von Usedom, the Prussian minister in Florence, had, indeed, urged them to energetic action, so that by a concurrent blow Austria should be compelled to divide her strength. To effect this, he urged, they must wait neither for the evacuation of Venetia nor trouble themselves with the Quadrilateral, but, turning the latter, strike the foe in the open field, force their way to the Danube, and thence stretch out a hand to Prussia. But La Marmora, who had resigned the presidency of the ministry to Ricasoli in order to take the post of chief of staff under the king, was aware of the pact of June 9, and asked himself why Italy should venture so high a stake on a game that she was bound to win in any case. On Usedom's plan being thus rejected, there remained only the choice between a formal siege-war or of operating within the Quadrilateral. La Marmora decided for the latter, but in such a way that he divided the army into two — namely that of the Mincio under the king, which should operate towards Villafranca, and that of the Po under Cialdini, which should support the king by way of Rovigo. As soon as the Archduke Albert was assured of the king's march towards the Mincio, he, although he had but 80,000 men to oppose to 200,000, without concerning himself about Cialdini, crossed the Adige, and occupied the line from Custozza to Castelnuovo. The king crossed the Mincio between Goito and Salionze; and, on June 24, the corps of Durando, constituting his advance, came unexpectedly into collision with the Austrians at Custozza. On the Italian side there was an utter want of concert or uniformity in the leadership. After a most obstinately contested battle, with losses of about 8000 men on each side, the king had to retreat over the Mincio; but as the Austrians — anxious to draw their troops towards the Danube — made no pursuit, he was able to halt on the Oglio.

The news of Königgrätz had fallen like a thunderclap on Vienna, transmuting over-arrogant confidence into deepest consternation. Benedek, hitherto the idol of the people, was dismissed ignominiously from his post, and the victor of Custozza called to the command-in-chief in his place. Scarcely less alarming than the defeat was the indifference, or rather the malicious satisfaction, manifested by the Hungarians. An imperial manifesto of July 7, appealing to their hereditary loyalty, fell without effect. In this strait the emperor no longer hesitated to do that openly which he had already done

secretly on June 9, and in order to oppose his undivided strength to the Prussians, formally made over Venetia to the emperor of the French (July 5), with the announcement that he was ready to accept his good offices as a mediator for peace. On the Tuileries, too, the news of Sadowa (as the French name the great battle) fell like a lightning-stroke. Napoleon's whole web was rent to pieces. Only as authoritative arbiter between the combatants could he hope to save France's sorely damaged prestige. He undertook, therefore, the office of mediator, and telegraphed to Victor Emmanuel that further bloodshed was uncalled for, inasmuch as Italy could obtain Venetia from his hands, stating, further, that he was writing the king of Prussia to propose an armistice to him also, as preliminary to peace-negotiations. Italy blushed through shame at having to receive as a gift from a third party what she was too weak to conquer by her arms. "There is something of higher value than Venetia," wrote Ricasoli to the ambassador in Paris; "and that is the honor of Italy, of the king, and the monarchy." He laid it down as a precondition for his acceding to an armistice that Prussia also should assent to such, and that Italy's just claims — especially on the Italian Tyrol — should be satisfied. Cialdini received orders promptly to resume the offensive, and on the 8th crossed the Po, while Garibaldi with his guerillas invaded the Tyrol. Great things were expected by the Italians from their fleet, but the sea was to be as barren of laurels as the land. On July 20 Admiral Tegetthoff worsted the badly managed Italian squadron off Lissa. The *Re d'Italia* was sunk with her entire crew, the *Palestro* blown up. Overcome with terror, Admiral Persano took refuge with his other ships in the harbor of Ancona.

Napoleon would now have preferred to take the part of an armed mediator; but from this his minister of war, Randon, earnestly dissuaded him, representing that the Mexican expedition had so emptied the arsenals and demoralized the whole military system of France, that it would be impossible to put a respectable force in the field. But that he should come out of the crisis with entirely empty hands seemed to the emperor damaging alike to his own prestige and that of his government. In this way he came to have recourse to the *Trinkgeldpolitik* ('pour boire,' or 'tip' policy) so mercilessly satirized by Bismarck. On July 10 the French council of ministers decided to refuse Austria's petition for help.

The task assigned to France's envoy, Benedetti, was a hard one,



—namely, that of dealing with the Prussians in their hour of triumph, without being able to lend weight to his representations by being able to point to an army ready for the field. It was July 12 ere he, after many difficulties, reached the royal headquarters at Zwickau, and then only to find that Bismarck cherished the desire of coming to a speedy understanding with Austria without the intervention of a third party. Already, with a keen eye to future possibilities, this astute minister was calculating the value of Austria's friendship, while cholera, which was working havoc in the army, also counselled the abridgment of the campaign. Beust arrived in Paris on the 13th, commissioned by the Emperor Francis Joseph to ask Napoleon to intervene immediately and with vigor. It was now too late. He found the French emperor under bodily suffering; and the only answer he could extract was, "I am not ready for war." Communications between the Prussian headquarters and Paris were impeded by



FIG. 60. — Count von der Goltz. From the copperplate engraving by Weger. Original, a photograph.

the frequent disturbances of the telegraph lines. The main points on which Prussia insisted before consenting to an armistice were — the exclusion of Austria from Germany; the erection of a North German Confederation under Prussian leadership; and a large accession of territory. Rather than return home without these ends attained, the king had declared he would prefer to abdicate. Of Prussian aggrandizement Drouyn de l'Huys would hear only on condition of equivalent gain for France. But the adroit Prussian ambassador, von der Goltz (Fig. 60), succeeded in getting the emperor, behind his



minister's back, to consent, on the 19th, to the incorporation into Prussia of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfort-on-the-Main, and the delay of the consideration of equivalents for France till after the king's return to his capital. An armistice of five days — in which Italy was included — was arranged, and Nikolsburg fixed on as the seat of further negotiations. These Bismarck insisted on conducting with Austria alone to the exclusion of her German allies. On July 26 the peace preliminaries were signed; Austria remaining territorially unchanged with the exception of the loss of Venetia. Emperor Francis Joseph recognized the dissolution of the German Confederation, and gave his consent to a reconstruction of Germany with Austria excluded. He pledged himself to recognition of the new Confederation that Prussia was to establish north of the Main, and declared his acquiescence to the South German states constituting themselves into a union with the prospect of ulterior closer national alliance with the northern league. He made over to Prussia all his claims to Schleswig-Holstein, and finally agreed that Austria should pay a war indemnity of 20,000,000 thalers. At the emperor's express request, Prussia left Saxony in its integrity. The king of Prussia bound himself to get Italy's assent to the peace. On these preliminaries being signed, an armistice was concluded for four weeks.

In the scene of war in the west the issue was such as it must ever be where unity, vigor, and preparedness are set against disunion, perplexity, and unreadiness. While, after the capitulation at Langensalza, the three sections of the Prussian western army, previously operating apart, were concentrated to form the army of the Main, of the four Confederate army corps which the diet had decreed to mobilize, only two, the seventh and eighth, were actually on foot, the former (Bavarian) 40,000 strong, the latter (Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, with the addition of Nassauers and an Austrian brigade made up of fortress-garrisons) numbering 46,000, — excellent material, but, devoid as they were of all unity, really little better than an armed mob. The troops of Electoral Hesse, quite unprepared for the field, were used to re-enforce the garrison of Mayence. Not one of the South German states was at the outbreak of the war in a state of military preparedness; in Bavaria companies contained on a peace-footing about twenty-five men, and many had not a full complement of officers. Prince Alexander of Hesse, at the head of the eighth corps, had under-

taken the task unwillingly and with little hope, and especially protested against being in any way subordinated to the leader of the seventh corps, the aged Bavarian Prince Charles; each of them thought only of the defence of his own land. After the capture of the Hanoverians at Langensalza, the two corps directed their march separately but convergingly towards the Fulda road, on which they felt sure of meeting with their collected antagonists.

Von Falkenstein, in accordance with Moltke's instructions, determined by taking the route from Eisenach to Fulda, the designed point of junction of the two hostile corps, to interpose himself between these, and so hinder their unification. The division of Göben was the first to strike the foe, at Salzungen (July 2), and after a short fight took Dernbach. Several encounters took place on the 4th; in particular the division of Beyer, in its advance on Fulda, came into collision with the Bavarian reserve cavalry under Prince Taxis near Hünfeld. The first discharge of artillery inspired the cuirassiers with such terror that they rushed back in headlong flight upon the succeeding cavalry column, and carried it in disorder along with them. That his troops might recover their organization, the prince resolved to retreat by a night march over the heights of Rhön upon the Franconian Saale; but when near Hersfeld they were seized by a second panic, and broke in wild flight, which only partially terminated at Würzburg. Taxis was removed from his command, and his division reconstructed. This flight opened to the Prussians the way to Fulda, and that the more completely that Prince Charles, finding the enemy on his flank, gave up all thought of a junction with the seventh corps, and concentrated his force behind the Franconian Saale.

The defeat of Königgrätz damped the spirit of Prussia's other enemies as well as of Austria. True, Bavaria still declined her proffers of peace; but the great quarrel was now decided, and an early peace in view; until this came the main object of the southern allies was to defend their own lands against invasion. Instead, therefore, of seeking a junction with the Bavarians, Prince Alexander listened to the call of the diet to come to its defence in Frankfort, and left Falkenstein free to deal with the Bavarians alone. Crossing the Rhön range, the Prussian general forced the passage of the Franconian Saale (July 10) at five points before the Bavarians had been able to reach the defensive position selected by them near Poppenhausen. On a sudden, however, Falkenstein turned away

from seeking the Bavarians, and, crossing the Spessart on his right, made after Prince Alexander, who was marching hither and thither without any fixed object. After bloody combats at Frohnhofen and Aschaffenburg, he occupied Frankfort on the 16th, and let this main nest of anti-Prussian intrigues experience all the woes of conquest. A contribution of six million florins was levied from the city, and two senators were made prisoners. The rump of the diet had on the 11th fled to Augsburg, where in the inn of the Three Moors it closed its inglorious existence (August 24).

While in Frankfort, Falkenstein received his letter of recall. The discontent at headquarters with his military conduct was concealed by his nomination to the governorship of Bohemia. His successor, von Manteuffel, inaugurated his command by demanding from the city a further sum of 24,000,000 florins within twenty-four hours; and on the payment not being promptly made, penal warrants were lodged in the houses of the senators, while the burgomaster Fellner in despair committed suicide. After the fight at Aschaffenburg, Prince Alexander, ignoring the defence of Frankfort, had effected a junction with the Bavarians on the Tauber. When the army of the Main, reinforced to 60,000 men, resumed operations on the 21st, Manteuffel anticipated offensive action on the part of the princes by delivering a series of successful assaults upon their army at Hundheim and other positions from the 23d to the 26th inclusive. This vigorous offensive, conjoined with the advance of the second reserve corps, which the grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin had collected at Leipsic with the view of getting in the rear of the Bavarians, as well as the news of the armistice concluded between the main powers, broke down the latter's resistance. While the Prussians were cannonading the citadel of Würzburg, a Bavarian flag of truce appeared on the 27th; the war was at an end. Two days thereafter the grand duke of Baden recalled his troops, and replacing his war-ministry by one favorable to Prussia, concluded a truce. Already, on the 21st and 22d, King William, amid the exultant shouts of his people, had made his triumphal entry into Berlin.

On August 23 the definitive peace between Austria and Prussia, on the basis of the Nikolsburg preliminaries, was signed at Prague. Peace was not concluded between Austria and Italy till October 3, when the latter state formally received Venetia on consideration of 35,000,000 florins, and her taking on herself a share of debt amounting to 65,000,000.



In Nikolsburg, Bismarck had insisted resolutely on the exclusion of the secondary states from the negotiations; and it gave Austria little concern to leave to their fate allies who had taken part in the war with only half a heart. Not till July 28 was Bavaria admitted to conference at Nikolsburg; the sacrifices demanded by Bismarck from it being 20,000,000 thalers and a slice of territory, in the north of the Rhine Palatinate and Franconia, containing at least 500,000 inhabitants. Aghast, von der Pfordten called on France for aid, depicting the danger which the mediatizing of the southern states inferred for it also, and the advantages it would derive from stretching out a helping hand to the dynasties delivered over to the tender mercies of Prussia. Minister Dalwigk of Hesse-Darmstadt spoke yet more emphatically. He implored the French to enter at once the Palatinate and Rhenish Hesse, where they would be received with open arms, assuring them that though Pfordten could not invite them openly he would be as glad to see them there as he himself would be. Thus the three foremost ministers of the secondary states — Beust, Pfordten, and Dalwigk — vied with each other in their efforts to place the decision in regard to the national fate of Germany in the hands of France. That their end was not attained is one of Bismarck's greatest services to his country. He offered to renounce all Prussia's acquisitions in Franconia on the right of the Main, provided Bavaria would enter into the proposed secret alliance, offensive and defensive. With deep emotion the Bavarian replied that he now saw how deeply Bismarck had been calumniated, and how true a German heart beat in his bosom. On August 22 Bavaria concluded peace, as well as the secret alliance whereby both parties guaranteed the integrity of each other's territories; the king of Bavaria pledging himself, in case of war, to make over the full command of his troops to the king of Prussia, which had already been done by Würtemberg (August 13), and Baden (August 17). Bavaria paid, like the others, a war-contribution, but was required to cede only the district of Gersfeld, Orb, and the enclave of Caulsdorf. Through these settlements the line of the Main — south of which Napoleon had interdicted Prussia from passing — was practically obliterated. Hesse-Darmstadt became a party to the peace on September 3, ceding the landgraviate of Hesse-Homburg, and a part of the circle of Giessen, and entered, with the province of Upper Hesse on the north of the Main and the portion of its army appertaining thereto, the North German Confederation. Meiningen, whose



duke had abdicated in favor of his son George, made its peace on October 8; Reuss-Greiz on September 26. Last of all, on October 21, came Saxony, which, thanks to the good offices of Austria, escaped without any loss of territory in consideration of a war-contribution of 10,000,000 thalers. The claims of the grand duke of Oldenburg were satisfied by the grant of the district of Ahrensböck in Holstein, and 1,000,000 thalers.

The triumphant Prussians could now return to their homes with the proud consciousness of having achieved grander results than had ever been accomplished by their laurel-crowned fathers in the most glorious days of the monarchy. All that envy and jealousy had done to damage their land for fifty years had now been expiated by the severe penalty of a fratricidal war. Through the domains incorporated, Prussia had received an accession of 28,000 square miles of territory, with a population of 4,800,000, and was therefore fully justified in assuming the rank of a great power in every respect. Her domains were now rounded off into a compact whole; she was now the leading state of Germany, and for the first time all North Germany to the Main saw itself bound together through her into one great and vigorous political power.

The patriotic feelings evoked by the war had tended to peace at home. The new elections to the house of representatives that took place on the eventful July 3, the day of Königgrätz, resulted in annulling the predominance of the 'Party of Progress,' and in the return of a majority of Conservatives and moderate Liberals. Army-organization — gloriously justified as it had been — could no longer constitute an apple of discord between the government and the people's representatives; and, this out of the way, the strife over the budgets and the constitution died away of itself. The speech from the throne on the opening of the Landtag, on August 5, breathed a spirit of peace and concord, admonishing that only through the government and the people's house working together in harmony could the seed sown in so much blood be brought to full maturity. It announced that the costs of the war had been met by the state's receipts and funds in hand, and, frankly acknowledging that, in consequence of the domestic strife, the government had not been conducted on constitutional principles, asked indemnity therefor on the score of necessity, so that an end might be put to the conflict for all time. The speech closed by asking an extraordinary credit of 60,000,000 thalers for the army and fleet, and permission to replace the moneys with-


drawn from the treasury from the compensation money received from the defeated states. "Have confidence in us," exclaimed Bismarck, "that we will employ these means only for the carrying out of the policy we have so auspiciously initiated." A peculiarly gratifying proof of the restoration of harmony between the king and people was given by the house when the former asked for 1,500,000 thalers wherewith to reward the more illustrious leaders in the war; it gave Bismarck the first place, next after him ranking the war-minister von Roon, Moltke, Herwarth, Vogel von Falkenstein, and Steinmetz.

The incorporation of the newly acquired territories was effected by means of a transition-period, during which the government was endowed, till October 1, 1866, with dictatorial powers. Of the deposed princes, the elector of Hesse-Cassel and the duke of Nassau consented to compacts with the Prussian crown. The king of Hanover, on the contrary, maintained his hostile attitude, till, in the end of September, 1867, his former minister, Windthorst, concluded an arrangement by which he was secured in the interest of 16,000,000 thalers, without any express renunciation of his claim to the throne. By far the greatest part of the various peoples submitted to unification with Prussia most reluctantly and with bitterness of heart; above all was this the case in Hanover, where a half-smothered Guelf sentiment continued to prevail, especially among the orthodox clergy, and in Schleswig-Holstein. This recalcitrant feeling was, however, largely mollified by an avoidance of violent changes, the grant of provincial constitutions, and the assignment of not inconsiderable funds for home-administration.

Nevertheless, remodelled Prussia was to find its full strength and realize its influence through intimate association with rejuvenated Germany. On August 18, 1866, sixteen North-German governments — the others following — entered into a provisional compact of federation with it, according to which the new Confederation should have a constitution based on that of Prussia of June 10, 1866, but with co-operation of a national parliament to be chosen in accordance with the election-law of 1849. On December 15 Bismarck submitted the draught of the Confederate constitution to the plenipotentiaries of the allied states invited to Berlin, requiring only such sacrifices of independence as were essential for the general good of the entire Confederation. It was an entirely new experiment, — a confederation of monarchies which had hitherto been

regarded as independent, and theoretically were still to remain so, with no mere ideal of a constitution like that formulated in St. Paul's Church at Frankfort in 1849, but with one adapted to the needs of the peoples. By it the presidency was permanently united with the Prussian crown, which, as representing the Confederation, in its name was to declare war and conclude peace, enter into alliances and other compacts with foreign states, accredit and receive embassies, and name the state-chancellor. The separate states were to be represented through the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*), Prussia having seventeen of the forty-three votes, but possessing no veto on its decisions.

February 24, 1867, the first North German diet (*Reichstag*) met to determine on the constitution (PLATE XIV.). "The basis of our relations," said Bismarck, "shall not be violence either towards princes or people, but confidence in Prussia's loyalty to covenant; and this confidence will never be shaken so long as you manifest equal loyalty towards us." To the National Liberal party fell the rôle of standing as mediator between unification and freedom, principle and expediency; while the ignoring of fundamental laws made the constitution unacceptable to the 'Party of Progress,' whose fears moreover, that the desired determination of the military budget for a series of years might infer a menace to freedom, were not to be assuaged by Bismarck's assurance that government desired "the development of the highest degree of liberty compatible with the general safety." "Let us set to work quickly," he urged, "and place Germany in the saddle; she will soon ride of herself." Yet, after all, it was the Confederation's military system that constituted one of the main points of difference between the government and the Reichstag. But, by the acceptance of a measure afterwards incorporated in the constitution, army organization and the three years' term of service, so much insisted on by the government, received legal sanction, at first, indeed, only till the end of 1871; but by a later vote, the Confederate army was made sure beyond this date, as well as a grant of 225 thalers for each man in it. A proposition for the creation of a federal ministry and a house of peers Bismarck resisted effectually on the ground of its incompatibility with the Federal Council. On April 10 the federal constitution was formally sanctioned by 230 votes to 53; and next day the king closed the Reichstag with the words: "The time has come when our German people, through its unified strength, is in a position to main-







Opening of the Reichstag of the North German Confederation, 1867, February 24, 1867, by King William I. in the White Hall of the Royal Palace in Berlin.

From the engraving by C. Möde.

tain its rights and dignity, and insure peace." After receiving the sanction of the various local diets the constitution came into force, July 1, 1867.

In the same year met the first legislative Reichstag of the North German Confederation. It approved of two weighty measures, promoted by the governments, — namely, of universal and uniform liability to military service, and of the provision of extraordinary means for the augmentation of the fleet, — sanctioning, moreover, a general consular system; the erection of a supreme federal tribunal of commerce sitting at Leipsic; measures in favor of greater industrial freedom, and in regard to emigration and the right of workmen to combine; the preparation of a general penal code; and confirming the commercial code already in existence. That the Zollverein should continue was accepted as a matter of course. How firmly established it had become in the course of the three decades of its existence was evidenced by the quiet and regular manner in which the customs-authorities discharged their functions during the war, counting on their receipts as confidently as in time of profoundest peace. But the time had now come for organizing it on a yet faster basis. Henceforth the Bundesrat and Reichstag were to decide for North Germany on all matters of customs-legislation; South Germany was to take part in the new Zollverein only on condition of complying with the necessary conditions and consenting to the annulment of the previous *liberum veto*. The new customs-compact between the North German Confederation and the other former members of the Zollverein, signed on July 8, 1867, extended the duration of the union until 1877; the Bundesrat, augmented by representatives of the southern states, and a customs-parliament superseding the former customs-conferences. The customs-parliament, immediately on its meeting, consented to a new customs- and commercial-convention with Austria in place of that dissolved by the war of 1866.

The economic unification of the whole German nation was thus, in spite of the Main line of separation, effected. But unity of spirit was still wanting. The most of the petty states conformed themselves easily and willingly to the new order of things, and amalgamated their troops with those of Prussia: the people of Waldeck even compelled their prince to make over the administration of his little domain to it for ten years, and would have made the transfer perpetual had not Bismarck laid down the principle that the number of the still existing sovereignties must not be dis-

turbed. In Saxony, on the contrary, the conquered party endured the 'Prussianizing' with ill-concealed antipathy, and—in spite of King John's formal assurance that he would be as true to the new Confederation as he had been to the old—regarded everyone with national leanings as a traitor to his country. Still more pronounced was the hatred of Bavaria and Würtemberg to their victor. To the easy-going South German the military rigor of the great North German power was especially ungrateful, while Ultramontanism and democracy saw in Prussia their most dangerous foe. Würtemberg's and Bavaria's choice of deputies to the customs-parliament fell mainly on democratic particularists. The anxiety of the South Germans in regard to an extension of the competence of the customs-parliament, Bismarck assuaged by the most soothing assurances.

Baden, on the other hand, showed an unreserved readiness to enter the North German Confederation, and even to organize its troops in association with the Prussian. Bismarck, however, judged the time was not come for this. He "would not cream the milk from fear of the rest becoming sour." The Hessian chamber showed a similar disposition; while in Bavaria, on the contrary, the anti-Prussian or 'patriotic' party gradually got everything into its own hands.

On December 20, 1867, Bismarck closed his justification of his Schleswig-Holstein policy by imploring Germans at this crisis to stand shoulder to shoulder, and to hold their eyes closely fixed on the exterior, so as to keep watch in common over the national interests. No one understood the full import of his words at the time; in little more than two years it was patent to all the world.

For Austria, too, the day of Königgrätz constituted a turning-point. On it not the Austrian army alone, but Belcredi's reactionary policy as well, suffered a signal defeat. "Away with this system," was the cry common to the German press, whose mouth even the state of siege could not stop. The calls of the government on the people to strain every nerve for the country met either with passive resistance or contemptuous defiance. The agitation for the constitution was initiated, July 7, by an address of the common council of Salzburg for the summoning of the Reichsrat. Vienna responded to the imperial manifesto of the 10th with the prayer that the capital should not be exposed to the perils of a conflict, but especially that such constitutional and political reforms should be introduced as were calculated to give confidence for the future.

Belcredi treated the appeal with contempt, and a direct address from the Vienna common council met with no better reception. The exasperation became more intense. Above all, it began to be seen that, without reconciliation to Hungary, nothing was to be effected. A meeting of German-Austrian deputies at Aussee, on September 10, formulated as their programme: "Dualism, limited by common parliamentary administration of affairs essentially common; repudiation of federalism, and, instead, union with Hungary, not through the provincial diets, but through the Reichstag of the hereditary lands;" and already the conviction had forced itself on the emperor that the only way out of the difficulty lay in this direction. The victory at Custozza had inspired Belcredi with courage to adjourn the intractable Hungarian diet. But, anon, the day of Königrätz broke this resolution, and suggested the thought of making the continuance of the war with Prussia practicable through immediate reconciliation with Hungary. In profoundest secrecy, Déak was summoned by the emperor to Vienna. He earnestly counselled Austria's separation from Germany, assuring the emperor that he could then depend all the more securely on Hungary pacified by the concession of its demands. For the carrying out of this plan the emperor called on the dismissed Saxon minister, von Beust, whose fluent tongue had impressed him with the belief that no one else was fitted to raise Austria out of its state of humiliation. Thus did Beust — a Protestant and an alien — come to undertake the heavy task of foreign minister, to the satisfaction, indeed, of the general public, but with rancorous mistrust on the part of the aristocracy. His nomination as minister-president, February 7, 1867, broke up the cabinet based on the October diploma.

Beust took his stand unreservedly on the Aussee programme. The announcement which in November greeted the reconvened Hungarian diet, that the emperor was ready to concede its demands, insured dualism, with the partition of the monarchy into two halves, — one Cisleithan, the other Transleithan. Hungary received its own responsible ministry, with Count Gyula Andrassy (formerly condemned to the gallows for high treason) at its head; the only matters reserved for the general ministry in Vienna being the unified army, foreign politics, the customs, and the public debt. In February, 1867, the Hungarian constitution, inclusive of the provisions of 1848, was rehabilitated; and on June 8 the imperial pair were crowned in Buda, with all circumstances of ceremony, inclusive of an



amnesty for the banished rebels, and permission to return. The Hungarian state, which thus attained recognition, consisted of four members. — Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia, and the Military Frontier. But scarce was the yoke removed from their own necks when the Magyars began an unscrupulous system of misgovernment of the others. The Military Frontier was left still subject provisionally to the general war-ministry, while Transylvania was, on the other hand, simply incorporated with Hungary, as was Croatia on June 21, 1868, with, however, some special provisions, including the establishment of a special portfolio for Croatia in the ministry at Pesth. Fiume was made into a sort of free city. On December 29, amid great rejoicings, the Croat deputies — after twenty years' separation — made their entry into the Hungarian lower house.

But for confirmation of the accommodation with Hungary the assent of the other provinces also was necessary, and this was not to be thought of without the restitution of constitutional privileges in them also. This, however, encountered opposition from two quarters — from the clerico-feudal party, to which the concessions to liberalism were an abomination, and from the Slavs, who demanded federalism, in place of unification, for this half of the empire. Beust (Fig. 61) made a breach in this racial opposition by inducing the Galician diet, through important concessions to the Poles at the cost of the Germans and Ruthenians, to send delegates unconditionally to the Reichsrat, while a German-Liberal majority was secured in Bohemia and Moravia by dissolving their diets, and bringing strong influence to bear on the new elections. Dissatisfied with this condition of matters, a strong deputation of Czechs, Croats, Ruthenians, and Slovaks attended the opening of the Slavic ethnographic exhibition at Moscow on May 15, 1867, to testify to all the world that, since the victory of dualism, all their hopes centred in Russia. On May 22 the Cisleithan Reichsrat was once more reopened, and began its labors with an address as strongly reprehensive of the abrogated system as was in any way compatible with respect for the sovereign. Now, however, so liberal a spirit was breathed on it from above, that the majority had no motive for opposition. The Cisleithan citizen-ministry (otherwise the 'ministry of doctors') constituted under Prince Karlos Auersperg, was accepted with enthusiasm. Beust, in reward for his services in pacifying Hungary, was elevated to the chancellorship of the empire. In the negotiations of the deputations summoned from both halves of the empire to settle their

relations to each other and to the state, it was soon seen how well the Magyars knew to make use of the advantages of their position. While the contribution of the hereditary lands for the common needs was fixed as high as seventy per cent, that of Hungary was only thirty; and, in regard to the national debt, the former had further to burden themselves with a yearly contribution of twenty-five millions for ten years. Thus was inaugurated the completely distinct financial economy of the two parts of the present 'Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,' and at the same time the transference of its centre of gravity towards the east.



FIG. 61. — Friedrich Ferdinand, Count von Beust, Imperial Chancellor of Austria.  
From the lithograph by Joseph Bauer.

A series of laws of high importance enacted the equality of all citizens before the law; complete liberty of faith and conscience; the equal right of all the Cisleithan races to the means for cultivating their own speech, without compulsion to learn another; independence of the judiciary; the erection of a supreme imperial tribunal for deciding in conflicts of competency between judicial and administrative authorities, between diets and the government, provinces and the empire — thus developing the 'February patent' of 1861 into a veritable constitution. On the other hand, the Poles, through the threat of their withdrawal, extorted from the Reichs-

rat a very serious limitation of its authority to the effect that, while the February patent endowed it with all competence not expressly reserved to the provincial diets, this relation was now precisely reversed. The Czechs, who, strange to say, found allies in the German high nobility, already went so far as to claim for the crown of Wenceslaus a dignity equal to that of St. Stephen, and to deny the competence of the Reichsrat to deal with Bohemian matters, showing in every way decided hostility to everything German. The meetings of the people on the Ziskaberg took an openly mutinous character; the German casino, the national theatre, and other obnoxious buildings were demolished by the populace of Prague.

If a special incitement was still required to make the clerics into embittered enemies of the liberal reforms, this was furnished by the agitation that sprang up in Cisleithania against the concordat. When the minister of justice, Hye, in the summer of 1867, intimated his purpose of submitting an interconfessional law, Archbishop Rauscher suddenly interposed with a secret plenipotentiary warrant, granted at the time of the concordat negotiations in 1855, by which the government bound itself to introduce no changes in church matters without the concurrence of the Vatican. The attitude of the bishops became still more hostile to the government after the installation of the new ministry, but an address of theirs against constitutionalism met with a decided repulse from the emperor. The decision of the upper house also — after the feudal preponderance there was overcome by a creation of peers — in favor of revision of the concordat was hailed with acclamations in Vienna. In vain were all the fiery appeals of the bishops. On May 25, 1868, appeared the three confessional laws passed by both houses, — a marriage law, conferring all jurisdiction therein on the civil courts; a school law, leaving religious instruction to the several churches, but interdicting their interference in other educational matters; an interconfessional law, enacting that in the case of mixed marriages the male children should follow the father, the female the mother, and forbidding the adherents of one church being made to contribute to another. Little wonder that Beust's proposal for a new concordat, with repeal of the old, received no welcome in Rome! On the contrary, a papal allocution appeared on June 22, denouncing the new laws as abominable, damnable, and to be altogether rejected.

In its contest with so many and so powerful adversaries the

German-Liberal centralizing system wasted its strength. It was too weak to cope at once with the opposition of the autonomists and the clerico-feudalists. The Czechs kept aloof from the Reichsrat; the Poles, the clerical Tyrolese, the Istrians, the Slovaks, and the delegates of Trieste now announced their withdrawal. After the resignation of Prince Auersperg, in April, 1869, partly in consequence of friction between him and the imperial chancellor, and the appointment of Count Taaffe in his stead, the question of whether the reluctance of the diets to send delegates to the Reichsrat should be met by having recourse to direct election produced a breach within the ministry itself. As the attempt to heal this by the partial reconstruction of the cabinet under the presidency of Hasner had to be given up, there remained scarcely any alternative but that of making trial of federalism. In this conviction a new administration, under the Polish Count Potocki, was constituted in 1870. The attempt to unite the Cisleithanians under the hegemony of the Germans, as the Transleithanians were combined under that of the Magyars, thus proved a total fiasco.



## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE SECOND EMPIRE BEFORE ITS FALL.

ON the opening of the French legislative body on February 15, 1865, the Emperor Napoleon announced the impending return of his troops from Mexico in these words: "In closing the temple of war, we are proud to inscribe on a triumphal arch the words: 'To the glory of the armies of France, for their victories in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America.'" But no rhetoric, however pompous, could undo the fact that the imperial policy had suffered a crushing defeat in Mexico, not merely military, but moral as well. The nation felt itself touched in its honor. The opposition assumed a confidence and audacity strange to it since the *coup d'état*. In the municipal elections, in defiance of all efforts to the contrary, a spirit hostile to the government made itself manifest.

The issue of Sadowa, also, France regarded as in effect a national humiliation. Napoleon had placed his stake on the cards of Austria, and had lost. He felt he must do something to rehabilitate his sorely damaged prestige; and this he determined to attempt by operating on three lines: He would purchase forgiveness for the miscarriage of his foreign policy by liberal reforms at home; a reorganization of his army should neutralize the so suddenly manifested superiority of that of Prussia; and, finally, an expansion of territory towards the east should realize the fundamental aim of his policy, from which he had never suffered his eyes to deviate, and at the same time gratify the restless cravings of his people. The failure of every one of these devices involved, as we shall see, his own ruin.

The empire shared the fate of all despotisms, in breeding no statesmen. In vain did men call for a younger race able to accomplish something. The more obvious the emperor's physical decay became, the more deranged became the guidance of France's policy. There was no longer a ministry bound together by identity of principle; each minister was but the tool for carrying out the purposes of the nation's virtually irresponsible head. The unity which charac-

terized the earlier adherents of the empire had vanished; such as made some profession (at least) of regard for liberty separated themselves from those whom, from their servile subserviency, they ironically nicknamed 'Mamelukes.' Count Morny, Napoleon's half-brother, president of the legislative body, won over Émile Ollivier, deputy for Paris, to the contemplation of a fusion between the empire, now in process of transformation, and those liberals who were willing to accept good even from the hand of a government they disliked; but Morny's unexpected death foiled the effort to build up a dynastic opposition in the chamber, and in Rouher's hands the reforms which the emperor now felt to be imperative shrivelled up into mere abortions. "The hour has come," Napoleon said in a note addressed to this minister, January 19, 1867, "for giving to our institutions all the development of which they are susceptible, and to the people all the freedom compatible with the preservation of the power with which the country has intrusted its sovereign." And in what did these reforms consist? First stood suppression of debates on the address, on the pretext that in the five years of their continuance they had failed to accomplish their end, and only served to agitate the public mind to no useful purpose. These were to be superseded in the future by a "wisely ordered right of interpellation." In future a special minister should be charged with the duty of representing the government before the senate and lower house, while two measures were to be introduced forthwith, — the one making the press again subject simply to the common law, the other relating to the right of combination. To the senate was to be given the right of pronouncing, not only, as formerly, on the constitutionality of new laws, but on their expediency as well, and whether they should be referred for consideration to the second chamber. Such were the reforms which the emperor dignified with the title of "the crowning of the structure erected through the will of the nation." To lessen the evil impression caused by their inadequacy, he ordered the reinstallation of the legislative tribune, which had been removed after the *coup d'état*. As the only result of the 'crowning,' there remained the universal conviction that the genius and institutions of the empire were not in harmony with the requirements of the nation.

The efforts of the emperor for the reform of the army had an issue still more fatally eventful. Even if the war of 1866 had not set the necessity for this before his eyes, the reports of his military attaché in Berlin, Colonel Stoffel, should have availed to do so.

This official — himself a distinguished officer — was never weary in representing the superiority of the Prussian army, not only in respect of organization, but morally and intellectually as well. "Who knows," he asked, "in what France's fatal blindness to these facts may end? Let us beware of thinking that, in the next war, we shall have to do with Austrian troops. Compared with Prussia, France, in respect to general culture and organization, is fifty years behind, while in respect of material pleasures and self-indulgence she is two centuries ahead."

One step towards army reform the emperor took, by arming the infantry with the *chassepôt* rifle; but in regard to other reforms not less needful, his counsellors and the nation generally did not lend him support. When he addressed himself to the military commission constituted under his presidency for aid in enforcing universal liability to service and the formation of separate, independent army corps, he met with the most obstinate resistance. The chambers, he was told, would never sanction measures of such a character; no deputy could face his constituents who voted for the imposition of such burdens on the people. The emperor — mortified to find how much his voice had lost in influence — had now recourse to another plan for attaining his end. But his new reorganization scheme, approved by the commission, of re-enforcing the field army to 800,000 men, and for the creation of a *garde mobile* 400,000 strong, for service in the interior — thus threatening the land with a burden threefold heavier than formerly — was received, on its promulgation in December, 1867, with a shriek of execration so universal that the government lost no time in declaring that what it submitted was but a rough sketch, capable of modification in any direction. Reform in some shape was, however, a matter of such necessity that Marshal Niel, immediately on his installation as minister of war in the following year, again took up the subject. But he had to make the same experiences that the emperor had done. The legislative body took its stand so determinedly on dispensation from service, either by exemption or purchase, that the government saw itself compelled to give way. One party, indeed, under the leadership of Jules Simon (Fig. 62), appealing to the *levée en masse* of 1792, declared for the total abolition of a standing army and the substitution of a national guard on the Swiss type; another party, following the banner of Ollivier, reprobated the reforms as foreshadowing a war of revenge for Sadowa, for which they had no good will. It fared worst of all



with the *garde mobile* in course of formation. Denial of exemption by purchase made the right of abstention from drill practically unrestricted; and Niel's (Fig. 62) weak concessions — that the exercises should not exceed fifteen in the year, and should not require any




FIG. 62. — Jules Simon. From the portrait by H. Roll.

guardsman to be more than twenty-four hours from home — which rendered the whole scheme virtually nugatory, were incorporated in the army law of February 1, 1868.

But the main defect in the new army law was not so much that it was ill-considered, and not adequate for its purpose, as that it



nurtured the vain belief that in this armed agglomeration of a *garde mobile*, France had called into existence a force able to cope with the Prussian landwehr made up of veteran soldiers, and that she had now




FIG. 63. — General Niel.

an army able to measure swords with that of any other power. This illusion became the more dangerous in proportion as the prickles of Sadowa touched the quick. That on this battlefield France had suffered as humiliating a defeat as Austria, and that the responsi-

bility for this rested with Napoleon III., was the immovable conviction of every Frenchman, imposing on the emperor the imperative duty of making up in some other way what had there been lost. With childlike simplicity he sent, through his ambassador, Benedetti, proposition after proposition respecting 'compensation' for Prussia's aggrandizements, — speaking now of the boundaries of 1814, again of the Rhenish Palatinate and Mayence, of Luxemburg and Belgium, and suggesting a treaty of alliance. Bismarck vetoed or ignored all these proposals with equal imperturbability, until, in January, 1867, the French government learned, first, of the secret alliance between the South German states and Prussia; next, that the Count of Flanders, heir presumptive to the Belgian throne, was betrothed to the Princess Marie of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, thus effectually blocking France's schemes on Belgium. With a heavy heart Napoleon had to give up his hopes of Belgium and Rhenish territories. But he kept on assiduously forging new plans for the acquisition of Luxemburg at least.

While French agents were busily at work among the people of the grand duchy, the emperor, with equal energy, entered into direct negotiations with the king of Holland. Prussia, he assured him, "was favorable to the transfer of the duchy, indeed, she looked on this as the very best means for getting rid of the occupation of the fortress with the least injury to German national sentiment. A refusal on his (the king of Holland's) part would make a war for the satisfaction of French feeling inevitable, and of that Holland would most surely be the first victim." In The Hague the Prussian victories had aroused deep anxiety, the queen—a princess of Würtemberg — being a bitter foe to Prussia. But the unsettled state of affairs in France, with a sick emperor, and the prospect of a regency, presented an aspect little assuring. The first step, therefore, was to secure Prussia's concurrence in black and white. But this was not to be extracted from Bismarck. He referred the Paris cabinet to the Dutch king as sole lord paramount of the territory, reserving, however, in mild, but scarcely to be misunderstood, terms, Prussia's right of veto to its incorporation with France. Notwithstanding this reservation, the emperor persisted in believing that Prussia would interpose no insurmountable obstacles, inasmuch as her assent would draw her and France nearer to each other, and be an evidence of their friendly relations to the rest of Europe. England and Russia, moreover, started no objections. On March 19, 1867, therefore, the

French minister at The Hague, on the pledge of the most profound secrecy, submitted his proposition, — namely, the sale of Luxemburg to France in consideration of her guaranty for the integrity of the Netherlands and of her securing the concurrence of Prussia. The king's answer seemed to promise the best.

And never did the imperial government stand more in need of some success. In the legislative body the opposition made its assaults on its foreign policy with more telling effect than ever; Thiers offering himself a spokesman for those who ascribed to its mismanagement both the war of 1866 and the coalition of Germany. With German unification effected, France, he prophesied, would sink to the level of a second or even of a third-rate power. She must approximate herself to England, Austria, and the lesser powers, and prepare herself for the struggle. The English alliance and peace, with 1,200,000 men under arms, were her only safeguards. "Not one blunder more must be made!" "Garnier Pagès," Ollivier said, "believes that what Bismarck has created will not endure. He errs; it will not only endure, but it will develop itself still further. The day will come, in the nearer or more remote future, but infallibly, when the confederations of the North and South will draw nearer to each other, and, despite of the Peace of Prague, join hands across the Main."

From Berlin, too, there came an answer to Thiers's speech. It consisted in the publication in the *Preussischer Staatsanzeiger* of March 19, of the treaty — offensive and defensive — with South Germany, by which his threat, "Thus far and no farther," was made a mere empty form of words. The impression made by this disclosure was deep and wide-spread. In The Hague it was seen with alarm that the relations between Paris and Berlin were by no means so cordial as French diplomats had represented. More earnestly than before the king insisted on a preliminary understanding with Prussia in regard to Luxemburg, and desired that the cession should be arranged through the signatories to the treaties of 1839. In Berlin he proposed the direct question of what Prussia would say if he divested himself of the sovereignty of the grand duchy. But Prussia gave no explicit answer, saying before doing so it must ascertain how the question was regarded by its Confederate allies, by the signatories of the treaties, and by German public opinion, adding that the king must take the responsibility of his dealings on himself. This the latter took as a half-consent, and, on March 30, signified to



the emperor his assent. In the Tuileries the affair was looked on as settled, and as a triumph wrung from Prussia. Only the formal signature was still wanting.

But on the following evening there came telegrams from Benedetti intimating a change in Berlin. In view of the agitation in Germany, the opposition of the military party, and the impending interpellation from the Liberal side through Bennigsen (Fig. 64), Count Bismarck desired the postponement of the signing. On the



FIG. 64. — R. von Bennigsen. From the engraving by Weger. Original, a photograph.

3d the Berlin cabinet gave it to be known in The Hague that it would regard the cession of Luxemburg as a *casus belli*. This gave the Dutch king a pretext for backing out of the engagement, of which he willingly availed himself. In the circumstances the question of the cession of Luxemburg was not again mooted.

This was the first occasion on which German public opinion was brought to bear with effect on the decision of any great political question: Napoleon was beside himself with rage. In his first transports he was disposed rather to fight than let escape the prey he had thought already his. In Berlin mobilization was contemplated. But while in Paris the emperor's hands were tied by the



ill-prepared state of his army, in the Prussian capital an impediment developed itself in the king's scruples to shed his subjects' blood for so trifling a cause, and especially in one in which his right was not beyond question. Bismarck asked him to give him only four days, and ere their expiration he had effected a compromise. This was made the easier for him, that France was on the eve of opening a World's Exposition, whose success the emperor was loath to imperil by a great war. Of indemnification to France nothing more was heard. A diplomatic conference met, at Russia's suggestion, in May, for the revision of the treaties of 1839, and resulted in a new compact on the basis of the neutralization of Luxemburg under the collective guaranty of the treaty-powers, according to which Prussia was to withdraw its garrison, and the fortress to be demolished.

The outcome of the Luxemburg embroglio was, as Moltke pointed out in the Reichstag, to demonstrate that a power had been constituted in the heart of Europe that, having no desire for conquest itself, was yet strong enough to interdict such to its neighbors. French vanity might regard this issue as a victory; if so, it was so petty a one as rather to resemble a defeat. None the less the second Paris Exposition developed a splendor of pomp calculated to impress on all the world — and especially on its own people — that imperial France was the foremost of all lands. Paris saw within its walls almost all the rulers and princes of Europe, of whom none attracted so much notice as William of Prussia and the Czar Alexander II. But Napoleon's attempts to allure the latter to the side of France proved a failure. The unconcealed sympathy of the French public with a Pole — Berezowski — who at a grand parade on June 6 discharged two shots at him, sent Alexander home more alienated than he came.

All the more diligently did the emperor court the friendship of Austria, whom the common desire of revenge for Königgrätz seemed to designate as an ally of France. And he found a congenial spirit in the imperial chancellor, Beust, who, notwithstanding his professions on entering the Austrian service of burying the past, repelled all Bismarck's attempts at reconciliation. Equally obstinate, and even more annoying to victorious Prussia, were the dethroned sovereigns, blind King George of Hanover with his 'Guelf legion' and the elector of Hesse-Cassel, who remained constant centres of intrigue, until their attitude became a menace to the general peace. On March 2, 1868, the property of both was confiscated, the interest

thereof being put at their disposal under conditions that made them innocuous. Thus, to use Bismarck's expression, "the venomous reptiles were pursued into their holes." Such was the origin of the so-called 'Reptile Fund.'

Austria's enfeebled and distracted condition ought to have admonished Beust not to provoke a new and uncalled-for war with Prussia. Nevertheless, all his efforts were directed to preparing a day of vengeance for Königgrätz, and, with this end, to entering into the closest possible relations with France. The Emperor Francis Joseph was on the eve of setting out to the exposition of 1867 when the news of his brother's execution in Mexico came to stop him. In return the French royal pair paid him a visit, nominally of condolence, at Salzburg, in August, 1867. In reality the object was political; and unquestionably a still closer understanding would have been arrived at, had not Count Andrassy pointed out not only Austria's absolute need of peace, but yet more emphatically Hungary's unqualified aversion to war and the still stronger antipathy of Austria's German subjects. Andrassy's objections prevailed, and both parties saw the expediency of avoiding intervention in German affairs.

On December 11, 1866, the French troops, in accordance with the compact of September 15, 1864, and despite all the protests of the clergy, were withdrawn from Rome. The imperial government had not failed to admonish the Italian of its duty in this event, but was itself the first to violate the treaty. For the papal legion levied with its concurrence in Antibes and officered by Frenchmen was nothing but the substitution of one French garrison for another, — a fact put beyond question by the despatch of General Dumont thither, in the following July, virtually as its commander. The fidelity with which the Italian cabinet had observed the compact of 1864, notwithstanding the loud calls on it to come to Rome, justified its protest against this gross breach of it. But the situation quickly changed. Ricasoli, after the failure of his scheme for rehabilitating the state-finances through the partial appropriation of the property of the church, retired to give place to a ministry formed from the Left under Rattazzi. Garibaldi judged that the moment had come for cutting the Gordian knot with the sword. He came back direct from the congress of the 'Friends of Peace' at Geneva (of which he had been nominated honorary president), inspired with accumulated hate of the Pope and the priesthood. But Rattazzi also was mind-

ful of his obligations. He caused the Roman frontier to be watched by 40,000 men; and when Garibaldi appeared in order to put himself at the head of the movement, he was arrested, and sent home to Caprera. His son, Menotti Garibaldi, however, found his way with some hundreds of men into Roman territory. The insurrection gained ground, and that the more unobstructedly, that Rattazzi retired from office, leaving Florence for some days without a government. Garibaldi evaded the watchfulness of his guard, and put himself at the head of the volunteers. The revolt invaded Rome itself, and the situation of the Pope became gravely serious. Napoleon was long at a loss what to do. A declaration in favor of the Pope would alienate Italy, on which he calculated for his plans for the future, while his wife insisted on immediate intervention. A French corps under General Failly appeared just in time to avert the defeat of the papal force at Mentana, on October 30, 1867, and to compel the guerillas to surrender. "The chassépôt has done wonders," telegraphed the general to Paris; and for the second time the papal government was maintained in Rome through French occupation.

Napoleon wished to leave the whole Roman question to be determined by his favorite expedient, a congress, and, indeed, sent out invitations for one; but the declinature of the three non-catholic great powers, on the ground that there was no basis for an understanding, prevented the carrying out of his idea.

The year 1867 closed with presages far from favorable for the empire. Miscarriage succeeded miscarriage; isolation in European affairs, and discontent and disaffection at home, combined to cast a cloud of discredit on the political genius men had ascribed to the emperor. The guidance of events had slipped out of his hands. He was no longer the dispenser of peace or war; age and sickness had made his need of rest imperative; and his silence and impassiveness had become more marked than ever. His wife's influence, too, prevailed more and more over his power of resistance; he stood in awe of her vehemence, and at the same time considered her an astute and well-meaning counsellor. Terrible was the intellectual barrenness that brooded over the empire. Napoleon himself — with assistance — compiled a life of Julius Caesar, and in this posed before the world as the nephew of the new Caesar — a second Octavianus Augustus, who closed the era of revolutions and civil war, and founded a lasting absolutism. But the age of the Virgils and Horaces, which his hireling scribes had announced as inaugurated,

would not materialize. All the emperor's endeavors to chain literature to his chariot-wheels resulted in failure. Between a government which suffocated political life, and a literature, such as that of France, that drew a large portion of its inspiration from politics, there yawned a great chasm. The *spirituelle* women who used to lend such a unique charm to French society were extinct. Romance, which attained its meridian brilliancy under the monarchy of July, had degenerated into satire, in which the blasé society of the empire took a sort of pleasure in hearing its vices castigated. But the satire became personal, and many of its sharpest missiles were directed against the emperor. Rochefort, the editor of the notorious *La Lanterne*, had to take refuge in Brussels, whence his envenomed shafts flew in clouds over France. Even the historical works of this epoch, as Ernest Renan's renowned "Life of Jesus," had their origin in the tendency antagonistic to Caesarism. E. Tenot's "Historical Studies on the *Coup d'état*" wounded the Empire more deeply than the poisoned stings of *La Lanterne*.

Through such influences the political sentiment became sensibly more disaffected. The republican party gave signs of reanimation. The young Godefroy Cavaignac, son of the general, became the hero of the hour, because in the presence of the prince imperial he had refused to accept a prize from the hand of the minister Duruy. On All-Souls' Day there was a republican demonstration at the grave of the people's representative, Baudin, shot down on December 3, 1851. Subscriptions for the decoration of his grave were opened by several journals, and the enemies of Caesarism flocked quite openly to contribute. The processes instituted and rigorously pressed against these papers gave the democratic party the best opportunity for setting the *coup d'état* and its author in the pillory. A young advocate, Léon Gambetta (Fig. 65), gained high renown by his masterly and impassioned defence of his clients, who through him escaped with light sentences. From this day forth Gambetta was a man of mark. To all this was superadded the unfavorable state of the finances. A loan of 700,000,000 francs was required to meet immediately urgent needs, and Thiers showed that since the institution of the empire there had been an annual deficit of 260 to 270 millions. For this deplorable condition he held responsible the false policy of the government and the powerlessness of the chambers to "make it hear the truths which, honestly spoken, would have power to shake a government, but which, left unsaid, would destroy it."





FIG. 65. — Gambetta. From the portrait by G. P. A. Healey.

The dissatisfaction pervading the country found expression in the general election of 1869. Although the attempt again made to unite the whole liberal party in opposition to the official candidates proved, as it had so often done before, a failure, yet the opposition had so grown in strength that it carried 93 seats out of 293. The first impression made by this issue on the Tuileries was that now, less than ever, could there be any thought of the extension of the people's liberties. But when, immediately on the meeting of the chambers, the middle or moderate party, 116 strong, arrayed itself against the government with a claim for the extension of constitutional rights and for ministerial responsibility, the dread that by the union of this party with the Left a hostile majority might be constituted, compelled to quite a different conclusion. An imperial message of July 12, without yielding ministerial responsibility, granted to the legislative body the right of regulating its own internal affairs, of choosing its bureau, of modifying commercial treaties, and of voting on the details of the budget. Further concessions were held in view. The result of the elections, however, was that the majority of the ministers gave in their resignations, and that the 'vice-emperor,' Rouher, was transferred to the lucrative sinecure of the presidency of the senate. A senatorial decree of September 8 confirmed the constitutional changes. Imperialism had entered on a perilous crisis. "The empire," Persigny had written to the emperor in December, 1867, "is tottering on all sides. Wherefore make plans for repairing a house that is on fire?"

The Restoration and the monarchy of July had entirely excluded the lower classes from the franchise by a high qualification. The second republic left the fatal legacy of universal suffrage, which Louis Napoleon abused to base his absolutism on the dread of the propertied classes for anarchy. In the feeling that his system could not bear parliamentary discussion, his government gave almost exclusive prominence to foreign politics to the studied ignoring of parliamentarism; but when its external mishaps compelled it to slacken the bit at home, it saw itself in a situation having all the disadvantages of parliamentary régime without its compensation—namely, that of enabling the government to share responsibility with the representatives of the people. Ever since 1863 every new election had been followed by a new shock to Caesarian absolutism. Every new concession to public opinion was like a breach through which the foe could pour in, while the wall itself was weakened. Things could

not remain as they were. The degree of heat to which the demagogic passions had attained was evidenced by the terrible excitement over the killing of the journalist, Victor Noir, who, in carrying a challenge from Rochefort to Prince Pierre Bonaparte, was assailed by the vilest abuse, struck in the face, and finally shot down. His interment was a virtual republican demonstration. The trial of the prince resulted, indeed, in his acquittal; but the journals teemed with the wildest invectives against the empire. With republicanism pure and simple the government would have had no great difficulty in dealing; but it was seriously concerned about the growth and attitude of the middle party, which threatened to spread desertion even among the ranks of its own partisans. The emperor had now to decide between reverting to absolute autocracy or going still further onwards in the path of reform, and reconstructing his rule on a liberal basis. Of these alternatives he chose the latter. In the eloquent deputy Émile Ollivier, he believed he had discovered the man to infuse new blood into the veins of already effete imperialism. On February 2, 1870, Ollivier formed a ministry chosen from the moderate party, in which he himself, as keeper of the seal, undertook the department of justice as well as that of instruction.

Thus had the empire acquired a parliamentary administration much the same as had existed under preceding governments. But Bonapartism and parliamentarism were things so alien, that it was impossible that the reconciliation between them could be genuine. Napoleon called to mind the source of his power. The offspring of the plébiscite of 1852, it required the sanction of a new plébiscite for the modifications it had since undergone. On March 21 the keeper of the seals was commissioned to prepare a *Senatus consultum*, confirming the amended constitution. On April 20 it was ready. "Changes in the constitution," it said in its most important provisions, "can be effected only through the people on the motion of the emperor. The emperor is responsible to the people, to whom he is entitled at all times to appeal. He commands the forces on land and water; declares war; concludes treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce; nominates to all offices; and authorizes the dispositions necessary for the carrying out of the laws." On May 8 the French people were summoned to their comitia to vote on the following plébiscite: "The people sanction the liberal reforms which have been effected by the emperor in co-operation with the great corporate state-bodies since 1860, and confirm the *Senatus consultum* of



April 20, 1870." The 'Ayes' numbered 7,350,142; the 'Noes,' 1,538,825.

In all the greater cities — Strasburg excepted — the 'Noes' were in the majority; even the army gave 40,000 negatives. Yet the assenting majority was so great that it gave the emperor and personal rule a feeling of strength and confidence. "Prussia had its triumph at Sadowa," boasted Ollivier (Fig. 66) on June 30: "the empire has had its in the plébiscite. Henceforth the world acknowl-



FIG. 66. — Émile Ollivier. From the engraving by A. Weger. Original, a photograph.

edges the supremacy of France." Armed with the plébiscite and with Niel's army-law, Napoleon held himself fully equipped to extort from the intractable Prussians by force what they had hitherto denied to his blandishments. The empress and her clerical coterie — which preached a federation of the Catholic Latin races against the Protestant Teutonic peoples — were on fire with eagerness for the conflict. The recall of the Duke of Gramont, ambassador in Vienna, to assume the guidance of the foreign office, was the first step towards



converting into fact what had been hitherto only the object of the most secret schemes.

It was long since the world had wrapped itself so confidently in the dream of peace as it did now. So fully did this seem assured that Virchow (Fig. 67), on October 21, 1869, made a motion in the Prussian lower house, in the name of the 'Party of Progress,' for reducing the military expenses of the North German Confederation, and bringing about a general disarmament through diplomatic negotiations. Neither he nor Deputy Lasker, who urged the immediate accession of Baden to the Confederation, had any suspicion of



FIG. 67. — Rudolf Virchow. From the copper plate engraving by H. Roemer, 1883.

what was going on behind the scenes on the historical stage. This was nothing less than a Franco-Austro-Italian conspiracy — guided from Paris — for a common war against Prussia and the North German Confederation.

Since the meeting of Napoleon and Francis Joseph at Salzburg, in August, 1867, a constant interchange of letters went on between them down to 1869, the result being a mutual and profoundly secret pledge of alliance. Concurrently with this there went on — with the knowledge of the Vienna cabinet — a correspondence between Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel, who felt himself bound to

the author of Italian unity. Begun in 1868, it went on till June, 1869, Menabrea (Fig. 68), president of the Italian cabinet, being his king's sole confidant. The Roman question proved for a long time an obstacle to an understanding. However, not to lose entirely the fruit of so much pains, the three sovereigns continued their interchange of letters, these embodying, if not a formal treaty, at least promises of mutual help in the war supposed to be impending. In February, 1870, the Archduke Albert, the victor of Custoza, appeared in Paris to concert a common plan of campaign. The discovery of a *casus belli* was left to Napoleon, — Beust conditioning only that this should not be found in a German question. for this would throw the whole country into the arms of Bismarck. Napoleon, on the other hand, believed, like all Frenchmen, that all south Germany yearned to be set free from subjection to Prussia.

Beust suggested as a pretext some Eastern question. The Tuileries, instead, began to feel its way towards proposing a general disarmament, thinking in this way to find a specious pretext for war with Prussia. Leboeuf, Niel's successor as minister of war, proposed a reduction of 10,000 men in the annual levy. But the scene was suddenly changed; and, instead of the disarmament question, quite another — that of the candidature for the Spanish throne — came to the foreground.

The Spanish throne had been vacant since October 3, 1868. The selfish and short-sighted policy of the *Moderados* (reactionaries) in marrying the youthful queen, Isabella, to her impotent kinsman, Don Francisco, secured, indeed, its immediate object of keeping their party in power, but in its later consequences worked their own ruin as well as that of the queen. An insane attempt on the queen's life, February 2, 1852, by a priest named Merino, gave occasion to the last outburst of Spain's traditional loyalty for its sovereigns, but, at the same time, to the adoption of measures of Draconic severity, which, in conjunction with the licentiousness prevailing in the royal household and the maladministration of the *Moderados*, fostered the spread of anti-dynastic tendencies. On June 30, 1854, the Progressist revolution, with General O'Donnell as its leader, reared its head victoriously at Vicalvaro, a village near Madrid. The queen-mother, Maria Christina, the mainstay of the absolutists, had to take refuge in Portugal. The constituent Cortes were summoned, professedly for the purpose of instituting a genuinely liberal government, in reality very much more with a view to



FIG. 68. — General Menabrea. From a photograph.

the gratification of personal ambition, which lay too much at the root of the whole movement. After O'Donnell succeeded in ejecting Espartero from the presidency of the ministry, he dismissed the members of the Cortes to their homes, any resistance being overpowered by force. Espartero retired definitively into private life. For a short time O'Donnell had to make way for Marshal Narvaez; but on regaining possession of the helm, June 30, 1858, he sought — though with but indifferent success — to confirm his position by raids into the domain of foreign politics. A perfectly purposeless campaign was undertaken in Cochin-China on the futile pretext of avenging the maltreatment of Spanish missionaries there. A second war against Morocco resulted, indeed, in victory; but the peace, prematurely concluded in face of a new Carlist rising, bore no proportion to the sacrifices made by Spain or to the high-wrought expectations of its people. The fruitless attempt to reduce San Domingo, the resultless participation in the Mexican expedition, the inglorious war against Chile and Peru, — dragging its slow length down to 1869, — all combined to show how hopeless it was for Spain, in her age of internal weakness, to attempt to emulate the glories of her great days. At home these repeated disillusiones served to sever the last weak ties that bound the *Progressistas* to the throne. Largely re-enforced in numbers, and under the leading of Sagasta, Olozaga, and Prim (Fig. 69) they announced themselves as the party of the revolution. By their side the democrats began to take shape as a separate party. For years pronunciamientos abounded, which became more menacing with every new issue. Prim was the hero of the revolutionists; but he, after repeated defeats, had in February, 1866, to take refuge in Portugal. Thence he sent out invitations to the heads of the opposition to meet for consultation, on August 16, at Ostend, and here an alliance between the *Progressistas* and democrats was sealed by the resolution to set a new revolution on foot. A rising initiated in August, 1867, proved, indeed, a failure; but a conviction began to grow, even among the *Moderados*, especially after Narvaez's death on April 23, 1868, that the queen, now the tool of the lowest creatures, should no longer be permitted to occupy the throne. The Unionists — that is, those who advocated an Iberian union under the house of Braganza — held out their hand to the *Progressistas*; others made advances to the duke of Montpensier, the husband of the queen's sister, the Infanta Louisa, who declared himself ready and willing to come to the help of his



sister-in-law with both person and means. Ultimately, as the parties could not agree among themselves, it was resolved to dethrone Isabella, and leave all beyond this to be determined by the nation.



FIG. 69. — General Prim. From a photograph.

Instructed of these plots, Gonzalez Bravo, Narvaez's successor, caused a number of the suspected generals to be arrested and deported to the Canary Isles, and at the same time warned Montpensier to leave the country. He further secured Napoleon's good-will by offering to send Spanish troops to protect the pope, in case the French should have to be recalled from Rome. It was even purposed

that the emperor's friendship should be still further confirmed by a personal meeting with Isabella, when the fleet under Admiral Topete in the harbor of Cadiz gave the signal for a rising. Prim re-appeared, according to concert the banished generals landed on September 19, Seville rose, and on the 28th Serrano defeated at Alcolea, on the Guadalquivir, the royalists, who went over in a body to the victors. The movement spread; the revolution was proclaimed in Madrid; on October 3 Serrano entered the capital amid the acclamations of the people, and instituted a provisional government. The throne of the Bourbons—rotten through internal corruption—collapsed. The queen fled to France, where she abdicated in favor of her son, Alfonso. Unionists and Progressistas shared the ministerial portfolios among them. But while all was jubilant exultation in Madrid, the republican propaganda raised its head in Catalonia; and the eloquence of Castelar and Fernando Garrido spread its doctrines through the provinces, till republican clubs were formed in the greatest and richest cities of the land. Of the forty-nine provinces of Spain, republican deputies to the Constituent Cortes were sent up from twenty-five. Still, among the three main parties, the ascendancy remained with the Progressistas. The article which declared monarchy the form of government in Spain was accepted by the Cortes by 214 voices against 71. On June 6, 1869, there followed the formal promulgation of the new constitution. By the nomination of Serrano to the provisional regency, Prim—once more premier and war-minister—saw his plan for honorably retiring the victor of Alcolea from active politics successful. Republican risings in several places were suppressed by force.

But there was still wanting a candidate for the throne who would be acceptable to all the three parties. Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, the hero of Königgrätz, was thought of; but his creed constituted an insurmountable obstacle. Then came into consideration successively the young duke of Genoa, King Ferdinand of Portugal, and the duke of Aosta—all without result. All the more eagerly did Montpensier now put forward his claim; but after killing his old personal enemy, the Infant Henry of Bourbon, in a duel, March 13, 1870, he was sentenced by a court-martial to banishment fifty miles from Madrid. The Cortes could think of nothing better than to endow Prim with absolute plenipotentiary power to deal with the question of the candidacy.

Already, in February, 1869, the deputy Salazar y Mazaredo had

drawn Prim's attention to Prince Leopold (Fig. 70) of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the elder brother of Prince Charles of Rumania, who, besides his personal qualifications, had the additional one of being husband of the king of Portugal's sister. Salazar betook himself in person to Sigmaringen to make offer of the crown to the prince; but he, after carefully informing himself in regard to the distracted state of the country, absolutely declined.




FIG. 70. — Leopold, Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. From the engraving by A. Weger. Original, a photograph.

In no way disconcerted with this disappointment, Prim, next summer, again knocked at the door in Sigmaringen, and this time with better success. After some hesitation, the prince promised to accept if he was the choice of the Cortes, and on June 28 received from King William, as head of the family, the assurance that he would not oppose his wish. In Madrid the prince's name was on every lip; although Prim, in his report on the situation to the Cortes, had not once mentioned it. All the more must Prim have been surprised when, on July 2, the French ambassador, Mercier, while



utterly disavowing any official instructions, and professing to express only his own individual opinion, told him that in the choice of a Prussian prince — so already had French diplomacy begun to designate Prince Leopold, although, in point of fact, he stood nearer to the Bonapartes than to the royal house of Prussia<sup>1</sup> — the public sentiment of France would recognize a defiance, and that this sentiment Napoleon could not suffer to be outraged. With justifiable feeling Prim replied that, in that case, he had better name a candidate himself; for, in his view, Hohenzollern excluded, there remained only the alternatives of Montpensier or the republic. This challenge Mercier evaded on the plea of waiting the official answer from Paris. This answer, which might have resolved the whole difficulty, did not come; and at length the ministerial council, weary of waiting, came to the conclusion to recommend the hereditary prince to the Cortes which was summoned to meet on the 20th. Till then it was agreed to keep his name secret.

The suspicion that Mercier's procedure had been strictly prescribed from Paris was converted into almost a certainty by the further action of the French government. Instead of stating its objections in Madrid, the only appropriate place, it, contrary to all diplomatic usage, addressed itself to Berlin, the Hohenzollern candidature having been meanwhile heralded through the press to all Europe. In a telegram to le Sourd, the French *chargé d'affaires* in Berlin, the duke of Gramont spoke in a tone of unconcealed menace of the bad impression made by the news of this intrigue, with which it was to be hoped the Prussian cabinet had had nothing to do. On July 4 Secretary von Thile gave le Sourd the thoroughly correct answer that, for the Prussian cabinet, the Spanish question had really no existence, but that the cabinet's impression was that the Spaniards possessed the right of offering their crown to whom they chose, and that acceptance or declinature lay wholly with him to whom the tender was made. On the very same day Gramont received an identical answer from the Prussian ambassador, von Werther; but this minister had the weakness of promising to instruct the king, whom he was about to see at Ems, in regard to the feeling prevailing in Paris, and to communicate his answer by telegraph.

But in Paris the answer was not waited for. A fevered excite-

<sup>1</sup> Prince Leopold's father was son of the French princess, Marie Antoinette, a niece of Murat, king of Naples. His mother was the Princess Josephine, a daughter of the Princess Stephanie, sister of Hortense de Beauharnais. — Tr.



ment seemed to pulse in every vein, and to affect the judgment of almost every one. On the 5th the deputy Cochery submitted an interpellation in the chamber regarding the candidature. In the evening the ministerial council met to consult upon their answer; and one was agreed on which, while barring the choice of the prince, seemed to dispose of the matter in a peaceful way. But at a second sitting next morning the emperor, to the surprise of the ministers uninitiated, assumed — probably through the influence of his wife over night — quite a different tone. A sharper resolution, aimed directly against Prussia, was adopted; and this Gramont read, on the afternoon of the 6th, in the chamber. “We will,” it said, “avoid every interference in the domestic concerns of the Spanish people; but we do not believe that respect for the rights of a neighboring nation obliges us to bear patiently that a foreign power, by placing one of its princes on the throne of Charles V., should disturb, to our prejudice, the existing balance of power in Europe, and imperil the interests and honor of France. This eventuality will not, we firmly hope, occur. We calculate on the wisdom of the German people; and on the friendship of Spain. But should it be otherwise, we, strong in your support and that of the nation, will know how to do our duty without weakness or hesitancy.”

This declaration was received by the chamber with a storm of applause. Only two voices on the Left were raised in opposition to the virtual declaration of war. When the deputy Picard demanded the submission of documents, Granier de Cassagnac called out, “Documents are uncalled for when the dignity and security of France are at stake.” From the chamber the frenzy spread to the public. The press joined in the war-chorus. The Spanish candidature fell quite into the background, and men saw only the Caudine Forks where Prussia should pass under the yoke. The only fear was that she might extricate herself from the strait into which she was driven. Girardin, in *La Liberté* exclaimed: “Will Prussia, through dread of imperilling Bismarck’s work, not agree to fight? Good! Then we must, with the butts of our muskets at her back, drive her across the Rhine, and compel her to give up the left bank.” Yet, anxious to evade the charge of being a peace-breaker, Gramont besought the English Granville-Gladstone cabinet to work in favor of peace in Berlin and Madrid. On July 8, on the other hand, he declared to Lord Lyons, the English ambassador, that Prussia’s silence made it impossible to his government longer to delay military

preparations, indicating, at the same time, the prince's voluntary renunciation as the best resolution of the difficulty, and begging the English government to use its whole influence to secure this. On the evening of July 7 Benedetti, then at Wildbad, received a telegram from Gramont (Fig. 71), directing him to proceed at once to the king at Ems, and require him to advise the prince to recall his acceptance.



FIG. 71.—The Duke of Gramont. From the engraving by A. Weger. Original, a photograph.

The provisional government in Madrid was not a little disconcerted by the disturbance to which Prince Leopold's candidature had given rise. The foreign minister, Sagasta, hastened to rectify, in a circular, Gramont's imputation that some foreign power had influenced the choice. Salazar, who had conducted the negotiations with the prince, publicly affirmed that the king of Prussia had in no way interfered in the matter. On the evening of July 8 Gramont received from Madrid the intimation that Prim was ready to facilitate the withdrawal of the prince. This effected, the *casus belli* dis-

appeared. But Gramont telegraphed to Benedetti: "The candidature is Prussian; and, since the king set it afoot, to him alone you must address yourself." He expressly forbade him to speak with the prince, who, indeed, was not in Ems. As the ambassador was quite sensible of the delicacy of the situation, he was careful to assume a tone at once temperate and respectful, sedulously guarding himself against speaking of orders to be given to the candidate. The king did not conceal from him that in Gramont's declaration in the chamber, he saw a challenge, but yet was at pains to explain that the Prussian government had had nothing whatever to do with the matter. He himself had spoken for the first time on the subject when Leopold asked his consent, and then he had simply said that he believed nothing could be said against his intention. Even yet he could not withdraw from this attitude; but if his kinsmen — both father and son — were disposed to withdraw their assent, he would do nothing but approve their decision. In accordance with this, von Werther, who returned to his post in Paris on the evening of the 11th, was commissioned to assure the emperor of the king's peaceful disposition, but warned against suggesting any step that might compromise his sovereign's dignity. Until the arrival of an answer from Sigmaringen, King William declined to say more.

But this did not by any means satisfy the fiery duke of Gramont, who was beside himself with impatience in Paris. One telegram chased another to Benedetti, all to the same effect: "We can wait no longer." On the 11th the ambassador had a second audience of his majesty, but got only a repetition of the first answer. "I am well-advised," added the king significantly, "of the preparations going on in Paris, and use my own precautions against being taken by surprise." Meanwhile the French chambers became ever more impatient over the silence preserved by the government. On July 12 Clément Duvernois, a discarded favorite of the emperor, proposed an interpellation, demanding what guaranties the government had conditioned for to guard against fresh complications with Prussia. This question suggested to the ministers a new motive for action, — viz., the fear of losing their portfolios; for it imported neither more nor less than a declaration of war by the Right against the administration. Gramont asked to be allowed a delay till the 15th before giving his answer. But two and a half hours later Ollivier appeared, beaming with joy, in the chamber, and made the announcement that, according to advice from Madrid, Prince Anton of



Hohenzollern had intimated to General Prim that his son, in order to relieve the Spanish nation from embarrassment, had renounced his candidacy.

This gave French diplomacy occasion to boast of a success, which it was easy to represent as a victory wrung from Prussia. France had frustrated what it set itself to frustrate. But the Bonapartists received the news with a shout of indignation against the miserable cowards of ministers, that allowed themselves to be satisfied with such a concession. War was what they desired, and they were beside themselves with rage to see their well-contrived scheme disappoint them through the king of Prussia's wise moderation. A stronger trump must be played. While the subject was under debate in the chamber, Gramont received a call from the newly returned Prussian ambassador; and their interview had scarce begun when it was interrupted by the incoming of the Spanish ambassador, Olozaga, bringing with him Prince Anton's telegram. He, too, offered his congratulations on the adjustment of the difficulty. But, on the instant, Gramont declared that this renunciation was insufficient to allay the excitement in the country. French sentiment must be propitiated, and, for this end, the king of Prussia must address an excusatory or apologetic letter to the emperor, the duke himself thereupon making out a draught of it. Ollivier, still deeply exercised about his portfolio, came in later, and went into ecstasies over Gramont's scheme. If von Werther felt himself precluded from personally suggesting the idea of the letter, then it would be necessary to instruct Benedetti to do so. Strangely enough, the former did not think it inconsistent with the honor due his sovereign to comply with the implied request. But already the duke had sent off this telegram to Benedetti: "Use all your tact — I might say craft — to arrange it that the prince of Hohenzollern's renunciation is announced, communicated, or given in through the king of Prussia or his government. This is, for us, of the highest importance. The king's concurrence must, at any price, be avowed by himself or be deducible, in some tangible way, from the circumstances." If there had remained the least doubt of the emperor's determination to compel the king to war, or to submit to the deepest humiliation, this would have been dissipated by the next telegram demanding that he should give his assurance that he would never allow the candidature to be renewed under any circumstances. "Go at once to the king," it concluded, "and demand such an assurance from him, which he



cannot hesitate to grant unless he has some secret scheme in the background."

Before Benedetti had got so far as to arrange for a new audience, he met the king, on the morning of July 13, on the springs promenade. This time, also, the king limited himself to saying that as yet he knew nothing further regarding the prince's determination, but as soon as the hourly-expected courier arrived from Sigmaringen, he would cause him to be called. The assurance required, he, notwithstanding Benedetti's repeatedly urged representations, declined to give. At midday the official communication from Prince Anton reached the king, but at the same time came von Werther's report of his conversation with the duke of Gramont. This report thoroughly opened King William's eyes to the object of the French government, and determined him, instead of again summoning Benedetti, to send his aide-de-camp to him with the message that in the official renunciation he saw an end of the whole matter. Although Benedetti, in consequence of a new despatch from Gramont, applied twice during the day for another audience, this was both times, though in the most courteous terms, denied him. In the following night Gramont anew notified the ambassador: "We cannot recognize the renunciation communicated by the Spanish ambassador as satisfying the just demands we have made on the king of Prussia, and still less can we see in it a guaranty for the future. To be secure that the son shall not disavow his father's renunciation, it is indispensable that the king shall say to us that he will not permit the prince to withdraw from it." Benedetti again, therefore, sued for an audience; and this was granted him in the royal waiting-room of the railway depot, where the king awaited the train to carry him to Coblenz. "I saw the king," he reported to Paris, "at the railroad station, who merely said he had nothing more to communicate to me, and that any further communications must come to him through his minister." In reference to these transactions at Ems, Count Bismarek had the following telegram sent to the newspapers: "After the intelligence of the hereditary prince of Hohenzollern's renunciation was made known officially by Spain to the imperial government of France, the French ambassador demanded from his majesty, the king, at Ems, that he should authorize him to telegraph to Paris that his majesty pledged himself, for all time coming, never again to give his consent in the event of the Hohenzollerns' reverting to their candidature. Upon this his majesty declined again to receive the French ambassador,

and sent his aide-de-camp in attendance to tell him that he had nothing further to communicate to him." Von Werther received his dismissal for his acceptance of Gramont's by no means honorable commission.

The French ministerial council met on the 14th, and Gramont had a hard fight to maintain against those of his colleagues who were disinclined to be allured to the war-path. The result seemed favorable to peace. Even the emperor uttered himself in this sense to the representatives of Austria and Italy. "We have let slip a fine opportunity," he said; "but perhaps peace is of more worth." But the passions excited by the government swelled on the streets of the capital into an increasingly violent ferment. A second council, in the afternoon, resolved on mobilization. A third, held at midnight, took the final resolve for war. For want of a better pretext it fell back on Benedetti's treatment at Ems and Bismarck's telegram.

And this was the sense of the declaration which Gramont in the senate and Ollivier in the lower house read as an answer to the interpellations proposed. The senate received it with storms of applause, but in the legislative body it did not pass without keen criticism. Gambetta insisted on the production of the despatch according to which King William had denied his door to the ambassador of France. Ollivier had for answer only a repetition of his tale of insult, garnished with the lie, that in the night of the 14th Prussia had begun her military preparations. Benedetti, on his arrival, was astonished to learn that he, and France in his person, had been insulted in Ems. Of special despatches Ollivier confessed he had none, but he had, instead, diplomatic reports from two representatives of France, whom he could not name. In reality, these referred only to the painful impression that the newspaper telegram had made in Munich and Bern. But most resolutely of all did Thiers take up his position against the insane procedure of the government. If there was any Frenchman who thirsted for revenge for Sadowa — he said — he was the man; but he found the pretext so badly chosen, that he recognized that France, in adopting it, was placing herself in the wrong in the eyes of all Europe. He, too, demanded production of the despatches on which the decision for war was based. A motion to this effect by Jules Favre was rejected by 159 votes against 94; and Ollivier persisted in his asseveration that if ever a war was justified and necessary, it was this to which Prussia had compelled France. "With this day," he concluded, "there begins

a heavy responsibility for me and my colleagues; we take it upon us with light hearts!" With like light-heartedness did the committee appointed to report on the war supplies, the credits for the army and fleet, the framing of laws for calling out the *garde mobile*, and for the enlistment of volunteers, perform its task. It acted as those do who wish to be deceived. To its question, "Are we ready?" Leboeuf, the war minister, answered, "To the last gaiter-button, and we have eight days' start of the enemy." When Gramont was asked whether he had allies, he replied: "If I have kept the committee waiting, it was because I had the Austrian and Italian ambassadors with me; I hope the committee will ask me nothing further." When Gambetta, on the resumption of the sitting, energetically pressed for the production of the insulting despatch which Bismarck had sent to all the cabinets of Europe, and Gramont answered that it had been communicated to the committee, his assertion was corroborated by its members, although such a note never had existence. In the following night-sitting, the house approved the government's demands, only sixteen votes being recorded in opposition. On the 19th it sanctioned an issue of treasury bonds for 500,000,000 francs. Next day Ollivier issued the declaration of war against Prussia. The senate and legislative body proceeded in company to the Tuileries, in order, before separating, to offer their tribute of homage to the emperor.

The people went into ecstasies. Woe to the traitor who ventured to doubt that the left bank of the Rhine, at least, would be the reward of victory. Men tore the newspapers from each other's hands, and crowds traversed the boulevards singing the Marseillaise and shouting, "To Berlin! To Berlin!"

While Napoleon plunged headlong into war, he had good grounds at least for relying on the active co-operation of his secret allies, Austria and Italy. In a despatch of the 20th to Prince Metternich (Fig. 72), Austrian ambassador at Paris, Beust said: "Repeat to the emperor, that we, true to our obligations, regard the cause of France as our own, and will contribute to the success of her army to the bounds of our ability. These bounds, however, are restricted on the one hand by our internal difficulties, on the other by political considerations of the greatest weight. We have reason to know that Russian intervention must, under certain conditions, be regarded not as a probability, but as a certainty. Our appearance in the field would involve that of Russia. To keep this power neutral till the advanced season of the year will not allow



FIG. 72. — Prince Metternich. From a photograph.

her to think of mobilization, and to avoid everything that could give her a pretext for interference—these must be the aims of our policy. Russia's neutrality hangs on ours. Let me, moreover, repeat what I emphasized in our last year's conversation. Our ten millions of German subjects see in this war, not a duel between



France and Prussia, but the beginning of a national conflict; and, further, the Hungarians would be slow and reluctant to spend their blood and treasure to recover for Austria her place in Germany. In the circumstances neutrality is, by an imperative necessity, imposed upon us." The despatch goes on to explain that this neutrality was but a means — the only means — for enabling Austria to equip herself for war without exposing herself unprepared to an attack from Prussia or Russia, and that he had been in correspondence with Italy with a view to conjunct intervention, but that the necessary preliminary to this was the immediate settlement of the Roman question. "The treaty of September, 1864, is no longer adequate for the situation. We cannot leave the Holy Father to the unreliable protection of his own troops. The day on which the French leave the States of the Church, the Italian army must enter them. Never shall we have the Italians cordially with us till the Roman thorn is drawn; and is it not better to know that the Holy Father is under the safeguard of Italy than to give him over a prey to the guerillas of Garibaldi? By doing as I suggest France will deprive its enemy of one weapon, and build up a wall against the flood of Teutonism which Prussia, a preponderating Protestant power, has known how to set afloat in Germany, and which we doubly fear on account of its contagiousness."

A communication to the same effect came to Napoleon from Victor Emmanuel. However divided views might be in Florence in regard to other points, they were at one on this — that the opportunity must be used for getting rid of the French army of occupation, and of the treaty of 1864, and that for the attainment of this end the Austrian proposition held out the best prospect. A correspondence was opened between Florence and Vienna, in which the terms were agreed upon on which the two powers should pass the state of armed neutrality into that of offensive alliance. By September 15 both were to have completed their preparations, and begin to take part in the war, with this proviso, however, that the French should by that time have made a successful inroad into South Germany. In respect to Rome, Austria promised to gain for her new ally better terms than those of the treaty of 1864. On August 3 Count Vimercati arrived at headquarters in Metz to explain to the emperor the conditions of this compact. Two points the latter found to take exception to: The late date at which the allies were to enter the field, and that concerning Rome. Vimercati hurried back to Flor-

ence, where he found Count Vitzthum, Austrian ambassador in Brussels; and here the final conditions were settled. The date for intervention was to remain unchanged; the article regarding Rome was allowed to drop.

All, therefore, that was now lacking was the French invasion of South Germany. Of what sort this was to be was to be inferred from Gramont's threat to the representative of Baden in Paris. The grand duchy was to be converted into a wilderness, as the Palatinate had been in the days of Louis XIV., not even the women being spared, on the charge — shown from Carlsruhe to be groundless — that its soldiers used explosive bullets.

But this invasion did not materialize. With three mighty strokes the German sword hewed an impassable gap between France and the borders of the Fatherland, and turned the grand design into a fiasco.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870-1871.

THROUGHOUT all the negotiations at Ems, King William had manifested a spirit of moderation and conciliation that his people began to think bordered on submissiveness. In any real danger of war they had for long refused to believe, because the questions at issue seemed too trifling for this. Not till the Ems telegram<sup>1</sup> made France's wanton breach of the peace patent to every one was their long-enduring patience exchanged for an outburst of indignation. The king on his journey homeward was everywhere greeted with indescribable enthusiasm. The crown-prince, Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon met him at Brandenburg in order to discuss the situation on the way. Even yet the king hesitated to speak the word "Mobilization." Not till, on his arrival in Berlin, he received the telegram of Ollivier's war speech, did he make up his mind to pronounce it. An immense multitude accompanied him to his residence, hurrahing and singing without cessation, till a message came out asking quiet for the sake of the council about to be held. In the course of the night this body adopted two momentous resolutions — mobilization and the convocation for the 19th of the North German parliament. A circular of Bismarck of the 18th to the representatives of the Confederation put the matter in its true light: "As the motives actuating the emperor we can, alas! recognize only the worst and meanest instincts of hatred and jealousy of Germany's independence and prosperity, combined with the desire of repressing liberty in his own land by involving it in a foreign war."

Next day the Reichstag was opened. In the course of his address from the throne King William said: "If in former centuries Germany bore infractions of her rights and insults to her honor, she bore them only because in her disintegration she was unconscious of her

<sup>1</sup> This telegram from Ems, the terms of which as published conveyed the impression of an actual insult by King William to Benedetti, is very generally believed to have been edited by Bismarck with the express intention of inflaming the public sentiment of France to such a point as would make war inevitable. — Ed.

strength. To-day, when the bond of legal and moral union has been forged in her wars for freedom — to-day, when Germany's armor no longer offers the foe an unguarded spot — she bears in herself both the will and the power to repel this renewal of French violence." An hour after reading this, he received the declaration of war given in by the French *chargé d'affaires*, le Sourd, and devoted the rest of the day to reviving the Order of the Iron Cross. The Reichstag received with loud applause Bismarck's announcement that Prussia had accepted France's challenge, and, on the 20th, unanimously voted 120,000,000 thalers (\$90,000,000) for war expenses.

Since a German people had existed, never had it been taken possession of by a feeling of nationality so general and so powerful as now. The fire of patriotism glowed in every breast; party spirit was mute; the 'Party of Progress' formally renounced opposition. As by a charm every heart was stirred by the notes of Schneckenburger's song, composed thirty years before, *Die Wacht am Rhein*; it became the battle-song and lay of victory for all the German peoples. The spirit of the War of Liberation was again alive, but not now in one part of the nation only, but in all. The South remained not one whit behind the North. Foremost of all came Louis II., the young king of Bavaria, with the announcement on the 19th that he had ordered the mobilization of his army, in order to place it under the command of King William. Only the Ultramontane majority in the chamber — the 'Patriots' — were out of line, and referred the government's claim for 27,000,000 florins (\$10,800,000) to a committee of their own number, which recommended a grant of only five to seven millions for the maintenance of an armed neutrality. But when the minister Bray reminded the chamber that the right of deciding on peace and war vested in the king alone, and von Prankh (Fig. 73), the minister of war, declared that Bavaria's claim to independence rested on its fulfilling its obligations, a part of the majority gave way, and a grant of 18,000,000 florins was voted by 101 to 47. Nor did the democratic Great-German chamber of Stuttgart venture to interpose any obstacles, though the minister, Varnbühler — with Bismarck's connivance — asked for a few days' respite before giving a conclusive answer to the French envoy, with the view that France's doubt in regard to Würtemberg's attitude might operate to delay her preparations. On the 22d the bridge of Kehl was blown up on the Baden side.



If Europe had still any doubt as to who was the disturber of the peace, this would have been set at rest by the publication in the "London Times" of July 27 of the proposed treaty of August 20, 1866, a draught of which Benedetti so unguardedly left in Bismarck's hands. Gramont's and Ollivier's denial of its genuineness the chancellor disposed of by exhibiting a photographic copy of the original to the diplomatic corps, as well as other documents which went to show that for eight years Germany had labored for the maintenance of the peace of the world, which had been all the time threatened by France. This made the deepest impression on Eng-



FIG. 73. — Von Prankh, Bavarian Minister of War. (From a photograph.)

lish public opinion, which was emphatically expressed against the peace-breaker. English statesmen, however, were unfortunate in their dealings with the embroglio. When Lord Granville made offer in Berlin of England's good offices as mediator, Bismarck referred him to Paris, where a similar proffer had been already declined. Now that Napoleon's views on Belgium had become palpably evident, Granville proposed to the combatants to enter into an agreement pledging both to resist, in conjunction with England, any attack made by either on the integrity of that country. Before the signing of the compact (August 9 and 11) the course of events had

made it objectless. Of much greater value to Germany than England's equivocal benevolence was the firm friendship of Russia, which, by the announcement of its neutrality, held not only Austria in check, but Denmark as well, for whose alliance Napoleon was sedulously suing.

The prompt and unconditional accession of South Germany to the Northern Confederation was only the first of a long series of disillusionments that awaited France. The second came when its army began its march to the frontiers. It had entered on the Crimean war, as well as the Italian campaign, without preparation, and in both had been favored by fortune. The consequence was a conviction that for a French army preparation was not necessary to insure success. The plan was to place two armies on foot, — the one of 150,000 at Metz, the other of 100,000 at Strasburg, both to cross the Rhine at Maxau, and, by their invasion of South Germany, give the signal to the two secret allies. A reserve of 50,000 men was to concentrate at Châlons. The fleet should support the operations of the land army by throwing, upon the accession of Denmark and Hanover, 30,000 men on the north coast of Germany. The consequence of placing the troops on the borders without mobilization was confusion beyond comprehension. Nothing was to be found where it ought to have been. Soldiers and companies wandered around without being able to find the corps to which they belonged; generals sought their brigades; regiments, their generals; throughout the whole army there was a lack of the most indispensable necessities; the commissariat broke down completely. On July 28 Napoleon, after making over the regency to the empress, left St.-Cloud with the prince imperial for Metz, to take the command-in-chief of the 'Army of the Rhine.' What met his eyes on his arrival was simply indescribable confusion. Instead of 385,000, there were only 220,000 men actually in the field. The right wing at Strasburg under MacMahon, instead of 107,000, numbered only 40,000. Of any passage of the Rhine there could, in such circumstances, no longer be any thought; and therewith disappeared the condition on which Austria's and Italy's co-operation depended.

A very different picture presented itself on the German side. Here the mobilization had been effected, and all dispositions made, with machine-like regularity and exactitude. On the 25th began the transport of troops to the west — so exactly ordered that not a single disarrangement caused delay. Already, in 1869, Moltke had pre-

determined the whole plan of movement for the eventuality of a French attack. The knowledge that the German army would be sooner fit for action than the enemy decided him to push it forward close to the frontier. A daring reconnoissance (July 25-27) by the Baden lieutenant, Count Zeppelin, with four officers and eight dragoons, through the circle of Weissenburg, as well as that of Major von Egloffstein towards Bitsch, gave the important information that, in these districts, there was no hostile force to be found. It was therefore possible, by a strong offensive, to transfer the scene of war to the enemy's country. For this end the whole German force was concentrated in the Rhine Palatinate. Here it not only stood on the enemy's inner line of operations, while his two army groups — separated by the Vosges, and without cross-railroad facilities — could only touch each other by marching, but its position constituted the most effective defence for South Germany, left apparently destitute of protection. Its princes, instructed in Moltke's plan, had no hesitation in denuding their lands of troops to lead these to join the hosts of North Germany. Punctual to the hour appointed every corps took its position at the spot designed for it.

The huge German host was divided into three armies. Its right wing, resting on the Saar, was constituted by the first army under General Steinmetz, 60,000 strong, composed of the seventh, Westphalian corps (von Zastrow), and the eighth, Rhenish (von Göben). The centre, stretching from Saarlouis to near Saargemund, was held by the second army, 131,000 strong, under Prince Frederick Charles. To it belonged the Guards under Prince Augustus (Fig. 74) of Würtemberg; the third corps, Brandenburg (von Alvensleben II.); the tenth, Hanoverian (von Voigts-Rhetz), and the fourth, Thuringian (von Alvensleben I.). Adding the reserve standing before Mayence, — the half of the ninth (Schleswig-Holstein) corps, the Hessian division, and the Saxon (twelfth) corps under their crown-prince, Albert, — the strength of this army amounted to 194,000 men. The third army, constituting the left wing, stood on both banks of the Rhine from Landau to Rastatt, and consisted of the fifth and eleventh Prussian army corps (Posen and Hesse-Nassau), under von Kirchbach and von Bose, as well as the South Germans, — namely, the two Bavarian corps under von der Tann and von Hartmann, and the Würtemberg and Baden divisions united to form the corps of von Werder, in all 130,000 men, under the Crown Prince Frederick William, whose chivalric spirit and cordiality of disposition quite won the southern



hearts. The total strength at the scene of war was 384,000. The first corps (von Manteuffel), the second (von Fransecky), and the sixth (von Tümping) were left behind provisionally to keep eye upon the ambiguous attitude of Austria. For the duration of the war the whole territory of the North German Confederation was put under five governors-general, of whom General Vogel von Falkenstein watched the North Sea and Baltic coast, with 90,000 men (Schleswig-Holsteiners and landwehr), under the grand duke Frederick Francis of Mecklenburg, at his disposal. The spirit of the



FIG. 74. — Prince Augustus of Württemberg. From a photograph.

army, like that of the whole people, was admirable. Every man knew that he had a severe struggle before him, and even made up his mind for some early defeats; but no one lost confidence in ultimate victory. By August 3 the three armies had reached their stations; the day before, King William, accompanied by Moltke, entered Mayence to take the command-in-chief over all the German forces.

On the French side the first army corps (Marshal MacMahon, Fig. 75), fully 41,000 strong, stood in the department of the Lower Rhine; the second (General Frossard), 26,000, at St-Ayold and





FIG. 7b. — Marshal MacMahon. From a photograph.

Forbach; the third (Marshal Bazaine), 39,000, between Courcelles and Boulay; the fourth (General Ladmirault), 29,000, at Boulay; the fifth (General Faily), 25,000, at Saargemund; the Imperial Guard (General Bourbaki), 30,000, at Metz; the seventh corps (Felix Douay), 20,341, was in process of organization at Belfort; the sixth corps, under Marshal Canrobert, was gathered into the camp at Châlons; but the *gardes mobiles* who had been sent him from Paris were of such quality that he urgently begged their recall. Further reserves there were none. Marshal Leboeuf (Fig. 76) acted as chief of the general staff. The renunciation of the original plan of campaign just when it should have been opening tended greatly to increase the disorder. All minds having been filled with the idea of entering South Germany, the possibility of having to defend their own land suggested itself to no one. No officer possessed a map of the frontier departments. In regard to the position of the German army no one knew anything; for here, as all through the war, the French cavalry performed the duty of reconnoitring most imperfectly. Day after day was passed in almost criminal inaction. The position of the corps showed that the plan of crossing the Rhine had been exchanged for that of an advance over the Saar; and, with this view, the corps of Frossard, Faily, and Ladmirault were instructed to place themselves under Bazaine, and be ready to march on the 21st. This, owing to their defective equipment, the generals declared to be impossible. But the impatience of the Parisians must be satisfied; and General Frossard received orders to make a reconnoissance, on August 2, as far as Saarbrücken. Here there had lain for fourteen days a weak advance guard, consisting of a Hohenzollern battalion and four squadrons of Rhenish Uhlans, with four guns, not more in all than 1400 men; but their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel von Pestel, manoeuvred so skilfully that he gave the enemy the impression they had a whole army-corps opposed to them. After a combat of three hours, in the presence of the emperor and his son, the little band, on the receipt of higher orders, evacuated the town, and disappeared into the forest of Küllerthal, leaving the three French divisions no wiser than when the engagement began. Pompons bulletins announced to the Parisians the serio-comic capture of Saarbrücken. "The prince imperial," they reported, "has received his baptism of fire; his coolness and presence of mind were worthy of the name he bears." The emperor returned to Metz, where he remained inactive, awaiting the arrival of Canrobert and MacMahon.




FIG. 76. — Leboeuf. From the engraving by A. Weger. Original, a photograph.



But no such inaction characterized the other side. Since the enemy would not move, the general offensive advance on the Saar was fixed for August 3. The left wing (the third army) was to move first, the first army holding back for a time. General MacMahon, governor of Algeria when war was declared, found, on his arrival at Strasburg on July 24, his army-corps still in process of organizing. His left wing — the division of Abel Douay — stood in and around Weissenburg, without a suspicion that it had a whole



FIG. 77. — Lieutenant-General von Blumenthal. From a photograph.

army, on the leash for the spring, close over against it. On the 4th the third army advanced through the Bienwald, the Bavarian division of von Bothmer opening the attack. The fight was directed by the crown prince and his chief of staff, von Blumenthal (Fig. 77), from the height of Schweigen. The French positions were desperately defended. It was midday ere the town could be stormed, and the battalion holding it compelled to lay down its arms. Douay himself was killed by a shell. The fortified hill near by, the Geisberg, cost a still more bloody contest, the arrival of artillery having to be



waited for to force its brave garrison to surrender. Fifteen hundred dead and wounded was the heavy price the victors had to pay for their capture; but even this sacrifice was more than compensated by the moral effect of this first action on French soil, despite of *chasse-pôts* and *mitrailleuses*, *Zouaves* and *Turcos*.

The French, through the loss of the line of the Lauter, saw themselves thrown completely on the defensive. Reconnoissances disclosed that MacMahon had taken up a position behind the Sauer.



FIG. 78. — General von Hartmann. From a photograph.

It was the crown prince's purpose to give his sorely wearied troops a rest-day on the 6th; but by the evening of the 5th the foreposts of the two armies stood so close to each other that they measured swords in frequent little skirmishes, the eagerness of the troops on both sides anticipating any regular leading. Thus came about, on the 6th, the battle of Wörth. Here, also, the French found themselves far inferior in numbers. Even when the emperor, at MacMahon's solicitation, had placed the first and seventh corps at his dis-

posal, he was able to avail himself only of the former, the latter allowing itself to be detained at Bitsch by the sound of cannonading on its left, so that it did not appear on the battle-field. But this numerical inferiority was in great measure compensated by the extraordinary strength of the French position on the heights, and on the vine- and hop-covered slopes stretching from the Sauer and the Sulzbach. Neither the Bavarians pressing onwards, under von Hartmann (Fig. 78), against the enemy's left, nor the Hessians, under von Bose, on the left wing, were able to gain any decided advantage; and as fruitless were all von Kirchbach's attempts from Wörth

upon his front. In some parts the Prussians had to surrender the advantages won, by reason of severe losses; in others, they were hardly able to bear up against the assaults of the French. Such was the state of matters when, at eleven o'clock, orders from the crown prince reached von Kirchbach to desist from battle, and to avoid all that might bring on a new engagement. As this order, through mistake, reached the Bavarian second corps also, it gave up the fight, and retired from the field. But von Kirchbach (Fig. 79) felt that a general abandonment of the struggle was not to be effected without great loss, and that, besides, it would give the French a right to claim a victory, as well as time to draw in new re-enforcements. The Germans could not expect to fight later under more favorable conditions. He resolved, therefore, to ignore the order, and continue the fight on his own responsibility. On his determination being announced to von Bose (Fig. 80), the latter responded gladly that he would not abandon the fifth corps. About one o'clock the crown prince, attracted by the thunder of the cannon,—contrary



FIG. 79. — General von Kirchbach. From a photograph.

to his expectation, waxing louder, — came on to the field, and took command of the battle. The fifth corps was directed to delay the direct front attack on the heights for from one to three hours, when it could have the co-operation of the wings expected by that time. The whole conflict in the centre consisted in an almost uninterrupted series of assaults by both sides, in which the assailants suffered immense losses, and the defenders maintained their position nearly unbroken. Only laboriously and by slow degrees did the greatly reduced Poseners, deprived of most of their officers, make so much progress, through calling on their last reserves, that their lines of sharpshooters enveloped the upper margin of the vineyards jutting

forward towards Wörth. It required all the energy and skill of all their leaders and the devotion of the troops to maintain themselves in such a position till the successful onset of the eleventh corps on the enemy's left wing, and its advance by way of Gunstett on Morsbrunn, brought the much-needed support and relief. To meet this onset the French cuirassier brigade of Michel charged forward like a thunder-storm, only to fall before the rapid German fire. "Men lay on men like a pack of cards dashed down on the table." The eleventh corps joined hands with the fifth; and, exhausted and out of array as the men were, Elsasshausen was stormed with a hurrah, and



FIG. 80. — General von Bose. From a photograph.

attacks — first of French infantry, then of Bonne-main's cavalry brigade — repulsed. The Bavarians, charging from the right, supported their sorely thinned Prussian brothers in arms, while the Württembergers were directed from Gunstett upon Reichshofen so as to impede the enemy's retreat. After an embittered but hopeless house-to-house struggle (in which General Raoult was slain), Fröschweiler, the enemy's last stronghold, fell about five o'clock. Such as were not captured fled in wild dis-

order by the roads to Reichshofen and Niederbronn, and had to thank for their deliverance one of Failly's divisions that enabled the fugitives to put the passes of the Vosges between them and their victors. Six thousand prisoners and thirty-two pieces of artillery testified to the completeness of the victory, which was, however, bought at the costly price of 489 officers and 10,153 rank and file killed and wounded.

On the same day that MacMahon's army was destroyed at Wörth, the ardor of the troops and zeal of their leaders converted the forward movement of the advance-guards of the first and second armies — meant only as a measure of precaution — into an equally hot



conflict about the heights of Spichern, to the south of Saarbrücken, which had been occupied by Frossard's corps. Von Kameke, commanding the fourteenth (Düsseldorf) division, on learning that the enemy was retiring on these heights from the neighborhood of Saarbrücken, determined that his withdrawal should not be unmolested. Shortly before midday the attack was opened, and by half-past two the southern border of the Gifertwald was taken. Here further advance was stopped by the murderous fire of artillery and small arms showered down on the assailants from the adjacent height of Spichern. Success depended on the taking of the Rotberg, an outjutting, craggy cliff that flanked all the lines of approach in the open. General von François, at the head of the seventy-fourth, gallantly attempted to scale the steep, but was hurried back. While leading the thirty-ninth to renew the attempt, he fell, pierced by five bullets; and the Prussians, tired out and their ammunition expended, had to retire. Kameke's situation became critical. It was fortunate for him that Frossard (Fig. 81) did not in turn become the assailant, or receive re-enforcements. To the hard-pressed Düsseldorfers, on the contrary, help began to come by degrees. Irrespective of orders, the thunder of the cannon attracted the columns in the rear irresistibly to the front. Von Göben came up with his Rhinelanders and Brandenburgers, and undertook the command, to be himself shortly superseded by his ranking general, von Zastrow. Von Alvensleben also took part in the fight. The troops were sent into the fire by battalions, as they arrived. A terrible struggle developed itself on the Rotberg, as well as in the woods of Gifert and Pfaffen; and by six o'clock both woods were in the hands of the Prussians. The toll-houses on the lower land were also captured. But once more the enemy threatened, by a vigorous onset, to give an unfavorable turn to the battle. Ultimately, with the help of two batteries, dragged with incredible labor up the height, the Germans succeeded in forcing him to give up his position. With the oncoming of dusk the retreat became general at all points.

At Weissenburg 26,000 Germans with 90 guns fought against 5,300 French with 18 guns; at Wörth, 75,000 Germans with 234 guns, against 35,000 French with 131 guns; but at Spichern 26,840 Germans with 78 guns were pitted against 23,900 French with 90 guns, established in a position, by nature as well as art, apparently impregnable. In the last fight, therefore, it was not numerical superiority, but the heroism of the men and skill in the leading, that



carried the day. "These battles," says a French writer, "were not triumphs of soldiers over soldiers, but of organization, order, clearness of comprehension, and certainty in execution over disorder, want of foresight, and inexperience." The frontier was penetrated by a double wedge; and the French army, broken through at the




FIG. 81. — General Frossard. From a photograph.


centre, could only concentrate far in the rear. Such was the strategic victory; the moral one was no less. Never before had the German peoples rejoiced with such enthusiasm as they did over these triumphs that put to flight all the fears they had harbored. Proportionately doleful was the awakening of France from her insanely vain imaginings. A fabricated despatch promulgated in the Paris

Bourse, telling of a great victory and the capture of the crown prince with 25,000 men, evoked a tumult of exultation that was only stilled on its falsity becoming painfully manifest. When the news of disaster came in the night, the throne of the Napoleons tottered to its fall. In vain did the empress-regent endeavor through a proclamation to allay the general consternation. The summoning of the chambers, first for the 11th and then for the 9th, with the declaration of the state of siege for Paris, only increased the excitement; while the meeting of the chambers set loose the tongues of the Revolution. No one listened to Ollivier's report, meant to soothe the popular feeling. Favre thundered out the demand for the retirement of the ministry, and the appointment of a committee of fifteen with dictatorial powers. But it was not this motion of the opposition that brought about the fall of the administration, but a vote of want of confidence proposed by Duvernois as representing the Bonapartist Right. The formation of a new cabinet the empress intrusted to Count Palikao, who was summoned by telegraph from Lyons, especially to the headship of the war-department. His friends termed this cabinet "the ministry of national defence," the opposition called it derisively that of "the last hour," and hastened to bring it into subjection to themselves. On another motion of Favre the law of August 12 enacted the reinstitution of the National Guard, and the enrolment therein of all men from twenty-one to thirty, who had lived one year at least in the commune, with power to choose their own officers. The foundation was thus laid for the standing army of the Revolution. The next most pressing necessity was the adoption of measures for the defence of the country and capital; for men began to realize the depth of the abyss on whose brink they were standing. The sick emperor broke down under the burden of responsibility imposed upon him. Leboeuf's incapacity was plain to the eyes of all; the new ministry compelled his resignation, and the transfer of the army, 170,000 strong, lying around Metz, to Bazaine, whom the people and the army alike demanded. MacMahon led the remains of his own army, unmolested, back to Châlons. Faily wandered aimlessly around with his force. The purposes of the leaders changed from hour to hour. The immediate adoption of the best of these — namely, that of retreating on Châlons — was prevented by dread of the impression this would make at home and abroad, and, above all, on Paris.

Meanwhile the three German armies resumed their advance.

Dense clouds of horsemen concealed their movements as with an impenetrable veil, and spread terror among the people, whose fears King William's assurance on entering their country, that he came "to make war on French soldiers, not on French citizens," failed to allay. The whole force co-operated in a grand turning movement. In order to afford the second and third armies time to encompass the enemy, the first army, on the right wing, moved slowly in advance. Prince Frederick Charles, in the centre, marched at a quicker rate on Pont-à-Mousson, and, more rapidly still, the crown prince, on the left, upon Nancy, he leaving, however, the Badenese division of von Werder behind for the investment of Strasburg, and other detachments to shut in the smaller fortresses, — Bitsch, Marsal, Lichtenberg, Lützelstein, Pfalzburg. It was expected that the enemy's main strength would take up its position behind the Nied. But Bazaine — who had assumed the command-in-chief on the 13th — had retired it to the Moselle at Metz, and posted it on the right bank, under the guns of Forts Queuleu and St.-Julien. But the plan of retreating upon Châlons was taken up anew, and on the morning of the 14th Bazaine's army began to cross the river, the emperor also betaking himself thither; the Germans, on their part, contemplated no attack for that day. But when von der Goltz, the leader of the advance-guard of the seventh army corps, perceived that the third corps (Dekaen), constituting the French rear-guard, still stood in its camp out of range of the forts, he conceived the idea of making an attempt to hold the enemy here, in order to give Prince Frederick Charles a start up the Moselle. The attempt succeeded in a marvellous manner. General Ladmirault, who had already crossed the river, let himself be misled into recrossing it on his own responsibility. It is true that any further tactical success than simply holding the battle-field was for the Germans not to be thought of. Von der Goltz, indeed, — though Manteuffel on his right and three divisions on his left came to his help — was in so critical a situation that Bazaine was able to let himself be congratulated by the emperor on having broken the charm. Nevertheless, the strategic object of this improvised feat of arms was fully attained. Bazaine's unimpeded retreat to Verdun was no longer possible. The French loss in this battle (Colombey-Nouilly) was about 3600 men; the German, about 5000.

Reports came into the headquarters of the second army that led to the conviction that the French army might be caught in full







retreat on the Meuse. Two army corps, the tenth and the third, were at once despatched to cross the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson, with orders to fall on the enemy's rear-guard, and generally to do him all the harm in their power. Only too soon, however, was it discovered that the assumption was erroneous. Bazaine had, indeed, resumed on the 15th the march interrupted on the day previous: but as his left wing — the corps of Ladmirault and Leboeuf — still stood on the morning of the 16th in the valley of the Moselle, the corps of Frossard and Canrobert, which had got so far as the neighborhood of Rezonville and Gravelotte, as well as the Guard under Bourbaki, which had joined them, were ordered to halt where they were till midday. While resting carelessly here, the French dragoons were suddenly startled, at nine in the morning, by German bombs bursting in their midst. Infantry swarmed forth against the assailants; and now, for the first time, Alvensleben realized that he had, not the rear-guard, but the greater part of the French army before him, and this without prospect of early or adequate support. But, undismayed, he and his Brandenburgers accepted the unequal battle. (See PLATE XV.: The Battle-fields about Metz, 1870.) After a bloody forest-fight in the wood of Vionville, the village was carried by a dashing charge about midday. In the hurly-burly of the struggle, swaying now this way, now that, all uniform leading was lost, and there was nothing to depend on but the judgment of the individual officers and the resolute bravery of their men. The high-lying Flavigny, also, was wrested from the French, and constituted a strong station for the Germans now facing eastward. It was fortunate for the latter that Bazaine, — first informed of their advance over the Moselle through a telegram of the English envoy in Darmstadt received by way of London, — dominated by the fear that they would cut him off from Metz, kept his eyes mainly directed to the south. Notwithstanding all this, the German left wing was threatened with destruction by the masses which Canrobert was rolling up against it from the north. It was but two o'clock, and no infantry or artillery in reserve. Now was the time to prove what a cavalry ready for self-sacrifice could do. But even of this there was but a handful to hurl itself against the attack ushered in by Canrobert, and silence his heavy batteries on the old Roman road. Enveloped in a tempest of artillery and musketry fire, poured on it from stations close at hand, the brigade of Bredow — six squadrons of Magdeburg cuirassiers and Old Mark Uhlans — dashed forward on the foe. His

first line was ridden down, and men and horses cut to pieces. The second line, also, was powerless to withstand the whirlwind of horsemen, and even the batteries standing on the heights in the rear turned in flight. Carried on by the frenzy of battle and lust of victory, the Prussian squadrons dashed forward through the trough-like valley which slopes downward from the Roman road, till finally, after a charge of 3000 paces, the cavalry of France threw themselves upon them from all sides. General Bredow caused the recall to be sounded. Breathless from their long ride, their ranks thinned by the hostile bullets, and completely surrounded, there was nothing left the heroic band but once more to cut its way through the artillery and infantry already ridden down by them. Only a half returned from this charge through the valley of death. But the sacrifice was not in vain; Canrobert's advance was checked ere well begun, and never resumed. But in his place came Leboeuf and Ladmirault, also from the north, before the weight of whose flank attack the Prussians had to evacuate the wood of Tronville. At this critical moment the 20th infantry division of the tenth army corps appeared on the field, and proved effective in restoring the fight. Concurrently with this, Prince Frederick Charles with his staff, after a ride of fourteen miles accomplished in an hour, arrived at Flavigny, and a second cavalry fight—the most brilliant in the whole war—maintained by the brigade of Barby at Mars-la-Tour put a conclusive end to the danger threatening the left wing, though the conflict did not cease entirely till ten at night. Next morning showed the Germans still holding the field, while the French had evacuated their positions. In this terrible struggle, the losses of both were heavy, and nearly equal,—about 16,000 men each.

It was to be supposed that, on the following morning, the enemy, far superior in numbers, would make a new attempt to open a way to the west. The frightfully depleted ranks of both the German army-corps required to be replenished by calling in fresh troops as speedily as possible. The king with his staff appeared on the battle-field early in the morning of the 17th. But the expected attack came not. The battle of Mars-la-Tour had impressed Bazaine with the conviction that he had had to do with a force at least as strong as his own, and that next day he would have to deal with a greatly preponderant one. In consideration of this, and of his own deficient supply of provisions and munitions, he determined to give up the movement on the Meuse, and to withdraw his troops nearer to

Metz, and face them towards the northwest, in preparation for a retreat by the northern road branching off at Gravelotte. On Gravelotte, therefore, the king on his side resolved to march next day with his whole army.

Bazaine, ever under the impression that his enemy meant to force him away from Metz, and prevented, owing to the wooded character of the country, from getting a view of the distribution of his forces, had taken special precautions for securing his left wing. The position—strong by nature, covered in front by the deep ravine of the Moselle, and resting with its rear on the forts St.-Quentin and Plappeville—was still further strengthened by art, while the farm homesteads had been converted into little forts. Bazaine himself took his post at St.-Quentin. On his extreme left stood Frossard at Rozerieulles; next to him, Leboeuf; then came Ladmirault on the height of Amanvilliers; the extreme right wing, under Canrobert, extended from St.-Privat to Roncourt. The Guard stood as reserve behind the left wing.

The German leaders, also, were in uncertainty as to the position and purpose of the enemy. Their right wing and centre, therefore, were ordered to maintain a waiting attitude till the left wing had fully ascertained the state of matters on Bazaine's more northern line of retreat, and till it, in case the French army had taken up a position to the west of Metz, should have turned its right flank on the north. The probability of this being the case showed itself more clearly in the course of the forenoon; the only error lying in the supposition that the French position did not, at the most, reach farther north than Amanvilliers. For this turning movement the Guard was told off, along with the twelfth corps, the Saxons under their crown prince, Albert. When, towards eleven o'clock, it was discovered that St.-Privat also was occupied by the French, this force received orders to march on St.-Marie-aux-Chênes, the Guard by way of Doncourt, the Saxons, in a wider détour, by Jarny. The rest of the first line of battle was constituted by the seventh army corps on the extreme left, resting on the Moselle, and holding the wood of Vaux: next to this came the eighth over against Rozerieulles, and in touch with it stood the ninth between Vionville and Rezonville. All along this line the Germans, towards midday, advanced to the attack. In accordance with the common plan, a protracted and hot artillery fight, supported by infantry charges, here developed itself; the ninth corps, which began the attack somewhat



prematurely, being for a time in an especially critical situation. But by three o'clock the enemy's advance posts were everywhere driven in, and the Germans had planted themselves firmly on the advanced slope of the plateau of Point-du-Jour in immediate proximity to the French main positions, while by the capture — though with great loss — of the homestead of St.-Hubert, they had gained a fast *point d'appui* in advance of their centre. In general, so much had been attained that the second and part of the third French corps were completely fettered, and rendered altogether incapable of lending support to the right wing threatened by the main attack. In expectation of an attack on the left wing, Bazaine had kept his reserve so long in the background that it was now too late to use it for the rescue of the right wing.

As the day already verged towards sundown, the time seemed come for increasing the pressure on the enemy's left wing, which was to all appearance severely shaken. The king, who followed the current of the fight from Gravelotte, therefore ordered General Steinmetz to set all the still available troops of the first army in motion upon the heights of Point-du-Jour. But now the enemy also brought all his reserves into action; his still effective batteries resumed their long-reserved fire, and showered missiles of all kinds over the woods and plateau of Gravelotte. The Germans, however, were not to be driven from their dearly won positions. Meanwhile, on the German left wing the first Guard division, von Pape's (Fig. 82), had stormed the village of St.-Ail, and — with the support of the Saxons — that of St.-Marie-aux-Chênes, and opened a hot but fruitless artillery fire upon St.-Privat. It became clear that nothing was to be effected against this fortress-like bulwark, established on a commanding height, till the Saxons' turning movement had taken effect. But as it now became obvious that Roncourt, beyond St.-Privat, was also occupied by the French, Prince Albert saw that it was necessary he should make a wider *détour* so as to envelop this as well. A lull, therefore, ensued in the fighting over the whole field. It was half-past five o'clock, and Prince Augustus of Würtemberg, on the conviction that the Saxons' intervention was imminent, believed he could no longer delay the attack on St.-Privat if the battle was to be decided on this day. Pape's remonstrances against an enterprise sure to result in a useless sacrifice of life were in vain. The prince gave the order for the advance. At the double-quick the regiments 'Kaiser Franz' and 'Queen

Augusta' advanced from St.-Ail towards the height. They had taken but a few hundred steps when they confronted a tempest of fire that mowed down the men, but especially the officers, like grain. The same fate awaited the first and third regiments of the Guard that hurried from St.-Marie to their support. The terrible losses weakened, indeed, their power for attack, but did not break their ranks. Headed by their few uninjured officers, they clung to the



FIG. 82. — General von Pape. From a photograph.

slope, and with iron resolution maintained the ground so dearly won. The artillery was again brought into action, and advancing to within 1000 paces of St.-Privat opened upon it a murderous fire. Meanwhile the Saxons had completed their flanking movement. Canrobert had in no way misunderstood this danger threatening his right wing, — floating, as it were, in the air; but as he had more than enough to do to hold his ground against the Guard pressing forward against his front, while his earnest calls for help were unresponded

to, he was impotent to do anything to hinder the movement that outflanked him. Instead, he evacuated the whole field north of St.-Privat. The French defenders, thus hemmed in and driven back on each other, made desperate exertions to maintain the village. But under the storm of shot and shell poured into it from two sides, walls and buildings crumbled to pieces, while columns of flame shot up from the ruins. The sun was sloping to its setting when the Guard and the Saxons threw themselves simultaneously upon the burning village. But even yet the resistance was bitterly obstinate. After a hand-to-hand conflict with bayonets and clubbed muskets the enemy laid down their arms. Such as managed to escape streamed in disorder to the valley of the Moselle. King William telegraphed the tidings of victory to the queen in Berlin (Fig. 83).<sup>1</sup>

The defeat of the sixth corps determined the withdrawal of the whole French army under the guns of Metz. The Germans' exultation over their victory was dampened by the terrible price at which it had been purchased. In all, their loss exceeded 20,000 men; that of the Guard alone amounted to 8200. The French gave theirs as 13,000. But an iron girdle had been drawn around their whole main army, by which — though itself unassailable — it was rendered incapable of contributing to the defence of the country, unless by breaking through the German lines.

The consequences of this catastrophe made themselves felt far and wide. In the first place it conclusively set at rest all thought of assailing the North German coast from the sea. On July 24 a so-called Baltic fleet of twelve ships had left Cherbourg under Admiral Bouet-Villaumez, with which the German flotilla came to

#### <sup>1</sup> EXPLANATION OF FIG. 83.

The despatch was written by the king in the bivouac at Rezonville, on the evening of August 18, with a lead-pencil, in the memorandum book of Chief-Engineer Friedheim, Director of the 4th division of the Field Telegraph, who preserved it by permission of the king.

#### TRANSCRIPTION.

Bivouac bei Rezonville 9 Uhr Ab.

Die französische Armee in sehr starker Stellung westlich von Metz, heut unter Meiner Führung angegriffen, in neunstündiger Schlacht vollständig geschlagen, von ihren Verbindungen mit Paris abgeschnitten, und gegen Metz zurückgeworfen.

WILHELM.

An Ihre Maj. die Königin  
Berlin

Soweit jetzt bekannt Artillerie Vom 3, Garde, 2te, 7, 8, 9 und 12 Corps im Gefecht gewesen,



Si unque in pace  
 athena q dicitur  
 in paupertate in  
 ut in sup pauper  
 velum mactis in  
 Muty puit mactis  
 aut sapientia  
 yoffia, in mactis

fundam pfecta  
 redounding pfecta  
 apen pua mactis  
 you mactis pfecta  
 pfecta, in mactis  
 pfecta pfecta pfecta

On the day  
 in origin  
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 pfecta pfecta pfecta  
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Fig. 83. — Facsimile of the despatch from Gravelotte announcing the victory to the Queen at Berlin.



an engagement, on August 17, off Hiddensee. On August 9 the French North Sea fleet, under Admiral Fourichon, appeared off Helgoland, but remained there inactive till on the defeat before Metz both fleets were recalled home. But though the French navy took no longer any part in the war, its marines and gunners did yeoman service in the later combats by land. Another consequence of the catastrophe was the total disruption of all relations with the secret allies. Nay, the empire stooped so low as to become a mere suppliant for help from its former protégé. After its flag — which for three years had waved from Fort Michelangelo over the Holy City — was struck, and the garrison shipped for home, the emperor sent his cousin, Prince Napoleon, with all speed to Florence to try what he could effect with his father-in-law. There he found only deaf ears. Stronger counter-influences made all his efforts vain. Garibaldi and his party protested loudly against any aid to the “man of December 2,” and showed much greater disposition to an invasion of Savoy and Nice with help of Prussian gold. But Rome was still the main stumbling-block. Victor Emmanuel and his people were at one in their glowing desire for Rome as the capital of Italy; but the king insisted that this must be brought about, not by an isolated party of extremists, but by the government supported by the vote of the whole land. Already a committee of the Left had been constituted under Crispi and Cairoli to urge the government forward, and one of their number had even gone to the German headquarters at Hamburg to deal with Bismarek in regard to the occupation. The wily chancellor availed himself of the opportunity to interpose an insuperable obstacle to any Franco-Italian alliance, and the delegate took the promise home with him that Germany would recognize the occupation of Rome as soon as it was an accomplished fact, and would use its influence to prevent any other power from protesting against it. The Italian ministers intrenched themselves against the prince behind the pretext that Italy could do nothing except in concert with Austria, and then, in order to escape from further solicitation from France, addressed themselves to London. There a league of neutrals was suggested, but the idea came to nothing. Only one thing was clear; namely, that France was left isolated to meet its fate. But the battles before Metz inspired the Italians with courage for the decisive step. On August 29 Visconti-Venosta, foreign minister, communicated to the powers the guaranties which Italy was prepared to offer the pope, — that after the loss of his secular

possessions he would still be in a position to exercise his spiritual functions with absolute freedom. No one interposed any objections. Before, however, having recourse to force, the king tried the effect of conciliation. He sent Count Ponza di San Martino with an autograph letter to Rome, in which, under assurance of his filial sentiments and his fidelity to and reverence for the church, he implored the pope not to reject the hand thus held out to him; intimating, however, at the same time, his resolution of taking possession of the city. The pope's answer rendered any accommodation impossible, and the order for crossing the frontiers followed forthwith. On September 11 the Italian army, 60,000 strong, under General Cadorna, entered the States of the Church, and on the 20th stood before the walls of Rome. As General Kanzler, commander of the 14,000 papal mercenaries, refused to open the gates, a breach was made in the wall at Porta Pia by means of artillery, and in a few moments the city was in the hands of the stormers, amid the enthusiastic acclamations of the populace. The Prussian envoy, Count Arnim, was the first to congratulate General Cadorna on the elevation of Rome into the capital of Italy.

To return to the grand field of conflict. On the evening of August 18, the German leaders were prepared for a renewal next morning of the struggle before Metz. But when the enemy's withdrawal became patent, dispositions were made in accordance with the changed situation. After the troops' excessive toils in marching and fighting it was imperative that they should be allowed a short rest. For the investment of Metz there remained behind the first army, and the second, third, ninth, and tenth corps, which, after the appointment of the somewhat headstrong Steinmetz to the governorship of Posen, were united under the command of Prince Frederick Charles. Out of three corps—the Guard, the fourth, and the twelfth—belonging to the second army, and two cavalry divisions, a fourth army—that of the Meuse—was constituted under the crown prince of Saxony. The objective point of this latter army, as well as of that under the crown prince of Prussia, was Paris; for it was to be expected that, at such an emergency, all the strength remaining available to the enemy would be found concentrated on this line for the defence of the capital. According to reports a new army of 120,000 was in the course of formation under MacMahon at Châlons, where the emperor also was. There those around Napoleon prevailed on him to appoint Trochu governor of Paris, and to consent to his own return

thither. Against this last proposition the empress—remembering the bad impression made by the return of Prince Napoleon from the Crimea—entered her decided protest. The people, on their rude awakening from their dream of victory and conquest, had been seized with a dangerous revolutionary fever and spirit of revolt. They detected spies everywhere as well as treachery, without which they could not account for the Germans' mysterious familiarity with by-roads and petty villages, and had, under this conviction, enforced the expulsion of every German from France.

So Napoleon remained with the army, with which, however, he had no longer a voice, either as commander or emperor. Henceforth not strategy but political anxiety determined its movements. The simplest and most natural step would have been the continuation of the retreat till the army should stand before Paris, in order there to deliver a new battle; and a decree of the council of war of the 17th pointed to the same conclusion, practically leaving Bazaine to his fate. In regard to the state of matters before Metz, no one had certain information. When MacMahon applied to Bazaine for instructions, he received for answer that as distance made free communication impossible, he must act on his own responsibility. Meanwhile the emperor had received from Bazaine a despatch to the effect that, while he had held the field on the 18th, it had been necessary for him, before resuming the march westward, to withdraw his army to Metz, so as to supply it there with provisions and ammunition. Immediately on the back of this, there came to MacMahon an order of the 19th from the minister of war, requiring him to march eastward, and effect a junction with Bazaine. MacMahon was perfectly aware of the terrible blunder involved in this order. Not only was the capital, threatened by the advance of the German third army, to be left destitute of defence, but he himself was to incur the risk of running into the arms of the enemy before he could reach the army of the Rhine, which—the road to Verdun being now barred to it—could avail itself only (if of any) of the more northern route by way of Montmédy. To leave himself a chance, at least, MacMahon chose a middle course, and on the 21st moved to a position near Rheims. There the minister Rouher made his appearance in order to remove his objections to an eastward march. But precisely the reverse of what he purposed occurred. The minister did not convince the marshal, but the marshal convinced the minister; and it was agreed that the route to Paris should be taken



on the 22d. But now there came a despatch from Bazaine in which he said: "I still calculate on getting away in a northern direction, and on fighting my way via Montmédy and Ste.-Menehould to Châlons, if this route is not too strongly occupied. Should this be the case I shall go to Sedan, and even to Mezières, in order to reach Châlons." This despatch led MacMahon to change his mind at the last moment, and to determine to join, if possible, the army of the Rhine, now, as he supposed, in its march in the direction of Montmédy. But to the five days lost through indecision in Châlons, two more had now been added in Rheims, while the discovery that two corps were in absolute want of provisions involved a third. For this reason he had to make a détour to Rethel, where considerable stores were gathered.

On the 23d the German armies also began their march upon Châlons. An attempt of the Saxons to take Verdun by a *coup de main*, as well as an earlier one on Diedenhofen (Thionville) proved failures, as did that of the second army on Toul. Owing to want of heavy artillery, the Germans had to content themselves with investing these places. On the 24th news was brought to the headquarters of the third army at Ligny that the Prussian Uhlans had found the camp at Châlons empty, and on the 25th it was made clear that MacMahon was trying to force his way to Bazaine. This movement was so much at variance with the elementary principles of strategy that General Moltke limited himself to ordering a slight general movement northward, meaning, moreover, to allow the troops a day's rest in their new positions. But when, on the 26th, the cavalry of the army of the Meuse recovered touch of the enemy — lost since Wörth — all doubt was set at rest. All the armies were forthwith ordered to change front towards the north, — the army of the Meuse as the left wing, crown prince Frederick William, with the sixth, fifth, and eleventh corps, the Bavarians and Württembergers as the centre and right wing, — the object being, by a forced march, to block MacMahon's route to the east, or strike him in the flank. General headquarters were transferred from Bar-le-Duc to Clermont-en-Argonne. On the 27th crown prince Albert's (Fig. 84) cavalry struck the mounted troops of Douay and Faily at Buzancy. And now the possibility of overtaking the enemy on the left bank of the Meuse suggested itself. The passages at Dun and Stenay were already held by the army of the Meuse.

The engagement at Buzancy showed MacMahon the hopelessness of his undertaking. As the way to Paris was already blocked



by the crown prince of Prussia, he determined, as his only means of deliverance, to retreat on Mezières. But now there came a despatch from the war-minister: "If you abandon Bazaine, we have the Revolution in Paris!" accompanied by the entirely groundless assertion that he had a start of thirty-six hours, and that the situation of his army was by no means so critical as he thought. Thus urged, he led his army on to its fate. The pressure of the German columns on his right flank soon made itself unpleasantly sensible. As the heads of these had already reached the Vouziers-Stenay Road, he



FIG. 84. — Crown Prince Albert of Saxony. From a lithograph by M. Müller.

gave up the advance on Stenay, and tried, by bending still farther to the north, to gain the passages at Mouzon and Remilly, whence he hoped to open a way for himself to Metz viâ Carignan. By the evening of the 30th his whole army was to be on the heights between the Meuse and Chiers, on a line from Mouzon to Carignan. But two only of his corps succeeded in reaching this line. An attack of the army of the Meuse had struck deep into the flank of the fifth corps when on its march. Notwithstanding that this corps was, on the 29th, hurled back by the Saxons upon Beaumont,

its general, Faily (Fig. 85), was so culpably over-confident that he took no care to plant outposts, so that the fourth German army-corps was able, on the 30th, to surprise its encampment while the men were in the act of cooking. Like a swarm of molested bees, the French tirailleurs poured forth against the, at first, small number of their assailants; but the Saxons coming to the help of the latter on the right and the Bavarians on the left, the French were driven back from the south and west upon the Meuse, losing many prison-



FIG. 85. — General de Faily. From a photograph.

ers. Faily, in disorderly retreat, crossed the bridge of Mouzon in the evening, while other sections of the army sought to gain a passage lower down. General Douay threw himself on the left bank and made for Sedan, which he reached utterly exhausted at five, on the morning of the 31st. This day of bad fortune had cost the French 5000 men and 42 cannon. Under the influence of so serious a discomfiture, General MacMahon himself at Mouzon gave orders at noon on the 30th for a general retreat on Sedan, not with


the view of accepting battle there, but of supplying his troops with provisions and ammunition for their further march to Mezières, where the newly organized corps of Vinoy was awaiting him. He reached Sedan, indeed; but here where every moment was costly, he wasted further precious time in indecision between a march to Montmédy and one to Mezières.

The German leaders, on the other hand, kept before their eyes the high aim of driving the foe over the Belgian frontier or compelling him to lay down his arms. On the evening of the 31st the crown prince of Saxony led his army across the Meuse, and completely blocked the little space between the river and the frontier. The crown prince of Prussia, with four army corps and two cavalry divisions, stood on the south, prepared to repel any attempt of the French in that direction, as well as to fall on the flank of any westward movement with his left wing. The forced marches made by his troops enabled him to push his eleventh and fifth corps so far forward that a short march on the morning of September 1, on Donchéry and Vrine, barred the enemy's last line of retreat. Fighting followed on the 31st, but only with the Bavarian corps of von der Tann, constituting the left wing of the third army, to which, standing close on the Meuse, the duty of watching the road on the other side leading to Sedan had been intrusted. Before the fire of its batteries, posted on the heights of Remilly, Lebrun fell back from that road; and as for some unaccountable cause the railroad bridge was left undestroyed, the Bavarians pressed on over it and reached Bazeilles. Since, however, von der Tann had been ordered to avoid any serious engagement, they returned to the right bank.

The conviction prevailed on the German side that MacMahon would endeavor to slip through the iron ring by means of a night march. This attempt was not, however, made, and the French army remained held fast 'in the mouse-trap.' Sedan, an antiquated, confined, fortified town, lies in the valley of the Meuse, — at that time dammed back as far as Bazeilles, — and is surrounded by heights on all sides. Two brooks — the one joining the Meuse at Floing, the other at Bazeilles — unite with it to form a right-angled triangle, whose area was filled by the French, their fronts occupying the heights on the inside of the streams. On the hypotenuse, stretching from Bazeilles to the village of Givonne, stood the twelfth and first corps facing eastward; the seventh extended from Illy on the north to the Meuse at Floing; behind it stood the fifth and the







Battlefield of Sedan.

cavalry as reserve, fronting the west. The two former bodies and the two last thus stood back to back. The third side formed by the Meuse was unoccupied; in its centre lay the fortress. (See *PLATE XVI.*: The Battle-field of Sedan.)

The king, along with Moltke, Bismarck, and Roon, posted himself on the hill near Frénois, from which the whole of the enemy's position was visible. So convinced were the German leaders that MacMahon would attempt to break through to the west, that the army of the Meuse and the first Bavarian corps had assigned to them as their sole task the blocking of a movement in that direction. In sad truth, MacMahon had no longer any plan. After he was wounded, however (before seven A.M.), and through necessity gave over the command to Ducrot, this general resumed the plan of a retreat upon Mézières, and with this view took steps for concentrating the army at Illy. If the route thence to Mézières were no longer practicable, there remained at least the crossing the boundary-line into Belgium. Scarcely, however, were the initiatory movements made, when General Wimpffen, newly called home from Algiers, who had joined the army the evening before, produced a secret warrant appointing him to the command-in-chief in case of any eventuality. The new chief at once countermanded Ducrot's dispositions under the determination of cutting his way through to Carignan. But the old swashbuckler, grizzled on the battle-fields of Africa, dashed himself in vain against the circle of iron with which the German commander had environed him.

The first blood on this bloody day — September 1 — was shed at Bazeilles. At four in the morning, and in a dense fog, the Bavarian division of Stephan crossed the river, and forced its way into this place. They supposed it weakly occupied; but they had to realize that they had to do with a foe in no way thinking of retreat, but with one who meant to maintain it unflinchingly. The assailants saw themselves as if drawn into a maelstrom of fire. But in the frenzy of battle they settled to their work even more sternly than the crown prince and Blumenthal had meant them to do. For three hours the conflict raged without intermission, even the townspeople taking furious part, ere the Bavarians found themselves masters of one-half the town. As weapons failed to clear a way for them, they called in the help of fire; and an untold number of the wounded were burned to death or lay buried under the fallen ruins. Between six and seven, when the fog began to rise, eighty-four guns commenced to

shower death upon the defenders from the heights of Remilly, while the army of the Meuse hurried to the scene from the right. When Prince George of Saxony, who now led the twelfth corps, saw how matters stood, he at once took part, although his own right flank at Daigny was yet seriously menaced by the Turcos and Zouaves, still standing on this side the Givonne. Again and again did these rush to the charge, to be as often driven back by the fire of the Saxons. It was precisely at this moment that Wimpffen assumed the command-in-chief, and strained every nerve to burst through the ring. Though it was with difficulty that the Bavarians maintained themselves in the gap between Bazeilles and La Moncelle, they yet pressed over the bridge and stretched a hand to the Saxons, in conjunction with whom they stormed the opposite height, and held it against repeated assaults. Simultaneously, about eleven o'clock, a united charge of Bavarians, Saxons, and Thuringians decided the matter at Bazeilles, and captured the entire place. What of the garrison were not made prisoners fell back on the suburb of Balan. In this sanguinary struggle the corps of von der Tann alone had lost 120 officers and 2000 rank and file.

Admonished to speed by the thunder of the cannon at Bazeilles, the Guard, at seven o'clock, reached Villers-Cernay, its destination being to join hands with the Saxons on the left and with the third army on the right, so as to close the Givonne-Bouillon road to the enemy. After a hot artillery fight, its infantry took Haibes, and, through the capture of Daigny, effected its junction with the Saxons. At the same time the third army, after completely blocking the passage to the west, pushed itself, like a bar of iron, across the route to the north by way of St.-Menges. When the cavalry of the Guard, towards midday, reached Illy, and met the advance of the third army, the circle was closed. Without waiting for the co-operation of the other arms, the artillery of the eleventh and fifth army corps opened crushing fire upon Illy. The enemy comprehended the deadly danger threatening him at this point. General Marguerite charged, at the head of his horsemen, to burst the terrible toil in which he was immeshed; but before the hail of musketry and shells his squadrons became disintegrated and fled, leaving behind them a field strewn with corpses. Three times was the captured Illy assailed, but each time ineffectually. Floing, too, fell about midday into the hands of the Germans. Four hundred cannon vomited forth death upon the foes still holding the field with a heroism magnificent, indeed, but



fruitless. Once more Douay hurled his cavalry against the on-pressing Germans. General Marguerite, with thirty-six squadrons, charged against Floing. He himself fell, and his gallant force was shattered by the steady fire of the Prussians; a part fled for refuge over the Belgian frontier. And again the German infantry resumed its victorious advance. It mounted the plateau, where another wave of horsemen shattered itself against it like spray upon the rocks, and the French cavalry was practically annihilated. Shortly after three the plateau of Floing was fully in German hands, its occupants fleeing in wild disorder to the fortress. At the same moment von Kirchbach seized Calvaire d'Illy. At the sacrifice of his last strength, Douay strove to maintain this, the key of the French position; but in vain. In a last victorious onset the fifth and eleventh corps, mingled with Guards and Saxons, carried the wood of Garenne, making many prisoners, and captured even the suburb of Cazal.

On the opposite side von der Tann, re-enforced by the Bavarian division of Walther, set himself with fresh vigor to the capture of Balan. By two o'clock this place, stretching to the glacis of the fortress, was carried. At the same instant, when the eleventh and fifth corps precipitated themselves from Calvaire d'Illy upon the fleeing foe, the Saxons and the Guard made their last onset by way of Daigny and Haibes. At the burning homestead of Querimont, where the French, like wild beasts in a trap, were penned in on all sides, there was a furious hand-to-hand conflict, where all who did not surrender were slaughtered. The whole height east of the Givonne was crowned with 180 German guns, that of Floing with 172; and from both positions their shot was showered down, like a hailstorm of iron, on the ever-narrowing space into which the French were now hemmed, in impotent despair. So frenziedly did the fugitives rush for the fortress that many were suffocated or trodden to death in the narrow opening of the gate. Then, as no signal of surrender was yet shown, the king gave orders to direct the deadly shot-storm upon the city itself. Fire broke out in several places. Napoleon, who at midday had ridden back to the fortress from his point of observation on the height of La Moncelle, now realized that all was lost, and that continued resistance meant only an unavailing slaughter. For the last time he exercised his prerogative as sovereign, and ordered the white flag to be hoisted. Wimpffen caused it to be hauled down. Even yet he dreamed of cutting his way to Carignan, and, rallying some thousands of men, led them to the weakening Lebrun. It was



in vain. The Bavarians resolutely repelled this, the last, attack also. At six o'clock the battle was at an end.

At the same time that Lieutenant-Colonel von Schellendorf appeared in Sedan with a flag of truce and a demand for its surrender, and was referred by the emperor to Wimpffen as commander-in-chief, Napoleon himself despatched General Reille with a letter to the king. "Sire, my brother," it said, "since I have failed to find death among my troops, there only remains for me to place my sword in the hands of your majesty." The king wrote in reply: "Sire, my brother, while I lament the circumstances in which we meet, I accept your majesty's sword, and beg you to invest one of your officers with full powers to treat regarding the capitulation of the army that has fought so bravely under your command. On my side I have nominated General Moltke." The king and his son, deeply moved, fell on each other's necks. Throughout the field hurrahs spread, myriad-voiced, from troop to troop. At ten o'clock the first consultation concerning the capitulation was held in Bismarck's quarters in Donchéry, with General Wimpffen accompanied by Generals Castelnau and Faure. In vain did the Frenchmen plead for an alleviation of the terms; in vain did Castelnau, instructed by the emperor, urge that the latter had surrendered himself to the king personally in the hope of thus securing more honorable conditions for his army; equally in vain was the threat of a renewal of the struggle. "The armistice," declared Moltke, "expires to-morrow at four in the morning; at four precisely I reopen fire." Ultimately the hour was extended to nine. This interval Napoleon employed to make a personal effort to obtain milder terms. But in the neighborhood of Frénois he met only Bismarck — not the king, who had slept at Vendresse, fifteen miles away. His attempt was all the more hopeless, that he declared himself, as a prisoner, precluded from treating for a peace. An audience with the king was denied him till the capitulation was concluded; and for this end, after a council of war had pronounced this unavoidable, Wimpffen betook himself for a second time to the German headquarters. At eleven o'clock the terms were signed in the Château Bellevue. The whole French army, 84,000 strong, 600 cannon, and all the war material, fell into the hands of the victors. In the battle there had been taken 21,000; the killed and wounded amounted to 13,000, while several thousands had escaped into Belgium or to Mezières.

On the height of Frénois, Bismarck and Moltke delivered the

subscribed agreement to the king, who, turning to the princely throng about him, expressed to them, in impassioned terms, his gratitude for their co-operation. To his wife he telegraphed: "What a change, through God's providence!" And now he proceeded to Bellevue to meet Napoleon, where the castle of Wilhelmshöhe, at Cassel, was designated as his place of confinement. After this King William visited the battle-field, where he was received with an enthusiasm that baffles description.

So of the two armies that expected to enter Berlin in triumph, the one was carried captive across the Rhine, the other was shut up in Metz awaiting the same fate. For this unexampled success Moltke was, first of all, entitled to the gratitude of Germany; and, in a scarcely less degree, the king himself, who, in the reorganized army, supplied him with so admirably efficient an instrument; and finally the troops themselves, for the unhesitating devotion which they brought to the execution of their most arduous and most perilous tasks. The rejoicings called forth at home by the well-nigh incredible news must be left to the imagination. The whole nation was penetrated with the conviction that it had reached one of the greatest epoch-making conjunctures in its history, and that the blood shed in the war would form the cement of national unity. The gifts for relief of the wounded doubled themselves everywhere, while in every heart there sprung the hope of an early peace. But Bismarck saw with clearer eyes, and, even on the field of Sedan, did not venture to indulge such anticipations. The strength of France was far from being exhausted, and a new and obdurate struggle was yet to be required to bring its people to submit to the dictates of a conqueror.

Bazaine's attempt to co-operate with MacMahon's march to his relief, by himself breaking through the German lines, proved unavailing, though some slight successes were gained at first in the battle of Noisseville, fought on August 31 and September 1. The French retired to Metz unmolested, and with this ended Bazaine's only earnest attempt to break through the girdle environing him.

The news that reached the ears of the Parisians from the theatre of war was meagre in the extreme. True, the ministers did not fail to dress up reports of German defeats, losses, and retreats; and, even on September 2, *La Patrie* served up a crushing defeat of the Prussians at Longwy, in consequence of which they had had to take refuge in Luxemburg, where they were disarmed. But the empress had already, on the previous evening, received, from Vinoy at

Mezières, information of the issue of the battle, and on the 3d received from her husband the laconic telegram: "The army is defeated and captured; I myself am a prisoner of war." By evening the fact was a secret to no one. Distrusting Trochu, the empress-regent had recourse for counsel to Thiers, who, however, declined to respond, as he did to the imperious demand of numerous deputies that he should place himself at their head and anticipate the inevitable revolution. The empire no longer existed. Overturned by no party movement, by no conspiracy, it disappeared simply because success had deserted it. When Palikao, at a night-meeting of the legislative body, briefly detailed what had occurred, Jules Favre rose and moved: "Louis Napoleon and his dynasty are deposed; the chamber names a commission of government with the duty of continuing the defence to the uttermost, and driving the foe out of the land; General Trochu is confirmed as governor of Paris." No minister had a word to say in opposition, and the chamber adjourned till next day at noon. While the streets already assumed a very threatening aspect, Palikao read in the chamber a project of law constituting a council of government and natural defence, with the power of naming ministers, he himself being invested with the office of governor-general. Thiers immediately made a counter-proposition, which, while confirming the appointment of a council of government, called for the summoning of a constituent assembly. Of the imperial dynasty no word more was heard. But the chamber, before its members could proceed to debate, was filled with a wild rabble of the populace, mingled with National Guards, who forced their way forward with the cry of "*Vive la république.*" In the midst of the tumult Gambetta's stentorian voice was heard demanding the deposition of Louis Napoleon and his dynasty for all time. The motion was accepted with an uproar of applause, whereupon the masses took their way to the Hôtel de Ville to proclaim the republic there. The empress fled from the Tuileries to the house of her dentist (Dr. Evans), who conducted her to the coast, and thence to England.

Meanwhile eleven deputies of Paris — Arago, Jules Favre, Garnier-Pagès, Gambetta, Picard, Ferry, Rochefort, etc. — installed themselves at the Hôtel de Ville as a provisional government. In the new ministry Favre became foreign minister; Trochu, war minister and president; Gambetta, without any ceremony, took possession of the interior, and began his career with the deposition of all prefects. A decree of the government enacted the dissolution of the legislative



body and the abolition of the senate. On the 6th Favre issued a pompous manifesto, in which, parodying the words of King William, he declared that the latter carried on war only against Napoleon, whose fall took away all pretext for the continuation of hostilities, adding the lofty boast that, in any event, France would surrender no foot-breadth of her soil nor a stone of her fortresses. The government fixed October 16 as the day for the election to the new national assembly.

The expectation that the victors, after the capture of Napoleon, would recross the Rhine without other compensation than the republic's forgiveness for their irruption, found no response in Germany. There everyone was conscious that the decisive word was to be spoken before the walls of Paris; and thither, as soon as the annihilation of the army of Châlons had opened the way to the heart of the land, the German host took its way. On the march an episode occurred which evinced the bitterness of the national feeling. After the surrender of the citadel of Laon to Duke William of Mecklenburg, a French soldier exploded its powder magazine, thereby causing the death of 100 Germans, and three times as many Frenchmen. In order to prevent the capital from being shut in, General Ducrot (Fig. 86), an escaped prisoner of Sedan, led, on September 19, a sortie against the Poseners advancing on Versailles, but was repulsed by a Bavarian corps falling on his left wing, composed of newly enrolled Zouaves, who shamefully took to flight. The storming by the Bavarians of the intrenched heights of Châtillon completed the investment of Paris, and necessitated the abandonment of all the French positions outside the circle of the forts. On the south side the army of the crown prince of Prussia stretched like a bow from Bougival, opposite Mont-Valérien, to Noissy on the Marne, and with the army of the Meuse on the north formed a circle which, measured on the line of foreposts, was not less than sixty-one miles in circumference. The grand headquarters was at Versailles.

The French saw in a siege of Paris an outrage of unheard-of enormity. The manifesto in which Victor Hugo declared to the world: "Paris is the centre of humanity, the capital of civilization, the sacred city: who attacks Paris attacks the whole human race; that such a focus of enlightenment, such a centre of intellects, hearts, and souls, such a brain of universal thought, should be desecrated, battered, stormed, and by whom, by hordes of barbarians! All this is impossible!" voiced the sentiment of every Frenchman. In like





FIG. 86. — General Ducrot. From a photograph.

manner it seemed to the provisional government self-evident that all the rest of the world was bound to spring forward to the help of sorely oppressed France, and that in a more effective form than the United States and Switzerland had done, who greeted their new-born sister republic with warm, indeed, but empty words of affection. Vehemently urged by Favre, Lord Granville let himself, at length, be prevailed on to ask Bismarck whether, and under what conditions, he would enter upon negotiations. The present rulers thought themselves entitled to special indulgence, inasmuch as they were of the party who had steadily disapproved of the war; but Bismarck's answer of September 13 gave them to know that Germany did not look for her guaranties in French sentiment, but only in making a renewed aggression more difficult by pushing her frontier farther back, and making the fortresses from which France threatened her into bulwarks for her defence. On the news that Thiers, despite his seventy-three years, was setting forth to invoke the intervention of the other powers, he admonished these that it would only be cruelty to foster hopes which could not be fulfilled, and by so doing prolong the war. "Strasburg in the hands of France was an open gate for her sallies into South Germany; in the hands of Germany—that in more than twenty wars had never been the aggressor—it, as well as Metz, would acquire a defensive character."

With standpoints so inconsistent it was a foregone conclusion that the interview granted by the chancellor to Favre, on the 19th, at Montry, and then, next day, at Rothschild's country seat in Ferrières, could have no practical result, and this the more that they bore only a private character, since Germany did not recognize the provisional government. They treated, therefore, mainly of an armistice to enable the National Assembly, already summoned, to constitute itself, and choose a permanent government, which could legitimately enter upon peace negotiations. "Strasburg," said Bismarck to the man who had vowed never to surrender a foot-breadth of French territory, nor a stone of a French fortress, "Strasburg is the key to our house, and we must have the keeping of it." The conditions Favre took back to Paris were: In and before Paris the maintenance of the *status quo*; before Metz, the continuance of hostilities; the surrender of Strasburg with its garrison as prisoners of war; as also of Toul and Bitsch, excepting that their garrisons should depart free. The Paris government rejected them absolutely; nor was their indignation mitigated by the reports Thiers brought back from London,

St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Florence, all uniting to show that France could reckon on no help from other powers. The fall of Toul, on September 21, aggravated the situation by materially facilitating the provisioning of the German army.

But since Sedan a marked change had developed itself in the sentiments of the other countries, who at first, almost without exception, had condemned France. Most evident of all was this in England, where the sudden uprearing of the German giant awakened unpleasant reflections in regard to the future. The sympathies of the British trader went forth, not unnaturally, to the country he found so good a customer for all the necessities of war; England, and, next to it, North America, being the arsenals whence France supplied herself with equipments in lieu of those she had lost. The German navy, however, made itself effective in seizing contraband of war in the Atlantic.

Of the possibility of Paris being besieged no Frenchman had dreamed at the outbreak of the war; and, therefore, not the slightest provision had been made for such an eventuality. The Palikao ministry at length began preparations by erecting new outworks at the most vulnerable points, and arming them with naval guns brought from the seaports, as well as by the accumulation of articles of consumption of all sorts. Even after the investment became a fact, the people evidenced no uneasiness. The novel situation had a kind of charm for them, and the newspapers amused their public with childish rhodomontade. Paris was to become either a Saragossa or a Moscow; one Archimedes after another offered the government his device for the annihilation of the barbarians, and Rochefort found his appropriate place as president of the barricade commission. The core of the garrison was constituted by the thirteenth corps (Vinoy), that had managed to reach Paris from Mezières, the marines, and fragments of other sections of the army. Far surpassing these in numbers were the National Guards and *gardes mobiles*, who proved, however, innocuous to the 'Prussians,' but a real menace to the government and the city itself. To capture Paris, which resembled a gigantic intrenched camp rather than a fortress, by direct assault was out of the range of possibility, and for a bombardment heavy guns were wanting. There remained, therefore, only the alternative of starving it into submission; and even in regard to this, the besiegers greatly underrated the citizens' power of endurance. Trochu's sallies bore a stereotyped character. The German outposts were first driven



in by superior numbers; but as soon as the main positions were reached, the assailants met such a reception that they were forced, after heavy losses, to retire to the city. Those of September 30 and October 13, led by Vinoy, had the same experiences. On October 18 the fort of Mont-Valérien set the beautiful château of St.-Cloud on fire, and reduced it to ashes. When, on the 21st, Ducrot burst forth from Valérien against Bougival, the Versaillese made sure of seeing the red-breeches once more amongst them and victorious, but General Kirchbach made them also glad to withdraw. Great was the exultation in Paris, when, on the 28th, the French got possession of the village of Le Bourget on the east of St.-Denis; but the rejoicing was short-lived, for two days thereafter, after an obstinate house-to-house and barricade fight, this important place was recaptured by the second division of the Guard, and 1200 prisoners left in the hands of the Germans.

With wise precaution the Bank of France, before the city was completely shut in, had placed its bullion and cash, along with the crown diamonds, in security in Brest, and thus enabled itself to advance, as required, 1600 million francs (£309,000,000) to the government for war purposes. The government itself, however, did not withdraw from the capital. Ridiculous as it seems for a country to be ruled from a blockaded fortress with no means of communication with the outside world but through the air by balloons and carrier-pigeons, yet to Frenchmen any other place than Paris was unthinkable as the seat of power. In order, however, not to be wholly out of touch with the provinces, the government established a 'delegation,' at first of a single individual—the aged Crémieux—in Tours, adding afterwards three colleagues. Such an arrangement naturally precluded all unity of rule, and served, rather, to foster the spirit of anarchy now raising its head in the south. Lyons, where clustered the Russian Bakúnin, the Pole Dombrowsky, and other birds of prey, raised the red flag, and Marseilles and Toulouse followed its example. Thirteen departments united to form the 'League of the South;' in the historic land of the Vendécans, eleven other departments constituted the Catholic-Royalist 'League of the West.' The Paris government—well knowing that the National Assembly, the elections for which had been fixed for October 2, would declare for peace—adopted the traditional revolutionary policy of a minority in power in making all bow before its will, and again suspended the election. The delegation, on the other hand, in accord



with the desire of the provinces, fixed the general election for October 16.

A rule thus divided could not endure. On October 6 Gambetta, invested by the provisional government with plenipotentiary powers, left Paris in a balloon for Tours, where he assumed the rôle of dictator. His first step was to revoke the order of the election; his next, to conjoin the war ministry with that of the interior already

held by him, appointing as his delegate in the former office the engineer Freycinet (Fig. 87), who now undertook the organization of the national defence.

The task instantly pressing on the government was to arouse the country to come to the help of the capital. But the means immediately at hand for effecting this were of the most meagre possible. An incomplete division called home from Algiers furnished the nucleus for a new fifteenth corps organized in Orleans under General Lamotte-



FIG. 87. — Freycinet. From a photograph.

rouge; and this, with disconnected bands of Breton volunteers under General Fiereck, and 24,000 men who had retreated on Besançon, under General Cambriels, constituted the whole strength of France outside of Paris and Metz. Yet by the exhibition of extraordinary energy the potentates in Tours were, within four months, successful in developing a national army of 600,000 men, and in enkindling a people's war, that, through the spread of the guerilla system, and the participation of civilians, became a serious annoyance to the invaders. Weapons and all other munitions and

equipments that France herself could not supply, her fleet brought home from America and England. The government's main mistake lay in this, that, misled by the traditions of 1792, it regarded these levies *en masse* as already effective troops, and, therefore, filled the ranks by transferring contingents of the *garde mobile* to the regular army, mobilizing, in place, the corresponding contingents of the National Guard. In this way it came about that the Germans, with disproportionately small forces, were able to hold these untrained masses in check.

The grand centre for all these levies, gathered along both banks of the Loire for the deliverance of Paris, was Orleans. The enemy, however, allowed them little time for the needful organization and instruction. As soon as the cavalry of Prince Albert of Prussia, which ranged through the Beauce, partly to secure the rear of the investing army and partly to forage, clearly ascertained that large bodies of men were assembling on the Loire, the crown prince or-



FIG. 88. — General von der Tann. From a photograph.

ordered the organization of an army of observation — mainly Bavarians — to the number of 28,000, with 160 guns, at whose head von der Tann took the way to Orleans. At Artenay, to the north of this city, he came, on October 10, upon the fifteenth French corps, and routed it, taking 2000 prisoners. This decided Lamotte-rouge to withdraw behind the Loire, not, however, without main-

taining a stubborn though unsuccessful fight on the eleventh, to defend Orleans. In the evening it was occupied by the Bavarians. Moltke had wished that von der Tann (Fig. 88) should follow up his successes beyond the Loire, especially for the purpose of destroying the numerous factories of arms and arsenals at Bourges; but the general held it impolitic with the small force at his disposal to extend his operations beyond Orleans.

It was of the highest advantage to the Germans that the troops before Strasburg and Metz were set free by the fall of both of these strong places. On September 27, after a breach was effected in the main wall and all made ready for the storming, General Urich, after a gallant defence of fifty days, surrendered Strasburg. Over 17,000 men, 1200 cannon, great stores of war material, and 10,000,000 francs in the state bank fell into the hands of the conquerors. Bazaine, whose position after Sedan as the head of the only large regular army left in France filled his mind with political ambitions sadly detrimental to his military efficiency, attempted by means of messengers some very equivocal negotiations with Napoleon and Eugénie, who, however, resolutely refused to interfere in French politics. The marshal's dreams of an armistice and a dictatorship over France were rudely dispelled by the speedy exhaustion of his provisions.

Capitulation became unavoidable. On October 27 the terms were agreed on. The entire army, — 173,000 strong, — including the three marshals, Bazaine, Canrobert, and Leboeuf, became prisoners of war; and Metz, with all its stores, was given over to the conquerors. All officers who gave their written pledge not to serve during the war were allowed to retain their arms.

Two great armies carried captive into Germany, a third driven behind the Loire at Orleans, and a fourth shut up in Paris, — such were the results that earned for the crown prince and Prince Frederick Charles their marshal's batons and for Moltke the title of count. But the close of the war still seemed far off. Paris showed as little disposition as ever for submission. Willingly had Bismarck given his assent to the request of the American general, Burnside, to be allowed to enter the city as a mediator for peace, intimating at the same time, through him, his readiness to grant an armistice to enable the elections to be held. The reception which the generous American met with from the provisional government robbed even him of all hope of being of service. Thiers appeared on October 31,



at Versailles, to enter upon negotiations for a truce. Although all the disadvantages of an armistice were on the side of Germany, and all the advantages on that of France, he yet got Bismarck's assent to a cessation of hostilities for four weeks on the basis of the military *status quo*. Nevertheless, the whole transaction went to pieces on Thiers's declaration that he could accept an armistice only on condition of its including a liberal revictualling of Paris, and of his inability to offer any military equivalent, such as the surrender of one or two forts. When Bismarck expressed a desire that yet another attempt to come to an understanding should be made on a new basis before the resumption of hostilities, Thiers held a conference at the outpost line with Favre and Ducrot, but received from them only instructions to break off negotiations.

The fall of Metz occurred just at the right time for the Germans, who became more and more convinced that the complete subjugation of France was yet to cost them a heavy winter-campaign. New armies sprung up as it were from the ground. The 'great tribune' in Tours never relaxed in rousing the passions of the people. Bazaine was branded as a traitor; Lamotterouge, because he had not accomplished the impossible, was dismissed from his command, and replaced by General Aurelle de Paladines. But he, a veteran soldier, retired to Salbris, between Orleans and Vierzon, in order there to find leisure to convert his undisciplined levies into effective troops. But after the capitulation of Metz, Gambetta's impatience could no longer be restrained. From Blois the two corps constituting the army of the Loire had to advance at once to the attack on Orleans. The wooded character of the country enabled the French to make their dispositions almost entirely out of view of von der Tann. But as soon as he gained a clear conception of their object, he deemed it unadvisable to await the onset in the position before the city, covered as it was with vineyards and other plantations, but decided to go forth to meet it. On November 9, at Coulmiers, he maintained with barely 20,000 men a struggle of six hours with 70,000, but after a loss of 800 men had to desert the field and evacuate the city. It was France's first victory, and was to be her last. But the exultation of the French was unbounded. Gambetta and Freycinet flew to the spot to improve the victory to the utmost, only, however, to become convinced through their own eyes how correct de Paladines was in his assertion that his troops were not available for a strong offensive. Instead of hurrying to the relief of



Paris, they had to content themselves with converting Orleans into an intrenched camp, and ordering new levies for the organization of two more army-corps.

The German head-quarters had never for a moment lost sight of the danger arising in the west, and immediately on the fall of Metz took steps to meet it. While Manteuffel, restored in command of the first army, turned himself northward in order to capture the strong places on the Meuse, and thereby keep open the Ardennes

railroad, so essential for supplies, Prince Frederick Charles got orders to hurry his march on the Loire. To cover the latter's left flank Werder was instructed to advance on Dijon, after the storming of which by General Beyer, on October 30 and 31, his army, 22,000 strong, extended itself on a line, nearly fifty miles long, between Dijon and Vesoul, which it held for two months. Behind him General Treskow set about the investment of Belfort, commanding the passes between the Jura and the Vosges, while before him



FIG. 89. — Frederick Francis II., Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. From a photograph.

he had Cambriel's (later Michel's) corps, and also Garibaldi's volunteers of all nationalities, allured to the war by the word 'republic.' This once so daring partisan leader, now old and broken down, was a source of greater annoyance to the French than to the Germans. Further, a separate army was constituted out of the first Bavarian corps and various infantry and cavalry divisions, and put under the grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (Fig. 89) with the duty of

checking any movement for the relief of Paris from the southwest. Prince Frederick Charles presently recalled the grand duke so as to be able to meet the evidently contemplated advance toward the capital with his entire force.

Meanwhile impatience had once more taken possession of the strategists in Tours. They decided that Aurelle (Fig. 90) should without delay resume the offensive, and that in such a way as to combine his operations with a great prearranged sally; and when the



FIG. 90. — Aurelle de Paladines. From a photograph.

wary general insisted on awaiting the attack of the Germans behind his intrenchments, they themselves assumed command of the army of the Loire, now numbering 200,000 men. Gambetta's and Freycinet's plan was that the army should press on to Fontainebleau by way of Pithiviers, and there, supported by a sally under Duerot, shatter the iron wall around the city. Thus it happened that Prince Frederick Charles, when on the eve of attacking the position at Orleans, was himself made the object of attack. The tenth corps, now counting only 11,000 men with seventy-six guns, saw itself on

the 28th confronted at Beaune-la-Rolande by an enemy of 60,000 men and 138 guns. Notwithstanding this disparity, it repulsed all attacks on the town till the Brandenburgers came at length to its aid. In the combat the twentieth corps, Crouzat's, suffered most severely on the French side, and once more illustrated the fact that these freshly-raised levies, while bearing themselves bravely in actual conflict, went to pieces in the retreat. The Germans again stood on the line of Orgères, Toury, and Pithiviers.

The advance of the right wing of the army of the Loire had miscarried. But on November 30 there came by balloon to Tours the announcement (sent out four days before) that Ducrot was, on the 29th, to attempt an outbreak with 100,000 men, and in case of success would take the road for Gien, in order there to effect a junction with the army of the Loire. It was now, therefore, two days that he had been engaged. Help to him could no longer be delayed. On that very evening Aurelle received the formal order—corroborated by a council of war—to advance without delay with his whole army. A success gained by Chanzy at Villepion over von der Tann, on December 1, though slight, heightened the confidence in success; and a fabricated report that the sally had been crowned with victory, sent out from Paris in the evening, converted it into certainty. Prince Frederick Charles was regarded in Tours as already lost. Full of this conviction, Chanzy, on the 2d, continued his advance; but soon, at the villages of Loigny and Poupriy, he struck on the section of the army under the grand duke, which repulsed all his assaults, and forced him to retreat. On the same day the prince had orders from Versailles to advance at once on Orleans, and strike the decisive blow. He set out thither on the 3d, with his entire force, and with little opposition reached within ten miles of it; but, on the supposition that the French would defend their fortified positions obstinately, postponed the attack on them till the following day. On this day he drew the circle still closer around the city. In accordance with Gambetta's orders it was Aurelle's purpose to concentrate his whole army on Orleans, and defend it to the last extremity. But his arrangements for this end could not be carried out, since his connection with his wings had been already broken by the Germans. Retreat behind the Loire became imperative. The threat of bombardment brought about the evacuation of the city on the following night, which was promptly occupied by the grand duke. Thus ended the first attempt of the



French to unify the strength of the provinces for the relief of their beleaguered capital.

In this struggle of two days before Orleans the French sacrificed 20,000 men — no fewer than 18,000 of whom were prisoners — 74 guns, and 4 gunboats left deserted on the Loire. The Germans purchased their success — the piercing of Aurelle's centre and its disruption from the wings — with a loss of 1700. Aurelle expiated his defeat by the loss of his command.

The army of the Loire was again divided into two armies — the first, under Bourbaki, of three corps, which retreated up the river along the left bank; the second, under Chanzy, of two corps, with two new ones organized by Keratry behind Le Mans, which moved down the river by the right bank. The grand duke was detached to follow up the latter, while Frederick Charles himself led another section of his army towards Vierzon in the hope of reaching Bourges. At Beaugency the grand duke came on an enemy five times stronger than himself, with which for four days (December 7 to 10) his weak command had to maintain the conflict from dawn to dusk without intermission. Even at night the foreposts were barely a musket-shot asunder. This stubborn stand made by the French determined the prince to forego his advance on Bourges, and bring help to the hard-beset grand duke, and this the more particularly that the capture of Tours had been earnestly urged upon him from Versailles. Chanzy had reckoned on Bourbaki's pressing on to help him; but that general, after getting as far as Vierzon, declared he commanded nothing but a demoralized horde of exhausted weaklings, and turned squarely back. Chanzy, now seeing himself threatened in the rear by Manstein's advance upon Blois, escaped out of the net which was being drawn around him by skilfully retiring on Vendôme. Here the struggle was renewed with fresh fury on the 14th and 15th, less, however, in the form of an ordered battle than of a desperate attempt at resistance. Chanzy had to make up his mind to another retreat, this time behind the Loir — a movement rendered more dangerous to him by the demoralization of his troops than through the pursuit by the enemy. It was not till he reached Le Mans that he was able to restore any degree of order. The 'outside government' had on the 12th transferred its seat from Tours to Bordeaux.

From this time forth there set in a lull in the western theatre of the war: and as it did not comport with the general plan of cam-



paign that the second army should be at such a distance from Paris, Prince Frederick Charles recalled such of his troops as had crossed over to the left bank of the Loire. The tenth army corps kept watch on the Loir. The grand duke, re-enforced by fresh cavalry, and standing at Chartres and Dreux, resumed his task of covering the rear of the investing forces against the west. The Bavarians, who had had the hardest work of all in these fighting December days, returned to Orleans. They, and indeed all the army, stood in sore need of rest and repairs. Their clothing was in rags, their foot-gear worn out, their ammunition all but spent, and yet no end was to be seen to these all but superhuman exertions. Gambetta, now the creature of uncontrolled passion, refused even to speak of peace, but declared war to the knife, and educing troops from the ground by the stamp of his foot, drove them forth into the field without asking whether they could march or fight. And now the question suggested itself to the German minds whether the forbearance they had hitherto shown were the right means for dealing with this planless resistance. The war assumed a more savage character, and on the French side was conducted with such disregard to humanity and international law that Bismarck felt himself impelled to denounce it before all Europe.

The troops environing Paris now enjoyed a condition of comparative quiet, though one calling for constant watchfulness. The charming country residences of the Parisians afforded them pleasant quarters; and when in the cold of winter all other fuel failed them, many a costly piece of furniture found its way into the fireplace. But their patience, like that of those at home, was sorely tried when the telegraph had nothing to report but the weary formula, "Nothing new before Paris." A bombardment the leaders either wished to avoid altogether or regarded as impracticable before the arrival of a siege-train. They calculated on Christmas being the latest date to which the city could hold out, but its tenacity derided all their calculations. Paris — the brilliant and light-loving — was even able to exist without gas. Mortality rose to double the average; the beef-cattle melted away, and there were none to replace them; horse-flesh became a delicacy, and after the horses came the tenants of the zoölogical garden. Cookery won its highest triumphs in converting what men at other times would shudder at into toothsome morsels. But the grand fact was that the spirit of the people remained unbroken, while the news of the victory of Coulmiers and the re-





Paris and vicinity, 1870-71

capture of Orleans inspired them with new lust for battle and more confidence in deliverance. Measures were at once adopted for breaking through the iron wall of circumvallation, and joining hands with the victoriously advancing army of the Loire. "As for myself,"—thus did Ducrot conclude his announcement of the impending great sally—"I swear to you before the whole nation that I will return to Paris only as a conqueror or a corpse. You may see me fall, but never retreat." (See PLATE XVII.: Paris and Vicinity, 1870-1871.)

The total armed strength within Paris amounted in round numbers to 400,000 men. Of these 80,000 *mobiles* stood in the forts and outside works, and 35,000 men held the fortifications of St.-Denis under Vice-Admiral de la Roncière le Noury. The remainder were divided into three armies. The first, under General Clément Thomas, comprised 266 battalions of National Guards, with one legion of cavalry and one of artillery, in all 130,000 men. Its special duty was to man the walls and maintain order in the city; but the most serviceable men were formed into *bataillons de marche*, 400 to 500 strong, to take the duties of the *gardes mobiles* when these were employed outside the fortifications. The second army, over 100,000 strong, was under Ducrot, and destined for the sorties. To it, therefore, the most reliable troops were assigned. The third, under Vinoy, 70,000 strong, was to occupy the enemy by feint-attacks on his front. On November 28 the troops destined for the sally were assembled around Vincennes; in the following night a division of the third army occupied Mont-Avron. On the 29th the grand attempt was to be made. While Vinoy attracted the attention of the Germans towards the south by a sally towards Epinal, Buzenval, and L'Hay, Ducrot was to cross the Seine between Joinville and Neuilly, and establish himself on the elevated plateau towards the east. An unseasonable flood, however, occasioned a postponement till next day, and gave time for the counter-preparations of the Germans, whom the attack by the army of the Loire on Beaune-la-Rolande had admonished to special watchfulness. On the following forenoon Ducrot threw himself with an overpowering force upon the positions of the Würtembergers and Saxons, and after a hot struggle captured the villages of Brie and Champigny. His subsequent inactivity enabled the Germans to concentrate portions of the second and sixth corps on the places threatened, and to advance on December 2 to the recovery of those they had lost. By order of General



Fransecky — in command, under the crown prince of Saxony, of all the troops between the Marne and the Seine — Prince George in the early morning fell by surprise on Brie and Champigny. Bloody battles developed themselves in the course of the day between the French and the Würtembergers and Saxons, with the result that




FIG. 91. — Moltke in his office at Versailles, Rue Neuve 38. By Anton von Werner; from a sketch drawn on the spot in 1870.

at evening each of the combatants maintained essentially his own position. The German loss was about 6200, that of the French 12,000; and the utter impossibility of rupturing the iron girdle had been demonstrated. On the 3d Ducrot still continued standing on

the left bank of the Marne, but only to hold the foe fettered to this point, in view of the expected advance of the army of the Loire to Fontainebleau. In the following night he led back his grievously exhausted troops to the city without having redeemed his oath. A sally on the 21st against Le Bourget and Dugny was no more successful.

In this last sally much account had been made of the army of the north. This force, at first organized in Normandy out of scattered National Guards and *gardes mobiles*, had acquired solidity under Bourbaki by the accession of marines and of fugitives from Sedan and Metz. The numerous strong places along the Belgian frontier constituted excellent bases, from which the French troops, by availing themselves of the fortified bridges over the Somme at Ham, Peronne, Amiens, and Abbeville, could at any time fall on the rear of the besieging army. Much to their loss, Bourbaki was recalled by the Tours government to the Loire just at the moment (November 21) when the German first army under Manteuffel reached the Oise. On the 27th the latter struck on the army of the north under Bourbaki's temporary successor, General Farre, close to Amiens. The complete overthrow of the French resulted, who fled with all speed to Arras. On the 29th the citadel of Amiens capitulated, Thionville having already done so on the 25th and Fère on the 27th. Montmédy followed on December 14. Leaving von Göben to occupy Amiens, Manteuffel marched on Rouen, which the French, contrary to expectation, evacuated without a blow, and delivered its civic authorities from domestic revolution. He now, for the purpose of covering the siege, established his main force on the Somme and the lower Seine, sending out strong columns to scour the country, disarm the inhabitants, and disperse any bands gathering, and causing von Göben to occupy Dieppe. How needful these measures were was proved by the surprise of a Saxon cavalry detachment in Etrepagny on November 30, and another surprise at Ham on December 9. But his main tasks were to render innoeuus the Norman bands holding the field under Briand, and to check the advance of the corps which had retreated on Arras, now under the command of General Faidherbe (Fig. 92). Various signs indicated that the latter had Amiens as his main object. Manteuffel, in compliance with orders from headquarters to attack any organized bodies appearing on the field, although his own force was little more than 20,000 men, did not hesitate, without waiting for re-en-

forcements, to march to the attack of Faidherbe's three times more numerous host. He assailed him in a strong position on the farther high bank of the Hallue, a tributary of the Somme; and although unable to drive him from it in a two-days' conflict (December 23, 24), he yet wrested from him, one after another, the villages on the stream itself; and when on the morning of the 25th he was pre-



FIG. 92. — General Faidherbe. From a photograph.

paring to renew the attack, it was discovered that the French had withdrawn to within range of the guns of the fortresses. The fall of Peronne, on January 9, 1871, gave the Germans command of the whole line of the Somme.

In the west the French second army of the Loire, resting in winter-quarters at Le Mans, though itself inactive, held a not inconsiderable position of the German strength in check, and prevented its



employment elsewhere. But early in January Prince Frederick Charles and the Grand Duke Frederick Francis were in full march against Chanzy (Fig. 93). The whole region between the Loir and Sarthe is thickly covered by vineyards, orchards, and vegetable gardens. The people live mainly in separate, strongly built home-



FIG. 93. — General Chanzy. From a photograph.

steads: and castles, with extensive parks fenced in by hedges, walls, and ditches, intervene at frequent intervals. Everywhere positions offered themselves where even indifferent troops could make a resolute stand under cover. In such a country but little use could be made of artillery and cavalry. Infantry had almost the whole brunt to bear. It was practically impossible for the general com-



manders to direct operations, so that each leader had to depend on himself. The difficulties of the troops were enhanced by the setting in of a winter of unusual severity. Snowflakes filled the air, while many of the foot-soldiers were marching in linen hose and worn-out shoes; the cavalry and artillery had to scramble incessantly through deep gullies and clefts and up steep ascents. In the face of all difficulties the men struggled forward with unbroken determination. Advancing in a wide bow, they drove what enemies they met back upon Le Mans. Here, on January 11, Chanzy took his stand for battle. The struggle that ensued remained undecided till dusk. But when, on the following morning, Admiral Jaureguiberry announced that all attempts to lead the troops again forward were vain, and that the last reserves were expended, Chanzy gave orders for the retreat, leaving 20,000 prisoners with many trophies and stores in the hands of the victors. They, too, had suffered severe losses, in all 3,650 men, especially the Brandenburgers, many of whose companies were led by sergeants. But the object of the movement on Le Mans had been attained; the army of the Loire was pressed back from Paris as far as Mayenne. Its condition was best demonstrated by the wagons left behind it, and the great numbers of arms cast away. The Breton National Guards broke in wild flight for their homes. The army of the Loire had lost half its strength, and was rendered ineffective for a considerable time to come.

What prevented its more vigorous pursuit, was the news that the French army of the north, re-enforced by troops brought by sea, was making ready for a renewed attack. It was imperative, therefore, that the first army should forthwith concentrate itself on the Somme; the thirteenth army-corps was accordingly summoned to Rouen. Faidherbe's plan was to turn his enemy's left flank, but Göben (Fig. 94) who had taken place of Manteuffel called away to the east, on January 19, inflicted a severe defeat on him at St.-Quentin. Three thousand wounded and nine thousand unwounded prisoners testified how incompetent these hastily scraped up masses were to cope with the disciplined soldiers of Germany. In vain did Gambetta hasten to Lille in the hope of reviving their courage by his magniloquent oratory. The army of the north was no longer capable of continuing the struggle.

Paris's power of resistance also neared the end. Through the two-fold effect of dearth and a winter of unwonted severity, this city of profusion and luxury became more and more a scene of privation and

misery. And now, moreover, the German bombs began to have a word to say. The two days' bombardment of Mont-Avon, which caused Trochu to evacuate it on December 29, constituted the introduction to that of Forts Issy, Vanvres and Montrouge on the south side, whose fires were partially silenced. The French attempts to destroy the advancing works were regularly repulsed. And now



FIG. 94. — General von Gölben. From a photograph.

the German shells, by an elevation of thirty degrees, acquired a range of 7500 to 8000 metres, thereby reaching the city itself. From January 5 onwards 400 to 500 fell daily into the quarters on the left bank of the Seine, and did considerable damage. But their moral effect was still greater than their material, and that not on the citizens alone. The foreign ministers remaining in the city entered a protest against a bombardment without previous announcement to them, only to be informed by Bismarck that military considerations

alone had weight in the matter, and that whoever voluntarily remained in the beleaguered city must himself assume the consequences.

The Dublin Academy and University, too, busied itself to rouse the other learned bodies throughout the civilized world to protest against the destruction with which the treasures of science and art within Paris were threatened, but to as little effect. The imprisoned citizens derived more comfort from Gambetta's assurances of the destruction impending over the Prussians through Chanzy's and Bourbaki's armies. Relying on these assurances, Trochu resolved to make one last desperate effort for deliverance by a sortie, on January 19, in the direction of Buzenval, to be undertaken by Generals Vinoy, Bellemare, and Ducrot, under his own personal direction. It was now only on the southern part of the peninsula of Gennevilliers and under the guns of Mont-Valérien that any considerable masses of men could be assembled. And, after all, nothing was effected beyond a useless waste of blood. The fifth army corps maintained its position against four times its number of assailants, without needing help from any quarter. Trochu was deposed from his governorship, and Vinoy, who was called to the ambiguous dignity, hesitated to accept it till a revolt, which began with opening the prisons, compelled him to act with energy. Concurrently with this, when the fall of the northern fortresses set the siege-guns free, the bombardment of St.-Denis was opened, and news was received of Chanzy's defeat at Le Mans.

While these symptoms combined to announce that Paris had entered upon her last agony, Versailles was witness of a very different and epoch-making scene—the proclamation of the German empire.

The blood poured forth by all the peoples of the fatherland in common had obliterated the artificial boundary-line of the Main, and the conviction gained ground from day to day that only through the creation of durable institutions could the bequest of this time of heroic effort and sacrifice be secured for Germany. Peoples and princes alike felt persuaded of the necessity for a faster bond of union between the north and south than that of an interstate league. As a great nation rose more and more into view, so the old curse of conflicting interests and separatism tended to vanish. The first suggestion came from Munich, where the young King Louis II. and his government reckoned it most politic to anticipate the inevitable. They let it be known, accordingly, in Berlin, as their conviction,

that the interstate compact that had hitherto allied the southern states with the northern confederation should be converted into a constitutional union. At their request Delbrück (Fig. 95), the Prussian minister of state, was commissioned to Munich, there to treat of the matter in detail, his sole instruction being to utter no word that could be construed into meaning that Prussia had it in mind to bring the slightest pressure to bear on the determinations of a loyal and proved ally. And to this principle Bismarck, in opposition to the crown prince, remained constant through all the negotiations. The Munich conferences were essentially furthered by Würtemberg's participation in them through its minister Mittnacht. His influence formed a salutary counterpoise to the extravagant claims which Bavaria believed it had to put forward in order to preserve its independence. Already, on October 2, Baden had made formal proposals for its admission into the North German Confederation, and Würtemberg and Hesse were on the point of following its example. If, therefore, Bavaria was not to remain entirely isolated and run the risk of either being



FIG. 95. — Minister Delbrück. From a photograph.

excluded from the confederation or of entering it later without any conditions, it, too, must take a step in advance. When, accordingly, the representatives of the four southern states came, in the later half of October, to Versailles — whither the further conferences had been transferred on a suggestion from Stuttgart — to consult with delegates from Prussia and with the Saxon minister von Friesen (Fig. 96), representing the other members of the North German Confederation, there was no difficulty in coming to an understanding with Baden and Hesse, which on November 15 signed a compact pledging them to union with the



Confederation, on the basis of a widening of its constitution into that of a new German confederation. Würtemberg would have followed suit had not Munich set every agency to work in Stuttgart to prevent such a consummation. But the threat of resignation by Würtemberg's two representatives at Versailles — the ministers Mittnacht and Sukow — sufficed to recall their royal master to his former course. Meanwhile Bismarck had constantly shown the greatest consideration for the semi-recalcitrant states. The federal constitution originally designed for only a part of Germany required



FIG. 96. — Baron von Friesen. From a photograph.

to be relaxed and otherwise modified, in order that it might be applicable to the whole land. Several articles were therefore elided from it and other alterations made, mainly out of regard for Bavaria. This kingdom retained full autonomy in time of peace in regard to its army, subordinating itself to the new confederation only in respect to uniformity with the others in the organization and equipment of its troops. It retained its own postal, telegraph, and railway systems, and its fiscal regulations in regard to beer and spirits, while the Confederation was precluded from interference with its relations to its subjects whether home or emigrant. Instead of

Bavaria's original claim to a veto on any change in the constitution, it was settled that such a power should be conceded to a minority of fourteen in the federal council. On these bases the contract of union was signed by it on November 23, and two days thereafter by Württemberg on much the same conditions.

"At length it is an accomplished fact," said Bismarck to those about him, when the covenant with Bavaria was signed, late in the night. "The newspapers," he continued after a pause, "will not be satisfied, and the historian of the common type will probably find fault with our compact. He may say 'The silly fellow should have demanded more. Had he done so they must have conceded it;' and perhaps he is not wrong with his 'must.' But to me it seemed of more importance that the peoples should be contented with the terms. What are treaties when people 'must'? I know they go hence satisfied. The compact has its deficiencies, but it is thereby just so much the stronger. I reckon it the grandest result attained in recent years."

By the accession of the four new states the members of the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*) were augmented from 43 to 58, those of the Reichstag from 297 to 382. Concerning the titles to be given to the new Confederation and its supreme head, men hesitated for a time. With that of 'Emperor' were associated too many memories of the calamities of the old empire for it to call forth any great enthusiasm. Notwithstanding, it was that which, as in 1848, most naturally recommended itself to the popular mind. The crown prince seems to have been the first to propose it, and Bismarck heartily accepted it. It recommended itself to the representatives of Bavaria at Versailles, inasmuch as they felt it must be easier for their sovereign to yield up certain of his prerogatives in favor of an emperor of Germany than of a brother king of Prussia. Count Holnstein brought the invitation to King Louis at Hohenschwangau to propose to his royal brothers the revival of the German empire and of the dignity of emperor. On November 30 — unwillingly or otherwise — he complied. After the assent of all had been secured, Prince Luitpold of Bavaria, as representing his royal nephew, brought the invitation to King William to assume the imperial rank, to which the North German Reichstag added their assent in an address carried by 191 against 6 votes. In the reception-hall of the prefecture of Versailles — a place recalling all the sacrifices through which the German peoples had had to purchase

their unification—the address was formally presented by a parliamentary deputation, with President Simson at its head.

With this the work of framing a new constitution could be regarded as accomplished. On the assumption that the assent of the South German legislatures would be received before the close of the year, the proclamation of the empire was set for January 1, 1871. In Baden, Hesse, and Würtemberg, this was granted without hesitation, as well as by the Bavarian Reichsrat, but the ‘patriotic’ Bavarian lower house delayed its assent until January 21.

Without waiting for the result of the Bavarian vote, on January 18—the 170th anniversary of Prussia as a kingdom—there was celebrated, within the mirror-hall of the palace of Versailles, the memorable ceremony of the proclamation of the New German Empire (Fig. 97). Detachments of all the regiments within reach were present with their battle-flags. Surrounded by the princes of his house and those of the other princely houses of Germany, and amid a concourse of statesmen and generals, stood ‘William the Victorious,’ worthy of the title with which Louis of Bavaria had already saluted him. After a short divine service, he read, amid the fluttering banners, the document proclaiming the empire, whereupon Bismarck, now imperial chancellor, by his command read the address announcing the empire to the German people. “We take upon us this imperial office,” it said, “in the hope that it will be granted the people of the fatherland to enjoy the fruits of their struggle, so rich in sacrifices, in enduring peace, and within territorial bounds that will guarantee them that security against attacks from France of which they have been so long bereft.” At the close of the reading the Grand Duke Frederick of Baden was the first to raise the cry: “Long live his Majesty, the Emperor William.”

All this time Paris was awaiting its fate. What this was to be, no one, after the abortive sally of the 19th, could longer doubt. Food and ammunition alike were all but at an end. To a council of war held on the 20th, the government invited the twenty mayors of the city, with the view of, if possible, devolving the sad task of treating concerning capitulation on them. But the civic authorities refused, with scorn, the ungrateful office, and demanded war to the knife and a new sortie. This, however, was sheer rhodomontade. No officer could have been found to lend himself to so purposeless a butchery. On the morning of the 24th an orderly brought to the outposts a note from Favre addressed to the chancellor asking a new






FIG. 97. — Proclamation of the new German Empire in the Palace of Louis XIV. at Versailles, on January 18, 1871. By Anton von Werner : from a sketch drawn on the spot.



conference. Bismarck said nothing of its contents; but he softly whistled "*Halali*,"<sup>1</sup> and those about him knew the stag was slain. On the same afternoon Favre left the city by stealth. Bismarck received him with but scant courtesy (Fig. 98). A resumption of the negotiations broken off at Ferrières on the basis of "no footbreadth of French soil," etc., he rejected curtly and unconditionally. He further restated his objections to entering into any covenant with a government of the illegitimate character of that of Paris, especially as it was extremely doubtful whether Gambetta would recognize any agreement they might come to. The French negotiator thus found himself at a disadvantage in every direction; but he held his ground manfully, insisting in especial, on two points: first, that during the armistice the German troops should not enter Paris; next, that the National Guards should retain their arms. On the 26th the difficulties were so far smoothed away that it was arranged that firing should cease from the following midnight till six next morning. On the 28th an armistice for three weeks was agreed on. The armies actually combatant on both sides were to remain in positions, seven miles from a line of demarcation drawn between them. The object of the armistice was declared to be to enable the government of national defence to summon a freely elected assembly, which, meeting at Bordeaux, should determine whether the war should be continued or on what terms peace should be concluded. All the forts outside the walls, with all war material, were made over to the Germans, and the walls themselves denuded of their guns. The garrisons in Paris and the forts, with the exception of 12,000 men for the maintenance of order within the city, became prisoners of war, and gave up their arms, but remained in Paris. In consideration of the Germans not entering the city, it paid an indemnity of 200,000,000 francs.

The departments of Côte d'Or, Doubs, and Jura were at the request of the French expressly excluded from the armistice; for there they still hoped the war would take a turn in their favor. This eastern region, therefore, became the scene of the last act in this mighty drama. To appreciate the reasons for this exception we must take a view, partly retrospective, of the situation there. Bel-fort still continued to hold out so resolutely that the weak force under General von Treskow was unable to overcome its resistance. But now the Bordeaux government was taken possession of by the

<sup>1</sup> The mort or note sounded on the death of the stag.



FIG. 98. — Bismarck and Jules Favre during the negotiations in the house of Madame Jessé at Versailles. By Anton von Werner, from a sketch drawn on the spot.

idea of a great diversion eastward, which indirectly should effect that in which the direct attempts from the Loire had failed, viz., the liberation of Paris. The first army of the Loire, under Bourbaki, setting out from Bourges, was thrown by way of Nevers towards the Saône, its mission being to capture Dijon, relieve Belfort, and break

the Germans' line of communication with the country in their rear, thus liberating the strong places in the north, and holding out a hand to Faidherbe. But great as were the hopes set on this expedition, mischance dogged it from the beginning. One essential to its success was absolute secrecy; instead of this, "the infallible scheme for the relief of Belfort" was trumpeted to all the world. The railroad transport, too, was slow beyond all expectation; while, from lack of preparation, confusion and stoppages were general, which, in the bitter cold and insufficient commissariat, subjected the troops to severe hardships. The head-quarters at Versailles kept its eyes wide open. The second and seventh army corps received orders to concentrate between Nuits and Châtillon-sur-Saône, with a view to the organization, out of them and all the troops already in the southeast, of a new army, — that of the south, — to be placed under Manteuffel. But till they came into the field, there were hard days in store for the fourteenth corps, but days, too, of imperishable fame. Bourbaki's view was to overlap the left wing of his enemy standing on the Ognon, and thus force him entirely away from Belfort. But finding Villersexel more strongly occupied by the Germans than he expected, he was compelled to draw off farther than he purposed towards the right, and thus gave them time to prepare for his reception. On January 9, 15,000 men, under von der Holtz, maintained there for a whole day one of the hottest fights in the war against two full French army corps — the eighteenth and twentieth — and part of the twenty-fourth. In the night they evacuated the place, to take up a new position behind the Lisaine, a sub-tributary of the Doubs, so as to bar Bourbaki's way to Belfort, whose three army-corps, on the morning of the 10th, stood as near the fortress as did the three Baden divisions. Luckily the severity of the weather, and the difficulty of finding food and shelter for man and horse, but, above all, the demoralized condition of his hastily gathered troops, conspired so to neutralize his energy that he made no attempt to disturb Werder's (Fig. 99) flank-march. On the 11th the latter general got word that the army of the south was organizing for his support. At the same time, however, Moltke strongly impressed on him the necessity of covering the siege of Belfort, and of constantly keeping touch of the enemy, so as to hinder him from throwing himself with his whole strength upon Manteuffel when on the advance. The time granted him by the enemy's inactivity was most sedulously employed in strengthening his position behind the Lisaine. Here Werder now awaited with his 45,000 men



the oncoming of Bourbaki with his 153,000; for even a lost battle could involve nothing worse than a farther retreat. For three days (January 15-17) the heroic band withstood the assaults of its overwhelmingly superior enemy, though its fast-failing ammunition compelled economy in its use. But even by the evening of the second day the French attacks began to wane in vigor. The miserable condition of his men, who had bivouacked for two bitterly cold nights — mostly without food — as well as his severe losses, robbed Bourbaki



FIG. 99. — General von Werder. From the lithograph by G. Engelbach.

of all confidence in the result of another assault. To all this, the pressure of the army of the south, now advancing on his rear, began to make itself uncomfortably felt. He renewed the struggle on the 17th, therefore, only to cover his retreat. The large number of prisoners who surrendered themselves voluntarily to their pursuers, as well as discarded weapons and munitions of all kinds, sufficiently evidenced the condition of his army. On the 22d he stood again in Besançon. The fortress of Belfort, from which the struggle on the





FIG. 100. — Bourbaki. From a photograph.

Lisaine could be distinctly seen, remained all the time unaccountably silent — awaiting its deliverance without itself striking a blow.

On January 14 Manteuffel set out on his advance to aid Werder, taking his route directly across the rugged table-land of Langres, with the thermometer verging on zero. He plodded his way stoutly over roads now buried in deep snow, now incrustated with glass-like ice, buffeted anon by violent storms of wind and rain. On learning, on the 18th, that Werder was not in immediate need of his help, he took the resolve of swinging round his right so as to throw himself on the rear of the French army of the east and bar its retreat. Manteuffel therefore cut himself entirely adrift from his already loose connection with the main army and with Germany, and went in search of an enemy, who, though much shattered, was still far his superior in numbers, while he ran the risk of being assailed on the flank by a new army which had gathered under Garibaldi at Dijon. Moltke approved his bold plan, which, if successful, could not but have decisive results. To protect his right flank he despatched the brigade of Kettler, 4000 strong, against Dijon; and this maintained a desultory conflict of three days (January 21 to 23) with Garibaldi's 'Army of the Vosges,' without, however, being able to wrest the city from it. But the confidence of Kettler's attitude close in presence of his enemy misled Garibaldi into believing that he had a large section of the army of the south before him, and decided him to restrict himself to a cautious defence of his position, so that Manteuffel had nothing to dread from that quarter. In the fight of the 23d at Nouilly, the flag of the second battalion of the German sixty-first regiment was found by the Garibaldians under a heap of dead, shot to pieces and drenched with blood — the only standard lost by the Germans in the war. Disregarding the most urgent calls from Bordeaux, the Italian hero remained immovable in Dijon till the approach of considerable re-enforcements to his courageous enemy induced him to evacuate it on the 31st.

Still Bourbaki (Fig. 100) hoped to break his way through in a southern direction; but when the troops detailed to hold, at any price, the important position of Quingey, gave this town up without a blow, this door of escape also was shut against him. Hemmed in within a narrow area around Besançon, he had, in addition to the pressure from without, constantly before his eyes the growing disintegration of his army. His provisions, moreover, were sufficient for but a few days. Under such circumstances he had only the

choice between an attempt at breaking out towards Auxonne or a retreat on Pontarlier. A council of war, which he called, disregarding the impracticable orders emanating from Bordeaux, decided for the latter. But despair took possession of the general, and he made an attempt on his life. The shot through which he hoped to end his cares did not spare him the pain of surviving his own deposition and the destruction of his army. Nothing seemed left to his successor — General Clinchant — but to continue the operation initiated by him, and march on Pontarlier. But when, on arriving there, he found the promised supplies not forthcoming, and learned that the army of the east was excepted from the truce, while the Germans, pressing ever closer upon him, had taken in all 15,000 of his men, and when, in especial, his generals declared they could no longer answer for their troops, he, after a last fight by his rearguard, on February 1, at La Cluse, entered into a convention with the Swiss General Herzog by which 85,000 men and 266 cannon were received into the Swiss territory, where they were disarmed. Some 20,000, mostly cavalry, made their escape southward.

Thus vanished the fourth French army within four months. The achievements of the Germans, mainly in a mountain region covered with snow and ice, and with insufficient food and outworn foot-gear, were worthy of all admiration. But the end justified the price. It annihilated the last possibility of the French continuing the war. Three hundred and eighty-five thousand of them were confined in Germany, one hundred and fifty thousand were shut up in Paris, a hundred thousand disarmed men were in Belgium and Switzerland; twenty-five departments and twenty-two fortresses were occupied by the Germans; while 600,000 muskets, 1800 field-pieces, and three times as many fortress-guns, with untold store of war materials, etc., were the spoil of the conquerors. On February 16 Belfort capitulated. Gambetta alone dreamed of continuing the struggle. In an impassioned proclamation, — in which he denounced the frivolous facility with which the Paris government had consented to an armistice, — he called frantically for new levies and the election of only such deputies as were favorable to the continuance of the war “in order to prevent France from being assassinated,” debarring, as ineligible, all who had held office as ministers, senators, state-councillors, or prefects under the empire, or who had ever been official candidates. Bismarck promptly protested against such exclusions as being incompatible with the freedom of choice



covenanted for in the armistice, and even the provisional government could not tolerate a measure that meant civil war. It sent Jules Simon to Bordeaux to effect its revocation; and on Gambetta's scornful refusal, it annulled it itself, whereupon Gambetta, 'the Bedlamite' as Thiers called him, gave in his resignation.

The result of the election showed two things, — first, that the land was weary of the war, and second, that the majority was not republican. The vast majority of the assembly opening at Bordeaux, February 12, were monarchists, divided into Orleanists, Bonapartists, and Legitimists; but by a sort of tacit agreement, all party distinctions were held in abeyance. To the monarchists, generally, it was entirely acceptable that they should be able to impose the odium for the humiliating peace upon the republicans. In France's absolute dearth of statesmanlike capacity, there was but one man to whom all eyes were directed to deliver it from chaos. After the government of September 4 resigned its powers into the hands of the National Assembly, this body, on February 17, made choice of Thiers to decide on the definitive form of government, with the power of nominating ministers. The National Assembly, above all things, desired peace; and, as peace was not possible without cession of territory, it had to reconcile itself to this. When an Alsatian deputy vehemently protested against the giving up of Alsace and Lorraine it passed an express vote of confidence in the negotiators; but, as a scapegoat had to be found, it took the first opportunity for loading the exiled emperor at Wilhelmshöhe with the entire responsibility for France's misfortunes. To give time for the negotiations, Bismarck prolonged the armistice till March 12, Thiers, with Favre and Picard, being intrusted with their conduct. The German demands were the cession of Alsace with Belfort, of German Lorraine with Metz, and a war indemnity of six billions of francs (\$1,158,000,000). Thiers exclaimed against the enormity of this sum, and offered two billions; but Bismarck explained that the mere cost of the war exceeded the latter amount, besides which there were to be reckoned pensions for the wounded and widows and orphans, recompense for the armies, the replacement of the war-material destroyed, compensation for the Germans driven out of France and for her captured ships, as well as for the maintenance of the prisoners in Germany. On February 23, he announced that Emperor William had moderated the sum to five billions. Thiers tried to get England to mediate in favor of an alleviation of the



terms, but to no purpose. From the other powers nothing was to be hoped. Russia had thought fit to make use of the war to gain her revenge for Sebastopol by renouncing the conditions of the Peace of Paris restricting her sovereign rights in the Black Sea, and this renunciation had just been confirmed by a conference in London, at which France was not represented; while Italy and Austria were, above all, anxious to do nothing that could compromise them with Germany. The fortresses were the cause of greater difficulties than the money, especially Belfort, on the preservation of which Thiers concentrated all his efforts. Bismarck at length agreed to except Belfort, on condition that the Germans should occupy Paris; but against this French vanity revolted more vehemently than ever. In the heat of discussion Thiers let slip the expression, "But that is an indignity!" Immediately Bismarck began to speak German. Thiers, after listening for a while confounded, at length remarked complainingly that he did not understand German. The chancellor retorted that he did not understand French sufficiently to answer him suitably when he spoke of 'indignity,' and caused an interpreter to be summoned. The hint sufficed, and Thiers conceded the demand he had characterized as an 'indignity.' On February 26 the peace-preliminaries were signed.

France ceded Alsace and Lorraine with Metz, but received back Belfort, and bound herself to pay five billions, — one billion in the current year, the balance within three years. Only 30,000 soldiers were to enter Paris, and were to be restricted to an area comprised between the Seine, the Rue St.-Honoré, and the Avenue des Ternes. The evacuation of France was to be effected piecemeal, in keeping with the payment of the instalments. The French army was to retire behind the Loire until the definitive signing of the peace, with the exception of 40,000 men left as a garrison in Paris. The negotiations for the definitive peace were to be opened without delay in Brussels.

On March 1 the emperor reviewed at Longchamp the troops told off to enter Paris; and immediately thereupon they began their entry, under the Arc de Triomphe, into the prearranged quarter. If German national feeling found but scant satisfaction in this limited occupation, the Parisians felt it as the most severe of all their humiliations. But Thiers had hurried off to Bordeaux, in order to abridge to the utmost the time of the capital's shame. When he began to read the peace-terms to the assembly, his voice failed him

after the first few words. The Left indeed, supported by Victor Hugo's redundant eloquence, demanded their rejection; but reason and necessity prevailed, and peace was approved by 546 to 107 voices. On March 3, the treaty was returned ratified, and the city of Paris was once more free from desecration by hordes of barbarians.

Frenchmen could not long more anxiously for the deliverance of their sorely afflicted land than Germany did for the return of her sons from a war so rich in sacrifices. Everywhere throughout the fatherland the returning victors were hailed with enthusiasm: especially magnificent was the entry of the emperor, on March 17, at the head of his soldiery, into Berlin. But no exultation over a triumph so unexampled and over so glorious conquests could make the country forget the price it had had to pay for it all. Its total loss amounted to 1871 officers dead, 4184 wounded, and 102 missing, and 26,397 rank and file dead (12,115 through sickness), 84,304 wounded, and 12,752 missing. The loss of the forty-eighth Prussian regiment was the heaviest of all. Out of a strength of 64 officers and 3000 men, it amounted to 60 officers and 1497 rank and file. But the troops left before Paris, under General von Fabrice, were to witness a yet more gruesome afterpiece — the revolt of the Commune.

All the powers of evil seemed to have been conspiring for months to precipitate the so sorely tried capital into the abyss of ruin. Ever since the overthrow of the empire — but in an enhanced degree all through the siege — the concerted schemes of the sedition-mongers and the ignorant instincts of the masses worked together towards this great cataclysm. The *Internationale* was the successor and heir of the Communist Federation which had prepared the way for the Revolution of February and the days of June. Its headquarters was Paris, with its hundreds of thousands of workingmen, now augmented by Napoleon's architectural enterprises. On the evening of September 4 it and the trades-union met to formulate their claims and constitute a central committee, consisting of representatives of the various city wards. Rochefort, as a Paris deputy, was a member of the provisional government; the painter Courbet became director of the fine arts; the vagabond student, Raoul Rigault, was chief of the political police; for Flourens the title of *Mayor de rampart* was invented. Otherwise they kept themselves perfectly quiet, quite satisfied with the prospect that the 'bourgeois vermin' would cover themselves with indelible odium through the

conclusion of a peace. But the incapacity and miserable weakness manifested by the Government of National Defence, from the first to the last day of its existence, smoothed the path for the revolutionaries. No one of its follies avenged itself more terribly than that of placing a musket in the hand of every one who desired it, thus raising the National Guard from sixty battalions to nearly 300, — that is, to more than 130,000 men, — under leaders chosen by themselves. This was a power before which they trembled, and which they did their best to spoil by bombastic flattery. So far from fighting the Germans, the Guard specially spared itself in the prospect of an insurrection, and, instead of working, preferred to live on the wage which each member received, not only for himself, but for his wife and children, so that he was able to live pretty much in a state of chronic idleness and drunkenness. Besides all this, the government itself, by obstinately procrastinating to fulfil its repeated promises of a communal election, gave occasion for the cry for the 'Commune,' first raised by Ledru-Rollin and Delescluze. Under the name 'Commune' was embodied the so long-cherished aspiration of Paris after self-government, colored by traditions of the Reign of Terror, and of the victorious struggle of the first republic against its foreign foes. With all this were blended fantastic ideas in regard to the reorganization of the world in a socialistic sense and, alas! the lowest passions of the Parisian proletariat. These influences — dangerous as multifarious — made their first attempt at asserting themselves in the riot of October 31, but were for the time suppressed. None the less, from that date on, the revolutionary groups or clubs maintained a constant conflict with the government, which looked on at the perfectly open machinations of the Central Committee with apathetic inaction, thus rendering unavailing all the efforts of brave General Clément Thomas to reduce the National Guards to some degree of discipline and order. These masses, thus forcibly abstracted from their ordinary course of life, and fevered with excitement, the government, though latterly perfectly sensible of the inutility of their resistance to the foreign foe, kept pampered with bombastic fanfaronade about their invincibility, and had accustomed to the belief that Paris would rather see itself in ashes than open its gates to the outside barbarians. No wonder, then, that the capitulation bereft them of the last relics of reason left them. For four months the citizens had been living in an atmosphere of blood and fire, and borne heavy deprivations with no little heroism, and not



less self-glorification that the country was to be saved through their sacrifices. And now the sacred city was in the robbers' hands! From the lips of all resounded the demoralizing cry of treachery. Their seething passions saw the enemy to be dreaded not on the outside, but within. It would be difficult to say whether love of country or mortally wounded vanity had more to do in rousing them to schemes of fancied reparation and revenge. To all this was added the fact that the long separation had operated to estrange Paris and the country from each other. As soon as the National Assembly met in Bordeaux the controversy between the two broke forth. The Parisian representatives were almost exclusively radical, and the capital felt it a gross trespass on its traditional prerogative that the country did not implicitly submit to its exclusive supremacy. The nomination of Thiers as head of the executive power looked to Paris like the prelude to an Orleanist reaction, and made the new government unpopular with it in advance. That the ministry and the National Assembly decided to select for their seat, not Paris, but Versailles, desecrated by having been the German head-quarters, was an additional aggravation.

Bismarck rightly apprehended the danger of leaving its arms in the hands of the National Guard after the conclusion of the armistice. Favre, however, affected to regard it as a point of honor to protect it from disarmament. And precisely at this time the Guard lost its best and most reliable elements. No sooner were the gates opened than there began an exodus of the well-to-do classes, who like liberated prisoners streamed forth into freedom. Those remaining behind belonged mainly to the classes especially prone to disorder and discontent, and were further rendered desperate by the indiscreetly precipitate stoppage of their pay. The brave regular soldiers, on the other hand, who had had to surrender their arms, felt themselves undeservedly humiliated in comparison with the ineffective National Guards. These 200,000 soldiers and *mobiles* remained for three weeks given over to vagabondage, and, mixed up as they were with the proletariat of the suburbs, exposed to incitements of all kinds to disorder. Troops and *mobiles* began to fraternize with the National Guards, whose demonstrations assumed more and more an insurrectionary character. General Thomas saw that his influence over them was at an end, and gave in his resignation. A police-agent was drowned by the infuriated rabble in the Seine with circumstances of cannibal-like atrocity, and the four battal-



ions sent out to quell them fraternized with them. The whole population now revolted against the thought of the entry of the Germans. Unable to believe in this lowest step of humiliation, they pleased themselves with swaggering resolutions never to endure this indelible ignominy. Without the instigation of the demagogues, they prepared themselves for resistance. Like a frenzy the idea seized the National Guards that they must save their cannon from the enemy; and on February 26 they dragged them — though no one was thinking of giving them up — to Belleville, La Villette, and especially to Montmartre. These positions they fortified, plundered stores of weapons and arms, and made as if they meant to precipitate themselves on the Germans when entering. Already there appeared the signal of civil war, — the red flag, — and still the government looked on with crossed arms at ‘the noble fury.’ Not they, but the Central Committee, allayed the excitement. But on the same third day of March on which the Germans evacuated Paris, the representatives of 200 battalions founded a second central committee — that of the National Guard; and by a singular coincidence, it was the same day as that on which Thiers made an attempt to tighten the reins of its discipline by the nomination of Aurelle as its commander-in-chief. But the choice was not a happy one; for Aurelle, as a Bonapartist, had been especially denounced by Gambetta for the defeat at Orleans. The dread of a *coup d'état* revived by this nomination made the National Guards more hostile than ever, while large numbers — and these the worst elements — of the discharged troops and *mobiles* found their way into their ranks. One most impolitic step of the government was the repeal of the respite for small bills of exchange and rents, all which were now required to be paid within three days. This in an especial manner embittered the petty traders, who saw themselves through this measure exposed to bankruptcy. The cry for the Commune, which had been stilled since the capitulation, began to make itself again heard.

Thus Thiers, on his arrival at Paris, found almost the entire citizen population full of hate to the government, of anxiety for the republic, and of gloomy suspicion of a *coup d'état*, with all legitimate authority vanished, and the whole town in the hands of the insurrection. And what had he to set off against all this? A garrison of scarcely 30,000 men, of whom not more than a third could be held in any way reliable. He saw but one way of deliverance — to

let Paris for a time 'stew in its own gravy.' But without making some attempt to reduce the city to order, the government could not appear before the National Assembly, now on the point of meeting in Versailles; and the chiefs of finance would engage in no operation for raising the five billions until order was restored. Therefore, although it was all but convinced of the vanity of another attempt to recover the cannon, yet such had to be made. And indeed it seemed at first as if this was to succeed. The night-surprise planned by General Vinoy was successfully carried out. On the morning of March 18 Montmartre with 161 guns was in the hands of the troops. But at the critical moment the teams to carry away the pieces were not at hand. When they appeared after two hours' delay, the starving and freezing troops, cajoled by the women and children crowding in amongst them, had already fraternized with the National Guard. The eighty-eighth regiment delivered over General Leconte to the mutineers; and he, along with Clément Thomas, formerly commandant of the Guard, was barbarously murdered by them. General Chanzy, who also fell into the hands of the rabble, was shamefully maltreated by it, and only regained his freedom some days thereafter. The most of the soldiery remaining in the city went over to the revolt, which thus became supreme over the whole right bank of the Seine. Once more Thiers resolved on doing what he had counselled Louis Philippe to do in February, 1848, namely, to evacuate Paris, and reconquer it from Versailles. In the confusion even Mont-Valérien was evacuated, but was fortunately re-occupied, before the insurgents had taken possession of it. Thus in uncontested possession of the city, the two central committees, now merged into one, fixed their common seat in the Hôtel de Ville, without well knowing what use to make of their adventitious authority. Among them there was scarce a man of real importance. They were, for the most part, contemptible fellows, who first of all ate and drank to repletion; and, in imitation of the heroes of 1793, were intent on maintaining their assumed dictatorial power by crushing down all opposition. Between March 18 and 23 not fewer than 3632 persons were arrested. To avoid civil war the mayors of the twenty arrondissements of Paris — among whom Clémenceau, mayor of Montmartre, particularly distinguished himself by a zeal far from salutary — submitted themselves implicitly to these revolutionary authorities, so that all power fell into the hands of the most extreme elements. A peaceful demonstration of the

friends of order in the Place Vendôme on March 22 was assailed with salvos of musketry, and some twenty men killed or wounded. Force alone must now decide the issue.

On March 26 the elections for the communal council took place. As of the 490,000 registered electors only 220,000 recorded their votes, the candidates chosen belonged almost exclusively to the party of the Revolution. On the 28th the central committee of the Hôtel de Ville resigned its functions in favor of the new communal authorities, while that of the National Guard surprised it by the friendly announcement that it would continue its labors as heretofore. The first measures adopted by the Commune were the remission of all rents and interest for the last nine months, abolition of the conscription, universal liability to serve in the National Guard with payment at the rate of two and a half francs a day; the necessary means for this and other purposes being supplied by forced advances from the Bank of France, insurance companies, and private persons, confiscation of church furniture, etc. Yet with all their pompous vanity these improvised potentates were not ignorant that the citizens, paralyzed by sudden perplexity and fear, were far from being in sympathy with them, and that they could rely only on force for the maintenance of their supremacy. The intelligent nucleus of the movement—the striving after communal self-government—fell quite into the background. As if to cover its own nothingness and incapacity, the Commune precipitated itself into the revolutionary frenzy, and unfurled the banner of the world-republic. But the possibility that these men might permanently maintain themselves was quickly put out of the question; for the country remained deaf to their invitation to follow the example of Paris and break itself up into a confederation of independent communes, and looked with wrath on the handful of upstarts who took it on themselves to condemn the will of the whole people freely expressed in the elections of February 8. A second reason for their impending fall lay in the growing strength of the Versailles government. To be sure, it required some time for it to constitute into an effective army the straggling soldiery returning from all quarters, especially German prisons; but it stood it in good stead that the northern forts were still in the hands of the Germans, who, while observing the strictest neutrality, were careful to watch that the Communists should not overpass the neutral zone. Most of all in favor of the government was the military incapacity of the insur-



gent leaders. The force of the Commune amounted to 140,000 or 150,000 men, irrespective of 28 independent corps, whose achievements consisted mainly in plundering and levying blackmail. The command-in-chief was offered first to Menotti Garibaldi; but on his declination it was partitioned into three, among 'Generals' Eudes, Brunet, and Duval. Instead of the cry being — as it had been six months before — 'On to Berlin,' it was now 'On to Versailles.' But a sally undertaken on April 2 by way of Neuilly proved a total failure; and on its renewal next day the assailants came under the fire of Valérien, which wrought great havoc among them, Flourens, among others, falling. This first success decided the loyalty of the troops. On the 4th MacMahon, who had assumed Vinoy's place as commander-in-chief of the army of Versailles, assumed the offensive. The more that he made progress the wilder became the despairing fury of the mutineers. No word of reason dared longer let itself be heard. Inasmuch as Duval, who had been captured, was shot by sentence of court-martial, and Blanqui, 'the head of the reptile,' was forcibly detained in Versailles, the Commune caused a large number of 'suspects' to be seized as hostages, and threatened to shoot two or three of these in reprisal for every individual executed in Versailles. The revolutionary tribunal and the committee of 1793 were revived. Thiers's and Favre's property was confiscated, and the house of the former destroyed. The defence of Paris gathered some measure of strength under the leadership of Cluseret and Delescluze; but their efforts could only postpone, not avert, the catastrophe. The more inevitable this was seen to be as fort after fort fell into the hands of the government, the more bitter waxed the dissensions among the heads of the insurrection and the stronger their mutual suspicions, while their passions rioted in unbridled bestiality. If their ruin were once assured that of Paris should also be made certain, so that it might not become the spoil of their conquerors. On May 16 Courbet initiated the work of destruction by the overthrow of the Column Vendôme, whose ungainliness offended his fine artistic sense. A 'scientific commission' collected and prepared the incendiary and explosive material to carry out their demoniacal purposes. While these despots and their instruments gave themselves up to the vilest orgies, the command-in-chief passed from one hand to another, so that no one knew with certainty who his leader was. On May 20 Paris was environed on all sides. On the 21st the troops became masters of the gate of St.-Cloud, and



soon thereafter they pressed in on the side of Versailles. Probably enough it might have lain within MacMahon's power to become master of the entire interior on the 22d, since the inhabitants eagerly longed for the entry of the troops. But, not to expose his small and newly organized army to too great risks, he adopted the more cautious resolution of encompassing the district held by the insurgents entirely, and thus at the same time preventing their flight. Through this the frenzied fanatics had time to carry out their diabolical plans. While the troops made their way but slowly by an embittered street-conflict, the incendiary and the assassin set themselves to their deadly work. By Rigault's orders Archbishop Darboy, President Bonjean, and the banker Jecker (of unsavory memory in connection with the Mexican campaign), as well as other hostages, were shot in the prisons of La Roquette and St-Pélagie. In the Rue Haxo thirty-seven priests and thirty of their defenders fell victims to the ferocity of the drunken rabble. Men no longer slaughtered under pretext of defence but from mere lust for murder. At the same time the *pétroleuses* were at their demoniacal task. The Palace of the Legion of Honor, the Tuileries, the prefecture of police, part of the Palace Royale, and other public buildings sank in ruins. The Louvre was saved, just at the last moment, by the appearance of the troops; for now MacMahon had forced himself into the centre of the city. On the 28th the Commune ended its hideous career. The struggle had cost the army, of officers, 83 killed and 430 wounded; of men, 794 killed and 6200 wounded or missing. The loss of the mutineers was never precisely ascertained. After most careful investigations the slain were estimated at 6667. Of 36,309 prisoners (among whom were 200 women and 650 children under 16) made over to the court-martial, 13,700 were condemned to death, deportation, or longer or shorter imprisonment. Delescluze had already been killed on the 28th, by a bullet from the Versaillese. Of the leaders of the rising the greater number had been careful to place themselves in good time in safety.

The revolt of the Commune had most injuriously affected the position of the French government in respect of the peace negotiations opened at Brussels, March 28. It brought, indeed, the execution of the peace into question, and made measures of precaution incumbent on the Germans. As the French government was entirely in arrears for the subsistence-money for the troops in occupation, and offered much more unfavorable conditions for payment of



PLATE XVIII.

Die Kaiserin von Deutschland!

ich bin König!

ich bin König!

ich bin König!

ich bin König!

ich bin König!

Die Kaiserin von Deutschland!  
ich bin König!  
ich bin König!  
ich bin König!

Die Kaiserin von Deutschland!  
ich bin König!

Die Kaiserin von Deutschland!  
ich bin König!

Facsimile of the autograph segment of Emperor William I. in the "Back of the War of 1870-71 and the Establishment of the German Empire, preserved in the National German Museum at Nuremberg.  
Bayer. Staatsbibl. M. 90. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

the indemnity than had been agreed on at Versailles, namely, one billion in cash in three yearly instalments, and the balance — also in instalments — in French *rentes*, Bismarck conceived the suspicion that it contemplated demanding, at some later time, when it should be stronger, altogether different terms. He caused therefore the return of the war-prisoners to be stopped, and the evacuation to be so protracted that the German force in France should continue strong enough for any emergency; and even considered the advisability of taking Paris in pledge, either by compact with the Commune or by force. This determined attitude had its effect. The negotiations broken off in Brussels were resumed in Frankfort with Favre and Finance-Minister Pouyer-Quertier; Bismarck, on the German side, taking part in them personally. The result was the signing of the definitive peace on May 10. On the 26th the ratifications were ready to be exchanged. The whole region ceded by France amounted to 14,508 square kilometres (about 5600 square miles), with a population of 1,597,228 souls. The French subjects within the surrendered territory were granted the option, irrespective of the German laws in regard to military service, of changing their residence to France any time up to October 1, 1874. The payments of the war-indemnity were to be in instalments, the last being due on March 2, 1874. After the payment of the first half-billion and the ratification of the peace, the departments of the Somme, Seine Inférieure, and Eure were to be evacuated; those of the Oise, Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne, and the Seine, as well as the forts of Paris, as soon as the German government thought order sufficiently re-established in France, in any case after the payment of the first 1500 million francs. Three hundred and twenty-five millions were deducted from the war-contribution in consideration of the railways in the ceded territory.

On March 21, 1871, the day of the opening of the first German parliament, Bismarck was created a prince by the Emperor William (PLATE XVIII.).





BOOK II.

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UNITED GERMANY



# UNITED GERMANY.

## CHAPTER X.

### THE VATICAN COUNCIL.

IT is one of the most noteworthy facts of recent history that the institution of the German Empire was coincident with the conclusive abrogation of the temporal rule of the pope, as well as with the promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility. In order to set forth the causes that led to these results, which are of far-reaching significance, it will be necessary for us to retrace our steps to the conditions that immediately succeeded the revolution of 1848.

Ever since 1848 the world had been witness of a most peculiar spectacle. While the relation of Pope Pius IX., as a temporal prince, to his subjects had become ever the more intolerable from the hour that terror for the Revolution had delivered him over an unresisting tool to the Jesuits, the papacy itself had won victory after victory, so that its long-pursued twofold object — namely, the church's independence of the state, and the consummation of papal ecclesiastical absolutism through the annihilation of the last relic of episcopal independence — could be regarded as attained. With inimitable adroitness the Catholic clergy knew how to make the revolution of 1848, as well as the reaction following thereon, serviceable to the church. Nothing could have come more grateful to them than the universal war-cry, "Away with bureaucracy! Down with absolutism!" And the church lost no time in shaking off these influences always so ungrateful to her, and — on the Frankfort parliament conceding, in the name of freedom, the ordering and administration of its own affairs to every recognized church, and repealing the ordinance decreeing the expulsion of the Jesuits — in improving the occasion in her own interests. At a conference at Würzburg, in October and November, 1848, the German bishops formulated their demands, — uncontrolled liberty in doctrine and teaching, exclusive



authority in the installation of priests and full power of disciplining them without appeal to any civil tribunal, uncontrolled management of all church property, full freedom of intercourse with Rome, entire liberty in the founding of congregations and settlement of orders, and the guidance and supervision of the spiritual life of Catholics in all and every relation. What the bishops hereby claimed as liberty for themselves inferred in reality the inthralment of the inferior clergy and the faithful, both of whom were to be given over unconditionally into the hands of the prelates. The episcopate also, without more ado, dispensed with the government's approval of its pastoral letters, as required by law in several states. With especial eagerness was the right, now granted, of forming associations in the service of the church, taken advantage of. The whole of Catholic Germany was covered as by a net by the Society of Pius, founded in Mayence in April, 1848, to which the Brotherhood of Vincent, working in the cause of home missions, and that of Boniface, established as a counterpoise to the Protestant Gustavus Adolphus Union, stood in closest relation.

On the arrival of the Reaction the governments once more in power, infatuated by terror of the Revolution, listened only too willingly to the soothing flatteries offered them regarding the solidarity of the conservative interests of the state and the church now reinstated in her canonical rights. The arrogated immunities were not only left uncontested, but were confirmed documentarily in one state after another. In Prussia the provision: "Every religious communion orders and administers its own affairs independently, and remains in possession of all institutions, foundations, and funds, destined for religious, educational, and benevolent purposes," found admission into the constitution, while by another section the state renounced all right to interfere in the appointment and installation of clergymen to offices. The Catholic section in the ministry of worship, originally organized in defence of the state's right of superiority over the church, became, after falling under Polish influence, a perfect breeding-place of Ultramontane machinations against the state,—nay, the government went so far as to concede the priests the prerogative of taking the oath to the constitution with express reservation of their duties to the church. Within the church itself every movement looking towards spiritual independence was rigorously suppressed. In 1857 the theologian Hermes, and A. Günther of Vienna, the champion of the scholastic system of Thomas Aquinas,

were driven by the Vatican from the church. The rectorial address of Professor Ringeis of Munich was an open declaration of war against all science that would not resign itself implicitly to the guidance of the church. And the Catholic propaganda acted with equal vigor. Bishop Martin of Paderborn boldly maintained that the Protestants within his diocese were subject to his pastoral guidance. Jesuit missions scoured North Germany; there was even talk of the erection of a Catholic see in Protestant Hamburg and of a *nuntiate* in Berlin. The increase in monastic institutions in Prussia after 1848 was almost incredible. Those for care of the sick rose from 28 to 223; those for education from 24 to 139; those with both ends, from 40 to 361. To these were to be added 50 devoted solely to the contemplative life. The Catholic church had good cause for celebrating the festival of St. Boniface in Fulda in 1855, like a triumph after a succession of brilliant victories. But the over-confident pastoral letter of the bishop of Mayence, evoked, in Bunsen's "Signs of the Times," the first note of warning from the opposite camp.

The same years of revolution produced the clerical demands on Austria. The prelates of that country met in 1849 in Vienna, and adopted the Würzburg claims as their own, which were nearly all conceded in April, 1851, and remained in force after the abrogation of the constitution. More implicitly than elsewhere did the Austrian authorities believe in laying the evil spirit of liberalism by closest alliance with the Romish church, and for her aid in effecting this did not deem the humble subordination of state to church too high a price. This alliance constituted, moreover, an antidote for the Magyars' and Slavs' longing for separation; for the clergy condemned the principle of nationality — as based on the confusion of tongues, and therefore an apostasy from God — as heathenish. In this way it was not difficult for the Prince Archbishop Rauscher of Vienna to extract from his former pupil, the young Emperor Francis Joseph, the concordat of August 18, 1855, by which the whole political and civil law was subordinated to canon law, the bishops granted perfect freedom of intercourse with Rome, and invested with the widest competence, and the lower clergy denuded of all rights as against the episcopate. It was not long till the school and religious funds formerly established by Joseph II. out of the sequestered churchlands for educational and humane purposes were delivered over to the clergy, the canonical marriage-law and censure of books intro-

duced, the Jesuits and Redemptorists, removed in 1848, reinstated, and the higher schools given in charge to them, the old Jesuit *ratio studiorum* constituting again the groundwork of the scheme of education. Non-Catholics saw themselves excluded from every Catholic burying-ground.

The five prelates of the Upper Rhine province did not lag behind their Prussian and Austrian brothers. When the governments rejected their demands, based on the Würzburg resolutions, they, under the leadership of the combative Bishop Ketteler of Mayence, announced that "they would conform themselves only to that which they regarded as dogma, and to the constitutional right of the church resting thereupon." It now, therefore, became a fundamental principle that a Catholic, and especially a Catholic priest, was bound to obey the laws of the state only in so far as these were in accord with those of the church or even with the assumptions of the Vatican. Archbishop Vicari of Freiburg, a mere tool of Ketteler, through continuous violations of the state-laws attained at length the martyrdom he coveted, in the form of imprisonment. A similar conflict the government of Nassau had to engage in with the over-arrogant bishop of Limburg. But the Vatican could not endure episcopal independence, even in asserting the rights of the church. Würtemberg in 1857, and Baden in 1859, concluded concordats with Rome. Hesse-Darmstadt alone, mainly to gain an ally against the strong national movement, entered, on August 23, 1854, into a secret convention with Bishop Ketteler, conceding the church its most extravagant demands. Nevertheless, these compacts never became practically effective, for nowhere could the people's representatives be won over to give the requisite assent. First of all in Baden public sentiment compelled the renunciation of the discreditable compact, whereupon the other governments willingly followed suit. But the controversy in regard to the line of demarcation between ecclesiastical and state law was not thereby set at rest. In Baden, especially, it was fomented by Lothar Kübel, called by the cathedral chapter to the archiepiscopal chair on Vicari's death in 1868.

Outside of Germany, also, Ultramontane Catholicism could point to the greatest successes. In France the Second Empire existed mainly through its grace, till it came to grief as its accomplice. But Belgium, thanks to the independence conferred on the church by the constitution, and the increasing wealth accruing to it by donations and legacies, was the true land of promise for the Ultramontane



Jesuits. The number of religious houses, which in 1846 was 770 with 11,968 inmates, mounted up in 1880 to 1559, with 24,672 inmates. Education was entirely in the hands of the Jesuits; the university of Louvain, founded by them in 1835, having a larger attendance than both the state universities combined. In this country the clerics constituted not only an ecclesiastical, but a political power, which in all elections controlled the votes of the masses. The liberals — mainly confined to the cities — long maintained an unsuccessful conflict with them, till the law in regard to charities — withdrawing the property of pious foundations from state control, and making it over to clerical communal boards — roused such a storm of opposition through dread of the restoration of mortmain that the clerical ministry of de Decker had to give place to a liberal administration under Frère-Orban. In Spain the Jesuits had a powerful patroness in Queen Isabella, who found it expedient to expiate the peccadillos of her youth by an extra show of bigotry. Thus under the administration of Bravo Murillo they obtained a concordat which assured, not only the restoration of the still unsold church lands, but compensation for such as had been alienated, only, however, to see these and other gains imperilled through the insecurity of the political situation and the ceaseless change of ministries. Portugal, on the other hand, as well under the last Braganza, Maria da Gloria, as under the house of Saxe-Coburg (commencing with Pedro V. in 1853), was quite inaccessible to Romish influences; and while the priests were not slack in attributing the premature death of the childless king and his two brothers to the divine judgment on the godless ruling house, the suspicions of the other side were only strengthened that these casualties were not to be ascribed to natural causes, so that the embitterment between the clergy and the new king, Louis I., was in no degree mollified.

As a general rule, the seeming anomaly is to be observed that the Romish Church encountered the most antagonism in Roman Catholic states, while in the Teutonic, predominantly Protestant, states — ever since the spirit of tolerance, due to progressively advancing culture, had removed the barriers erected against her — she made the most progress. Scarce had these barriers fallen in England when the Romish church advanced to the reconquest of the ground there lost by her through the Reformation, and in this essay she was successful beyond anticipation. As if spontaneously, a



spirit of conversion spread through the upper ten thousand, which brought them back in crowds to the only fold that insures salvation. Not only does Anglicanism, with its hierarchical constitution, stand in closer relation to Rome than the communions of the Reformation, but the tendency was strengthened by the spirit of romance fostered by the poetry of Scott, Byron, and Moore, and yet more through mistrust of the higher criticism of neology and of ecclesiastico-political radicalism. Puseyism, the offspring of these tendencies, having its birth in Oxford in 1833, became — largely through the influence of Newman (afterwards Cardinal Newman) — the transition-stage for such numbers to the one Apostolic Church, that in 1850 the Vatican thought itself justified in imposing a Roman Catholic hierarchy on proud England. In the three Scandinavian kingdoms, also, the repeal of the laws restricting freedom of worship laid new and fruitful fields open to the propaganda. In the Netherlands, where King William I. had been already ensnared in the clerical net by his mistress, the Countess d'Oultremont, the reign of his successor, William II. (1840–1849), was marked by a continuous chain of favors to the Romish church and its clergy, the result of which was the disappearance of the old spirit of nationality in the Catholic church of the Netherlands. When, ultimately, in the reign of William III. (1849–1890), the pope went so far as, by a simple brief, to install, in March, 1853, an archbishop of Utrecht and four bishops in this heretical land, the conservatives availed themselves of the outburst of Protestant indignation to overthrow the liberal (but over-complaisant) Thordecke administration. But even the ministry succeeding it, under van Hall, failed to check the encroachments; and at last the people saw that the only means of protecting themselves was the institution of secular schools through the law of August 17, 1857. Yet more sharply defined was the distinction between Romish and Teutonic states beyond the Atlantic. The government of Brazil — although far from tolerant to non-Catholics — came to violent strife with the bishops, and coerced them, however refractory, to submission. Similar conflicts were common to several of the Central American republics. In Mexico the church lost its landed possessions, which were confiscated for the rectification of the disordered national finances. Guatemala, in 1872, drove forth the Jesuits, banished the rebellious archbishop, and closed the cloisters. In Venezuela the apostolic vicar, who protested against the introduction of civil marriage, was expelled the country, and the bishops required to

recognize the law of the land on pain of deposition and dissolution of all connection with Rome. Ecuador alone of the Spanish American states earned the commendation of the pope for her loyalty. But in the United States the growth of the Catholic Church was very great.

This vast increase in power was, in the main, the work of the Jesuits, who in the name of Pius IX. exercised virtually supreme authority over Roman Catholic Christendom. To make this authority secure for all time, they kept steadily before their eyes as an object the consummation of papal absolutism, towards which the whole policy of the Romish church since the days of Gregory VII., and in a stronger measure since the last ecumenical council at Trent, had been directed. With characteristic astuteness they knew where to find the means suitable for their end, namely, in the dogma maintained from the fourteenth century by the Franciscans against the Dominicans, of the 'Immaculate Conception' (birth of the Virgin Mary without original sin). In his first encyclical of 1846, Pius IX. characterized the Mother of God as the 'Immaculate,' without attracting the notice of the world, then busied with other matters. To her grace he ascribed his return from exile, and ever since he had lived in the conviction of overcoming all the enemies of the church through the help of his heavenly patroness. On December 8, 1854, he promulgated the new dogma purely out of his own individual absolute supremacy, without the co-operation of a council. It was no longer the simple Mother of God of the Middle Ages, nor the Madonna of the Renaissance, that spoke through his person, but the Queen of Heaven and Earth, whose worship was substituted for that of the Father and Son. It was a deed without precedent in any preceding pontificate. For this autocratic definition involved the final decision of the question, constantly negatived by the old councils, as to whether the pope was in his own person infallible in matters of faith; and so little of the earlier feeling of dignity and independence was now alive in the episcopate that it accepted this insulting violation of its rights without remonstrance, while the lay world, Catholic as well as Protestant, had only laughter for the novel article of faith rummaged out from the lumber-room of mediæval scholasticism. The mystical nature of Pius IX. found further expression in his dealing out beatitudes and saintships with more liberal hand than any of his predecessors, including, among others thus glorified, the atrocious executioner of the Inquisition,

Pedro Arbues. It was still further attempted to identify the papacy with Christianity and to substitute the person of the pope in the place of that of Christ by the extraordinary pomp with which the fiftieth anniversary of his consecration was celebrated, on April 11, 1869. The free-will offerings collected throughout the whole Catholic church from 1859 to 1865, under the name of Peter's pence, amounted to over 40,000,000 francs, and placed financial resources at the disposal of the Vatican such as it had not enjoyed for centuries.

The height to which the aspirations of the Vatican now soared was evidenced — more unequivocally than ever before — by the encyclical of December 8, 1864, with its appended *Syllabus Errorum*, enumerating eighty heresies to be repudiated by the faithful, and pronouncing a curse upon all that restrained the influence of the church, whether on the individual or the nation, as also upon communism, socialism, and the theory of popular sovereignty, upon the assumed independence of the secular power, and religious toleration. It was ecclesiastical absolutism's declaration of war against modern culture in any form. None the less this annunciation of the papal claims, so drastically renewed, failed to rouse Protestantism from its equanimity. By Rome, on the other hand, it was recognized very clearly that the modern commonwealth, as represented, e.g., by Prussia, was little consonant with the principles therein enunciated. For this reason the war of 1866 was, in the eyes of the Vatican, a war for the faith, whose issue at Königgrätz extorted from Cardinal Antonelli the piteous cry, "*Casca il mondo*," "The world is going to pieces." And through this dire day, also, the very pillars on which the church's authority over the Austro-Hungarian monarchy rested were shaken to their foundation. For the accommodation with Hungary necessarily involved yet another arrangement in regard to its church affairs. For, though the Auersperg ministry disturbed nothing in the concordat itself, yet in the way of domestic legislation it sought the restoration of civil marriage, the liberation of the schools from priestly rule, and the equality of all confessions. The bishops and nuncio protested, and the pope issued an allocution against the measures having these scandalous ends in view; but all in vain. In May, 1868, they received the emperor's ratification.

The more severely the blow of 1866 was felt in Rome, the more boistrous became the demand there for the object foreshadowed in the encyclical, — namely, the constitution of the personal infallibility



of the pope into a permanent dogma by the most solemn act within the competency of the church. The summoning of a council became, accordingly, the immediate object of the Jesuits. It was not without some dismay that the bishops saw the preparations making for a change that would not only involve dissension between church and state, but also the annihilation of the small remnant of independence still remaining to them. When, therefore, nearly 500 of them met in Rome in June, 1867, to celebrate the eighteen hundredth anniversary of the martyrdom of Peter and Paul, they showed themselves fully in accord, indeed, with the summoning of a council, but, on the other hand, rejected the proposal of certain members for promulgating infallibility, without more ado, in their address to the pope, satisfying themselves with repeating in it the words of the encyclical of 1864: "the divine right is conferred on him of feeding, guiding, and ruling the whole church." Nay, Bishop Ketteler (Fig. 101) roundly declared that the dogma of papal infallibility was a novelty unknown, either in name or fact, to the church of Christ, and an invention of recent times, whose promulgation would be something unheard of. This outspoken opposition admonished to circum-



FIG. 101. — Bishop von Ketteler.  
From a photograph.

spection. Among the seventeen questions submitted to the bishops, that of infallibility did not find a place; and as little mention was made of it in the bull *Aeterni Patris*, inviting the representatives of all Christendom — logically, therefore, Greek churchmen as well as Protestants — to meet in Rome on December 8, 1869.

What it left unsaid was all the more loudly proclaimed by the Ultramontane press: namely, that the true cure for the disorders of the church was the declaration of papal infallibility: for through this alone could the supreme pontiff work, free and unencumbered, for the weal of Christendom and the whole family of mankind. In par-



ticular the pope's special organ, the *Civiltà Cattolica*, indicated it as the wish and expectation of all Catholics that the council should, before all else, promulgate the dogma of infallibility, and along with




FIG. 102. — Ignaz Döllinger. From the lithograph by G. Engelbach.

this the ratification of the objugatory provisions of the syllabus as well as the dogma of the bodily assumption of the Virgin. "It was only," it said, "out of a feeling of dignified reserve that His Holiness

did not wish to appear as taking the initiative in a matter immediately relating to himself; but it was hoped that by the manifestation of the Holy Spirit through the mouth of the ecumenical council, the doctrine of infallibility would be defined by acclamation."

When the ground appeared sufficiently prepared, the Jesuits allowed their purpose to be seen more undisguisedly; but, concurrently with this, opposition manifested itself. The first note of alarm was sounded from Germany, in the form of an address from the Coblenz Catholics to the bishop of Treves; Montalembert indicated his concurrence with them from the borders of the grave. Still more attention was excited by a series of articles (soon expanded into a volume), in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, under the pseudonym of 'Janus,' and this the more especially that the writer was known to be Döllinger (Fig. 102), the provost of the Munich chapter, a profound church historian and formerly an indefatigable antagonist of Protestantism. In warning tones he foretold, as the immediate and enduring consequence of the new dogma, a widespread falling away from the faith, since men would be called on to accept as the truth what it was out of their power to believe. Von Schulte, professor of canon law in Bonn, spoke out in the same sense and with equal impressiveness. The German bishops acted with greater circumspection. Their pastoral letter, issued from Fulda on September 6, sought to allay the anxieties aroused, — "for neither now nor at any time would a general council promulgate a new dogma not sanctioned by Holy Scripture or apostolical tradition, or inculcate a doctrine conflicting with the rights of the state and of its authorities, the object of such a council being much rather to place the primitive truth in a clearer light. Equally groundless and unjustifiable is the suspicion that the freedom of deliberating and counselling will be restrained at the council," — a carefully balanced utterance, that might serve either as a warning before the proclamation of the dogma, or a recognition of it as no new doctrine, but an old one. Fourteen of those there assembled had already expressed their doubts in writing to the pope, not, however, in regard to the dogma itself, but in regard to the opportuneness of the time for proclaiming it. With greater decision did the most highly esteemed members of the French episcopate — Archbishop Darboy of Paris and Bishop Dupanloup (Fig. 103) of Orleans — pronounce against the Jesuit proposal; while Father Hyacinthe Loyson, the most eloquent pulpit-orator in France, protested against "doctrines and practices that call

themselves Romish, but are not Christian." The Vatican judged it wisest to put an end to the feuds raging among the prelates by refusing its *imprimatur* to controversial writings. What the Jesuits wanted in solid grounds wherewith to silence opposition, they made up by passion. Bishop Hefele of Rottenburg, who had the courage to declare openly that the new doctrine was not only inopportune, but untrue, had to listen to the threat from Molitor, the representative of the bishop of Spire, that "they would soon drag their heretical hides from the malcontents."



FIG. 103. — Bishop Dupanloup. From the engraving by Muzelle.

The political world as a whole looked forward to the council with indifference. When the Bavarian minister-president, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, in a circular of April 9, 1869, raised the question whether the European states ought not to take steps in common, which would leave the Roman court no room for doubt in regard to their attitude towards the council, he found countenance nowhere. Beust held that they should not depreciate the expected opposition of the most important princes of the church by stamping them as simply

representatives of their governments; and the chancellor of the North German Confederation, Bismarck, taking his stand on the Old Prussian standpoint of the church's perfect freedom in regard to ecclesiastical affairs, declined to interfere in any way in the dogmatic legislation of the Romish church, adding, however, the significant intimation that Prussia would take no action unless the dogma entered into the domain of practical politics and civil law.

Still, the opposition showing itself in so many different quarters made an impression in Rome. Pius (PLATE XIX.) debated with himself the propriety of confirming the syllabus, whose twenty-third



PLATE XIX.



Pope Pius IX.

From the marble bust by F. Pajes y Serratosa, 1878.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 380.*





article condemned as heretical the opinion that a pope had ever overstepped the limits of his power, encroached on the rights of princes, or ever erred in questions of faith and morals. But the hesitation was short-lived. As soon as the council was opened by the pope in person in the Vatican, on December 8, 1869, it soon became obvious that all had been arranged behind the scenes, while the fathers of the council — except the initiated — had been left to grope about in darkness. The issue had been fixedly predetermined, the only matters for consideration being how and in what form the new dogma should be smuggled into the teaching of the church. And the constitution of the council facilitated this feat in a very material degree; for while of its 744 members Germany contributed only 19 and Austro-Hungary 48, Italy alone supplied 276 (143 from the States of the Church) all unconditionally devoted to the pope. And not less so were the thirty generals of orders — who, contrary to all precedent, had been invested with the right of voting — as well as the 119 bishops *in partibus infidelium*, living during the council at the cost of the papal see. According to the order of procedure arranged beforehand, the right of offering propositions belonged exclusively to the pope. In the constitution of the committees — who had to report on amendments of any kind — the recalcitrant minority was systematically ignored, while the bad acoustic quality of the hall made freedom of speech altogether illusory in the plenary meetings. The fathers were forbidden to print anything whatever.

Antonelli had pacified diplomacy by the assurance that the Holy See would not move its own infallibility. The promise was fulfilled in the letter, for the pope himself made no such motion; he only took care that it should be made by others. The purpose of having the dogma proclaimed by acclamation was frustrated by the threat of the minority that in such a case they would immediately leave the council. A new order of procedure reduced the minority to absolute silence by substituting the voice of the majority for the hitherto unassailable voice of the unanimous council. On the discussion of the scheme of faith on March 22 there ensued a scene of the wildest uproar. When Bishop Strossmayer of Diakovar, the pugnacious orator of the opposition, repudiated, as contrary to truth, the assertion, in the preface of the syllabus, that the present prevailing indifferentism, pantheism, atheism, and materialism are purely the fruit of Protestantism, the madly indignant fathers of the majority precipitated themselves with wild cries and clenched fists

on the tribune, so that the president saw himself compelled to close the sitting.

When these proceedings, despite the secrecy in which it was tried to shroud them, found their way to the public, the governments began, of their own accord, to move. Beust had already despatched a note of warning to Rome "against projects that if carried out would open a chasm not to be filled up between the laws of the church, and those of most modern states;" Bismarck assured the opposition prelates of his support; the French foreign minister, Count Daru, demanded the revocation of the articles in the scheme inferring danger to the state. But the complications resulting in the Franco-Prussian war soon so engrossed the attention of statesmen that they troubled themselves little more about what was going on at Rome. There, no means were left untried — from flattering allurements to downright intimidation — to break up the opposition of the minority; and its members must have been better united among themselves than they were, and had surer ground to stand on, in order not to succumb. For, after all, the matters in dispute were not questions of faith and conscience, but simply of opportuneness and powers — on the one hand, namely, of the fitness of the time for dogmatizing; on the other, of the right of the episcopate to a share in the infallibility and supreme authority now asserted for the papal chair. Little wonder, therefore, — though some even of the majority made a timid attempt to conserve the teaching authority of the episcopate, — that the resistance waxed feebler and that the arrogance of the Jesuits, as expressed through the pope, became more intolerant. The committee for formulating the decrees of the council was directed to accentuate still further the dogma of papal supremacy, not only over each and every church, but over each and every individual pastor and member of the church as well. The debate thereon was cut off by the domineering majority with forty announced speakers still unheard; and the council, in face of the protest of the minority of 93, passed to the order of the day. From that date the minority took no further part in the deliberations, but contented themselves with embodying in a memorial their views in regard to the incompetency of a mere majority-decree, and appealing from an unfree council to a future free one. The vote on the whole scheme was taken on July 13, when it was approved by a meeting of 601 out of 692 remaining members, — 451 voting simply *Placet*, 62 casting a conditional affirmative

vote, and 88 voting *Non placet*. The new dogma is expressed literally as follows: "The pope, when he, *ex cathedra* — i.e., in the exercise of his office as pastor and teacher of all Christians — through supreme apostolic authority, decides a doctrine of faith



FIG. 104. — Archbishop Darboy. From the engraving by L. Massard.

or morals to be held by the whole church, possesses, in virtue of the divine aid promised him by St. Peter, that infallibility with which the divine Saviour wishes his church to be endowed in deciding a doctrine affecting faith or morals; and, therefore, such decis-



ions of the pope of themselves, and independently of the assent of the church, are immutable." The opponents determined on making a last essay. A deputation — Archbishop Darboy (Fig. 104), at its head — waited on the pope on the 15th, and solicited a modification of the words "of themselves," etc. into "on the ground of the testimony of the church," Bishop Ketteler, on his knees, beseeching him to restore to the church and the episcopate, by this small concession, their lost unity. When this effort also proved in vain, the 88 "Nays" declared they would leave the council without taking part in the final vote. Only two (Bishop Riccio of Ajaccio and Bishop Fitzgerald of Little Rock, Arkansas) of the opposition had the manliness to persist to the end, and openly vote *Non placet*. The other 531 still remaining voted unconditionally, *Placet*. Pius forthwith adjourned the council till November 11, but the situation of the world had so changed by this time that there was no longer thought of a reassembling.

The promulgation of the new dogma in the bull *Pastor aeternus* was meant to coincide in point of time with the triumph of Catholic France in the great secular war. Independently of its disappointment in this, the success of the Vatican had been quite phenomenal. That the opposition had been nothing more than a mere rope of straw, was proved by the fact that not one member of it remained true to the position he took up at Rome. One after another of them made sacrifice of his intellect, and it may be of his conscience, with the poor consolation that no evil within the church could be so great as its disruption. Not content with this, they vied with each other in inflicting the penalties of the church on such as hesitated to profess belief in that which they themselves, but a short time before, had pronounced incredible. Once again a pastoral letter was issued by the German bishops from the grave of St. Boniface; but this, in contradiction to the first, demanded from the faithful the unreserved submission of their pride of reason to authority. Bishop Hefele, however, wrote in November: "I can as little conceal from myself in Rottenburg as in Rome, that the new dogma has no true foundation either in scripture or tradition, and injures the church in an incalculable way, that the later never received a more deadly wound than on July 18. But, now that the whole German episcopate has, over night as it were, changed its conviction, and a part of it gone over to the persecuting doctrine of infallibility, my eye is too weak to see in this hour of our extremity any way of deliverance."

As was anticipated, the Jesuit stroke of July 18 changed the previous relation of the church to the state into one of constant war, with transient armistices of shorter or longer duration. The first government to draw the necessary logical conclusion from the arrogant usurpation was the Austrian, which, on July 30, 1870, declared the concordat no longer in force, inasmuch as the new dogma subverted all the conditions regulating the relations between church and state, so that compacts made under former circumstances were no longer valid. With the young kingdom of Italy the Vatican was, in other respects, at deadly feud. Notwithstanding that the guaranty laws of 1871—agreed on by the government with the parliament—conserved to the pope in perpetuity, not only the full prerogatives and dignities of a sovereign, but also the unrestricted exercise of all the rights of sovereignty within the church, with renunciation of the state's *placet* and all interference in the collation to sees, so that Cavour's 'free church in a free State' found its provisional realization, the 'prisoner of the Vati-



FIG. 105. — Professor von Schulte. From a photograph.

can' (as Pius took pleasure in calling himself) was never weary of protesting against the sacrilegious outrages of the 'Subalpine government,' of plotting with its enemies, and of rejecting the rich donation offered by it. The Bavarian government refused the bull its *placet*; but the bishops promulgated it independently of this, and threatened every one with the ban who denied its validity. Several of the smaller states contented themselves with declaring that they did not recognize the legality of the change in the constitution of the church. The papal nuncio in Munich, Meglia, confessed with a sigh to the

Württemberg *chargé d'affaires*: "We can no longer enter into an accommodation; only the Revolution can help us."

What the episcopate had not the courage to essay, that the Catholic scholarship of Germany set itself to do. Döllinger, called on by the archbishop of Munich to subscribe to the decrees of the council, in his answer exposed with irresistible logic the utter invalidity of the new dogma. "As a Christian," he concluded, "as a theologian, as a historian, as a citizen, I cannot accept this teaching." Excommunicated, therefore, but chosen by the university almost unanimously as its rector, he boldly and openly pronounced,



FIG. 106. — Professor Hubert Reinkens. From a photograph.

in his inaugural address, the Vatican decrees to be Rome's declaration of war against German science. In Döllinger the quasi-rebellious movement had found a leader with a great name. Scholars like Friedrich and Huber in Munich, and Schulte (Fig. 105) in Bonn, identified themselves with it, distinguishing themselves by the name of 'Old Catholics.' A Munich committee presented an address, bearing 12,000 signatures, to King Louis II., who briefly expressed the

hope to Döllinger that his intrepid fellow-combatants would be successful in baffling the Jesuit machinations and in thereby securing the victory of light over darkness. At a meeting of German, Austrian, and Swiss Catholics, convened at Heidelberg, it was agreed to hold a diet of Old Catholics at Munich, at which delegates out of almost all the countries of Europe appeared to the number of 250 (September 22-24, 1871). On June 4, 1874, Professor Reinkens (Fig. 106) of Breslau was chosen at Cologne as Old Catholic bishop; and the Jansenist Bishop Heykamp of Deventer gave him

canonical consecration at Rotterdam. He fixed his see at Bonn, and was acknowledged by the governments of Prussia, Baden, and Hesse, Bavaria being prevented from following their example by the concordat of 1817. Prussia, moreover, endowed him with a yearly income of 16,000 thalers. Regularly recurring synods and congresses busied themselves with the internal organization of the Old Catholic church. But the great hopes aroused by all this initial energy were not to be fulfilled. Döllinger, when men, contrary to his advice, proceeded to the erection of a separate Old Catholic organization, withdrew from the guidance of the movement. The decree of the Synod of Bonn, in 1878, repealing, in spite of the earnest remonstrances of the bishop and other leaders, the law of celibacy, gave offence to many; and although the strife between the Old and New Catholics in relation to the ownership of the church buildings, properties, and endowments was, by law, decided in Baden and Prussia in a sense favorable to the former, still the main point of all refused to materialize — the masses were not with them. It became obvious that the moment was unpropitious for a church-reform movement, at least for an ill-defined and half-and-half one, professing to be Roman Catholic and yet at daggers drawn with the Vatican and its champions. The Old Catholics remained a general staff without an army. In Germany their number never exceeded 52,000, and even that soon waned.



## CHAPTER XI.

### THE GERMAN EMPIRE: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION.

IT was fortunate in the highest degree for the empire called into existence at Versailles in January, 1871, but still awaiting organization, that the men who, above all others, may be called its authors, were still at its head to guide it through the critical embryo period, and to labor in undisturbed harmony for its development, — namely, the Emperor William I. and his chancellor, Prince Bismarck. It is a spectacle unprecedented in history for a statesman of such creative power as the latter to have been able to develop his magnificent energies under a prince always so fully in earnest in the discharge of his high duties as the Emperor William, who, by the side of a Moltke, still remained the commander, and by the side of a Bismarck was still the ruler. The history of the first two decades of the German empire is, in an eminent degree, the personal history of Bismarck, the foremost statesman that Germany ever produced. To him his countrymen are indebted for their political education, the securing of the empire's young existence against internal and external foes, and its constitutional organization. From him emanated the ideas whose fruitage was the new empire.

Not in conformity with any cut-and-dried model was the structure of the empire conceived, but in wise accord with the particular conditions and needs developed by the diversities in the situation of its members. "Logic," said Treitschke (Fig. 107), "is not the most important thing in the political life of nations." "I belong not to those," said Bismarck, defending himself from the charge of vacillation, "who believe they have in no circumstances any more to learn. For me there has always been but one lodestar by which to steer — *Salus publica*. From the beginning, I have perhaps often acted precipitately and inconsiderately; but, when I got time to reflect, I have ever subordinated myself to the question: What is best for my country, the most expedient and right? A doctrinaire I have never in my life been. All the systems, through conformity with which parties see themselves banded together or divided, stand

to me in the second rank; in the first stands the nation,—her position towards the outside world, her independence, and our organization in such a way that we can breathe with freedom in the world as a great nation.” The constitution of the empire, he believed, would evolve itself, just as the English constitution had evolved itself, not in conformity with a theoretical ideal towards which men pressed forward without regard to the impediments in their way, but by organic development from the existing conditions. In 1877 he observed, “We must allow a natural organic development time to mature itself, and not become impatient when periods of stagnation occur.”

Through careful regard to the rights pertaining to the several states, Bismarck succeeded in convincing the dynasties that their position would be much more secure and dignified within the empire than in the old Confederation. He found, therefore, among them acceptance for the idea, to which he sought to accustom Germany, that the empire was not an excrescence on the struc-



FIG. 107. — Heinrich von Treitschke. From a photograph.

ture of the federal states, but that it was rather the comprehensive dome under which they could harbor in their totality, the care for which was a duty incumbent on all. More critical and subject to vicissitudes was the chancellor's relation to the Reichstag. In 1866 Bismarck had adopted universal suffrage and secret voting (the ballot), because the experiences he had made, in the Prussian Landtag, of the deputies sent up by the liberal middle classes led him to believe the masses to be more loyal to the king than they. But it soon became questionable whether the expedient did not yield results different from what was expected,—whether, in short, political morality,

instead of being elevated, was not injured by it. It soon became matter of doubt whether the Reichstag thus elected was the genuine expression of the national will. Under the overpowering influence of the just-ended war the first general election, in May, 1871, gave a strong national-imperial majority. The controlling power lay in the hands of the National Liberals, composed of Old Prussians and New Prussians, somewhat re-enforced from South Germany. Further towards the Right the liberal *Reichspartei* of 29 constituted the transition to the more aristocratic and conservative German *Reichspartei* of 38; the Conservatives proper numbered 50; the 'Party of Progress,' 44. The Ultramontane element assumed the non-significant name of the 'Centre,' and its influence made itself felt in a manner most prejudicial to imperialism. Elected through the influence of a clergy all-powerful to pardon or punish, and having as its organ a press disciplined to obedience, this party, in the next election, increased its number of 57 to almost the double, and knew how to hold its position impregvably; for it stood in closest relation to all the elements unfriendly to the empire, — to the Poles, the Guelfs, who looked for the restoration of Hanover as a kingdom, and the Alsations and Lorrainers.

The characteristic feature of this Reichstag was, accordingly, the extraordinary number of its parties. Even the strongest had of itself no majority, but required the support of those less or more favorably disposed to it. Bismarck's relation to such a parliament was far from an easy one. Among all its factions not one followed him implicitly. Even his fastest adherents deserted him on occasions; while he, as the person responsible for the conduct of the government, was the target for the shafts, not only of the foes of the empire, but also of all the parliamentarians inspired with the impulse to have their theories and crotchets ventilated. Only a personality as powerful as his own, and endowed with a proportionately strong sense of duty, would have been able — under the bodily malady from which he suffered, and which necessitated repeated and long absences — to bear up against the unintermitting and wearing strain. Although not gifted with the showy qualities of the popular orator, he yet, by the depth and clearness of his perception, the breadth and grandeur of his views, and the appositeness and force, as well as the homely *naïveté*, of his mode of expression, produced always the most profound effect on his hearers. The days on which he took part in the debates were always among the great days of the



imperial parliament, and on every such occasion his ascendancy asserted itself. "I would earnestly recommend," he said in January, 1872, "that we should look at politics from a practical point of view; they constitute, indeed, an eminently practical science, in which one cannot too much exercise himself." "Criticism," he said one day when tired out with finding in the Reichstag only hypercriticism, "criticism is notoriously easy, but art is difficult. Politics is no pure science, as many of the *Herren Professoren* figure to themselves; it is, over and above that, an art." Bismarck was no party-man; for, as minister, he learned to subordinate his own predilections, and even his convictions, to the needs of the state. The excellent effects resulting from the first parliamentary soirée at his house in April, 1869, induced him to continue the practice; and members of the Reichstag of all parties—excepting democrats and socialists—were wont to meet there, and converse in the most unconstrained and cordial way possible.

The administration of the empire was originally so organized that foreign affairs were in the hands of the chancellor, while the minister of state, Delbrück, was over the home-office. The result of the early good understanding between the chancellor and the National and Liberal parties was a legislative energy eminently conducive to the upbuilding of the empire. One of the first matters demanding attention was the disposition of the sums payable by France, which, inclusive of interest up to March 31, 1877, amounted to 4,463,202,618 marks (§1,064,473,824). Of this, 6,000,000 marks were allotted by the Reichstag as compensation to the Germans expelled from France; nearly 17,000,000 for shipping captured or compelled to inaction; 116,000,000 as indemnity for war-injuries inflicted on Kehl, Altbreisach, Saarbrücken, and the towns in Alsace, and for the repayment of the requisitions levied on Alsace-Lorraine; 12,000,000 to help needy members of the reserve and landwehr; 350,000,000 were required for the erection of barracks and reconstruction of fortresses,—especially those of Metz and Strasburg,—to adapt them to the long range of artillery; 66,000,000 were granted to enlarge the original plan of 1867 for creating a navy; 120,000,000 as a defence-fund for the empire; and in 1873 an invalid-fund was decreed of 560,000,000, which, with its interest, was calculated to be expended in about fifteen years; 12,000,000 were placed at the discretion of the emperor for the remuneration of generals and statesmen. The emperor had already, as duke of Lauenburg, presented Bismarck with



demesnes in the district of Schwarzenberg, yielding an annual revenue of  $\approx 25,000$ . Finally 25,000,000 marks were assigned for the erection of a Reichstag building, the foundation of which was laid by the emperor in June, 1884. The balance of the indemnity-money, after deducting the costs of the war and of the rehabilitation of the army, was allocated to the different states, to be disposed of as each judged best. Of this balance Prussia, as the greatest, got 320,000,000; Schaumburg-Lippe, as the least, some 420,000 marks.

This imperial army now consisted of eighteen army-corps, of which Prussia, in conjunction with the smaller states associated with her, contributed fourteen; Saxony, one; Würtemberg, one; and Bavaria, two. In 1874 the government proposed a comprehensive measure fixing the peace-strength of the army at 401,659 actually with the colors, exclusive of the one-year volunteers. While the government urgently pressed making the permanence of the army independent of the views and appropriations of the Reichstag, the most of the deputies saw, as they had seen four years before, in their yearly deliberations and grants, an inalienable right of the people's representatives. Moltke (PLATE XX.) lent the great weight of his authority to the government's proposals; and in a speech on February 16, which attracted much attention, declared that "a great state exists only through herself and her own strength, and fulfils the purpose of her being only when she is resolved to maintain her existence, her freedom, and her rights. Let us not forget that the savings deposited in our coffers during long years of peace may all be lost through one season of war." After depicting the army as an educational institution such as no other land possessed, he continued: "The best man cannot live at peace if it does not please a bad neighbor to let him. But I think we will show the world that we have become a mighty nation, and yet have remained a peace-loving one, — a nation which does not need war to win renown, and does not desire it for the sake of conquests. But to insure peace we must be prepared for war." He was supported, as regards the legality of the measures, by Gneist (Fig. 108), an expert in civil law. Another conflict between crown and parliament seemed imminent. But there came a popular reaction. To vote for the ten-year period meant to vote for the fatherland. A compromise was effected, by which the Reichstag agreed to concede, and the government consented to accept, the prolongation of the army peace establishment for seven years. On April 20, therefore, the Reichstag decreed the 'Septennate' over

PLATE XX.



Count Moltke. Marble bust by Reinhold Begas.

In the National Gallery at Berlin.

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the votes of the Centre, the Progressists, and the Social Democrats. The peace establishment thus reconfirmed corresponded to a war strength of 1,392,000 men, with 299,562 horses, irrespective of the *landsturm*, constituted by the law of February 15, 1875, comprising all liable to service from the age of seventeen to forty-two, not belonging to the army or navy.

The navy, too, in accord with the plan of 1873 for the creation of a fleet, experienced rapid development. While, almost up to the outbreak of the great war, Germany had had to draw upon England and France for her steamships, she now had these built exclusively in the yards of Dantzic, Stettin, Kiel, Hamburg, and Bremen.

The payment of the greatest part of the war-indemnity in gold not only enabled the reform of the monetary system, promised forty years before in Zollverein compacts, to be made, with concurrent introduction of a gold currency, but rendered it a matter of urgent necessity. The local coinages previously issued by the several



FIG. 108. — Dr. Rudolf Gneist. From a photograph.

states were now replaced by a uniform currency based on the mark<sup>1</sup> as its unit. The new silver coins were henceforth, like the nickel pieces, to serve only as small change. Only the thaler<sup>2</sup>—to avoid too great a depreciation of silver—provisionally retained its value as a legal tender. The transition from the old chaos of currencies was effected with surprising ease. The new gold coins bore the impress of the imperial eagle on the one face, with the head of the prince of the state issuing them on the other. A corresponding reform was ef-

<sup>1</sup> The mark equals 23.85 cents of American, or about 11½d. of English money.

<sup>2</sup> One thaler equals three marks.



feeted in the paper currency, whose bewildering multiplicity of bank and other notes (mainly one-thaler bills) to the value of 500,000,000 thalers, among other evils, facilitated counterfeiting. Of these the empire made a clean sweep. From January 1, 1876, they were replaced by imperial treasury-bills to the amount of 175,000,000 marks. The imperial bank, with a capital of 120,000,000 marks, invested with the privilege of tax-free issue to the amount of 250,000,000 marks, and coming in place of the Bank of Prussia, by its competition seriously restricted the field of operations of the private banks.



FIG. 109. — Albert Maybach, Minister of Public Works. From a photograph.

Various attempts were made, also, to unite the railroads of the different states under the ownership, or at least control, of the empire. These, however, all failed through the resolute particularist sentiment. In Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony, where the railroads were for the most part state property, the opposition was particularly strong. Finally the Prussian government determined, by buying up practically all the private railroads in its own territories, to unify its own system, and at the same time gain a commanding

position with reference to the connecting lines. The scheme was successfully carried out, and proved most satisfactory both in regard to the furtherance of traffic and financially, largely through the able and energetic administration of Maybach (Fig. 109), minister of commerce from 1878.

The postal system, which except in Bavaria and Württemberg was transferred to the empire, was brought to a state of high perfection. The postal congress held at Bern in 1874, on the motion of State Secretary Stephan (Fig. 110), resulted in the institution of the Universal Postal Union on October 9 of the same year.

One inconvenience from which Germany had suffered for many years was that its customs boundaries were not conformable with those of the Zollverein, Hamburg and Bremen lying outside the latter. A somewhat free use of pressure finally brought both cities into the customs' union, — Bremen in 1885, and Hamburg on October 1, 1888.



FIG. 110. — Dr. Stephan. From a photograph.

The first work of organic legislation successfully carried through by the empire was the reform of the judiciary and the extension of its competency over the whole domain of law. Prussia was from the first not unfavorably disposed to the change, but the second-rate states, otherwise in an ill humor because they had too little share in shaping the projects of imperial law elaborated in the Prussian ministry of justice, protested against the limitation of their power, hitherto final in this department within their own bounds. Nevertheless, the undeniable urgency of the national requirements brought the consideration of whether it would not be better to acquiesce of

their own accord than to have to submit to a majority. After the motion of Lasker and Miquel (Fig. 111) in favor of considering the reform passed three successive sessions of the Reichstag with growing majorities, the Bundesrat gave its assent (1873) over the votes of the two Mecklenburgs and the two Reusses. The scheme, elaborated by a commission having at its head Pape, the president of the superior court of commerce, was in the following year sub-



FIG. 111. — Deputy Miquel. From a photograph.

mitted by the Reichstag to a committee for consideration and embodiment in a measure. To no fewer than eighty-six of the points they embodied the Bundesrat refused to assent. At length, however, the four main judicial laws—those, namely, in regard to the constitution of the courts, penal and civil procedure, and bankruptcy—were carried in December, 1876, to be in force from October 1, 1879, and the blessing of uniformity in its laws secured for the whole German people. The compil-

ing of a code of civil law presented such difficulties that the commission intrusted with the task required twelve years for its completion. At first it was thought that the supreme court of the empire would hold its sittings in Berlin, but subsequent reflection led to the choice of Leipsic as the site of its sessions. Simson (Fig. 112), for many years speaker of the Reichstag, was nominated by the emperor to the presidency of the court. The press-law of May 7, 1874, was characterized by essential liberality in various ways, conferring greater security and freedom of action on the press of all Germany.



One of the most serious questions pressing on the new empire was that of Alsace-Lorraine. These provinces had not been seized by Germany from a spirit of conquest, but as a measure of security and one of the most reliable guaranties for the adhesion of South Germany to the north.

The question after Germany's triumph, therefore, was not whether the annexation should be effected, but in what shape. The idea of constituting Alsace-Lorraine into a neutral state, like Switzerland and Belgium, and of establishing in this way a barrier-chain from the Alps to the North Sea, Bismarck promptly rejected; for while this would prevent Germany from attacking France by land, it would not hinder France from attacking Germany by sea. "Till our fleet can cope with the French one, we can never be safe on the seaside," said the chancellor. But a yet more serious consideration was that neutrality was really of no reliable value unless the neutralized people were prepared to defend their neutrality by arms. Such was so far from being the case in the provinces in question that France could have been always




FIG. 112. — Dr. Simson, President of the Reichstag. From a photograph.

secure of finding support there for any aggressive scheme. The simplest plan then would have been their incorporation with Prussia. But Bismarck thought it probable that the Alsatians would more easily reconcile themselves to the name of 'Germans' than to that of 'Prussians;' and it was therefore decided that Alsace-Lorraine should remain apart as an imperial federal state (*Reichsland*), immediately under the emperor and the Federal Council, passing first through a sort of probation under the emperor's guidance, to end January 1, 1873.

Bismarck was resolved to hurt the susceptibilities of the new



subjects as little as possible. As the Alsace-Lorrainers had maintained no small spice of particularism under French lordship, he felt called on to foster this spirit to the utmost of his power, on the assumption that the more the people felt themselves to be Alsace-Lorrainers, the more readily would they un-Frenchify themselves, while he cherished the further hope that German forbearance and kindly feeling would be successful, haply in no long time, in making countrymen of them. The three 'departments' were constituted into three government districts (*Bezirke*), Upper Alsace, Lower Alsace, and Lorraine, subdivided into twenty-two circles (*Kreise*). Von Möller, the former first president of Hesse-Nassau, was in September, 1871, nominated first president with an imperial advisory board by his side, Bismarck-Böhlen, the chancellor's cousin, having up to this time officiated as governor.

But the hopes that Bismarck at first cherished in regard to the new imperial territory were doomed to disappointment. A bureaucracy of office-holders aggregated from the various federated states, without a visible monarchical head, was the form of rule least of all adapted to reconcile it to its new conditions. The sentimental feeling of tenderness which prompted the Germans to press to their hearts their so long alienated brothers found no response across the Rhine. Apart from the limited class who retained the conviction of the superiority of German culture in respect of both head and heart, the whole population, French and Frenchified Teutons alike, repulsed the advances of the would-be common mother. The 'Party of Protest,' incited from France through the agency of the Alsatian League, was never weary of impressing on the people that the present situation was merely temporary, and that their reincorporation with France was only a question of time, and that a short time. Nay, the burgomaster of Strasburg — Lauth — declared to the first president quite frankly that he remained in Alsace only as waiting the return of the French. In consequence, he was deposed from his office, and the common council suspended for protesting against the act of deposition. Nor was this the only case of the kind; at the elections to the district and circle diets in 1873, so many 'Protesters' were chosen who refused to take the oath to the emperor, that of the twenty-two latter diets, only fourteen could transact business, and of the three district diets only one.

And to these anti-German influences no adequate counterpoise was found, either in the treaty with France of 1874, which, with

the assent of the pope, separated all the imperial communes from the dioceses of Nancy and St. Dié, and revoked the subordination of the bishoprics of Metz and Strasburg to the archiepiscopal see of Besançon, or even by the reorganization of the university of Strasburg on a German basis with abrogation of the five French faculties. Above all, it was essential to deal effectually with the common schools. The educational measure passed in February, 1872, decreed compulsory education, with exclusive use of German in the elementary schools within German-speaking districts, and broke down the influence of the clergy by decreeing that the inspection and direction of schools should be in the hands of the state authorities, who alone should have a voice in regard to their organization and course of study, and in the examination and appointment of teachers, as also that such schools as did not conform to the state-regulations should be closed. The conditions prescribed by the measure were such as to compel the retirement of almost all the teachers, male and female alike, of whom there were upwards of 700 in Upper Alsace alone. As it was found impossible to raise the army-corps decreed for Alsace, the fifteenth, out of the natives of the land, the corps was constituted out of old German regiments, while the men levied on the new territory fulfilled their service in other corps. In conformity with the treaty of Frankfort, all the Alsace-Lorrainers had to make their election by October 1, 1872, as to whether they would remain in Germany or remove to France. About 160,000 decided for removal; but when the time came only about 50,000 migrated, the rest remaining, and claiming the right of foreigners to exemption from military duty. The government, however, in spite of their outcries against tyranny, treated these 'option men' as German subjects.

From the belief that participation in political life would be the best means for reunifying Alsace-Lorraine with Germany, the constitutional privileges of the empire were extended to it in 1874, and representation in the Reichstag conceded. But the result of the first elections disappointed even the most moderate hopes. Ten clericals and five 'Protesters' were chosen; and these latter had the effrontery to make their début by demanding that in the debates such as were not masters of the German language should be allowed to use French, and that their people should be asked whether or not they indorsed incorporation. When these demands were rejected, most of them turned their backs on the Reichstag. Meanwhile, the apprecia-

tion of the uselessness of this merely disclamatory attitude paved the way for the formation of an Alsatian or Home Rule (autonomist) party, in contradistinction to that of the 'Protesters,' which, taking its stand on facts, was ready to co-operate with the government and Reichstag for the weal of the country. The wish of the party was for a permanent territorial constitution and a provincial diet; but this could not be complied with, for a parliament that drew its inspiration mainly from French and Romish sources could not have existed excepting in a state of perpetual conflict with the imperial government. It was, however, a step in this direction when, by imperial ordinance of October 29, 1874, a territorial committee (*Landesausschuss*), with an advisory voice, was created, to which each of the three district diets contributed ten members. From this committee the Party of Protest had excluded themselves by refusing to take the oath of fealty. The government's experiences of this institution were so favorable as to justify it in thereafter widening its competence to the extent that territorial laws approved by it were promulgated by the emperor with the assent of the Bundesrat without the concurrence of the Reichstag, the last being appealed to only when the government and the territorial committee could not agree. By the law of July 4, 1879, a governor (*Statthalter*) was appointed for the territory with much extended powers, as also an administration, with a secretary of state at its head, and a state-council for sanctioning projects of law. Commissioners, with a deliberative voice, could be delegated to the Bundesrat by the governor. The territorial committee received the power of initiating measures, and its membership was raised from thirty to fifty-eight.

Field-Marshal von Manteuffel was nominated to the governorship, and his administration was not wanting in efforts to abrogate French influences. Sensational Chauvinistic journals, and aught tending towards hostile agitation generally, were suppressed; even admission was denied to the (so-called) agents of French insurance companies supposed to have political ends in view. The use of the French language in the territorial committee, hitherto customary, was, in 1881, prohibited. None the less these efforts proved all but ineffective; and this was due, in great measure, to the governor himself. The brave and honestly intentioned, but vain, Manteuffel held intercourse preferably with the out-and-out French notables and the Ultramontane priesthood, flattering himself that they, out of pure

personal regard for him, would give up their political views. The result for himself was only half-concealed ridicule, and for Alsace-Lorraine an aggravation of its Gallomania. 'Optimists' remaining in the land fanned the flames of discontent; French families which spent their summers on their estates in the territory fostered the hope of a reconquest. French officers passed the hunting-season with friends in Alsace. Several prosecutions for treason disclosed the extent to which this underground work was being pursued, often with the complicity of subaltern officials continued, from the French time, in their positions. In vain did the governor deplore, in his many speeches, that this attitude of the people impeded the fulfilment of his life-task,—that of securing for the land its full constitutional rights. On his death, June 17, 1885, the sum-total of his achievements was that the work had all to be begun over again. Under his successor, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, circumstances in some measure bettered themselves. Strasburg received back its common council; the reception which the crown prince, as representing his father, met with in Metz surpassed all expectations. The local elections showed an important improvement. In the territorial committee Baron Zorn von Bulach had the courage to warn his countrymen against setting their hopes on a war of which they would be the first victims. But the effects of the Manteuffel system were not to be so easily eradicated. With emphasis the new governor impressed on the Alsace-Lorrainers, before the election to the Reichstag, that their frequently expressed wish for parity of state-rights could have a prospect of fulfilment only when the federal governments and the German nation acquired the conviction that they accepted the existing situation unreservedly, and when the 'Party of Protest' had vanished from sight. The coadjutor Stumpf, by command of the pope, called on the clergy to hold themselves aloof from all compromising electoral agitation. But there were infatuated men, who gave less heed to the words of such advisers than to those of the men who assured them that war would break out in the spring, German rule be subverted, and the land occupied by the French — when woe betide such as had voted for candidates friendly to Germany. So hate for Germany and preference for France once more won the day. Protesters and Clericals alone were elected. Decided intervention became a matter of absolute necessity. The legislative centre was transferred back to Berlin, the government was empowered by the Reichstag to nominate salaried



burgomasters; all French or Frenchified clubs were limited in their operations or entirely suppressed; several communal councils were suspended; and the French firearms were transformed into accordance with the German style. There followed restrictions on the residence of foreigners, whereby the open visits, at least, of French officers were made impossible, and passports were made imperative on all entering from the side of France,—measures that did not remain without effect, and served to convince the natives that the imperial government was not to be trifled with.



FIG. 113. —Count Eulenburg. From the copper-plate engraving by Weger. Original, a photograph.

From the intimate relations existing between the empire and Prussia, as peculiarly representing the imperial authority, the reorganization of Germany necessarily reacted more effectively on the domestic economy of that kingdom than on that of any other of the federated states. The stagnation of legislation during the years of conflict between executive and legislature had prolonged the life of feudal institutions here that had ceased to exist else-

where, and this especially in its eastern provinces, in whose local diets the petty nobility maintained a supremacy out of harmony with actual conditions. In 1875, against the desperate resistance of the feudalists, the eastern provinces (except Posen) were reorganized; feudal privileges were abolished, provincial diets established, and a large measure of self-government granted the local corporations. These measures were largely the work of the minister of the interior, Count Eulenburg (Fig. 113).

From December 21, 1872, to November 9, 1873, Bismarck with-

drew from the presidency of the Prussian ministry in order to devote himself more exclusively to imperial matters. Finding this policy injurious to his real influence, he resumed the relinquished position on the latter date, receiving, however, Camphausen (Fig. 114) as vice-president to relieve him from the drudgery. His influence over the Prussian government was, moreover, strengthened by the cabinet ordinance of February 8, 1875, to the effect that all measures contemplated by any individual department of the administration must get the approval of the whole ministry before being drafted.



FIG. 114. — Finance-Minister Otto Camphausen. From a photograph.

He had good cause for issuing the ordinance. The difficulties which he had to contend with in carrying out his life-task — the consolidation of the empire — were not a little enhanced by the personal hostility to which he found himself exposed from more than one quarter. Most keenly of all did he feel the hostility, alike to his person and policy, shown in the ranks of his own party, the Conservatives, who did not limit themselves to open antagonism, but worked through underhand intrigues and salon influences. Even among the immediate companions of the emperor, agencies were in

operation for his overthrow. In these lofty circles a successor was kept in readiness in the person of Count Harry von Arnim (Fig. 115), the ambassador at Paris, who had already had differences with Bismarck, at the time of the Vatican council. Well advised in regard to this underhand work, the latter availed himself of an occasion — of itself of little account — to declare war on this antagonist. In reply to a letter from Arnim diffusely discussing the presence of diplomats from the second-rate German states in Paris, he wrote: "I must, when I am again in a condition to conduct



FIG. 115. — Count Harry von Arnim.  
From a photograph.

business, require from all the agents of the empire in other countries — even the highest — readier observance of my instructions and less of independent initiative and prodigality in inculcating their own views than you have hitherto exhibited in your reports and official procedure." A reprimand of such severity seemed to leave Arnim no alternative but to ask his immediate release. Instead of this, he addressed himself to

the emperor personally, with the prayer that he would clear up the situation, obviously in the hope of in this way triumphing over the chancellor. He completely deceived himself. In the delicate form of a transfer to Constantinople, the emperor ordered his recall. But the count did not appreciate this lenity. He opened a newspaper war against the man of his hate, partly in the Vienna "Press" with revelations from the period of the ecumenical council, partly in a letter to Döllinger also appearing in the journals. His dismissal followed forthwith with a demand for the delivery of the documents which his



successor found missing in the archives of the Paris embassy. After some delay partial restitution was made; but he persistently refused to give up over fifty pieces relating to his conflict with Bismarck, on the plea that they were private property. He was therefore arrested, and brought before the Berlin city tribunal, where he was found guilty of transgression against public order, and was sentenced accordingly to imprisonment for three months, which the court of second instance raised to nine months. He was, in addition, dismissed from the imperial service. On account of his publishing an anonymous paper, *Pro Nihilo*, he was further sentenced, in 1876, to imprisonment for five years; but this penalty he evaded by fleeing the country.

Bismarck's secret annoyance at the ambiguous attitude which the *Kreuzzeitung*, the organ of the high conservatives, had assumed in relation to these intrigues, found expression in the sitting of the Reichstag of February 9, 1877. He called on all men who had regard for honor, character, or Christian sentiment to combine against such base practices, and sever their connection with a paper, however high its standing, which could in any way countenance or palter with falsehoods, till such time at least as it had cried *peccavi*, and made expiation for the wrong it had done men holding the loftiest places in the eyes of the world. Bismarck's violence, and, in the judgment of not a few, his unfairness, to the paper overreached itself. A number of high conservatives declared that his attack would have no effect in making them disassociate themselves from an organ that had stood up, fearless and true, for the watchword of their party, "With God, for king and fatherland;" from this declaration they received the name of 'Declarants.'

Weary of these and similar frictions Bismarck at length, in April, 1877, begged his discharge. This the emperor answered with an emphatic "Never," but, in lieu, granted him respite from duty till the following February.

The months that the chancellor thus spent in seclusion in Varzin became of high import in more than one point of view. Here he matured those administrative plans with which he made his début on his return. Here the conviction was borne in upon him that for the carrying out of his ideas a reliable majority was an absolute essential, and he even made an attempt, through Bennigsen and Lasker, their leaders, to create a party loyal to the government out of the National Liberals. The result of the failure of these negotiations was that the National Liberals went over to the opposition.



Bismarck, in order to increase the facility of administration, early set about a gradual subdivision of the imperial chancery; the railroad department being separated from it in 1874, the general post-and-telegraph-office in 1876, the department of Alsace in 1877. The same process was adopted in regard to the imperial treasury; and in



FIG. 116. — Prince William of Prussia and Princess Augusta Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg. From a photograph.

December, 1879, the chancellor's office received the name of the imperial home office. With this was accomplished its transformation into a number of co-ordinate imperial bureaus, whose official intercourse with the imperial chancellor was effected through the imperial chancery (*Reichskanzlei*), instituted in 1878. But this reform was

precisely the reverse of that aimed at by the Party of Progress. For while, since these departments were placed directly under the chancellor, the authority of the latter was enhanced, the desire of the Progressists was that they should not be subordinated to him, but, like himself, be responsible to the Reichstag. This demand Bismarck antagonized with all his might.

In binding the imperial house more closely to those of the other princely families of Germany, the forming of new ties of relationship was by no means ineffective. To reconcile the still sulky Schleswig-Holsteiners to their incorporation into Prussia, no happier expedient could have been thought of than the marriage of the emperor's grandson, Prince William, with Princess Augusta Victoria (Fig. 116). Thus the daughter of the dispossessed Duke Frederick VIII. became future empress of Germany. The younger imperial grandson, Prince Henry, wedded the Princess Irene of Hesse, and thus conciliated the house to which the new conditions were most distasteful. The way was paved for relieving the tension in the case of the house of Nassau-Orange, when another grandson, — Frederick William, son of the grand duke of Baden, — led home Hilda, daughter of the deposed prince, Adolphus. Another stumbling-block was removed by the death, October 18, 1884, of the aged Duke William of Brunswick, with whom the Guelf Brunswick line became extinct; the next heir, according to descent, being Ernest Augustus, duke of Cumberland, the Hanoverian pretender, who held his court at Gmunden in Upper Austria. If it had previously been questionable whether the annexation of Hanover did not convey this succession also, the duke himself put it beyond doubt by his manifesto of July 11, 1878, addressed to the crowned heads of Europe, in which he expressly refused to recognize the annexation. On October 21, 1885, the Brunswick diet appointed as regent Prince Albert of Prussia, nephew of the emperor. In 1886 the Brunswick army was incorporated with that of Prussia, obviating all danger of further difficulty in this quarter.

## CHAPTER XII.

### THE GERMAN EMPIRE (CONT.): THE KULTURKAMPF.

THE wars of 1866 and 1870 had delivered the peoples of Germany from the bane of political disintegration. But at the self-same moment when the country was settling down to national unity, the other curse, which had come to it in the sixteenth century — the discordance of creeds — awaked to new life, to nip like a spring frost the opening buds of national life.

Two circumstances combined to make especially energetic and bitter in Germany the conflict which Ultramontanism, under Pope Pius IX. and the Jesuits, everywhere waged against all civil government not perfectly subservient to itself. The first was the ill-judged legislation of 1850, by which, in a fit of weak-minded liberality, the Prussian government practically stripped itself of that supervisory power over the church which even the Catholic countries of Europe deemed necessary and retained. The second was the result of the wars of 1866 and 1870, which, transferring the centre of gravity in Europe from Catholic Austria and France to Protestant Prussia, caused the Ultramontanes to concentrate their strength for a desperate struggle of supremacy in the last-named state. On October 1, 1870, Bishop Ketteler of Mayence, in a writing to the federal chancellor, expressed fears for the religious peace of the fatherland; "for in consequence of the discomfiture of Catholic France, Catholic Germany dreaded that it might have to become Protestant, if it were not secured against such a calamity by the embodiment of the church articles of the Prussian constitution in that of the new empire." In November, Count Ledochowski, archbishop of Posen, presented an address to King William in Versailles, calling on him to exert his influence for the restoration of the States of the Church, and the deliverance of the Holy Father from his state of "imprisonment." As this most peculiar request produced no effect, mobilization of the Ultramontane forces against the Prussian state was set about without delay. The elections for the Landtag, in November, 1870, were characterized by unprecedented excitement. Each candi-

date put forward by them had to pledge himself to aid in forming a special Catholic parliamentary group. The professors of the Universities of Bonn and Breslau, who had been suspended from their offices on account of their non-acceptance of the dogma of infallibility, and some pastors and gymnasium teachers in the same plight, appealed to the government for protection, when the minister of worship and instruction (*Kultusminister*) von Mühler took their part. In allusion to the prayer of fifty-seven Prussian deputies, asking the emperor to consecrate his mighty office by the glorious deed of restoring the pope's secular sovereignty, the speech from the throne, on the opening of the first Reichstag on March 21, 1871, contained these significant words: "The spirit which animates the German people, permeating their entire nature and habits of thought, and in no less a degree the constitution of the empire and its military institutions, preserves Germany, amid all her successes, from misusing the strength she has won through unification.



FIG. 117. — Deputy Peter Reichensperger.  
From a photograph.

The respect which she claims for her own independence she willingly pays to that of all other states and peoples, weak as well as strong." The draft of the Reichstag's answer to the address was in the same spirit, but gave even more emphatic expression to it. "The day," it said, "for intervention in the domestic affairs of other peoples, under any pretext and in whatever form, is, we hope, past, never to return." Immediately after the reception of the address, the leaders of the 'Centre,' or Ultramontane party, Ketteler, Windthorst, the two Reichenspergers (Fig. 117) and Mallinkrodt (Fig. 118), brought forward a motion for embodying the so-called fundamental principles



of the Prussian constitution of 1850 — viz., the freedom of the press, the right of instituting societies, and the complete independence of the church — in the constitution of the Empire, and above all for extending the last provision to the other German States, to the abrogation of the relations then existing between these states and the church. After a hot debate of three days, the motion was negatived by two hundred and twenty-three votes to fifty-four.

Thus was the conflict opened between the Centre and the new German empire and the Prussian state, which received from the



FIG. 118. — Deputy von Mallinkrodt.  
From a photograph.

publicist Virchow the name of the “war of worship and instruction” (*Kulturkampf*). Once more there resulted a trial of strength between the state and the church. More distinctly than by anything else was the aim of the latter manifested by the fact that it found its surest allies in all the elements most hostile to the empire — in the Guelfs, the Alsace-Lorrainers, and the Catholic priesthood, that, with Ledochowski at its head, fomented the agitation in the eastern prov-

inces against Germany. Bismarck felt it to be opportune to bring the offensive attitude of the Centre, and the abuse it made of the papal authority, to the notice of Rome, with a suggestion of the danger with which the liberty hitherto enjoyed in Prussia by the Catholic church was thereby threatened. The Centre despatched Deputies Prince Löwenstein-Heubach and Lingens to Rome, in order to convince the Vatican of the indispensability of their party, whereupon the Curia also entered into the *Kulturkampf*.

This experience convinced the chancellor of the necessity for assuming a more resolute attitude of defence. "It is time," he said, "and more than time, to have done with a political dualism of the worst kind. The sovereignty in legislation is single, and must remain so; and whoever represents the laws of his country as not being binding on him places himself outside of the law." In July, 1871, there followed the abrogation of the Catholic section of the bureau of worship and instruction. The government now introduced a measure (December 4, 1871), enacting that "all officials and others having to do with the management of schools and the school system generally discharge their functions in the name of the state and are in so far officers of the State." The object in this measure was twofold — viz., the exclusion of clerics from the schools, and the safeguarding of the latter against Ultramontane-Polish influences. The introduction of this measure was the last official act of Mühler (Fig. 119). His successor was Dr. Falk,



FIG. 119. — Von Mühler, Minister of Worship and Instruction. From a photograph.

the chairman of the Federal Council's committee of justice, and the minister antagonistic beyond all others to the Centre and Ultramontanism. The measure, before it became law, had to contend against the opposition not only of the Centre, which declaimed against it as an intolerable state monopoly, and "the tyranny of tyrannies," but also of the adherents of an orthodox hierarchy among the Protestants.

The conflict involved ever wider circles, especially when the Bavarian government called on the empire for help against the Ultra-

montanes — the so-called ‘Patriots.’ In August, 1871, the Bavarian minister of worship and instruction, von Lutz, had in a comprehensive ordinance repelled the claims of the archbishop of Munich with emphatic decision. To the bishop of Augsburg he denied the help of the secular arm for the expulsion of Pastor Renftle of Mehring for disavowing infallibility. In July, Count Bray had received his dismissal as minister-president, as too accessible to Ultramontane influences. But in a land, the three-fourths of whose population were Catholic, and the greatest part of



FIG. 120. — Minister Johann von Lutz.  
From a photograph.

these, thanks to their meagre education, especially open to the incitements of a clergy who abused their office to maintain a pestiferous agitation, and where the bishop of Ratisbon was emboldened to declare that if kings would no longer show that they were such by the grace of God, he would be the first to overthrow the throne, the government had no longer

strength of itself to defend the authority of the state with effect. It proposed, in the Bundesrat, a supplement to the penal code, in virtue of which abuse of the pulpit should be punished by two years' imprisonment, "as a bulwark of the state, upon which others must follow if the church makes new aggressions." Minister von Lutz (Fig. 120) explained that in Bavaria the question was whether the government or the church should be master in state affairs. He referred in evidence of the truth of what he said, to the words of the bishop of Passau: "The church is striving, let men do what they will, for the mastery in the state. She has



tried for it in all forms; with absolutism nothing is to be done and as little with constitutionalism; she is now going to try another tack; she will ally herself with the democracy — the masses." He cited besides the passage from one of the propositions of the last council: "The church stands high above the state; when state law collides with church law, the former must give way." On November 28 the 'pulpit paragraph' was accepted by the Reichstag, thus involving the imperial authority in the conflict.

Notwithstanding all this, however, so little did Bismarck desire war, that he announced to Rome his purpose of accrediting Cardinal Hohenlohe as Prussian envoy to the Vatican. With a rudeness all but unprecedented in the annals of diplomacy, the Holy Father, in May, 1872, repulsed the proffer. Even then the chancellor declared against the step recommended by many voices in the Reichstag,—that of breaking off all diplomatic relations with the Holy Chair. He would not, he said, "break down the bridge of compromise behind him." On the other hand, he allayed the fears in regard to the conclusion of a concordat. "I hold it impossible," he declared, "to arrive at a concordat after the promulgation of the new dogma declaring the Catholic church a secular power, without effacing the authority of the empire to a degree that Germany could never assent to. Have no fear, we shall not go to Canossa, either bodily or in spirit." But when the Pope spoke of "the inhuman persecution of the church in the German empire" and of the "insolent arrogance of its government," Stumm, secretary of legation, who acted as German *chargé d'affaires* in Rome, received orders to take indefinite leave of absence. For nine years diplomatic intercourse remained broken off with Rome.

Moved by a deluge of petitions for and against the Jesuits, the Reichstag, on May 23, formally invited the chancellor to lay before it the draft of a law which should define the legal status of the religious orders, and restrain their perilous activity — especially that of the Jesuits — through legal penalties. "The danger," he said, "which the diligence of the Jesuits imports for the unity and natural development of Germany, lies not in their Catholicism, but in their entire international organization, in their renunciation of all national ties, and the suppression of the spirit of nationality everywhere. This cosmopolitanism, in contradistinction to devotion to country, is my main charge against this body; otherwise the order is abler and more tolerant than any other." Accordingly, after strong



opposition, the Jesuits and their affiliated societies — Redemptorists, Lazarists, Priests of the Holy Ghost, the Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesus — were excluded from the German Empire on July 4, 1873.

Prussia, after it had gone so far, could not stop there. It must proceed to regulate its most important relations to the church independently. Minister Falk (Fig. 121) formulated four laws, all based on the principle that in the domain of morals the church and state were equipollent powers, but that in the sphere of law the state was the higher, the church having only the function of co-operation. The



FIG. 121. — Dr. Falk, Minister of Worship and Instruction. From a photograph.

first law delimited the boundaries of the church's power of discipline and punishment, and, while securing to each church the right of disciplining its members ecclesiastically, prohibited encroachments on the sphere of civil penalties. The second dealt with the training and installation of clergymen; the third with secessions from the church; the fourth placed all reformatories for the disciplining of ecclesiastics

under the supervision of the state. Of these the second (the *Anzeigespflicht*) was the most important, making it incumbent on the bishops to make intimation to the state of every intended clerical appointment or transference, and empowering the government to veto either of these acts on the ground of insufficient education or of the criminal or political character of the nominee.

There was nothing in these laws in the least affecting faith or religion. They did nothing more than regulate the external relations of the clergy to the state, just as these had long been ordered

in various other lands. None the less the entire episcopate rose as one man against them. In one of his most important speeches, Bismarck elucidated the situation from a high political point of view. "It is," he said, "simply the old trial of strength between monarchy and priestcraft; a struggle as old as humanity, and that fills the pages of German mediaeval history down to the disintegration of the empire." These laws, which are commonly known as the 'May Laws,' passed the Prussian parliament in May, 1873.

The Jesuits deemed that the time had come for the pope to speak. Pius accordingly wrote to the emperor on August 7, 1873: "All the measures proceeding from your majesty's government have for some time back aimed at the annihilation of Catholicism. When I take counsel with myself in regard to the cause for these severe measures, I find myself unable to discover any. Nay, on the other hand, it has been reported to me that your majesty is not in accord with the procedure of your government. If this is so, will your majesty not reach the conviction that these measures can have no other effect than that of undermining your own throne? I speak with freedom, for the truth is my standard; and I speak to fulfil a duty which consists in admonishing all, even non-Catholics, of the truth, for every baptized person belongs, in some relation or other, to me as pope." The emperor's answer noticed, first of all, his error in conceiving that the government could enter upon any course disapproved of by him, and indicated the refractory conduct of the Catholic clergy as the cause of the disturbance of the peace that had prevailed for centuries between the two creeds in Prussia, further expressing the hope that the pope, now that he was informed of the true position of affairs, would use his authority to put an end to an agitation promoted by an abuse of priestly influence, and closing with the following words that resounded throughout all Protestant Christendom: "One expression in your Holiness's letter I cannot pass unnoticed; that is, that every baptized person belongs to the pope. The Evangelical faith, which I, like my forefathers and the majority of my subjects, profess, does not permit the recognition of any mediator between God and man other than our Lord Jesus Christ."

Neither writing produced any effect. And this the more especially, that the May Laws proved inadequate to cope with the insubordination of the clergy, and had, in 1874, to be supplemented by two additional measures, — one imperial, one Prussian, — concerning the administration of vacant bishoprics and the installation of

clergymen. The 'expatriation law,' accepted by the Federal Council and the Reichstag at the instigation of Prussia, empowered the separate governments to proceed against clergymen who persisted, notwithstanding their suspension, in the exercise of their office, either by eviction from certain districts, or by imprisonment, deprivation of citizenship, and expulsion from imperial territory. Finally, inasmuch as a large proportion of the Catholic population were, through the illegal procedure of the clergy, living in illicit wedlock, the Prussian government, in 1875, laid before the Landtag a bill for making civil marriage obligatory on all its subjects, without distinction of creeds.

The 'May Laws' with their complements brought the fight to a head. At a meeting at Fulda, the bishops adopted a resolution to refuse to obey them, although enactments of the same nature has previously been in force in Prussia. Once brought, through the dogma of infallibility, under the yoke of Rome, and robbed of their independence, the prelates saw themselves compelled to follow in the train of the foreign enemy of their people. For Ultramontanism there was only one bitterly detested foe,—the Prussian state,—the only power that placed itself in irreconcilable antagonism to its aims. The episcopate refused to comply with the *Anzeigepflicht*, denied the first president the inspection of their seminaries, withheld payment of the money-penalties inflicted on them, let their goods be distrained, and when there was nothing left to be seized, submitted to imprisonment. The high court of justice for ecclesiastical cases had enough and more than enough to do. In 1874 it pronounced the deposition of Archbishop Ledochowski, now a prisoner in Ostrovo, and the bishops of Paderborn, Cologne, Breslau, Münster and Limburg, shortly shared his fate. Besides this, the three dioceses of Fulda, Osnabrück, and Treves were vacant through death; so all the Prussian bishoprics save those of Kulm, Ermland, and Hildesheim lay orphaned, for in the case of no vacancy did the chapter and the government come to an agreement in regard to refilling it. The deposed prelates continued to demean themselves as the legitimate occupants, and the great mass of the people adhered blindly to them. This state of spiritual deprivation the Ultramontanes entitled a Diocletian persecution of the church. The guidance of the conflict passed out of the hands of the bishops into those of a coarse clerical demagoguery, which openly fomented revolutionary agitation. The South German clerical press teemed with the coarsest outbursts of

hate against detested Prussia, and boasted that in a short time, with the help of France, an end would be made of the German empire.

The Prussian Conservatives, owing to their attitude in regard to the church question, suffered a severe defeat in the Landtag elections of 1873. These showed that the Protestant people understood their interests better than to let themselves be used as a re-enforcement to the Ultramontane army in its war on the Prussian crown. To the Centre, on the other hand, the fanaticism of the masses



FIG. 122. — Windthorst. From a photograph.

brought large accessions in the Reichstag elections of 1874. It grew from 58 to 92, and then to 100 and 106, at which last number it remained for several sessions. Thus it was, that the party which spoke the decisive word in the imperial diet was one that voted in accordance with the behests of a foreign potentate, while the halo of a strife for freedom with which it knew how to invest itself brought it, on more than one occasion, votes from the Left. The leader of the Centre was Windthorst (Fig. 122) — “the business-manager of the party,” as Bismarck called



him—whose words were as oil—not of the sort that soothes wounds, but of that which feeds flames. His object was, above all, to heap odium on the name of Bismarck, “the best-hated man in Europe.” On July 13, 1874, a journeyman cooper of Neustadt-Magdeburg, named Kullman, incited (as the evidence showed) by these clerical demagogues, fired at the chancellor while he was staying at Kissingen for the sake of the waters, and inflicted a slight wound on his hand.

In the encyclical *Quod nunquam* of February 5, 1875, Pope Pius IX. gave strongest expression to the irreconcilable antagonism



FIG. 123. — Cardinal Ledochowski. From a photograph.

between infallible ecclesiastical autocracy and the modern state, roundly declaring the new laws—subverting the divine constitution of the church and the sacred prerogatives of the bishops—invalid, and prohibiting all, on pain of the greater excommunication, from yielding obedience to them. His Christmas allocution was turgid with denunciations of the ‘second Nero :’ other addresses, with vituperation of the ‘second Attila.’ Ledochowski (Fig. 123), by way of despite to the Prussian government, was indued with the cardinal’s scarlet. The Prussian government, in reprisal, issued a new series

of laws: first, the interdict law (the *Sperrgesetz*), by which all state payments to the bishops and other clergy were interdicted in all cases of recusancy to give their pledge to obey the laws of the land. The second measure abolished ecclesiastical orders and kindred fraternities in Prussia, excepting such as cared for the sick. The third expunged from the Constitution paragraphs 15, 16, and 18, which guaranteed the independence of the churches. A fourth gave Catholic parishes, in conjunction with the state, a large share in the administration of the church property. In the debate on this last bill, such crying abuses were exposed in the clerical administration that the clergy themselves dared not venture to maintain their resistance to it.

But in other respects their attitude remained as contumacious as ever. In Posen a canon was sentenced, as papal privy delegate, to two years' imprisonment. Pastoral charges were lying void everywhere because the bishops refused to recognize the *Anzeigepflicht*; in many Catholic schools no religious instruction was given; the academic chairs in the theological faculties were unoccupied. But the Vatican had neither ear nor eye for the spiritual destitution. The weal of religion and of the eight million Prussian Catholics lay infinitely less at its heart than its own hierarchical interests. Supernaturalism was invoked to work on the ignorant masses. At Marpingen, near Treves, some crafty children proclaimed manifestations of the Mother of God that they afterwards confessed to have been fabrications. At Gereuth in Alsace the Virgin appeared to the pilgrims thither, and announced the near approach of the day of their liberation, till the police put an end to the apparition.

Nor did others of the German states escape the religious conflict. Bavaria, Baden, and Hesse, and, among neighboring states, Belgium and the Swiss cantons of Basel and Geneva, all had to contend, with varying success, against Ultramontane onslaughts. In Belgium the clerics aimed, through the institution of a bank covering the country with a network of branches under the management of the parish priests, at constituting themselves the foremost moneyed power in the land; but the craze resulted, in 1871, in discreditable bankruptcy ruinous to tens of thousands, and involving the fall of the clerical d'Anethan ministry. In Bavaria the conflict between *Kultusminister* von Lutz, and the Ultramontane 'Patriots,' headed by Deputy Jörg (Fig. 124), was especially embittered. In most of these states, however, the death of Pius IX. was followed by somewhat better feeling.

The death of Pius IX., on February 7, 1878, and the election on the 20th of the candidate of the moderate party — Giacchino Pecci, bishop of Perugia — under the name Leo XIII. (PLATE XXI.), marked the beginning of the end of the *Kulturkampf*. The new pope, a man of wide learning and intelligence, was inclined to seek the advantage of his church rather by a conciliatory manner and through some slight concessions than by the narrow and obstinate policy of his predecessor. On the other hand, peace was becoming




FIG. 124. — Deputy Jörg. From a photograph.

increasingly necessary for the Prussian and imperial governments through the practical impossibility of securing any working majority for their measures and policies without the aid of the Centrists. A long series of reciprocal concessions, managed with considerable skill — when his pressing need of an accommodation is taken into account — by Bismarck, resulted, on the whole, in more being yielded by the government than by the church. This, however, was to be expected; as some of the measures of the state had been wholly exceptional,



PLATE XXI.



Pope Leo XIII.

From a photograph.







PLATE XXII.



Luitpold, Prince Regent of Bavaria.

From a photograph.

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taken only to oppose a clerical hostility which it was of the greatest importance to neutralize at this favorable opportunity, in order that Germany might present a united front to any possible external foe. Falk retired from his ministry in July, 1879, and was succeeded by von Puttkamer. Large discretionary powers in regard to suspending the obnoxious ordinances were granted the Prussian government by the Landtag of 1880, and as a result most of the vacant sees and parishes were filled. Five series of amendments to the May Laws, the last in 1886, practically repealed them, except as regarded the *Anzeigepflicht*; on the other hand, Leo acknowledged the *Anzeigepflicht*, and filled the sees with moderate men who were acceptable to the state.

The *Kulturkampf* was ended, leaving behind it, however, certain very definite legislative and political results. These were, the discontinuance of the Catholic department in the Prussian ministry of worship and instruction; the repeal of the paragraphs of the Prussian constitution guaranteeing religious equality; the *Anzeigepflicht*; the imperial banishment of the Jesuits, and their allied orders; and last, but perhaps not least important, the permanent establishment in the imperial parliament of a Catholic Ultramontane party commanding over 100 votes, which avowedly cared less for the common interests of Germany than for the dictates of a foreign ecclesiastical potentate and of a church that has long been a foe to German unity and freedom.

A melancholy incident, caused in part by the religious conflict in his realm, was the suicide by drowning, on June 13, 1886, of the insane King Louis II. (Fig. 125) of Bavaria. His uncle, Prince Luitpold (PLATE XXII.), who had been appointed regent six days before, retained that position after the accession of Louis's brother and successor, Otto I., who is likewise insane.

Under King William — a man sincerely pious and loyal to his church, but charitably tolerant — a freer spirit began once more to permeate the Protestant church, and fostered the revived interest of educated persons in religious matters. Originating in this spirit, the Protestant Union — meant to pave the way for a German national church — held its first meeting in Eisenach in 1864. It denied the necessity of a breach between Christianity and modern intellectual development with the alternative of renouncing either faith or science, but maintained the reconcilableness of both, and incurred



thereby the hostility of the strictly orthodox party. The 'Evangelical Alliance' (founded in Scotland in 1845), having the same objects, namely, the safeguarding of Protestantism against Catholicism and indifferentism, but with stronger accentuation of the church's creed, took root in Germany in 1857, while the 'conference of Evangelical



FIG. 125. — King Louis II. of Bavaria. From a photograph.

churches,' consisting of representatives of the supreme church courts meeting periodically, had for its aim the redressal, to some extent at least, of the want of external unity.

In Prussia, Minister Falk set himself the task of combining all the forms of the Protestant faith in one unified organization, through which the church-members should have an interest in the religious

life of the land by having a voice in the parish councils and in the district, provincial, and general synods. On September 10, 1873, the king, as head of the church, promulgated a parish and synodal organization for the six eastern provinces. Rhenish Prussia and Westphalia had possessed a synodal organization since 1835, while the new provinces maintained their ecclesiastical independence. With this the Prussian Protestant church attained, as in most of the other German states, an independent constitutional existence. On the whole, a remarkable transformation had developed itself in the church. While the cultured classes had become more religious, the lower orders had grown less so. This phenomenon was closely associated with the great social revolution which had been maturing itself during the last decades.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE GERMAN EMPIRE (CONT.) : SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POLICY.

THE great revolution brought about in productive agencies through the steam-engine, with the consequent development of manufactures on a great scale, and the decadence of the smaller industries to the aggrandizement of capital, together with the deep-reaching recasting of all economic relations, operated from about the middle of the century to occasion a complete transformation in the ideas of the artisan classes in the direction of socialism. Not till 1862 did anything like system come into the movement, when Napoleon III. sent a number of freely chosen workmen, with a view to improvement in their callings, to the exposition at London. The Frenchmen were struck by the contrast between themselves and the English artisans, who produced more cheaply though they worked fewer hours and received higher wages. They persuaded themselves that this was due to trades-unionism, which enabled the wage-earners of Britain to treat with the wage-payers on a footing of equality. The ties between the workmen of France and England were here first knit together into the nucleus of a world-organization which should embrace the workingman's party of all lands and tongues. At the head of the movement stood a German of Jewish origin, Karl Marx (Fig. 126), a man endowed with extraordinary power for commanding the masses. At a meeting in St. Martin's Hall, London, on September 28, 1864, the first attempt was made to give social democracy an international and uniform character by the appointment of a committee to draft statutes and a party-programme. In the following year the French branch of the *Internationale* constituted itself, and in 1866 a constituent congress at Geneva accepted the programme formulated by Marx. This programme proclaimed the great object, to which every political movement should subordinate itself, to be the industrial emancipation of the working-classes and the annihilation of all class-domination, without regard to creed, color, or nationality. The original leaders of the movement were no doubt, at first at least, earnest, intelligent men, honestly anxious for the elevation — material

and moral — of the working-classes. They endeavored at the congress decreed by the alliance to keep all radical and communistic extravagance at a distance. But they saw themselves more and more outflanked, and their original policy of keeping the wage-worker as far away as possible from political agitation was discarded for that of striving to bring about the revolution through political agitation. Great and protracted strikes followed each other almost uninterruptedly, and were welcomed as occasions for giving vent to the socialistic passions. Any material power worthy of the name the *Internationale*, indeed, never possessed. It was Marx's astuteness alone that knew how to surround it with a nimbus behind which it was supposed to act as the secret and invisible power watching over the destiny of the workingman. In Germany, up to this time, it had no influence.

Here these phenomena appeared later than in France and England. The proper father of German social democracy was Ferdinand Las-




FIG. 126. — Karl Marx. From a photograph.

salle, a man whose character presented a singular commixture of idealism and self-seeking intrigue. Through his most promising intellectual and philosophical achievements he had early attracted the eyes of men of eminence to himself; but after becoming the knight of the divorced countess of Hatzfeld, he betook himself more and more to crooked paths. Ignoring, like Marx, the theories of the French world-betterers, he was inclined to those of the English economic reformers, especially of Ricardo; he thus distinguished himself from those who held the subversion of all monarchical and religious institutions, the obliteration of all national landmarks, and the constitution of a grand European republic, as the indispensable



precondition for the realization of their systems. He believed in the compatibility of social equality with monarchical government, and conjoined the development of his ideal with nationality, that is with Prussia and with Bismarck, as competent to carry out the work. "Lassalle," pronounced the latter, who took pleasure in holding intercourse with a man so richly gifted, "was ambitious in the grand style; and whether the German empire was to close with the dynasty of Hohenzollern or the dynasty of Lassalle was probably a matter of doubt to himself, but in his heart he was a monarchist out



FIG. 127. — Ferdinand Lassalle. From a photograph.

and out." The birthday of German social democracy was April 12, 1862, on which day Lassalle (Fig. 127) spoke in the trades-union of Oranienburg of the "special connection between the present period of history and the idea of the handicraftsman's estate," calling on this fourth estate to assume the predominant rôle on the stage of the world's history. An elaboration of this programme constituted his letter of March 1, 1863, to the Leipsic Central Committee, showing by critical analysis of the 'Iron Wage-Law,' that under the domination of 'supply and demand' the workman's

earnings are kept down to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of life. Against this iron law individual efforts are powerless, and hence comes the necessity for co-operative associations of the actual producers, gradually embracing the whole world. With the declared purpose of forming his followers into an independent, organized political power, endowed with the right of universal suffrage, he founded at Leipsig, in May, 1863, the German Workingmen's Union; but after his death through a duel in August, 1864, the body fell to pieces. The countess of Hatzfeld, who had supported the union out of her private means, renounced connection with it, and founded a new one — the so-called women's branch.

What individuals could not accomplish was effected by the great events of the age — by German unity with its accompanying conquests of freedom of the press, liberty of migration, and, above all, of universal suffrage. In the elections to the first North German Reichstag of 1867 the Socialist Democrats won their first victories in several of the chief seats of industry, in Elberfeld-Barmen, Lennep, Chemnitz, casting nearly 40,000 votes. In the Reichstag of 1869 seven Social Democrats took their seats. The more that the improved means of instruction made the lower classes accessible to printed matter and speeches, the greater was the effect produced by the oratory and party-cries of the leaders of the movement. They were successful in rousing the masses out of their 'accursed contentment,' and making them eager for a change. Strikes, hitherto all but unknown in Germany, became frequent, and exhibited the same characteristic they had had in England, namely, that they were not so much the recourse of the poorest classes as of the comparatively better-paid. Admirably as the party was organized, rivalry broke out between Schweitzer, the head of the trades-unions, and Liebknecht, the apostle of international communism, a hater of Prussia, to whom the North German Confederation was 'the fig-leaf of absolutism.' After the close of the Reichstag, Schweitzer assailed the 'aristocracy' of the Union, and appealed from it to 'the sovereign people.' The men's and women's branches coalesced, and all but unanimously chose him for president, debarring Liebknecht and his coadjutor, the Leipsic turner, Bebel, as notorious traitors to the cause, from ever again appearing in a workers' meeting. But they did not let themselves be so easily repudiated. They summoned a congress at Eisenach, and there instituted a Socialist Democratic workingman's party, with the programme of universal suffrage in the

state and communes, direct legislation through the people, restriction of women's and children's work, a statutory working-day, gratuitous education, abolition of indirect taxes, graded income-tax, a tax on inheritances, state aid to the co-operative system, with the right of the people to self-defence. Even within the trades-unions this tendency gained ground, and nothing remained for them but to go over to international socialism.

Then came the war, which completely paralyzed the socialist propaganda. On the motion for the war-loan, in July, 1870, Bebel



FIG. 128. — Deputy Liebknecht. From a photograph.

and Liebknecht (Fig. 128) made themselves conspicuous by withholding their votes. In November the Social Democrats voted against the new loan, and also, later, against the convention with South Germany and the titles 'emperor' and 'empire.' The magniloquent phraseology of republican France seemed to have captivated them, but the elections for the first German Reichstag resulted in the complete discomfiture of their party. The first

expedient tried by them to repair the disaster was unbounded glorification of the Commune. Hasselmann, one of their leaders, announced the near advent of the murderous class-conflict between labor and idleness, between capital and labor, toil and sensuality; and when Hasenclever called on his followers everywhere to celebrate March 18, the anniversary of the uprising of the Commune, the solidarity of German Social Democrats of every grade with the Communists was formally declared.

Now, for the first time, the aim of social democracy was openly avowed, — the subversion of all existing states with their



institutions, and the establishment of a new society, a new humanity, whose culminating point should be unconditional equality not only in legal and political rights but in respect of property. And the means employed for attaining this end was the inflaming of men's worst passions, through the press and speeches, at meetings and in unions, against the propertied and cultured classes, with dazzling pictures of the golden age to follow on communism's victory.

But nothing contributed more to the propagation of social democracy than the mania for wild speculation — for forming new companies and setting on foot great enterprises — consequent on the influx of the French indemnity, and the disastrous reaction following immediately thereon. As the former period was marked by reckless enhancement of wages, and gross sensual indulgence on the part of the workers, as well as by frequent strikes with their enforced idleness, the succeeding collapse resulted in general industrial and commercial paralysis, in stoppage of work, misery, and hunger. The severe distress suffered by the working-classes promoted the spread of Social Democracy with phenomenal rapidity. On the elections to the Reichstag of 1874 the party cast 340,000 votes, thus securing ten seats, and, in 1877, 490,000 votes. In this last year a Social Democrat appeared in the Saxon Landtag; in 1881, four. Here Bebel (Fig. 129) might be heard denouncing the church as the grand Obscurantist institution, and proclaiming the Social Democrats its declared enemies and atheists. The general Socialist congress held in Ghent in 1877, in which Germany was represented, renewed the international bond of the party. "Let the disinherited class of all lands," said its manifesto, "constitute itself into a great party sharply marked off from the bourgeoisie, and march forward hand in hand with the Socialists of all lands. The fight is for your rights and the annihilation of all privileges. Proletarians of every clime, shoulder to shoulder!" Half-educated as the leaders were, they thought themselves capable of remodelling, through wide-spread literary productivity, the science of socialistic democracy. The journeyman bookbinder, Most, daringly wrote an anti-Mommsen "History of Rome;" Bebel improved his compulsory leisure as a prisoner to compile a "History of the Peasants' War." His scandalous book, "The Position of the Woman," depicted an empire of the future in which there was to be no property, no government, no marriage, no family, no God, no fatherland, but in which the most seductive en-



joyments awaited the workingman. Yet however great the folly of such undertakings was, still greater was the folly of the dupes who implicitly swore to the words of their teachers.

Two attempts on the life of Emperor William I. (PLATE XXIII.), on May 11 and June 2, 1878, were caused, as was conclusively shown, by the class-hatred fomented by the socialist propaganda. This led the government to resume its attempt, made fruitlessly in the Reichs-



FIG. 129. — Deputy Bebel. From a photograph.

tag of 1875-76, to narrow somewhat the limits of an excessive and dangerous license. A 'Socialist law,' passed in the summer of 1878, empowered the government to declare all places in which public safety was threatened in a state of lesser siege, to limit the right of holding meetings, and to expel dangerous persons. The bill became law; and though its validity was at first limited to March 31, 1881, it was prolonged, on four separate occasions, to September 30, 1890.

PLATE XXIII.



Emperor William I.

From a photograph.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 430.*



The state of siege was renewed for Berlin annually ; in 1880 it was extended to Hamburg and Altona, and in 1881 to Leipsic.

So far was the Socialist Law from crushing out the inchoate anarchy, that it did not even check its spread ; it made it only somewhat less reckless. Its leaders, on recovering from their first panic, discovered means for superseding open agitation through secret. The deputies living in Leipsic constituted themselves into a provisional committee ; the propaganda was prosecuted by means of literature smuggled in from abroad, among which the Zurich "Social Democrat" and Most's wildly revolutionary *Freiheit* (published in London) held the most prominent place. A prosecution instituted in 1886 at Freiberg in Saxony against six members of the Reichstag and others showed that the object of the organization was to paralyze laws, and resulted, accordingly, in their imprisonment for several months. Even in Switzerland the Berlin police had detectives watching the 'comrades.'

These precautions were quite indispensable ; for the movement had now passed on to the stage of an anarchism that inscribed on its banners the motto, "Abolition of all restraint on the individual," and whose propaganda was 'the deed,' that is, assassination. The perfection now attained by explosives placed a terrible weapon in the anarchists' hands. In Frankfort-on-the-Main and Elberfeld-Barmen their association announced itself through explosions of dynamite, which the Zurich "Social Democrat" did not hesitate to approve. Vienna had been selected as one of their head-quarters ; and the violent robbery perpetrated in clear day on the shoemaker Merstallinger, in 1882, with the view of seizing means for the revolution, coupled with the murder of the policemen Hlubek and Blösch — announced long before in New York in Most's *Freiheit* — produced intense excitement amid the populace there. The perpetrators were seized, and their examination showed them guilty, not only of both these murders, but of others similarly motivated in Stuttgart and Strasburg. In Frankfort-on-the-Main, in January, 1885, police-councillor Rumpff fell under the dagger of an anarchist. But the most hideous of all their schemes was that to destroy the emperor and crown prince with dynamite on the occasion of unveiling the national memorial of victory on the Niederwald in September, 1883. Only the accident that the match that was to explode the mine was extinguished by rain saved their lives. The author of the scheme, a fanatic named Reinsdorf, was given over to condign punishment.



The 'Social Democrats' protested solemnly, indeed, against the idea that they were in any way associated with the anarchists; but their protest was virtually nullified when their leader did his utmost to rescue the seven Chicago anarchists from the death to which they were condemned. One consequence of the Niederwald attempt was the passage, on June 9, 1884, of the law against the use of explosives, known as the Dynamite Law.

This law, and still more the execution of the captured would-be assassins, gave the country rest from anarchy. The humane emperor and his chancellor regarded it as their highest duty to stimulate to the utmost the sanative influences of the appropriate civil and ecclesiastical institutions, and through this means to strengthen and confirm their young creation — the empire. But private endeavor was altogether inadequate to deal successfully with the deep-rooted evil. The school of political economy represented by Rodbertus, taking form in 1872, which — controverting the Manchester School's theory of the illegitimacy of state interference in industrial affairs — asserted the right of the monarchy to intervene in the interests of the economically weaker classes, made a deep impression on the mind of Bismarck. In accord with its views he recognized the duty of interference in three directions, — by direct care of and provision for the working-man; by promoting, through protection, native industry against foreign competition; and finally by lightening, as far as possible, the burden of taxation pressing on the poorer classes. "I do not believe," he said, "that the *laissez faire* policy of the pure Manchester School — with its dicta of 'let every man look out for himself;' 'who is not strong enough to stand must consent to go under;' 'to him who hath it shall be given, but from him who hath not shall be taken even that which he hath' — is compatible with a monarchical state ruled in a spirit of paternalism." In answer to the charge of socialism, he replied: "Many of our measures are somewhat socialistic, but the administration in our empire must accustom itself to something more of socialism."

A first step in this direction had been made in 1869, by the limitation of child-labor, the appointment of factory inspectors, and cognate paternal arrangements. Two years later came the law making employers responsible for accidents to their employés, which, however, was comparatively inoperative through the imposition on the injured parties — with the exception of railroad hands — of the extremely difficult task of proving that they had not been contributory

to their own hurt. The Relief Fund Law (*Hilfskassengesetz*) of 1876 compelled each operative to contribute to a sick-fund, but allowed him the choice of that to which he should pay in. But the government acted much more decidedly in his interest in the accident insurance bill of 1881 (which, however, did not become law until 1884), by which the state took the place of the local community in caring for the injured poor. This law provided for the insurance of operatives earning less than 2000 marks a year, injured in the pursuit of their callings, in an institution to be erected and administered by the state. The premium for persons earning over 750 marks annually was to be paid, half by the employé, half by the employer; workmen earning less were to be free from contributing, their share to be made up by the local poor board, by their particular state, or by the empire. The organization of the industrial sick-fund system in 1883 provided for those incapacitated through age or other disability. Bismarck, in the course of the debates over the accident insurance measure — specially affecting handicraftsmen — gave his assurance that it was his purpose to extend the principle to husbandmen. "The question is," said he, "whether it is the duty of the state to care for its helpless children or not. I maintain it is, and that, not of the Christian state only, but of every state. If any one object that this is socialism, I do not recoil before the charge. We have to ask how far the boundaries of legitimate socialism extend? Every law in behalf of the poor is socialism . . . Give the laborer employment as long as he is in health, assure him of nursing when he is sick, of care when he is old. If you are not alarmed at the sacrifices this entails, nor cry out 'State Socialism,' when any one speaks of caring for the old, I believe that the pipers of social democracy will pipe in vain, and that its ranks will be sorely thinned as soon as the toilers see that the governments and legislatures are in earnest in their care for their well-being."

On July 14, 1884, the imperial insurance office assumed material form. Bismarck's state socialism had won a victory that was to be made more complete in the next Reichstag. None the less the socialist congress meeting in Copenhagen unanimously adopted a resolution testifying that it had confidence neither in the purpose nor the ability of the ruling classes as regarded social reform, and expressing the conviction that their so-called reform was merely a tactical device to divert the minds of the working-classes from what should be their true aim. The object of these agitators was plain.

It was to convince the masses that no amelioration was to be looked for save through them. Nor was the effect of Bismarck's beneficent reforms on the minds of the working-classes what had been hoped for. Yet, besides the care for the artisan masses, the interests of the handicraftsmen, whose industries were more and more threatened with being swallowed up by capital with its great manufacturing establishments, were not neglected. That compulsory guilds were incompatible with modern industrial methods, and, though called for by many handicraftsmen, incapable of restoration,

was beyond question. Yet the law of 1882 for the institution of optional guilds had for its object the industrial and social elevation of this class by the promotion of its trade interests, as well as of a spirit of brotherhood and self-respect.

The next link in the chain of economic reforms was constituted by the transformation of Germany from a free trade to a protectionist nation. Bismarck, who long followed implicitly the teachings of the free-trade doctrinaire Manchester School of political



FIG. 130. — Deputy Eugen Richter. From a photograph.

economy, represented in Germany by Delbrück, was brought to assume a contrary position by three reasons: first, the desire to enable the empire, by giving it a large indirect revenue, to be free from the necessity of relying upon the contributions of the individual states; next, the conviction that indirect taxation is less burdensome than direct; and last, the depressed condition of German manufacture and agriculture, especially shown by Germany's inferior exhibit at the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition of 1876, which seemed to require some radical remedy. "Abstract scientific doctrines," the chancellor in 1877 declared, "leave me completely



cold; I decide in accord with the experiences we make. I see that the lands that are unprotected are on the downward path. We, according to my view, by reducing our tariff too low, were undergoing a process of depletion, temporarily checked, indeed, by the advent of the indemnity, but for which we would five years ago have been in the situation we are to-day. The question before us is in no wise political; it is purely economic. We have to restore our blood and its circulation to its normal condition." The cause of free trade was heatedly, and for the time successfully, espoused in the Reichstag by the Progressists, headed by Eugen Richter (Fig. 130). In the Reichstag of 1879 the conflict was resumed, and, through the aid of the Centre, a system of moderate protective duties was inaugurated. The efforts of Baron von Varnbüler (Fig. 131), former minister of Württemberg, were largely instrumental in winning this success, while Bismarck's part in the debate constituted the high-water mark of his parliamentary efforts. "We desire," said he in



FIG. 131. — Baron von Varnbüler. From a photograph.

opening the general debate, "moderate protection for native industry. Germany has hitherto been, through her door standing ever open, the dumping-ground for foreign over-production. This is the cause of our economical depression. Let us shut our door, and seek to create a German market for German labor." Measures passed in 1878 and succeeding years, levying internal revenue taxes on tobacco, playing-cards, etc., contributed to make the imperial government fiscally independent, and even to give it surpluses to share among the states.

All these measures combined to concentrate upon the chancel-



lor's head a tremendous storm of opposition, especially from those who feared that the new indirect taxes would make the government too powerful for the just influence of parliament. The cry, "Out with Bismarck," was heard on every hand. The Reichstag elections of 1881 — which were preceded by unparalleled agitation — resulted disastrously for the government. The Conservatives and National Liberals numbered together only 130; the seats lost by them falling to the Progressists, the Centre, the Guelfs, and even to the Social Democrats, the last word on all important questions being spoken by the Centre. No party was so loudly exultant as that of 'Progress,'




FIG. 132. — Deputy Bamberger. From a photograph.

Richter above all. The aim of this party was, as ever before, parliamentarism, with the consequent overthrow of the chancellor. "Parliamentarism," said Bamberger (Fig. 132), "implies nothing more than that government is the incarnate will of the majority of the people's representatives." — "Where, then, is your majority here," retorted the minister of finance, von Scholz; "how is it to maintain itself compact and permanent?"

Party disruptions such as we see in this house condemn your theory. I spurn the idea that a majority that has no *bona fide* existence shall prescribe to government the way in which it is to walk. Our government is not parliamentary; it is monarchical." The truth of von Scholz's taunt to the divided opposition was proved by their helplessness in this and succeeding Reichstags, despite their majority, to effect anything positive, or even to make any consistent and successful opposition to Bismarck's policy. They remained split up into numerous hostile petty groups or 'fractions;' though the death of Lasker (Fig. 133) in 1884 permitted his followers, the 'Secessionists,' to unite with the Progress-



PLATE XXIV.



Prince Bismarck. Marble bust by Reinhold Begas.

In the National Gallery at Berlin.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XIX., page 137.*

ists to form the 'German Advanced Liberals' (*Deutschefreisinnige*), a name of which Bismarck caustically said that it was most untrue, as the party was neither German nor liberal. "In a quarter of a century, I apprehend," said Bismarck (PLATE XXIV.) in the Reichstag in 1884, "parties and factions will be less in fashion, and a future Poschinger<sup>1</sup> will have a better condition of affairs to delineate. I base this belief on the character of the rising generation. Our youth now manifest a spirit of nationality and a conception of political life altogether more fervent and grander than were prevalent among my



FIG. 133. —Eduard Lasker. From a photograph.

compeers, who passed through 1847 and 1848 carrying with them party stains which they have not since been able to wash from their skins. Let us all be dead, and then it will be seen how Germany will burst into bloom. We are all too much imbued with partisan prejudices, and believe too much in the importance of an election

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Richter von Poschinger edited a work in four octavo volumes (1882-1888), entitled "Prussia in the Confederate Diet from 1851 to 1859," consisting mainly of Bismarck's reports from Frankfort, deposited in the royal archives, Berlin. It is a work of great historical value, and was published with Bismarck's sanction. — TR.



victory or of a party vote. But I have confidence in the German nation, and especially in its youth now studying, or who have studied, under the influences of the great age inaugurated by our emperor and his army, — a confidence that they will look back with the eyes of a Poschinger on the politics of to-day, and on the blindly selfish particularism of the ten or twelve party-factions now striving against each other. This is the hope in which I die easy.”

Not one of the predictions which the opposition fulminated against the new tariff was verified. The effects of the economic policy inaugurated by the customs-tariff of 1879 made themselves seen in the progressive development of the national prosperity. Contrary to expectation, however, the increased grain-duties remained without effect of any kind, whether as regarded the dreaded rise in the price of bread or in the promotion of agriculture. They proved duties for revenue only, yielding a considerable amount to the imperial treasury. But if any industry had a right to protection it appeared to be agriculture, whether as regarded the number of persons engaged in it, or the progressive decrease in the value of land, and corresponding increase of the mortgages which threatened to absorb it. The imperial government therefore made up its mind to make an attempt to aid it by a substantial heightening of the corn-duties. In this the radicals saw only a device for enriching the landed proprietary. Bismarck protested against any such interpretation: “as if the federal government had any other object in view than the protection of the entire property of the nation, of the poor as well as the rich. I am of opinion that we should devolve the burdens that our landed interest bears rather on the foreigner through duties than on our own land through taxes. I honestly regret the injury this may inflict on our friends in Hungary, Russia, and America; but every person is nearest to himself, and we must think of our own husbandmen before we exercise our minds with cares for the Hungarians.” In 1884 the triple duty on wheat and the double on rye were carried, while the tax on the importation of cattle was augmented.

Prussia now received from the empire, in the form of assignments out of the customs and tobacco-tax, some 20,000,000 marks; but, to make good the deficit in the state treasury, and to meet the urgent needs of the land through the rapid growth of communal and school burdens, at least 140 millions more were required. This sum, as well the means for covering the ever-growing military outlays,

Bismarck hoped to make up from the brandy monopoly, from which he looked for an income of at least 300 millions in excess of the present 53 millions derived from the spirit-tax. The opposition declaimed furiously against the chancellor's "schnaps-policy, timber-policy, and hog-policy." "You have charged," said Bismarck in reply, "that the monopoly schemes would make the state too strong, but I think that the younger among us will live to see the day when men will be looking around for a strong state." As the conservatives refrained from voting, the monopoly was almost unanimously rejected. In lieu of this project, the government, in 1887, brought in two bills for raising the duties on brandy and sugar, and both were passed. This rounded off the scheme of economic reform.

The same desire for the economic elevation of Germany prompted the imperial government to re-enter the so long neglected path of colonial policy. This movement, which Germany shared with other European states and which in its larger aspects resulted in an extraordinary colonial expansion, will be treated in our next volume.



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


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